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Preface 
This study describes and analyzes the marketing system for coffee and 
cocoa in Sierra Leone, during a period of transition from a state-controlled 
to a privatized marketing system. Agricultural marketing systems have been 
studied extensively, but little attention has been paid to the role of 
agricultural producers in such systems. In this work, we have tried to 
remedy this omission. 
The heart of this book is formed by the data collected in two extensive 
and intensive periods of fieldwork, carried out in the 1990/91 and 1992/93 
buying seasons for coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone. In March 1991, the 
rebel war broke out in our research area, and we were advised to leave the 
Eastern Province. The situation became too dangerous to stay. We had to 
wait for more than one year, before we were able to return to the Eastern 
Province. There is no doubt about the seriousness of the effects of the rebel 
war on this research. However, by adapting our research plan, we were 
able to continue our work and come up with substantial results. We thank 
the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research 
(WOTRO) for their patience and financial support. 
We are grateful for the encouragement and supervision of Prof. Dr. J.M.G. 
Kleinpenning, Dr. G. Peperkamp and Dr. H.L. Van der Laan, who gave us 
guidance in our work and stimulated us to continue our research. We also 
wish to thank Guus Debouillé, whose ideas greatly contributed to the early 
draft of the research proposal. 
In Sierra Leone, many people have made this book possible. First of 
all, our fieldwork assistants, Franklin Samai Kannen and Maquiston 
Mustapha Suaray, were of invaluable help in organizing our stay in the 
villages and in translating English and Mende. They deepened our insight 
in the local production and marketing circumstances, and they were also 
great companions. In Freetown, CARE International in Sierra Leone 
provided us with logistical support. Special mention deserves Abdul 
Ghandi, former project manager of CARE, who provided valuable ideas for 
our research. Mike Samura, director of the Boys' Society, offered us a 
home in Freetown, while we are grateful to the staff of the Pastoral Centre, 
Fr. Eugenio Montesi, Sr. Mary Breen, Sr. Judith Routier and Sr. Lois-Anne 
Bordowitz, for their hospitality in Kenema. With Abu Brima, national co-
ordinator of the Network Movement for Justice and Development, Fr. 
VI 
Augustine Combey and Sahr Gborie, we held interesting discussions and 
we thank them for helping us to understand the Sierra Leonean society. Of 
course we also received help from various other people who provided us 
with useful information or gave us access to the necessary data. They are 
mentioned in the list of informants. 
The excellent foundation for the drawing of the maps was done by 
Damiaan Vreman, the maps were finished by Frank Selbes. We very much 
appreciate the work of Judith Henderson on revising our English. 
Personal acknowledgements of the authors: 
Frank Sellies 
To concentrate yourself for about six years on an extensive research such 
as this, you need a supportive, stimulating and "listening" environment. 
Family and friends have given me this, and it was invaluable to have them! 
I hope they will like the result. 
Jos Wanders 
The years I spent working on this book have enrichened my life 
tremendously. Especially the time I was a guest of the farmers and their 
families in the Sierra Leonean villages. They taught me a lot about human 
values. Therefore, I am grateful to my parents who gave me this 
opportunity, and for all their care. Much love and support to finish this 
thesis came from Julie, who brought the spirits of Africa in our house. 
Finally, we like to dedicate this book to the people of Dama, Koya, 
Nongowa, Small-Bo and Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom, and thank them for 
their co-operation and hospitality. We sincerely hope that the results of this 
work will be of benefit to them and to their colleague farmers. 
November 1996, 
Frank Sellies 
Jos Wanders 
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1 
Research Background 
Frank Sellies and Jos Wanders 
This study deals with the functioning of the marketing system for coffee 
and cocoa in Sierra Leone during a period of transition from a state-
controlled marketing system towards a privatized marketing system. The 
main focus will be on the production and marketing conditions of 
especially small scale coffee and cocoa producers in this country. 
During the period characterized by a state-controlled marketing system 
the producers met several constraints which limited their marketing 
opportunities and put them in a vulnerable and dependent position within 
that marketing system. This study tries to reveal whether the transition 
towards a privatized marketing system leads to improved production and 
marketing conditions for these small scale producers and wants to answer 
the question what role the producers themselves played and can play in 
order to strengthen their position within that system. 
In section 1.1, we describe the relevance of this thesis on the 
marketing conditions for small scale producers in a period of transition 
from a state-controlled marketing system, towards a privatized marketing 
system. Based on section 1.1, we have formulated the research topic and 
its related objectives in section 1.2. The sequence of research steps and 
their methodological consequences, are summarized in section 1.3. In the 
last section of this chapter, we briefly outline the contents of the remaining 
chapters. 
1.1 Relevance of the research 
During the 1970s and 1980s, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa faced 
a severe economic recession. The average economic growth rates were 
declining and the disparity between national income and expenditure was 
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growing1. As most of the economies of these countries are dominated by 
the agricultural sector, the major problem has been the slow pace of 
agricultural development. In spite of slight increases of agricultural 
productivity, the agricultural production per head of the population has 
been decreasing. This has led to increased imports of food items and, 
together with declining world market prices for cash crops, to increasing 
balance of payment deficits. 
Initially, the governments in Sub-Saharan Africa dealt with the balance 
of payment deficits by increased borrowing, taxes on imports and 
restrictions on public expenditure. In spite of this, their creditworthiness 
deteriorated to such an extent that international borrowing became more 
difficult, and the subsequent restrictions on foreign exchange supply 
undermined economic performance. Furthermore, the national development 
strategies developed in the 1970s to improve the performance of the 
agricultural sector failed because of false assumptions. Modernization and 
technical innovations of agricultural production systems were then still seen 
as the force behind productivity increases. However, in reality, improved 
farming technologies have hardly been adopted by farmers because these 
technologies have not accounted for the conditions the farmers face when 
they cultivate their land and try to sell their products on the market. 
As a consequence, almost every country in Sub-Saharan Africa had to 
approach the international finance and development agencies, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, for balance of 
payment support2. To a large extent, they are still dependent on the credit 
facilities that these financial institutions offer. Consequently, most 
governments have been forced to agree with the conditions that IMF and 
World Bank have imposed on them by means of economic recovery 
programmes to address structural imbalances. The principal elements of 
these economic recovery programmes are the upgrading of public sector 
management, more efficient allocation of resources, institutional reforms 
and market liberalization. 
With regard to improving the productivity of the agricultural sector, 
market liberalization seems to be the central strategy within these economic 
recovery programmes. It is implemented by several measures. These 
1
 Although the average growth rates of low-income countries in the whole of 
Africa increased from 3.0 per cent in the period 1965-1973 to 4.0 per cent in 
1980-1987, the percentages for low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
decreased from 2.9 to -2.8 per cent for the same periods (World Bank, 1989). 
2
 Of the 51 countries which had received World Bank adjustment finance by the 
end of 1987.25 were situated in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kydd and Spooner, 1989). 
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include price liberalization, the promotion of the private sector, the removal 
of administrative controls and the reduction of the role of the state. In the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa which are highly dependent on export 
earnings derived from the sale of agricultural cash crops, this strategy has 
led to a transition from a state-controlled marketing system for agricultural 
export crops to the privatization of export trade. However, just as in the 
case of the development strategies of the 1970s based on modernization, 
one can question whether these economic recovery programmes really take 
the conditions into account that farmers face when they cultivate their land 
and try to sell their products on the market. It is, therefore, doubtful 
whether these macro-economic policies will have any effect on raising 
farmers' incomes as long as imperfections of the marketing systems, 
especially at the regional and local level, are not dealt with. The current 
emphasis on promoting private sector activities without first ensuring that 
prerequisites for a successful private sector are in place, leads to failures 
in adjustment policies. It is not only a matter of privatization. One also has 
to take steps to create conditions necessary to ensure the competitiveness 
of the private sector. These conditions are free entry into markets, free flow 
of market information, control of quality standards, access to credit and 
transport opportunities for private traders as well as for small producers. 
In this respect, the development discourse of recent years has focused 
upon the marketing conditions which define the possibilities and constraints 
for agricultural producers with regard to the sale of their agricultural 
products. Questions arise as to which type of marketing system is best: a 
system in which the state plays an important role, or a system which is 
dominated by free market forces; and what role should several types of 
traders play within the marketing system? Abbott (1987) discerns the pros 
and cons of different marketing forms as follows: private traders can take 
advantage of unforeseen opportunities and follow up new ideas, start up 
and maintain themselves on little capital and can operate at very low costs. 
Parastatale, on the other hand, can moderate supply and price fluctuations 
by creating buffer stocks or price stabilization funds. Moreover, such 
structures can obtain higher returns for producers because of better 
information on marketing and quality control. They often handle a system 
of guaranteed minimum prices, protecting producers, to a certain extent, 
from exploitation by traders (ibid.). 
Abbott is right not to give any preferred solution because it is not 
possible to generalize about different countries and different contexts. 
Imperfections found in the implementation of one of these forms under 
specific circumstances do not mean that the form is without value in a 
different context, a fact also acknowledged by Van der Laan (1989). So, 
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the ideal actor does not exist. The performance of several types of actors 
in the marketing system will not only be determined by the functions to be 
performed at a certain stage in the marketing process, but also by more 
specific circumstances, such as the transport situation, the degree of 
competition between traders and the reliability of government services. 
The development discourse about private versus state-controlled 
marketing systems has been dominated by economic approaches. Most 
research that has been done on this topic has focused on national pricing 
policies, its effects on raising farmers' incomes and the role traders play as 
agents of development (Bauer, 1954; Levi, 1976; Hesp, 1983; Bowbrick, 
1986; Abbott, 1987; Bates, 1988; Minster/Abco, 1993b; World Bank, 
1994b). Heated debates have arisen around the question whether private 
traders do or do not abuse the producers' dependency on their services. 
Some speak of traders as only taking a modest share from the trade, forced 
to do so in order to compensate for their own marketing costs and to be 
competitive (Donhauser, 1986; Lutz, 1986). Others speak of underpayment 
by traders exploiting producers by taking advantage of the producers' 
marginal position within the marketing system (Klomberg and van Riessen, 
1983; Aldworth and Wisniewski, 1987; Peperkamp 1990; CRS, 1991). 
However, from the producers' perspective, one can question the usefulness 
of these debates in finding ways to raise farmers' incomes and improve 
their position within the marketing system. Peperkamp (1990) is right when 
he concludes that what, in a purely financial sense, may seem to be only 
a reasonable remuneration for commercial services offered by the private 
trader, may mean underpayment and permanent debt to the small producer 
and may mean underexploitation of production factors in the long run to 
the national economy. 
So, it appears that the discussion so far has been dominated by the 
question as whether the national pricing policies and prices paid by traders 
are justified from the perspective of several types of traders. However, less 
attention has been paid to the same question from the perspective of the 
producers. Therefore, in order to contribute to the discussion about private 
versus state-controlled marketing systems and its benefits for the actors 
within the systems, one should include a study of the functioning of a 
marketing system from the producers' perspective as well. Within such a 
study, the main focus should be on the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
producers within the marketing systems, the producers' marketing 
behaviour and the marketing relations they have with several types of 
traders. 
We have conducted this type of study in Sierra Leone and concentrated 
on the question whether the privatization of the marketing system in Sierra 
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Leone led to significant changes in the relation between the producers and 
the different types of traders. More specifically, we have tried to find out 
whether small producers, since the privatization of the produce trade, 
received better prices for their products and found themselves in more 
favourable marketing conditions as compared to the period before. Or did 
this process not affect the position of the producers at all and did their 
marginal position within the system remain the same? 
To answer these questions, this research mainly focuses on the 
production and marketing conditions at the regional and local level, i.e. the 
marketing conditions in the coffee and cocoa producing areas. Within these 
areas mechanisms are at work which restrict the farmers' opportunities to 
improve their inferior position when selling their cash crops. It appears that 
less research has been done at the regional and local level to describe the 
marketing conditions of producers and to find ways to collect data about 
the actual prices paid by traders. This might be explained by the fact that 
researchers are discouraged by the tedious methods of data collection at 
grassroots level and the difficulties they face in finding valid methods to 
collect data about transactions between producers and traders (Chambers, 
1985). Although it is admittedly not easy to collect reliable data, especially 
with regard to prices actually received by farmers when selling their 
produce, there is no excuse for this type of research to be omitted. To 
collect reliable information about the functioning of the marketing system 
at regional and local level in general, and on financial transactions between 
traders and producers in particular, it is of utmost importance to understand 
the marketing conditions of large groups of producers and the constraints 
they face when selling their produce on the market. Several sources can be 
found in literature which deal with the level of actual producer prices at the 
regional or local level, although in many cases supportive data is minimal 
(Muntjewerff, 1982; Peperkamp, 1984; Hesp and Van der Laan, 1985; 
Bowbrick, 1986; Donhauser, 1986). To fill this gap, this study is based on 
field work at grassroots level conducted to collect data about prices 
actually received by producers and to describe whether their production and 
marketing conditions have changed under influence of the privatization 
process started at the national level. 
To conclude, this study describes the characteristics of the marketing 
system for coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone, the marketing conditions for 
the producers and how producers react in order to improve their position 
within the marketing system. Based on a better understanding of these 
marketing conditions at the local level, a differentiated policy can then be 
developed to improve producers' remunerations for cash crops and to 
improve the purchasing power of the rural population. Although this study 
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might provide incentives for similar research in other countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa that produce and export coffee and cocoa, we do not 
pretend that all conclusions and policy recommendations drawn from this 
case study will be of general use in other countries. As we stated before, 
there is no preferred solution, because it is not possible to generalize for 
different countries and different contexts. 
1.2 Research goals 
We formulated the following research questions, based on the previous 
section, which are also partly based on previous research done by the 
authors and other scholars from the Department of Human Geography of 
Developing Areas of the University of Nijmegen. 
1) Are the coffee and cocoa producers in Sierra Leone underpaid, and if 
so, what are the causes of underpayment? 
2) What measures can be taken in order to avoid or reduce 
underpayment and to improve the production and marketing conditions 
for these producers? 
Attention is given to the comparison of the period before and after the 
privatization of the produce trade in Sierra Leone since 1991. To answer 
the research questions we deal with the following research objectives: 
1) To describe the socioeconomic differentiation among coffee and cocoa 
producers 
To determine the marketing conditions of the coffee and cocoa producers, 
it is necessary to analyze the different socioeconomic circumstances which 
influence the farmers' production activities. For example, differences in the 
farmers' access to land, labour, capital and education might lead to 
different marketing opportunities and different marketing behaviour. 
2) To describe the marketing system of coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone 
To determine the marketing conditions of the coffee and cocoa producers, 
we describe the functioning of the marketing system of coffee and cocoa 
and the different actors involved in the purchase and sale of produce. 
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Emphasis will be laid on the changes which took place within the 
marketing system during the period of transition from a state-controlled to 
a privatized marketing system. 
3) To establish the level of underpayment 
We establish the level of underpayment in the different marketing 
conditions of the small producers. Underpayment is defined in two ways. 
For the period of state-controlled marketing, underpayment is described as 
being the phenomenon that producers receive prices for their coffee and 
cocoa which lie below the reference price, i.e. the official minimum 
producer prices set by the government. Since August 1991, the marketing 
of coffee and cocoa has been completely privatized, which means that 
traders and exporters of coffee and cocoa are free to set the producer prices 
themselves. For the latter period, underpayment is defined as the 
phenomenon that producers receive prices for their coffee and cocoa which 
lie below the reference price, i.e. leading producer prices they might have 
obtained when selling their produce in the urban trading centres in the 
producing areas. We will return to the conceptualization of underpayment 
in chapter 7. 
During the period of state-controlled marketing, the government 
appointed so-called Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) who should, according 
to the rules, have paid the official minimum producer prices. However, 
there were ample opportunities for LBAs, their subagents and itinerant 
petty traders, to underpay because there was no control on their buying 
practices (Peperkamp, 1984; Debouillé and Wanders, 1987). Several studies 
have tried to establish the level of underpayment of coffee and cocoa 
producers in Sierra Leone (Bolder et al., 1980; Klomberg and van Riessen, 
1983; Peperkamp, 1984; Donhauser 1986; Debouillé and Wanders, 1987; 
Heerschap and Koreman, 1991). The level of underpayment can, in several 
transactions, be partly explained by the marketing costs incurred by traders 
to purchase and sell the produce. However, studies of Winter (1981), 
Aldworth and Wisniewski (1987) and Peperkamp (1989) reveal that part 
of the level of underpayment can also be seen as usurious profit. In this 
respect, Debouillé and Wanders (1987) use the concept of "net 
underpayment" which takes the marketing costs and reasonable profit 
margins of traders into account. 
In this study, we try to find out whether underpayment still occurs 
since the buying season 1990/91. And if so, we try to gain insight into the 
variation of the level of underpayment. These variations depend, amongst 
other things, on the different production conditions of farmers and the 
8 Who Pays the Price? 
different types of traders the farmers choose to sell their produce to. 
4) To describe the causes for underpayment 
We make an inventory of factors that can serve as an explanation for 
underpayment when analyzing the functioning of the marketing system in 
areas with different production and marketing conditions. Furthermore, 
these factors will be related to the different socioeconomic positions of the 
producers. Previous studies in the coffee and cocoa producing areas of 
Sierra Leone have described the following factors as influences on the 
producers' opportunities to sell their produce and, consequently, the level 
of remuneration for their produce (Klomberg and van Riessen, 1983; 
Debouillé and Wanders, 1987; Peperkamp, 1990): 
Distance 
The first factor is formed by the distance between villages and buying 
stations. These buying stations are unevenly located within the coffee and 
cocoa growing areas and are mainly concentrated in the urban trading 
centres of the area. This, together with the high costs of public transport, 
limits the producers' ability to reach a buying station and often restricts 
their choice of trading partners to itinerant traders in their village. It 
appeared that the level of underpayment outside the urban trading centres 
is relatively more significant, which can only partly be explained by 
increasing costs of transport. 
Amount of produce 
The second factor that influences the level of payment is closely related to 
distance, namely the amount of coffee or cocoa sold by producers. 
Producers who have only small quantities of coffee or cocoa for sale, more 
often turn to an itinerant petty trader, and for that reason receive lower 
prices than larger producers. Producers with larger quantities for sale are 
better able to bear the burden of transport costs in order to reach an urban 
trading centre. Moreover, traders might be more interested to persuade 
farmers who have large amounts of produce for sale, to sell to them. This 
can also lead to better producer prices for farmers with large amounts of 
produce for sale. 
Credit relations 
The third factor concerns the type of credit relations the producers are 
involved in. In general, producers often need to borrow money or food to 
feed their family and to pay and feed the labourers who work in the coffee 
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and cocoa plantations. However, many credit suppliers expect the producer 
to sell part of his produce to the lender in return. Sometimes they agree in 
advance on the amount of produce to be repaid in exchange for certain 
amounts of money or food to be borrowed. This might lead to usurious 
interest rates and, hence, decreasing remuneration for their produce. 
Moreover, it may place severe restrictions on the producers' options to 
choose a trading partner. 
Social relations 
Next to credit relations, the producers might also be restricted in their 
choice of trader because of social relations. Within the village 
communities, producers and traders are often members of the same 
extended family and might face the obligation to sell produce or lend 
money from traders belonging to the same family. Furthermore, producers 
might sell their produce for years to the same trader because he helps them 
when they are in need or because of friendship. Sometimes farmers decide 
to sell their produce to a particular trader to become his friend in return for 
help, usually credit, when necessary. 
Education 
The last factor mentioned in the previous studies is the lack of education 
of the producers and the lack of access to information about the current 
produce prices and weighing procedures when selling their produce. Most 
producers are satisfied just to receive money for their produce and are not 
aware whether or not they are receiving the correct amount of money for 
the produce they sold. 
This study describes in how far these factors and other factors mentioned 
by the farmers played a role in their decision where and to whom to sell 
their produce. Consequently, the farmer's choice of trader affects the price 
he receives for his produce. 
5) To describe the farmers' reactions and government policies 
The last research objective is to describe how producers react to the 
changing marketing conditions during the period of privatization of the 
produce trade. Furthermore, we assess the measures that have been taken 
recently by government, development organizations and farmers' 
organizations to diminish the imperfections of the marketing system at the 
regional and local level for the benefit of the producers. 
In this respect, special attention is paid to the results of the Village 
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Marketing Project, which has been carried out from 1986 until 1992 by the 
international Non-Govemmental Organization (NGO) CARE (Co-operative 
for American Relief to Everywhere), in co-operation with the government 
of Sierra Leone. The project's main objective was to establish village-based 
Marketing Centers, run by local farmers' associations in some of the main 
coffee and cocoa producing areas. Furthermore, it wanted to offer 
producers opportunities to sell their produce at the local level to LBAs, 
selected by themselves and later on to the larger private buying agents. In 
addition, by using the Centers as food and credit distribution channels, it 
was thought that producers would be less dependent on middlemen and, 
hence, would receive a higher remuneration for their produce. 
Furthermore, this study pays special attention to one specific initiative 
taken by the producers themselves, to react to the imperfections of the 
regional produce buying system, namely the formation of farmers' co-
operatives at chiefdom level. These co-operatives, as a union, formerly 
acted as a LBA, but are now a private trading company. They purchase 
produce from their members and export the produce on their behalf. It 
appeared that producers selling their produce to either co-operatives or 
farmers' associations, received higher remunerations for their produce 
compared to producers selling produce elsewhere (Heerschap and Koreman, 
1991). However, one can question whether these initiatives indeed brought 
significant improvement to the marketing conditions of all the producers. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether all producers are able to change their 
marketing behaviour and sell their produce to such new marketing 
associations, because of their socioeconomic position and dependency 
relations with several other types of traders. 
These approaches are necessary but insufficient measures to eliminate 
certain imperfections of the marketing system. More differentiated policy 
measures may be required which account for the different spatial and 
socioeconomic circumstances the producers find themselves in when 
producing and selling their produce. In addition, it may not be sufficient 
to concentrate only on development efforts which are made to bring about 
changes in the produce buying system and to raise prices of coffee and 
cocoa for the benefit of the producer. The marketing system and its 
deficiencies should be studied within the broader context of the 
socioeconomic circumstances of the producers and the limitations these 
circumstances create for the marketing opportunities of producers. 
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13 Research methodology 
The following research steps and methods have been used to gather 
relevant primary and secondary data to answer the research questions. 
To collect primary data about the functioning of the marketing system 
for coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone and the role producers and traders 
play within the system, the authors carried out fieldwork in Sierra Leone, 
more specifically in the coffee and cocoa producing areas in the Eastern 
Province, in the period November 1990 until June 1991, and September 
1992 until July 1993. The choice of these periods was determined by the 
occurrence of the produce buying seasons for coffee and cocoa. The buying 
season for cocoa generally starts in September and ends in March. The 
buying season for coffee starts in December and ends in June. To describe 
and analyze the functioning of the production and marketing system of 
coffee and cocoa, we collected primary data by making use of both 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, such as unstructured 
interviews, standardized questionnaires and observation techniques. 
1.3.1 Selection of research area 
Maps 4.1 and 4.2 show the main coffee and cocoa producing areas in the 
Eastern and Southern Provinces of Sierra Leone and the area the authors 
selected to carry out the research. In order to analyze the influence of 
production levels on the marketing conditions for producers, the authors 
selected a research area which can be divided into smaller areas, differing 
according to the suitability of the land to grow coffee or cocoa. 
In order to analyze and compare the different levels of accessibility of 
the villages and the consequences on the marketing opportunities for 
producers within the selected research area, we selected 34 villages. When 
selecting the villages, we also took into account the distance to the urban 
trading centres and the presence of Village Marketing Centers. This 
selection enabled us to classify the villages into different categories 
according to their degree of accessibility. An accessibility index has been 
developed, which is not only based on absolute distance, expressed in 
miles, but also on relative distance, related to the condition of the roads 
leading from the villages to the buying centres, as well as the means of 
transport available to the farmer, to convey their produce to the main 
centres. The accessibility index is discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
To conclude, based upon the above-mentioned criteria, the selected 
research area covers five chiefdoms in the Kenema District in Eastern 
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Dama 
Koya 
Nongowa 
Small-Bo 
Kandu L.' 
high 
low 
high 
high 
low 
high 
low 
high 
low 
low 
none 
none 
(Cenema 
Blama 
none 
Province. For every chiefdom, table 1.1 gives an overview of the 
production levels, the location of an urban trading centre within its 
boundaries, and the number of Village Marketing Centers. 
Table 1.1 The characteristics of the research area 
Chiefdom Production level Urban trading centre Village Marketing 
Coffee Cocoa Center 
1 
1 
6 
1 
4 
* Kandu Leppiama. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
1.3.2 Data collection at grassroots level 
Besides literature study and interviews with key persons at governmental 
institutions, NGOs and private trading companies, a farmers' questionnaire 
and a traders' questionnaire have been conducted. The authors stayed and 
lived together with the villagers for about two weeks in every selected 
village, not only to conduct the interviews but also to gain confidence from 
the farmers and to observe daily aspects of their farming life, which might 
illustrate or explain some of the factors determining their production or 
marketing conditions. 
Selection of respondents 
To select the respondents for the farmers' questionnaire, we used a 
stratified random sampling technique. A random sample was taken from a 
group of farmers who actually cultivated coffee or cocoa. Another random 
sample was taken from a group of farmers who did not have a coffee or 
cocoa farm or who had only young coffee or cocoa plantations that did not 
yield yet. The respondents were selected during village meetings held on 
the first evening of our arrival in the village. The intention of these village 
meetings was to explain the purpose of our visit and to have general 
discussions about the problems the farmers face when cultivating and 
marketing their cash crops. The number of farmers to be selected per 
Research Background 13 
village depended on the number of farmers inhabiting the village . 
A sample percentage of 30 per cent was taken with a minimum of five 
respondents and a maximum of 15 respondents per village. Before we 
interviewed these respondents, we organized a short interview with the 
Town Chief and his elders to get more acquainted with the general 
characteristics of the village and the specific production and marketing 
conditions for cash crops, as well as food crops. Moreover, in case the 
Town Chief and his elders would not have been selected for the 
questionnaires, we could thus prevent any form of embarrassment or 
offence for not selecting them. 
The fanners' questionnaire 
The farmers' questionnaire consisted of both standardized and open 
questions. We applied the standardized interview method to questions 
relating to quantitative data, such as household size, farm size and 
production figures. The open interview method was applied to producers' 
perceptions and reasons for certain issues, such as the choice of a certain 
type of trader and the increase or decrease of production yields. 
Originally, we planned to visit each selected village twice. The first 
time during the buying season 1990/91, and the second time during the 
season 1992/93. Our initial plan was to analyze possible changes in 
marketing opportunities and behaviour of the producers. Moreover, because 
interviewer and respondent would be more acquainted with each other after 
the first visit, more delicate questions would then be posed about the 
respondents' marketing behaviour and their willingness to co-operate in 
measurement tests of sales transactions. However, due to security problems 
in the country, we had to adapt this plan4. 
We visited 18 villages in 1990/91 and 27 villages in 1992/93. From 
the 18 villages visited during the first period, 12 were also visited in the 
second period. In total, 248 small scale farmers were interviewed in 
1990/91, of whom 203 cultivated coffee or cocoa and actually sold produce 
that buying season. In 1992/93, we interviewed 375 small scale farmers, of 
3
 The Central Statistics Office provided us with the population figures of the 
selected chiefdoms and villages. The figures were based on the Population 
Census held in 1985. 
* Due to a rebel incursion, starting in March 1991 from the border with Liberia, 
a part of our research area was affected and had to be left out of the original 
research plan. Instead, we selected another area which had not been affected by 
the incursions and which showed similar conditions for the production and 
marketing of coffee and cocoa. 
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whom 305 cultivated coffee or cocoa and actually sold produce that 
particular buying season. In total, 120 farmers have been interviewed both 
in 1990/91 and in 1992/93. 
Since the knowledge of the authors of the local language (Mende) is 
rather limited, we made use of local fieldwork assistants to conduct the 
interviews. These people normally worked for the Central Statistics Office 
and had experience in primary data collection and were familiar with the 
aspects of the production and marketing of cocoa and coffee. In 
collaboration with the fieldwork assistants, we compiled and tested the 
survey to eliminate misinterpretations of questions and to test their validity. 
Apart from their translation work, the fieldwork assistants were invaluable 
in helping to obtain research permission from regional and local authorities 
and to organize the fieldwork and to make introductions in the villages. 
Traders ' questionnaire 
The farmers' survey also revealed a list of the types of traders the farmers 
sold their produce to. Based on the lists that were compiled in every village 
after conducting the farmers' survey, we selected, at random, several 
traders to be interviewed. To interview the traders, we designed a 
structured questionnaire with standardized and open questions. The majority 
of those traders living in the same village in which we conducted the 
interviews with the farmers, had no objection to being interviewed as a 
trader. To interview the traders in surrounding villages, we first had to 
approach the village authorities to ask permission. In total we interviewed 
105 traders. 
1.3.3 Measurement of transactions 
A central issue of this research is to describe and analyze the transactions 
that take place between different types of producers and traders under 
different marketing conditions. To answer the question whether producers 
receive the correct remunerations for their produce according to the actual 
weight and the reference price, i.e. the current producer price per pound at 
the moment of transaction, the authors used several methods to collect 
information about the way transactions are being carried out. So far, 
grassroots level research in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa, to 
describe the functioning of the marketing system at local level for coffee 
and cocoa, and especially to gather data about the financial aspects of 
transactions, has been limited. Many studies dealing with the pros and cons 
of a marketing system often lack empirical evidence from the grassroots 
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level, to underline their conclusions. Although a few scientists attempted 
to collect data about actual prices paid by traders for coffee and cocoa, 
most of them, except for Donhauser (1986), gathered price information by 
interviewing producers and traders only. Donhauser gathered price 
information about completed transactions at the markets, by interviewing 
farmers about the prices they had just received for their produce. Although, 
in the latter case, the problem of memory recall is limited, one may 
question whether farmers are willing to inform strangers about the prices 
they just received5. Moreover, one has to rely on the farmers' ability to 
indicate the exact amount of produce they sold. Although these methods 
can provide us with useful indications about the level of prices being paid, 
other methods should be tested to find ways to improve the reliability of 
the data. In this study, we used the following methods to obtain 
information about the transactions between producer and trader. 
Observation of transactions 
First of all, we asked the farmers we interviewed whether they were 
intending to sell coffee or cocoa at the time we would be present in the 
villages. Those who had plans to sell their produce, we asked whether they 
would like to co-operate in a test, to see whether they received a 
reasonable remuneration for their produce. To stimulate them to co-operate, 
we offered them a small financial reward for their co-operation. In total, 
out of 305 farmers who cultivated coffee or cocoa, 58 were about to sell 
produce at the time we visited their village and were willing to co-operate. 
Before they sold their produce, we weighed, in the presence of the farmer 
only, the amount of produce to be sold. Then, the farmers were asked to 
sell their produce and to inform us on the transport costs to the buyer, the 
way the buyer weighed the produce, the weight stated by the buyer and the 
amount of money received. Most farmers were willing to co-operate and 
were curious to know whether their produce had been correctly weighed 
and whether they had been correctly paid according to the weight and the 
prevailing producer prices. It appeared to be a quite accurate method to 
obtain reliable price information, because the farmers had no objection to 
informing us about this part of their income and because they were 
acquainted with our presence in the village. This method avoids the 
5
 Johnny (1985) carried out a test for the reliability of fanners memory recall, 
regarding data related to farm sizes in Sierra Leone. He concluded that recall 
data of farm sizes underestimated the data obtained by field measurement by 25 
to 30 per cent. 
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problem of memory recall by asking the farmers to inform us immediately 
after completing their transaction. 
Comparison of prices in the urban trading centres 
Secondly, the authors carried out a test in the main urban trading centres, 
to compare the measurement procedures and the prices paid for coffee or 
cocoa by several types of traders, mainly regional wholesalers. Several 
times during the buying season for coffee and cocoa, a visit was paid to 
marketing co-operatives in Kenema and Blama, the largest urban trading 
centres in the research area. The aim of these visits was to discuss the 
marketing activities of the co-operatives and their role within the CARE 
Village Marketing Project. Because we were well known and regular 
visitors of their stores and because these test also provided them with 
valuable information on current prices paid by their competitors, the co-
operatives were willing to assist in carrying out this test. We weighed a 
certain amount of produce at their stores and asked the staff to select a 
literate member farmer who was present at the store at the time, and who 
was prepared for a small financial reward to carry out this test for us. The 
farmer was asked to go around in town with the produce and ask all types 
of traders to weigh their produce and state the price they would offer. For 
every test, someone else was asked to go around, in order to prevent 
suspicion among the traders. This resulted in ten test cases providing us 
with reliable data about differences in weight and current producer prices. 
Respondents' last transaction 
The third option used to collect data about transactions was to pose 
questions concerning the last transaction farmers had been involved in. 
However, the information obtained in this way has to be treated with care, 
because this method is less reliable than the other methods. Farmers do not 
have written accounts of their transactions and might have difficulties 
remembering the exact amount of produce they sold and the amount of 
money they received6. The majority of the farmers could remember their 
last transaction which, in most cases, took place in the same season they 
were interviewed. Most of them could indicate in which month or even on 
which day the transaction took place and, more or less precisely, the 
6
 Chapter 6 will show that the producers and the traders use a wide range of 
conventional and non-conventional (or traditional) measurement units to weigh 
the produce, which makes it difficult to convert the weight into one standard 
measurement unit. 
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amount of produce they sold and the amount of money they received. 
Identical to the latter method to indicate producer price levels are the 
interviews conducted among several types of traders. Among others, 
questions were posed about the amount of cocoa and coffee they purchased 
during their last transaction and the price they paid for the produce. Most 
traders had no objection to stating the price they paid per pound or per pan 
but they were more reluctant to disclose prices paid for larger amounts of 
produce7. 
By interviewing both traders and producers, we gathered information 
on 452 transactions for cocoa and 379 transactions for coffee for the 
buying seasons 1990/91 up to 1992/93. As with the price information 
obtained from the farmers' questionnaires, we will present these data with 
care because of reliability problems. 
1.3.4 Co-operation of respondents 
Experiences from various studies in Sierra Leone indicate that it is not an 
easy task to ensure the co-operation of the research population. Potential 
respondents might be suspicious about the motives of the researcher and 
the purposes to which the information will be used. Furthermore, there is 
doubt about the benefits the research might bring to them (Spencer, 1972; 
Johnny, 1979). The suspicion and doubt will be aggravated when delicate 
issues, such as production figures, credit arrangements and prices are 
involved. People may hesitate to provide this type of information because 
of their experience that this, as in previous times, could lead to higher 
taxes. Moreover, they might be reluctant to disclose their income because 
they do not want relatives to be aware of it and, consequently, being asked 
to share it with them. 
In order to promote the willingness of producers and traders to co-
operate and to take away suspicion and doubt, we took the following 
measures. As well as obtaining research permission from district 
authorities, emphasis was laid on introducing ourselves to the Paramount 
Chiefs of the several chiefdoms where the research would be carried out. 
The support of the local village authorities was guaranteed when we could 
7
 A traditional method to weigh and to indicate the price of a certain amount of 
produce is the use of the three-pence pan. This is a tin bowl, available in 
different sizes, used by producers to estimate the amount of produce and used 
by traders to indicate the price per pan of produce. Chapter 6 will discuss the 
pros and cons of the use of this type of measurement unit as compared to other 
types. 
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handover to them the letters of recommendation we had obtained from the 
Paramount Chiefs. During the village meetings, quite some time was spent 
explaining the motive of our visit and to convince the farmers that this 
research was, first of all, designed to find ways to improve their marketing 
opportunities which might be of personal benefit to them. Also the role 
farmers themselves could play in order to improve their standards of living 
would be dealt with. Special attention was paid to ensure that the 
interviews could be held without interference to guarantee the respondent's 
privacy. 
1.4 Outline of the book 
In chapter 2, this study is placed within a theoretical perspective of the 
commercialization process in the agricultural sector of developing 
countries. Attention is focused on the role of marketing in agricultural 
commercialization and the discourse about the role of state intervention and 
private initiatives in the produce trade. Furthermore, this chapter 
emphasizes the process of incorporation of small scale farmers into a 
market economy and their resistance to it by means of group organization. 
The first part of chapter 3 presents a general description of Sierra 
Leone, with emphasis on the effects of the structural adjustment 
programmes on the economy. The second part describes our research area 
in Eastern Province. 
After a brief introduction of the agricultural production systems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in general, chapter 4 describes the main agricultural 
production systems in Sierra Leone. Chapter 5 focuses on the coffee and 
cocoa production system and the socioeconomic differentiation among the 
producers in our research area. 
In chapter 6, we outline the marketing system for coffee and cocoa in 
Sierra Leone in general. Emphasis is laid on the changes that occurred in 
the produce trade since the introduction of these cash crops in Sierra 
Leone, especially the transition of a state-controlled marketing system to 
a privatized one at the end of the 1980s. 
In chapter 7, we tum to the regional level of the marketing system and 
describe the marketing infrastructure of the research area and the types of 
traders involved in the produce trade. In the last section of this chapter we 
present the results of the measurement of transactions between producers 
and traders. An analysis is made in how far the farmers are underpaid by 
different types of traders. 
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Chapter 8 focuses on the marketing behaviour of the farmers. The 
choice of trading partner and the location of transactions is analyzed. 
Furthermore, attention is given to the factors which may explain their 
choice of trader. 
Chapter 9 discusses two development strategies to improve the 
farmers' bargaining position and to enlarge their opportunities to sell their 
produce to the highest bidder. The first section analyzes the new co-
operative initiatives that have been taken to organize farmers to empower 
them in the production and marketing of produce. The second section deals 
with the CARE Village Marketing Project, as an attempt to improve the 
marketing facilities for coffee and cocoa farmers. 
In chapter 10, we outline the main conclusions of this study. To end, 
we present some considerations and proposals for policy measures to create 
better marketing opportunities for the farmers, which may enable them to 
profit from the privatization of the produce trade. 
2 
General Observations on the Role of Public, Prívate 
and Co-operative Marketing in Rural Development 
Frank Seilies and Jos Wanders 
Rural development is considered by most scientists and policy makers to 
be a process of change in rural areas leading to better living conditions and 
a greater security of existence for the people (Collinson, 1972; 
Greenshields and Bellamy, 1983). A central aspect in this process is the 
increase in agricultural production. However, there are wide differences in 
policy approaches how to achieve this objective. 
The increase in production often concentrates on the commercialization 
of the agricultural sector. This sector provides employment and income for 
the majority of the rural population. Moreover, higher production will lead 
to the sale of surpluses for the domestic or export markets. However, 
whether this process will also automatically lead to improved living 
conditions for all people in the rural areas is subject of heated debates. 
Section 2.1 places the present study in a broader theoretical context, 
emphasizing the discussion of the consequences of commercialization of 
the agricultural sector for the living conditions of the people in rural areas. 
In most Third World countries the role of the state in the development 
process is dominant. Government policy, and especially agricultural policy, 
is a crucial factor in determining production and living conditions in rural 
areas. Since African countries acquired political independence, most of 
them in the 1960s, their governments have expressed their intentions to 
stimulate agricultural commercialization by means of cash crop cultivation 
for both domestic and export markets. The organization and functioning of 
national and regional markets was greatly influenced by interventionist 
policies of governments. These policies were comprised of trade and price 
regulations to guarantee remunerative prices to farmers, in order to assure 
them of an improved level of living and to stimulate them to produce more 
agricultural produce for domestic and export purposes. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, rural development has been, to a 
large extent, determined by neo-classical economic theory. The advocates 
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of this theory, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, emphasize the liberalization of trade in general, and marketing 
structures in particular. As a consequence, African economies, mainly 
dependent on credit facilities offered by IMF and World Bank, had to 
accept structural adjustment programmes based on neo-classical economic 
thinking. One of the measures imposed on African economies has been the 
privatization of state enterprises. In the agricultural sector the most obvious 
target for that privatization drive has been the privatization of the purchase 
and sale of produce at national and sub-national level. 
In section 2.2, therefore, we discuss the role marketing plays in the 
process of agricultural commercialization. This discussion concentrates 
mainly on the debate about the role of the state and private traders within 
a marketing system. Analysis of the functioning of a marketing system 
often defines the role of the state and the several types of traders within the 
system from an economic perspective. However, less attention has been 
paid to non-economic circumstances which also influence the way in which 
different actors function in the marketing system. Every type of marketing 
system has its own characteristics, advantages as well as disadvantages, 
which occur under specific conditions (Abbott, 1987). 
Furthermore, the functioning of a marketing system should be 
evaluated from both the traders' perspective as well as the producers' 
perspective. In order to analyze a certain type of marketing system and to 
answer the question whether there should be more state intervention or 
more space for private initiative, it is not sufficient to determine the role 
of traders only. Analysis of the role of producers who have became an 
incorporated or integrated part of a certain marketing system, is by 
necessity, a complementary part of the analysis in order to give a full 
understanding of the functioning of a marketing system. 
By taking as the subject of our study, the marketing of agricultural 
export crops in Sierra Leone, which experienced in recent years the 
transition of state controlled marketing towards the privatization of export 
trade, we endeavour to show that neither state intervention nor private trade 
are the ultimate solutions for acquiring an effective marketing system as an 
instrument to bring about rural development. 
In the last section, we describe the ways in which producers may react 
under certain marketing conditions and what initiatives they may develop 
to improve their bargaining position within a given marketing system. The 
example of marketing co-operatives is presented as a suitable instrument 
to improve the marginal marketing position of farmers, emanating from the 
unequal power relations with the other actors in the system. 
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2.1 Commercialization of the agricultural sector 
Rural development is a broad and complex concept with a wide range of 
definitions and opinions around the central theme. In most views, the 
increase of agricultural production in rural areas as a driving force towards 
the improvement of the living conditions of the rural people, occupies a 
central place in the definitions and concepts. Agriculture is recognized as 
the major source of employment and income for the majority of people in 
developing countries. It is this fact that has led to a focusing on the 
development of the agricultural sector. However, when compared to the 
industrial sector and the service sector, its importance is not followed by 
a more or less equal share in total production. Many scientists explain this 
by stressing the low level of productivity and the largely subsistence nature 
of the agricultural sector. They, therefore, regard the expansion of a 
market-oriented agricultural sector as the foundation for a more general 
development policy (for example, van Lindert, 1979; Hinderink and 
Sterkenburg, 1987). Increases in agricultural production concentrate on the 
intensification and commercialization of agriculture, which in tum lead to 
the sale of surpluses for the domestic or export markets. Whether this 
process automatically leads to improved living conditions for all people in 
rural areas is subject to debate. 
Divergent opinions abound regarding the function of the extension of 
a commercialized agricultural sector as a means to achieving rural 
development in general and in Africa in particular. Opinions correspond to 
two broad categories of development theory; the modernization or 
technical-economic approach on the one hand, and the political-economic 
approach on the other. 
2.1.1 Modernization approach 
Supporters of the modernization approach argue that the problem of 
underdevelopment is a matter of mainly quantitative differences between 
the level of development of the industrialized countries in the North and 
the developing countries in the South (for instance, Johnston and Nielsen, 
1966; Baum, 1968; Ruthenberg, 1968; Greenshields and Bellamy, 1983). 
To bridge this gap in levels of development one needs to stimulate the 
process of agricultural commercialization. They interpret rural development 
as equal to the growth of agricultural output. Production increases have to 
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be achieved through better allocation of resources on existing farms or by 
bringing new areas under cultivation. The emphasis is on commercial crops 
for export, or on a combination of export crops and food crops for the 
domestic market. The improvement and expansion of physical infrastructure 
is considered to be an important precondition for output growth. It is 
assumed that higher production and increased productivity will raise 
incomes of farmers. Their main assumption is that commercialization and 
economic growth will lead automatically to rural development by means 
of the so-called "trickling down" effects of benefits to other segments of 
the rural society in the long run. 
Within this approach, the main aspect is the reorientation of resources 
from subsistence to market-oriented production. Commercialization in this 
approach is used as a synonym for modernization and development. The 
economic history of western countries and the stages of growth they 
experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth century serve as an example. 
It is assumed that the development of agriculture and the economy in 
general in developing countries could follow the same path as that of the 
western countries in the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
In this view, the traditional African societies have long been 
characterized as regions with static economies lacking market principles 
and with a primitive subsistence agriculture based on simple modes of 
production. It was commonly believed that Sub-Saharan Africa took on its 
development process only after the territorial occupation by western 
countries at the end of the nineteenth century. As Ruthenberg remarks: 'It 
might well be expected that the take-off in smallholder development, which 
began with coffee, would facilitate the introduction of innovations' (1968, 
p. 217). 
As a variant of the economic-technocratic approach, the psychological 
approach can be considered. The focus of attention of the representatives 
of this stream of thought is on the promotion of the so-called "innovation 
diffusion" (Rogers, 1962 and 1966). Their main assumption is that lack of 
entrepreneurial abilities, traditional values and apathy of the agricultural 
producers are considered as barriers to development. Their main objective 
is to teach farmers to accept western techniques and ideas. Once the change 
of behaviour is established, then the farmer will be willing to leave his 
traditional path, and be willing to try the western techniques in his 
production process. 
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2.1.2 Political-economic approach 
Supporters of the political-economic approach (for instance, Saul and 
Woods, 1971; Leys, 1975; Szentes, 1976; Amin, 1990) emphasize the 
relationship between the incorporation of pre-capitalistic societies in a 
world-wide, predominantly capitalistic system and the current level of 
underdevelopment. Kleinpenning (1991, p. 1) defines incorporation as 
'processes through which more or less independent entities or units are 
made part of a greater and often more complete order.' Furthermore, 
according to Kleinpenning (ibid.), incorporation is 'the result of differences 
in power between the parties or entities involved. It refers to developments 
which are imposed from above and/or from outside, and negatively affect 
the incorporated unit or people in some way, e.g. subordination and 
dependency1.' 
For Africa, this approach emphasizes historical developments. 
Traditionally, Africa was marked by autonomous social formations based 
on long distance trade and dynamic centres of commerce. During the 
mercantile period (1600-1800), however, Africa became a peripheral part 
of the world trade system. The autonomous development of African 
societies in the pre-mercantile period was replaced and modelled by the 
requirements coming from outside, i.e. the demand for cheap labour 
(slaves) and cheap agricultural products. These acted as engines for the 
industrialization process in Europe and North America and responded to 
the demands of overseas markets to sell manufactured goods from the 
North. 
The incorporation of Sub-Saharan Africa into the world economy 
during the colonial period caused a profound transformation of the social 
and economic structure of the African societies. According to Amin (1973), 
the role of the colonial states was to organize the conditions of exploitation 
of labour and land in order to supply the industry in the advanced, 
capitalist countries with cheap raw materials. The means used to organize 
this colonial economy in favour of the industrialized countries were: 
1) the organization of a dominant trade monopoly of colonial import-
1
 Kleinpenning uses the same définition for incorporation as well as for 
integration. However, in his view, integration has a more positive connotation. 
'Integration refers to a development which is considered entirely or almost 
entirely positive for the parties involved, particularly for the weaker one' 
(Kleinpenning, 1991, p. 1). 
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export houses with Lebanese traders occupying the intermediate zones 
of the trade network in which the African traders were relegated to the 
subordinate positions; 
2) the taxation of African farmers which forced them to produce what the 
monopolists offered to buy and which, later on, forced them to accept 
the price trading houses were willing to pay for the produce the 
farmers offered for sale; 
3) political support to local Chiefs and other social groups allowing them 
to appropriate land and to develop these lands into commercial 
plantations using paid labour from inland territories, and: 
4) recourse to administrative coercion, such as forced labour and 
compulsory cultivation of export crops (Amin, 1973). 
However, this did not lead to a complete transformation of the African pre-
capitalistic economies into modem capitalistic ones, but to a partial 
commercialization of agriculture. Most African farmers continued to grow 
crops for their own consumption and at the same time produced cash crops 
for the market. The establishment of an externally oriented production 
structure primarily based on the development of the export sector appeared 
to be highly profitable for capitalistic investments due to the continuing 
existence of the subsistence sector. The wages for hired labour and the 
prices for the marketed output could be kept at a low level and, 
consequently, the profit rates in the capitalistic sector could be maintained 
at a high level. It is this specific role which the colonial trade economy had 
to fulfil for the development of the capitalist countries by shaping the 
circumstances which would be profitable for the capitalistic sector. The 
capitalistic mode of production has partially destroyed and transformed the 
pre-capitalistic modes of production in the peripheral social formations, but 
at the same time maintained them (van Lindert, 1979). 
In this context, Saul and Woods (1971) describe this transformation 
process as a partial but incomplete commercialization of the agricultural 
sector where "primitive agriculturalists" in pre-capitalistic African societies, 
under the influence of the incorporation into a capitalistic world economy, 
become peasants. They define peasants as those farmers who are dependent 
on their own food production produced with family labour but who are, 
due to the incorporation in a market system, also forced to acquire a cash 
income. The extent to which peasants could respond to cash cropping 
depended on the adaptability of the traditional agricultural system to the 
incorporation of new crops without threatening the security of minimal 
subsistence production (ibid.). In this respect, Bernstein (1979) mentions 
the phenomenon of "reproduction squeeze" in Africa. An increasing 
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number of peasants and their families are not able to meet their basic needs 
any more without engaging themselves in the sale of agricultural produce. 
As a consequence of this partial agricultural commercialization process, 
peasants have had to divide the available production factors (land, labour 
and, to a lesser extent, capital) between the production of subsistence crops 
and cash crops. Peasants who allocate more labour, land and capital to 
export crop production than to food crop production may loose their self-
sufficiency and have to satisfy their food needs partially by purchases. In 
other words, because of this incorporation process, agriculture in Africa 
finds itself in a process of increasing commercialization. 
Supporters of the political-economic approach also consider the 
increasing commercialization of agriculture in developing countries as a 
necessary condition for development. But, as opposed to the modernization 
approach, they feel commercialization alone is not sufficient. The essential 
condition must be that the produced surplus created by the society will 
indeed be used by society as a whole to ensure that all people will benefit 
from agricultural development. However, the largest part of created surplus 
only benefits those groups in the society who have the greatest economic 
power. 
2.1.3 Control over agricultural commercialization 
This present study is another example which shows that, apart from 
commercialization, additional structural measures are necessary to start a 
real economic development process. It shows that the problem of 
agricultural commercialization is not only a matter of increasing market 
production, it is more a problem of re-allocation with the main focus on 
control and distribution of the created agricultural surplus. Hinderink and 
Sterkenburg (1987), amongst others, made a broad study of the process of 
agricultural commercialization in Africa and the role of government policy. 
They also concluded that the policy measures that aim to increase the 
commercialization of the agricultural sector do not automatically result in 
better living conditions and higher social security in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
For example, most African countries south of the Sahara show an 
export-led agricultural sector through which governments have tried to 
consolidate their political power. An important instrument used to gain 
influence in rural areas and to have control over agricultural surplus, was 
the establishment of parastatal trading institutions, the so-called marketing 
boards. The marketing boards were very useful for two reasons. Firstly, to 
extract means from the agricultural sector, by purchasing export crops at 
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lower prices than the world market prices. These financial means were used 
to finance all kinds of governmental expenditures in the urban areas and 
to finance the industrial sector. Secondly, to subsidise prices of food 
products in favour of the urban population. This was done by using the 
profit from extracted agricultural surplus. So, in fact the producers of 
agricultural cash crops were paying these subsidies by receiving lower 
prices for their crops (Bates, 1981). We elaborate on this further in section 
2.2. 
In general, farmers can have control over their means of production, 
but they lack control over the value of their cash crop proceeds. This is 
because producer prices are set by national governments or trading 
companies. Some farmers react by concentrating solely on subsistence food 
production. This is a normal reaction, because the production costs required 
to cultivate cash crops may exceed the revenues. For governments this 
would mean that an important source of political power, namely the control 
over agricultural surplus, would fade away. However, most farmers are 
dependent on traders because of debts or future credit possibilities, and in 
addition, have already invested too much in the cultivation of cash crops. 
This prevents them from switching completely over to the cultivation of 
food crops for home consumption. It is important to take into account these 
unequal relations between farmers and governments. We contribute to this 
by describing and analyzing the unequal power relations in trade between 
small producers, several types of traders, trading companies and the 
government of Sierra Leone. 
2.1.4 Conclusion 
The discussion of the consequences of the commercialization of the 
agricultural sector for the living conditions of small farmers contains useful 
elements. But, in line with Long et al. (1986), we discern several 
shortcomings in the analyses of commercialization studies. On the one 
hand, there is a tendency to over-emphasize the penetration of the 
capitalistic system. The destruction of the ability of farming households to 
be self-reliant due to this penetration plays an overwhelming role. Such 
commercialization studies over-emphasize the extent to which economic 
decisions, such as choice of crop cultivation or use of hired labour, are 
determined merely by external market forces. On the other hand, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the reactions and counterforces of 
farmers in this process of agricultural commercialization. It is necessary 
that at the grassroots level not only the consequences of commercialization 
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for the fanners are analyzed, but also the ways in which farmers develop 
their own initiatives to react against the declining self-reliance. But before 
elaborating this statement in section 2.3, we describe first the function of 
marketing in the processes of commercialization and the consequences of 
agricultural commercialization for the several actors within the marketing 
systems, starting with the role of the state and traders. The role of 
producers is described in section 2.3. 
22 The role of marketing in agricultural commercialization 
As we showed in section 2.1, there are different views on the consequences 
of commercialization of agriculture for farmers. These different points of 
view have also influenced the numerous studies on trade and markets. The 
most salient aspect of the commercialization process is the purchase and 
sale of commodities or agricultural products. As the agricultural sector 
moves from subsistence to commercialization, it becomes increasingly 
important to study the marketing system to determine the role it is playing 
in economic development. 
2.2.1 Structural and actor approach of marketing 
Some economists (for example, Drucker, 1958; Schultz, 1964) argue that 
efficient marketing systems are the most important multiplier of economic 
development. Marketing systems enable the agricultural producer to move 
from semi-subsistence to growing produce for regular sale. The products 
of specialization in one area may then be exchanged for those obtained 
more easily elsewhere. Everyone benefits when the producers of different 
products are able to sell their goods to one another. They can obtain more 
of the other goods than they could have produced themselves with the 
same effort. A precondition is that market opportunities must provide the 
proper incentives to agricultural producers. Intervention must be directed 
towards the introduction of new production methods, improvement of 
storage, processing and marketing facilities and road construction. An 
efficient marketing system depends only on the presence of cheap 
transportation and good roads. In general, the advocates of free trade argue 
that improvements in marketing organizations or procedures will expand 
trade, raise the level of living of all concerned and add to the economic 
wealth of the community. 
Furthermore, free trade supporters argue that access to a market 
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outside a particular area can be the best way to make use of underutilized 
resources. Before farmers in Africa started growing export crops, they 
concentrated on subsistence food crop production and did not fully employ 
available land and labour. But by gaining access to export markets, 
peasants were induced to increase rapidly export crop production. 
Incentives were stimulated by the possibility of purchasing consumer goods 
supplied by local traders who, in turn, were supplied by European traders. 
European trading companies were responsible for organizing the market 
movements through such vents for surplus activities, by making use of 
local marketing organizations. 
This view of marketing as the promoter of development has been 
criticized, for example, by Vandergeest (1988). He sees it as an uni-linear 
programme heavily biased towards modern technology, exposing farmers 
to the vagaries of the market and promoting socioeconomic inequality. 
In their various studies of marketing structures and processes in 
developing countries, Mittendorf and Abbott mention that the complexity 
of marketing processes and their significance for economic progress have 
often been underestimated (Abbott, 1987; Mittendorf, 1989). Economists 
and policy makers were only focusing on production, on the assumption 
that, once crops are produced and roads and railways built, the 
development of markets and the means of serving them will be a relatively 
straightforward matter (Abbott, 1987). Important criticism comes from 
Long et al. (1986), who state that most marketing studies are inadequate 
representations of the agricultural development process. They argued that, 
in general, these studies pay little or no attention to the farmer who, as an 
actor, plays a strategic and active role in the process of agricultural 
commercialization. 
In the last decade the focus of market research has shifted. Broad 
historical-structural theories are being replaced by actor approaches, with 
emphasis on strategies, choice and decision making. According to de Jonge 
and Wolters (1993), social scientists are no longer sure about the direction 
of development, and they focus on aspects, rather than on overall processes 
of change. This shift in focus appears more clearly from a discussion of 
specific themes that have come up in more recent market studies. Wolters 
and de Jonge describe several themes in market studies. The most 
important ones are: 
1) The focus on specific commodities. 
It has become clear that characteristics of commodities determine, to 
a large extent, the patterns of trade and the marketing channels. These 
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characteristics include technical matters, such as seasonality, 
storability, transportability, and processing on the supply side. On the 
demand side, characteristics, such as income elasticity of demand and 
sociocultural aspects, for example, the place of commodities in the 
food system, consumers' preferences and the value of commodities are 
considered. For example, a marketing system for food crops will 
function in a different way compared to a marketing system for cash 
crops. In the case of Sierra Leone, we see that the marketing system 
for rice, the staple food crop in Sierra Leone, operates in a different 
way compared to the marketing system for coffee and cocoa. Studies 
by Borren (1986), on the marketing system of rice in Sierra Leone, 
and Peperkamp (1984), amongst others, on the marketing system for 
coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone, show different patterns of trade and 
different types and roles of actors within the marketing system. 
The attention to transaction and information exchange between buyers 
and sellers. 
Transactions are carried out in different ways and under different 
institutional arrangements. Developing countries have a whole range 
of trade networks with many differences. The characteristics of trade 
networks depend on many factors, such as the nature of the product, 
the access to capital, the integration of an area or community in the 
greater society and the integration of traditional forms of exchange, 
such as barter. 'A society with a shortage of, or unequal access to 
capital will develop different trade practices than a society in which 
there are enough, freely accessible economic resources. The specific 
qualities of certain products or the specific circumstances under which 
they are produced also lead to a different form of commercialization' 
(de Jonge, 1993, p. 116-117). 
Buyers and sellers need information about the quality of their products, 
about each others' creditworthiness, or about each others' reputation 
before they decide to enter into a regular exchange relationship. Long-
term trading relationships involve personal aspects in which reputation 
and trust play an important role. 
The focus on structure and shape of marketing channels. 
This type of research emerged from historical studies of the 
development of retail trade and geographical studies of spatial patterns 
of marketing in Europe (Dawson, 1979). This approach has been 
extended to developing countries, where researchers have studied 
different marketing channels of agricultural commodities (Siamwalla, 
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1978; Hayami et al., 1987; Stem and El-Ansary, 1988; Crow, 1989; 
van Tilburg and Van der Laan, 1995). 
4) The political context in which markets function. 
Governments have interfered radically in agricultural production and 
marketing, both in the developed world and in developing countries. 
Governments have also attempted to secure food supplies and exports 
of cash crops by intervening at various stages in the process of 
production, marketing, transportation, processing, distribution and 
consumption. Moreover, according to de Jonge and Wolters 
'governments have tried to replace markets by non-market 
organizations, like marketing boards' (1993, p. 10). 
The specific themes mentioned above also form the main elements of our 
study, in which we describe and analyze the structure and shape of the 
marketing channel for two specific commodities, namely coffee and cocoa. 
Special attention is given to the specific roles that several types of 
producers and traders play in this marketing process, within a changing 
economic and political context. 
2.2.2 Governments' role in marketing 
As a starting point to describe the role of the state and traders within the 
marketing system, we use the political context in which markets for cash 
crops, such as coffee and cocoa, function. This can be explained by the fact 
that in several countries of Africa south of the Sahara the marketing of 
agricultural crops is experiencing a transition from state controlled 
marketing to the privatization of trade. 
Pricing policy 
Because of the importance of the agricultural sector in the economy, 
governments attempt to intervene in the agricultural and food pricing 
sector. One of the major policy instruments governments use to stimulate 
output and or to reallocate resources is the manipulation of agricultural and 
food prices. Ghai and Smith (1987) summarize how agricultural pricing 
policy can help to achieve the following goals: 
1) to encourage food production in order to achieve self-sufficiency; 
2) to stimulate export commodity production to generate additional 
foreign exchange earnings; 
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3) to increase the flow of raw materials to domestic manufacturing and 
processing industries; 
4) to stabilize prices to agricultural producers; 
5) to raise rural incomes; 
6) to stabilize food prices to urban consumers and restrict food price rises 
in an attempt to reduce inflationary pressures on the economy; 
7) to generate government revenues by taxing the surpluses of the 
agricultural sector in various ways; 
8) to assist domestic industries by making agricultural raw materials 
available to them at prices below those that would otherwise exist, 
and: 
9) to encourage specific forms of production, organization and social and 
economic transformation, such as co-operatives, collectives, state 
farms, private sector plantations, smallholdings, and so on. 
Ghai and Smith are right to conclude that several of these goals are 
conflicting. 'Attempts to achieve them all through a single pricing 
instrument may create conflicts and inconsistencies' (p. 58). For example, 
an increase in the price of food to stimulate food production or raise rural 
incomes can have a significant effect on the standard of living for urban 
people, leading to demands for higher wages and creating inflationary 
pressures on the economy. Furthermore, Ghai and Smith doubt the 
effectiveness of a pricing mechanism in the rural sector of many Sub-
sanaran African countries as the only instrument to raise agricultural 
production. Their doubts arise because the price mechanism works 
effectively only when all resources and commodities are traded in markets 
that are well integrated and competitive. However, considering agricultural 
production in Sub-Saharan Africa, a substantial proportion of goods and 
resources is not traded and many of the markets are extremely fragmented. 
There are several reasons that contribute to an explantation for this. First, 
there is the lack of an effective transport system. Some areas are 
geographically isolated from major marketing channels for certain 
commodities or resources. The degree of monetization in these areas may 
be very low and price movements may have a very limited effect on 
resource allocation. Second, farming households attempt to be self-
sufficient for a large proportion of their basic food requirements even when 
cash crops can be produced and sold. This reflects, as this study shows 
later on, a reaction against the failure of the marketing system to provide 
a reliable supply of food at reasonable prices and accessible market outlets 
for cash crops with remunerative prices, also at the local level. Third, some 
resources requiring an expansion of production, such as high yielding seeds 
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and fertilizers and labour, may be unobtainable or scarce in some areas. 
Governments' intervention through traders 
Governments can intervene in agricultural pricing either by implementing 
their policy through private traders or by entering into the marketing 
system themselves. The first option suggests that governments attempt to 
impose mandatory pricing rules on traders. This creates the problem of 
price control. First, there is insufficient manpower to ensure that the 
announced prices are being implemented. Second, inspectors might engage 
in bribery or corruption. Third, there is a variety of market outlets for 
producers to choose from, particularly for those living near the borders 
where goods can be smuggled into neighbouring countries. Therefore, 
governments tend to limit their pricing policy activities to those 
commodities and stages of the marketing process where they consider most 
benefits can be gained. 
The first group of commodities of importance to governments are 
agricultural export crops, such as coffee and cocoa. The two most 
important goals for government intervention in the marketing of these crops 
is to impose export tax and to influence producer prices. The first goal can 
be achieved without engaging in marketing itself because the crops are 
shipped overseas and have to pass through a limited number of port outlets. 
However, this might not work where produce can be smuggled through 
land boundaries to countries with better prices for these products2. The 
second goal can be achieved by using a licensed buyer system, granting 
buyers purchasing rights to buy certain commodities on behalf of the 
government. As this study shows, this can lead to considerable abuse of 
monopsony powers, particularly where producers also rely on the same 
buyers for supply of other consumer goods or credit. Furthermore, this 
system only functions well when the buyer is given sufficient financial 
incentive to collect the produce and transport it to its destination. 
The second important group of commodities that governments can 
easily intervene in, in order to influence either producer price or consumer 
price, are food crops that pass through a restricted number of marketing 
channels. An example is grain, which is milled in large scale industrial 
plants in urban areas. This makes it easier for governments to determine 
and control prices. This price policy can be extended to retail stages for 
grain-derived products, such as flour and bread. The same accounts for the 
2
 Producers of coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone used to smuggle part of their 
produce to Liberia during limes when producer prices in Liberia were higher. 
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control over imported grain products where complete control can be 
obtained over the whole marketing channel. Control over prices of these 
products is of utmost importance to governments because of their 
significance in the consumption expenditure of the urban population. 
Marketing boards 
The second option for government intervention in agricultural pricing is for 
them to enter into the marketing system. Many governments in Sub-
sanaran Africa decided to become actively engaged in the physical 
marketing of commodities. They formed marketing boards to organize the 
marketing of export crops, the marketing and milling of major grain 
products and the distribution of fertilizer and agricultural credit. 
Hesp and Van der Laan (1985) define marketing boards as "parastatal 
trading enterprises for agricultural products" (p. 2). In the African context 
they describe the marketing boards as follows. First, the marketing boards 
were government boards which cater for African producers, described as 
farmers, peasants or smallholders. The boards took a monopoly position in 
the buying and selling of produce, but they always made use of private 
enterprises to purchase produce up-country on the basis of licences or 
contracts. In case a contract was signed and a license was permitted to a 
private enterprise, the trader became known as a Licensed Buying Agent, 
acting as auxiliary of the marketing board for buying, storing, processing 
and transporting the produce to the port. 
Second, they describe nearly all marketing boards as "price stabilizing" 
boards which made use of producer prices. Producer prices were prices 
paid to producers which were fixed at a certain level for a relatively long 
period of time by governments. The main aim was to level out inter-
seasonal price fluctuations and to stimulate the production of agricultural 
crops. 
Third, Hesp and Van der Laan notice that marketing boards have a 
pronounced preference for durable or storable products because marketing 
boards lack cold storage and processing facilities. For this reason the list 
of controlled crops contains traditional crops, such as millet, sorghum, rice, 
maize, groundnuts, palm oil and newly introduced crops, such as coffee, 
cocoa, cotton, tea, tobacco and rubber (Hesp and Van der Laan, 1985). 
Dijkstra and Van der Laan (1990) divided the marketing boards into 
two categories; the Raw Material Marketing Boards (RMBs) and the Grain 
Marketing Boards (GMBs). The RMBs controlled export crops, such as 
cocoa, coffee, groundnuts and palm kernels and were engaged in buying 
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and selling of crops which serve as raw materials for industries3. The 
GMBs control domestic crops, such as grains and are engaged in the 
buying and selling of crops going from domestic producers to domestic 
consumers (Dijkstra and Van der Laan, 1990). As our study mainly deals 
with the marketing of coffee and cocoa, we will confine ourselves here to 
the functioning of RMBs. 
The buying operations of RMBs mainly consisted of transactions in 
which agricultural products were exchanged for cash at a fixed price. Every 
year the government fixed an official buying price for each of the 
controlled crops. This producer price should be announced before the 
harvesting season of that particular crop, so that producers were aware of 
the prices they ought to receive for their produce. Furthermore, this 
producer price should be kept constant for the whole harvesting season. 
This seasonal stability of producer prices should be an advantage to the 
producers because it would remove speculative trading activities. In 
practice, as we will see in the case of Sierra Leone in section 6.2.2, the 
RMBs not always succeeded to accomplish this function. The level at 
which producer prices were fixed was of paramount importance for the 
producers. However, when studying the functioning of RMBs and the 
impact of its pricing policy on farmers' incomes, it is not sufficient to deal 
only with the level of producer price. Even more important it may be to 
analyze whether RMBs had the capacities to implement their pricing policy 
and whether they could offer producers sufficient opportunities to be able 
to receive those prices. 
With regard to the selling operations of RMBs, their major aim was 
to obtain the highest possible price for the crops they exported. The RMBs 
preferred early sales which meant rapid evacuation and forward selling of 
the export crops. They tried to keep the interval between up-country buying 
and delivering abroad as short as possible. This policy of rapid evacuation 
kept storage and capital requirements to a minimum. Furthermore, by 
means of forward selling, the marketing boards could speculate on future 
world market prices. 
In general, they operated in a free, open market and their profits 
depended at the level of world market prices. Theoretically, the marketing 
Formerly, the RMBs of tropical Africa had to export iheir raw materials, 
because the factories were all located in the industrialized countries. But the 
process of industrialization has brought about a certain relocation of industry on 
a global scale. In the last two or three decades, new factories have been 
established in tropical Africa (Dijkstra and Van der Laan, 1990). 
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boards could accumulate major financial reserves during periods of 
increasing world market prices for their export commodities and used these 
profits to keep up producer prices in periods when world market prices 
were decreasing. But, in reality, as prices at the world market fluctuated 
quite often, marketing boards reacted defensively. They fixed producer 
prices at a low level to avoid a trading deficit when world market prices 
unexpectedly fell. Another aspect of uncertainty for marketing boards were 
varying volumes of harvest which differed from year to year due to 
uncertain weather conditions as well as due to the occurrence of produce 
smuggling to neighbouring countries where higher producer prices might 
be obtained. Both factors might endanger the boards' contractual 
obligations to overseas buyers (Hesp and Van der Laan, 1985). 
National and political environment of marketing boards 
After this brief outline of the basic aspects of the buying and selling 
operations of marketing boards, we will place the function of marketing 
boards within the broader perspective of their national and political 
environment. 
Marketing boards were often used as instruments for the promotion of 
agricultural and rural development. Several governments converted the 
marketing boards into crop development organizations or so-called 
commodity boards. Their main goal was to assist small scale farmers to 
increase their production of the crops controlled by the board. So, these 
commodity boards also had to distribute farm inputs, such as fertilizers, 
improved seeds, farming tools and so on. Furthermore, their task was to 
introduce modern farming methods through extension services and to 
administer credit and loan schemes. Compared to the situation before the 
introduction of the marketing boards, however, the results of the 
commodity boards have disappointed the producers as well as the 
governments. Before the rise of the marketing boards in the 1940s and 
1950s, the European trading companies had been more successful as a 
distribution channel for consumer goods, farm inputs or sources of credit. 
But, as we have seen in the previous section, these trading companies were 
sidelined when the marketing boards were given full control over the 
produce flow. In the beginning, the European trading companies were still 
functioning as agents for the marketing boards but the final result was the 
withdrawal of the European trading companies from up-country purchase 
of produce (Van der Laan, 1983). In several countries large Lebanese or 
African wholesalers had been appointed as buying agents for the marketing 
boards to take over the position of the European trading houses. In this 
capacity, just like their predecessors, they combined most of the functions 
General Observations 37 
of the former two-way trade, namely buying produce on the one hand and 
providing consumer goods, farming inputs and credit on the other hand. 
For the purchase of produce in the villages they made use of numerous 
small indigenous traders. 
Furthermore, marketing boards may be viewed as an instrument to 
extract resources from the agricultural sector in favour of the public sector. 
One of the official objectives of the marketing boards was to increase 
agricultural production by raising prices. Governments, however, used the 
profits accumulated by the marketing boards for general and political 
purposes instead of retaining them for periods when world market prices 
were decreasing to keep up producer prices at a relatively constant level. 
In the 1950s, Bauer (1954) already warned that such low producer prices 
had negative consequences for the level of production in the long run, 
reducing foreign exchange earnings and public revenues and outweighing 
the short-run gains of low producer prices for the governments. 
Critics on marketing boards 
This brings us to a presentation of the most important points of critic on 
the performance of marketing boards. 
First, the producer prices set by the marketing boards were very low 
compared with the world market prices. In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
producer prices for various crops hardly exceeded 50 per cent of the free 
on board (f.o.b.) prices (Bates, 1981; Hesp, 1983; Debouillé and Wanders, 
1987). Hesp (1983) analyzed the level of producer prices for various crops 
which were stabilized by government intervention in several African 
countries. His main conclusion was that, although producer prices increased 
during the 1970s, the ratio of producer prices to export prices became 
lower. The declining share of the producer prices can be explained, 
according to Hesp, by the expanding role of the marketing boards. The 
margin between producer price and export price has served to cover their 
operating costs and to finance the several development projects in which 
many of them have become involved. Furthermore, several authors have 
stressed that low producer prices have negative consequences for the level 
of production. According to them, one cannot expect that farmers who 
receive low prices, often less than 50 per cent of the export prices realized 
by the marketing boards, will be stimulated to expand the production of 
export crops (Bauer, 1954; Say lor, 1967; Levi, 1976). However, as we will 
see in subsequent chapters, this does not account for a significant part of 
the farmers in Sierra Leone who, in spite of low producer prices, still 
continue to expand the size of their coffee and cocoa plantations. 
Second, critics focus on the fact that marketing boards acted as tax 
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collectors, transferring agricultural surplus to other sectors of the economy. 
According to Bates (1988), African governments pursued low price policies 
with respect to producer prices in order to accumulate the difference 
between sale and purchase price in the form of trading revenues4. They 
used the marketing boards to support the interests of those sectors of the 
economy, such as the civil service sector. This enabled them to take and 
retain political power. Therefore, these trading revenues have often been 
used to subsidize food prices in urban areas or to finance general non-
productive government expenditures instead of reinvesting the revenues in 
the agricultural sector. According to Kydd and Spooner (1989, p. 15) 'the 
marketing boards have been part of a system of political patronage, but 
they were so inefficiently organized that their performance constituted a 
key constraint on agricultural progress.' 
Third, one can question whether the stabilization of producer prices 
automatically leads to the stabilization of producers' incomes. Even in 
periods when producer prices increase, prices of consumer goods and 
inputs might even increase faster. So, the real value of producer prices can 
be substantially decreased in spite of nominal increases. Williams (1980) 
calls this phenomenon "the syndrome of a dual squeeze" referring to the 
low producer prices and the high prices producers have to pay for 
commodities they do not produce themselves. 
However, the low remuneration for cash crops is not only caused by 
low world market prices and doubtful pricing policies of governments. Also 
the structure and functioning of controlled buying systems at the regional 
and local level put producers in a more or less subordinate and dependent 
position. This will be exemplified by the marketing structure for coffee and 
cocoa during the period when the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board 
was active. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, many academics and policy makers 
concluded that interventionist policies of African governments did not 
contribute significantly to an improvement of living conditions in rural 
areas. Developments in Sub-Saharan Africa were too much determined by 
the renaissance of neo-classical economic thinking. Many academics and 
This policy of low producer prices is even aggravated by the phenomenon of 
export parity pricing in countries with a substantive black market rate. This 
means the producer price, as a residual of the export price minus the marketing 
costs a board has to bear, is calculated in the local overvalued currency against 
the official rate. 
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policy makers became more optimistic about the functioning of markets 
without any state interference. 
However, according to Lele and Christiansen (1990), 'the long history 
of state intervention, the African governments' perception of the success 
of public-sector marketing institutions in fostering commercial agricultural 
production, their desire to maintain control over the marketing of politically 
strategic commodities and doubts about the efficiency of the traditional 
private sector, have contributed to a prejudice against private trade and the 
continuation of public control and regulation' (p. 5). Furthermore, they 
argue that 'the unwillingness of African governments to let non-indigenous 
communities achieve a prominent position in the political arena also 
worked in favour of the parastatals. Steps needed to develop the legal and 
institutional framework essential for the development of competitive 
markets were rarely taken' (ibid., p. 6). Armah (1989) mentions that many 
developing countries have gone to the extent of establishing government 
institutions along traditional marketing systems. 'Other developing 
countries have declared the traditional systems even illegal and established 
government monopolies instead' (p. 2). 
Nevertheless, the majority of the Sub-Saharan African countries 
introduced "neo-classical-type" marketing reforms in the 1980s. Under the 
influence of structural adjustment policies, emphasis has been laid on the 
liberalization of agricultural markets and prices. The role of governments 
should be reduced to providing facilitating services which are conducive 
to a smooth development of the privately organized marketing system. 
Examples are the provision and maintenance of roads and bridges, together 
with communication services and the provision of organized marketing 
outlets. The assembly and dissemination of information on crop prospects 
and prices and supplies in markets, is also recommended because it can 
usually be undertaken more efficiently on behalf of all market participants 
than by any one individual. 
Vigorous debate has developed about the appropriate role of the state in the 
marketing system. The question arises as to which type of marketing 
system is best: a system in which the state plays an important role or a 
system dominated by free market forces? Do marketing boards need to be 
abolished completely or will they play another role in a liberalized 
marketing structure? Before elaborating on these questions we deal with the 
role of traders in the marketing system. 
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2.2.3 The role of traders 
Alongside the role of the state in the marketing system, discussions have 
continued on the role of traders in the development of an economic system. 
Harriss (1981) identifies three different interpretations of the role of traders 
in rural development. 
First of all, she distinguishes the traders as entrepreneurs, as agents of 
development. As characteristics of these traders, Harriss mentions their 
innovative choice of new commodities and their usefulness for the 
distribution of inputs and transfer of new agricultural techniques, their 
ability to mobilize scarce resources and to provide credit, their efficiency 
when compared to marketing boards, their employment creating activities 
and their compulsion to save. 
Second, she identifies traders as agents of stagnation, active in 
subsistence trade. Harriss characterizes this trade as handling a variety of 
products to minimize risk, requiring small initial capital requirements, by 
the relatively ease of access to it, and by the prices being determined by 
bargaining. She describes the traders as being after short-term, easy profits 
and obtaining their capital from borrowing. There are not many permanent 
traders and they often combine small scale production with trade. Much of 
the labour is done by the family and is highly specialized. The traders have 
little entrepreneurial daring. 
Finally, she describes traders as powerful agents of under-development, 
as exploiters. The traders' class exerts a stranglehold on commodity and 
money markets, appropriate monopoly profits to be reinvested either 
"unproductively" in conspicuous consumption or in land and property. But 
producer and consumer both suffer from price manipulation by the traders. 
Discussion of the role of private traders is often dominated by 
advocates of the extreme points of view. General conclusions have been 
drawn from case studies or literature about the role of traders without 
making a clear distinction of the specific type of trader and the specific 
type of marketing system. 
On the one hand, there is a widespread view that traders and 
middlemen are exploiting both rural producers and urban consumers. These 
allegations sometimes acquire an extra political load when the middlemen 
belong to a specific ethnic group, which sets them apart from the farming 
population, such as the Lebanese trading community in Sierra Leone. 
The allegations imply that 'they exert some measure of control or 
domination over the market, a form of power which allows them to apply 
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unfair business practices, such as monopoly, collusion, cartels, exclusion 
of outsiders and discrimination' (Wolters, 1993, p. 94). According to Lele 
and Christiansen (1990, p. 22) this is caused by unreliable transport and 
unequal access to credit for traders, leading to domination of the market by 
the few traders who have access to these resources. Other authors assume 
that traders are exploiting the farmers by paying too low prices (Crow, 
1989; Harriss, 1981). Furthermore, governments lack the means of control 
to implement mandatory pricing rules on traders, which means traders are 
free to pay any price they want to farmers (Peperkamp, 1984; Ghai and 
Smith, 1987; amongst others). 
On the other hand, neo-classical economists recognize, in principle, 
that collusion and cartel-formation reduce the competitive character of the 
market, but they are less inclined to accept the allegations as correct and 
remain sceptical as to whether the markets for agricultural products show 
systematic distortions (Jones, 1972; Hollier, 1985). Kinsey (1988), for 
example, views the private trader as an economical, efficient hard-working 
benefactor of the local and national economy. She feels it is a pity that 
private traders are being hindered in performing their activities by all kinds 
of government measures. Lutz (1986) and Klaasse Bos and Neefjes (1987) 
conclude from case studies on Sri Lanka and Benin, respectively, that 
private traders do not exploit their customers and that they only take an 
economically justified share from this trade. Furthermore, they conclude 
that many failures resulting from state intervention in produce buying prove 
that there is no economically viable alternative to private trade in these 
countries. 
This study does not give a polarized view of the role of traders being 
exploitative on the one hand or being agents of development on the other 
hand. Judgement of the role of traders should be based on the specific 
function they fulfil in a specific marketing system. Private traders can 
range from large traders to small traders. Large traders market export 
products and storable foodstuffs. They operate at interregional and national 
levels. They often utilize facilities, such as stores and vehicles, have access 
to market information, resources and marketing skills and they undertake 
collusive action. Small traders operate at a local level and work with their 
own family labour. They have low turn-overs, lack relevant market 
information about the prices which are offered in the large towns and meet 
practically no entry barriers except for the need for some social relations 
(Büscher, 1986). 
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2.2.4 State intervention or private trade 
As we have seen from the preceding two sections, there are different points 
of view concerning the role of the state and the traders as actors in 
marketing systems for agricultural produce. Consequently, vigorous debate 
has also developed around which marketing system is the best; a system 
in which the state plays a dominating role or a system dominated by free 
market forces. 
Abbott (1987), for example, argues that every marketing system has 
its own characteristics which occur under specific conditions. Both private 
traders and parastatale can provide positive contributions towards the 
functioning of a marketing system. He believes that private traders, on the 
one hand, 'take advantage of and exploit unforeseen opportunities and 
follow up new ideas (...) start up and go a long way with very little capital 
(...) operate at very low costs (...) show ready initiative and quick response 
to changing situations (...) and extend the marketing operation with high 
confidence and low risk using family ties and kinship linkages' (p. 181-
182). Parastatale on the other hand, are 'convenient vehicles for the 
application of public capital, implementation of government price policies 
and assignment of marketing policies where these are judged advantageous' 
(p. 185). Parastatale moderate supply and price fluctuations by creating 
buffer stocks or price stabilization funds in order to 'implement minimum 
prices to producers', to protect them to a certain extent from exploitation 
by traders. Furthermore, parastatale 'can obtain higher returns for growers 
if they control enough of the total volume going on to a particular market 
to be able to influence prices' (p. 185-186). 
Van der Laan (1989) also argues that every marketing system has its 
own characteristics under specific circumstances. He divides the export 
crop marketing process into different stages and evaluates different possible 
actors for each stage in order to select the most suitable one for each stage. 
In the final stages of the marketing process (i.e. the buying of produce at 
the national level and selling and exporting it abroad), he has a general 
preference for maintaining the marketing boards instead of private 
enterprises. His main argument is that private enterprises might abandon 
their marketing activities more readily because of price fluctuations, 
currency risks, and so on, and no longer provide the continuity on which 
farmers depend. Moreover, he believes that 'costs can be kept down when 
marketing boards are dissuaded from operating at the intermediate stages' 
(p. 48). The intermediate stage is more or less the terrain of traders with 
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access to transport, cash and credit and buying produce at regional level 
from co-operatives, small traders or producers and selling it to marketing 
boards at the national level. At the intermediate stage, 'private traders seem 
to be the best solution because of their superior performance in transport, 
notably lorry transport, and in handling cash and credit' (p. 53). In the 
primary stages (the buying of produce from farmers at the local level) Van 
der Laan prefers, in general, primary marketing co-operatives, although 
they have less working capital than traders and restrict the freedom of 
producers to choose their buyer. He argues that 'profits should be 
distributed among the farmers and not accrue to one trader.' Furthermore, 
'a cooperative will mean less cheating of farmers and fewer cases of 
chronic indebtedness than in a situation dominated by traders' (p. 48). 
Like Peperkamp (1991), we feel that evaluating the performance of a 
marketing system should be much more than answering the question 
whether traders operating within that system are honest and efficient. The 
question whether a particular system functions in such a way that producers 
see their needs satisfied is at least as important. For them, the main 
consideration is not how effective a marketing system is at the sales end, 
but how they are treated at the local buying stage when they have produce 
to sell. For example, how much the buyer does to help them match the 
quality and how much he helps them obtain the inputs needed for efficient 
production and sale, and how promptly he pays and provides credit to 
cover expenditures until sale proceeds come in (Abbott, 1987). 
Programmes aimed at privatization of marketing structures also need 
to identify clearly the likely actors and beneficiaries. It is important to 
distinguish between small scale producers and traders, the handful of large 
scale indigenous traders or government officials and the external 
multinational corporations. The last two groups might become the 
beneficiaries of privatization and take over the monopoly power of 
marketing boards. The two most serious problems facing small private 
traders as well as producers, namely transport constraints and lack of 
access to credit, have to be addressed. Without reliable transport and access 
to credit, the prospects for private sector activities are low. Activities would 
probably become dominated by the few traders who have access to these 
resources. 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
The debate about private trade versus state controlled trade often 
concentrates on the role of government and traders within a marketing 
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system. Within these controversies the functioning of a marketing system 
has been analyzed by describing the role of the state and several types of 
traders within the system. Less attention has been paid to the role of 
producers and how they react under certain marketing conditions and what 
initiatives they develop to protect or improve their bargaining position. 
Therefore, this discussion should also be seen from the producers' 
perspective, as they represent the largest group of actors, and although 
traders and producers operate independently to a certain extent, they are 
directly or indirectly tied to another. 
In section 2.3, we concentrate on the reactions of farmers to their 
incorporation into a system or structure. For farmers, agricultural 
commercialization has resulted in the increasing importance of producing 
for the domestic or export markets. Commercialization has led to an 
increasing monetization of the socioeconomic environment of farmers and 
has forced them to sell at least part of their crops. The process involved in 
selling agricultural crops takes place within the context of a certain 
marketing system. Within this system, farmers have always been a weak 
actor, the dependent party. The other actors in the marketing system, 
whether private (large or small) traders, the state or state marketing 
institutions, were often, if not always, the more powerful actors. We 
emphasize the fact that, in our opinion, this needs revision. The 
organization of producers of marketable crops into groups, for instance, 
into marketing co-operatives, may enable them to become more equal 
actors in the marketing system. Group organization provides farmers with 
a platform to not only voice their problems with the functioning of the 
system, but to actually improve their position within it. 
2.3 Co-operatives as means of resistance 
We argued in section 2.1.2 that the incorporation of pre-capitalistic 
societies in a world-wide predominantly capitalistic system has led to a 
partial transformation of social and economic structures. In this process, 
producers are partially transformed from pre-capitalistic, subsistence 
oriented farmers into what many have called "peasants" (Chayanov, 1925; 
Wolf, 1966; Saul and Woods, 1971; Shanin, 1971, 1982 and 1987; Hyden, 
1980; Klein, 1980). This transformation process has been called 
"peasantization" by Post (1972). The process takes place at the society 
level and at individual level, with not only pre-capitalistic societies being 
incorporated, but also individual producers. In this section, we argue that 
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at the individual level peasants have the opportunity to organize themselves 
into groups. These groups can then function as important instruments in 
softening the negative consequences of peasantization. In other words, they 
can react against their incorporation into a given system. Group 
organization may even enable them to become forces to be reckoned within 
that system. 
It is not our intention to interfere in the peasantry debate, and to 
present yet another definition of the "peasant". It suffices here to state that 
the peasant class (or better: society3) or category of farmers is 
heterogeneous instead of homogeneous, hence it is virtually impossible to 
provide a comprehensive definition. In this respect we agree with Bernstein 
(1981) that there is no single or "essential" peasantry. Nevertheless, in the 
overwhelming amount of literature on the subject, certain common 
characteristics of the peasantry can be observed. Peasants are usually 
characterized by both their autonomy and their dependence (Нуden, 1980). 
They have been defined as producing mainly with the help of family 
labour, they produce mainly for home consumption, but are at the same 
time incorporated into a larger social and economic unit, system or 
structure. This incorporation may take the form of contributions to the 
dominant unit (as tax or rent), but may also take the form of enforcing 
farmers to produce, at least partially, for the market. 
For this work, the aspect that peasants are being dominated by a 
another social or economic unit is crucial. Leaving aside the differences 
between levels of analysis (i.e. "the peasant", "the peasant mode of 
production" and "the peasant society", respectively), we concentrate on the 
opportunities for peasants, being a group of individual farmers, not "the 
peasantry", to resist this domination. 
2.3.1 Peasants and peasant resistance 
The different ways in which peasants are capable of resisting incorporation 
are treated rather one-sidedly in the literature. Two options are considered. 
Hyden (1980), for instance, argues that the African peasantry is still 
"uncaptured", and he claims that this results from their ability to withdraw 
from the capitalistic system. He emphasises the independency of African 
3
 In a strict - Marxist - sense, the category of "peasants" cannot be called "class", 
because of their internal heterogeneity and the fact that there is little (political) 
organization among them. Shanin (1987) states that a class position consists of 
a social conflict-relationship with other classes. This is virtually absent with 
peasants (see also Bernstein, 1981). 
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peasants, who can decide to stop producing for the market and go back to 
subsistency (the "exit option"). Moreover, Hyden states that Africa is 
unique in the sense that it is virtually the only continent in which peasants 
have not yet been captured by other social classes. We think that this point 
of view is too optimistic. It is only true in those cases where peasants need 
cash for subsistence only. But peasants may already be too far incorporated 
into the monetary economy that it is impossible for them to withdraw. Cash 
is then needed not only for food, but, for example, for school fees as well. 
The second option that is usually considered is rebellion. This may 
take the form of political or social action, or the form of armed action 
(Shanin, 1987). However, the dominant opinion is that the heterogeneity of 
the peasant society makes it difficult, if not impossible, for peasants to 
actually succeed with their action. Wolf (1969) states that it is difficult for 
peasants to rebel for six reasons. First, peasants work alone, hence are not 
used in working together with other peasants. Second, peasants are 
occupied with their work in an annual (or better, seasonal) routine. Their 
work is strictly planned and they cannot afford to disrupt the routine. 
Third, the control of the land enables peasants to withdraw to subsistence 
production (what Hyden has called the exit option). Fourth, peasants are 
living in a confined social environment, usually the village and the 
extended family, which can function as a safety net for social security. 
Fifth, the heterogeneity of the peasant society may inhibit any form of 
action. The poor peasant may be related to the rich peasant, so it is 
difficult to speak and act about "us" against "them". Lastly, the 
confinement of peasants to their small community often deprives them of 
the knowledge needed to translate their irritations into concrete actions. 
Wolf continues his argument by sketching the factors which, according to 
him, have led to peasant participation in a few revolutions. He does this 
with the help of examples of some of the "great" rebellions of the twentieth 
century (Mexico, Russia and Vietnam amongst them). Wolfs point is that 
in the cases which witnessed peasant participation, the peasantry joined in 
a broader, social movement. The peasants did not start rebellions 
themselves. 
It is remarkable that a more realistic or pragmatic form of peasant 
resistance, namely group organization, is hardly considered in peasant 
literature, an observation which Rahmato (1991) makes as well. The link 
between peasant resistance and group organization as a means of this 
resistance is not explicitly stated anywhere in the literature. One reason for 
this might be that the peasantry, despite the observation of peasant 
specialists that it is heterogeneous, is still seen as a coherent group, and as 
a group peasants have never undertaken collective action. A second reason 
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for the neglect of group organization in peasant literature might be that 
"action" is usually interpreted either as defensive (i.e. withdrawal) or as 
offensive (i.e. attack) action. Analogous to this subdivision is the one that 
Hirschman (1970) makes. He contrasts two types of civilian action against 
the unacceptable behaviour of a structure or system. The first one is "exit", 
where dissatisfaction is expressed in civil disobedience or evasion. This 
type of behaviour can be seen as escaping from the system. The second 
behaviour type is "voice", which implies the "interest articulation" (a well 
known concept borrowed from political scientists) followed by direct 
protest or action in order to change the system. Thus, the options open for 
resistance are either to escape from or to change the system. 
The link between group organization and peasant resistance, or a group 
consisting of peasants that resist, does indeed exist, but mainly outside 
peasant literature. Several authors in Worsley's collection of contributions 
on co-operatives (1971) make the link between resistance and co-operation. 
Rahmato (1991) provides nine different categories of primary organizations 
(i.e. peasant organizations) which are used by peasants for self 
empowerment. In addition, Rahmato mentions the popularity of peasant 
organizations among a large number of international donors. It may be 
clear that this popularity is not derived from the resistance aspect of 
organization, but from its ability to function as "hidden" or "indirect" 
agents of change in rural development (see, for example, also Kerr, 1978; 
FAO, 1979; and Esman and Uphoff, 1984). This might be another reason 
why peasant organizations are ignored in peasant literature. 
We feel that the organization of peasants (by which we, again, do not 
aim at the peasantry as a society) into groups at a grassroots level may be 
a viable alternative form of action against a structure. By acting as a group, 
acting collectively, individual peasants have an opportunity to demonstrate 
their dissatisfaction with a given system or structure. It may be that these 
organizations rarely 'aggregate into large movements and become 
significant agents of social change', as was put forward by de Janvry 
(1987, p. 403). But the point is that self-organization may help peasants to 
not only voice (although not completely in Hirschman's sense) their 
dissatisfactions with the system, but to actually improve their position 
within it. 
We try to provide an example of group organization, namely co-
operatives, that can fulfil this role. We defend the view that co-operative 
societies may help small farmers to defend themselves against the negative 
effects of agricultural commercialization. Co-operatives can lead to an 
improvement of the livelihood of farmers and the strengthening of their 
security of existence. Moreover, co-operatives can promote equity and 
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efficiency, can lead to higher incomes for members and can provide easier 
access to goods and services. Co-operatives are useful in providing farmers 
with better access to resources which would otherwise be out of reach 
(Worsley, 1971; Attwood and Baviskar, 1988). 
The co-operative marketing of export crops is used as an example to 
make this case. The constraints involved in marketing are outlined after 
which the possible role and requirements for successful co-operative 
development are discussed. But first we provide a brief history of the 
genesis of the co-operative form of group organization, its ideas and 
principles. 
2.3.2 The roots of co-operative ideas and organizations6 
The basic ideas on co-operation were formulated in the early stages of the 
Industrial Revolution in Europe. The establishment of co-operatives can be 
considered as a counter-force to the threatening economic context of the 
time. Economic depressions and rising unemployment caused by the 
introduction of machines, resulted in diminishing social security. People, 
whether farmers or traders, started to organize themselves by establishing 
self-help schemes. Co-operatives were established so that they could serve 
as a protection mechanism for their members. However, this is not to say 
that mese co-operatives only had an economic goal. Worsley (1971) states 
that these organizations were also part of a social movement. Co-operatives 
were opposed to the existing state and economy because these were seen 
as the causes of the poverty that the organizations were fighting. 
The first successful co-operative was established in 1844 in Rochdale, 
England. There, 28 craftsmen and entrepreneurs united to establish a shop 
which provided consumer goods at reasonable prices for members (ILO, 
1988). The "Rochdale Principles" were formulated, of which the important 
ones were that the co-operative was to be a voluntary association, formed 
with an economic purpose; that the surplus was distributed to members 
according to the amount purchased in the shop; and that every member had 
one vote (van Dooren, 1978). These Principles have influenced the world 
co-operative movement up to the present. The International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA), the apex organization for co-operatives worldwide, has 
adopted six "universal" co-operative principles, based on the Rochdale 
Principles. Adherence to the first four principles is considered as a 
6
 The following sections are partly based on Sellies (1993). 
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condition for ICA membership7. Co-operatives were also founded in 
Germany and were based on agricultural production. Raifeissen, a local 
mayor, recognized that credit was a constraint for the rural population in 
the villages where he had worked. In order to increase the well-being of 
poor farmers, he not only stimulated self-help organization, but also added 
a credit component to the Rochdale co-operative model (ibid.). 
The co-operative principles have been the centre of debate since the 
first constituent meeting of the International Co-operative Alliance in 
London in 1895 (ILO, 1988). These debates focused on the universality of 
these principles. When considering the universal validity of the co-
operative principles, the African case is worth mentioning. There, the 
social, economic and political circumstances differ tremendously from the 
circumstances in the western world, from where the co-operative principles 
originated. Africa's special case demands an adaptation of those principles. 
The western European co-operatives were closely connected to the 
opening up of rural areas and the increasing monetizad on of the economy. 
Co-operative organization proved not only that the dependence of small 
producers could be reduced considerably by co-operation, but also 
contributed to a more gradual and smooth transition from subsistence 
oriented production to market production. 
In this century, in eastern Europe production co-operatives were 
created to enhance the collectivization of production. Production co-
operatives and collective farms were integrated into a centrally planned 
economy. The co-operatives were introduced or extensively controlled by 
governments and were part of an ideology. Collectivization was seen as an 
essential step on the road to socialism (Shanin, 1971). 
The first half of this century witnessed the dispersion of co-operative ideas 
over the world, including to the then colonies of European countries. For 
example, at the beginning of this century, village co-operatives were 
already being organized in the Punjab Province, India (Brahme, 1984). In 
Africa, co-operatives were first formed in Tunisia (1907), and a year later 
in Kenya and Egypt (ILO, 1988). In the developing countries governments 
were actively involved in establishing co-operative societies, although in 
most cases no collectivization of production emerged. Colonial 
7
 The ICA principles are: 1) voluntary and open membership; 2) one member, one 
vote principle; 3) limited interest on share capital, if any; 4) equitable 
distribution of proceeds; 5) provision of education opportunities, and: 6) co-
operation between co-operatives. 
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governments liked to see co-operatives play the same role in developing 
rural areas in the colonies, as they did in the western world. Also, co-
operatives could be used to control the peasantry, for example, to obtain 
greater control over agricultural output, specifically export crops. In 
addition, co-operatives were seen as an instrument to provide the rural 
population with basic services, such as infrastructure and credit. 
In Europe co-operatives were formed voluntarily by the people 
themselves - although sometimes the initiative was taken by distinguished 
citizens, such as mayor Raifeissen - to serve a common interest (namely, 
economic protection), and relied on self-help ideas. In the colonies co-
operatives were introduced "from above" by colonial government officials, 
virtually without considering the interests of members. The principles of 
self-help were not so much introduced to develop the rural areas and its 
population, but they were primarily established to enhance macro-economic 
objectives. With hindsight, it became clear that this start was a false one. 
2.3.3 Definitions of co-operatives 
Before beginning the analysis of the benefits that co-operatives might bring 
to small scale farmers, a concept definition seems appropriate. However, 
as was the case with the peasant concept, there is no consensus on a 
definition of co-operatives. In spite of some common characteristics, co-
operatives differ in many respects. Before mentioning these common 
characteristics, we need to make a distinction in order to differentiate 
traditional forms of organization, e.g. labour groups or specific savings 
groups, and so on, from co-operative organizations, although there are 
strong similarities (see, for instance, Bouman, 1977; Gerretsen and Selbes, 
1989, and Rahmato, 1991). Traditional forms of organization, which 
include para-co-operatives, pre-co-operatives, quasi-co-operatives and so 
on, (see also ILO, 1988) are more loosely organized than "genuine" co-
operatives, but they may possess "co-operative like" features. The 
permanent character of co-operatives is usually emphasized, as is their 
business character. A co-operative society is not established for one activity 
only, contrary to most traditional forms of organization. Furthermore, the 
traditional forms of organization are usually informal, i.e. have no official 
premises, are not legally registered or recognized and do not possess a 
structured leadership. Co-operatives are formal, i.e. are legally registered 
and have a hierarchical form of leadership (Rahmato, 1991). 
What then are specifically the characteristics of co-operatives? Let us 
first examine some of the definitions that are used in the literature. Van 
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Dooren (1978) quotes a number of definitions, which can be divided into 
two broad categories. On the one hand there are those definitions which are 
particularly suitable for the "western-based" co-operatives, while on the 
other hand there are the definitions which are more appropriate to 
developing countries. 
The co-operation of members in order to achieve a common economic 
goal is emphasized in the first category of definitions. For example, Seibel 
and Massing (1974, p. 45) define a co-operative as 'a voluntary, open, and 
permanent association of egalitarian structure in which the members secure 
for themselves certain economic interests through communal self-help'. 
Kirsch (1976, p. 11) also gives an economic interpretation of co-operatives: 
'Co-operation refers [only] to collaboration among people and is seen as 
a social system of an economic nature (...)'. 
The definitions which are generally used in the literature for co-
operatives in the developing world emphasize common goals of members 
too, but also include social-political goals of states, which seem to 
dominate the needs of members. Co-operation is then considered to be an 
ideological ("top-down") means to achieve certain ends. As Perkash (1965), 
talking about co-operative development in India, puts it (quoted in van 
Dooren, 1978, pp. 23-24): 'The co-operative movement is a democratic 
organization with an economic programme and a social purpose. It is an 
indispensable instrument of planned economic action, in a country which 
has accepted democratic socialism, as the basis for achieving economic 
progress and bringing about social change'. The emphasis is more on 
(macro-economic planning, than on economic needs of members. 
The generally accepted elements of an organization based on co-operative 
principles could be summarized as follows: 
it is an association of members (which can be individuals, but also 
member-businesses); 
it is owned by its members; 
it is voluntarily formed in order to realise a common (economic) goal; 
it is primarily providing services for its members (member-patrons); 
the proceeds are distributed to the members, whether equally or 
according to turnover. For example, according to the amount of 
produce a member delivers to the marketing co-operative, or according 
to the amount of consumption goods a member buys from the 
(consumer) co-operative; 
it is democratically controlled by its members, and; 
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it has an open membership. 
Keeping these general elements in mind, we now turn to the development 
of the co-operative movement in Africa. There, co-operatives were first 
introduced by colonial governments, with the main objective of establishing 
a mechanism that would enable these governments to control and guide the 
peasantry. 
2.3.4 The African experience 
The 1950s and '60s were a real "boom" period for the establishment of co-
operative organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the rural areas especially, 
enormous numbers of co-operatives were established by the national 
governments. At first, the co-operatives were started by colonial 
governments, but later, many newly independent states recognized the 
importance of co-operatives as well. They considered co-operatives as an 
ideal instrument to promote development. 
Co-operatives became active in almost every aspect of the rural 
economy, hence, numerous different types of co-operative societies arose, 
created in order to perform different functions. For the rural areas, we can 
distinguish the following broad categories of co-operatives: 
Production co-operatives (i.e. group farms) 
These are associations of farmers who collectively own and farm their land. 
They either cultivate collectively full-time (which means that no individual 
farms continue to exist any more) or part-time (implying that some degree 
of individual farming may still take place). 
Service co-operatives 
These organizations provide several services to their members. Possible 
types of services include the provision of inputs (e.g. fertilizers, seedlings), 
banking opportunities (i.e. savings and or credit facilities) or transport 
facilities. 
Consumer co-operatives 
This type of co-operative is specifically created to supply its members with 
certain consumer goods at reasonable prices (e.g. rice, beverages). 
Marketing co-operatives 
Finally, marketing co-operatives are those organizations which are 
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established to market collectively the agricultural products of their 
members (e.g. cocoa, piassava and other export crops). 
In urban areas co-operatives were also established. Particular forms of co-
operation were initiated there, for the production and marketing of pottery 
or dyed textiles, for example. 
All these co-operative categories can be considered single-purpose 
organizations, meaning that their activities are confined to one terrain only 
(e.g. they only provide certain services or only market certain export 
crops). A combination of activities, however, is more common. The co-
operative can then be considered a multi-purpose organization. For 
example, the combination of marketing of export crops and the provision 
of inputs does occur quite regularly, as we shall see later on. 
At the same time, these categories of co-operatives can be considered 
primary co-operatives, i.e. co-operative organizations consisting of 
individual members. Primary co-operatives can join together to their 
advantage, to form secondary co-operatives, also known as Unions. The 
forming of Unions may be necessary in order to obtain the economies of 
scale to export cocoa, for example. Primary co-operatives may be too small 
to fulfil that task. Finally, in order to achieve further representation, these 
secondary co-operatives can establish an apex organization, usually called 
a federation. Federations may also undertake the task of training and 
educating (primary and secondary) co-operative staff and carry out 
monitoring, auditing and supervisory functions. At the same time, co-
operative organizations may be divided according to territorial size. 
Associations can be active at the local (i.e. village) level, or at the micro-
regional, regional, provincial, national and inter or multi-national levels. 
In this and the following sections the emphasis is on marketing co-
operatives in Africa, especially those which are active at the local and 
regional levels. In Africa especially, there was a particular need for 
marketing co-operatives, because a solution to the lack of regular and 
adequate transport facilities was of paramount importance. By working 
collaboratively in a co-operative organization, farmers could realise 
economies of scale for transport. Marketing co-operatives could also serve 
well as protection against the activities of middlemen, by means of 
obtaining a better bargaining position. 
The scarcity of arable land in Africa was less problematic than, for 
instance, in India, which explains that production co-operatives were not 
in high demand. The emphasis was not placed on production, but on 
marketing (Mukonoweshuro, 1993). 
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Summarizing the beneficial effects of co-operative development along with 
ILO (1988) shows that co-operatives today are significant for three reasons. 
First, they give economic strength to farmers. Members have learnt that 
even poor people could achieve more when they act collectively instead of 
individually. Second, from a sociological point of view, the economic 
strength gained generates greater self-confidence and ability for self-
management. Finally, co-operatives are important in the struggle against the 
detrimental effects of urbanization. On the one hand, by realizing higher 
prices, they help to keep small scale producers in the rural areas, and on 
the other hand, they help to feed a growing urban population. 
Generally, the marketing co-operatives which appeared from the 1950s 
onwards in Sub-Saharan Africa were initiated by government officials. In 
Anglophone Africa special "Departments of Co-operatives" were created, 
under the leadership of government appointed "Registrars of Co-
operatives". These Registrars were supposed to channel the co-operative 
movement in the "right" direction, which meant that the state was able to 
control the co-operatives. In Francophone Africa co-operatives were hardly 
ever formed through initiatives evolving from the grassroots level (COPAC, 
1984). The organizations that were founded shortly after independence, 
were promoted as a policy choice, partly based on the existing "sociétés de 
prévoyance", and partly on the co-operative legislation established by the 
French (ibid.). 
Verbally, the encouragement of the co-operative movement was 
defended by emphasizing the beneficial effects of co-operatives for 
peasants. Co-operation would improve productivity through the provision 
of better marketing and credit facilities. In reality, however, the progress 
of co-operatives was used as a mechanism to incorporate the peasantry into 
a national development strategy, or even just to capture the peasantry 
(Hyden, 1983). 
A decade later it appeared that this "top down" approach possessed 
major defects. Because co-operatives were used as a means to establish 
"development from above", they became merely an instrument for macro-
economic and social policies by national governments. The individual 
needs of co-operative members were neglected. In the worst case, co-
operatives became bureaucratic governmental institutions, instead of being 
organizations meant for and controlled by its members. According to van 
Dooren (1978, p. 42), this signified that "co-operatives" had become "gov-
operatives". Ultimately this approach led to the collapse of many co-
operative societies. However, it is important to keep in mind that the 
downfall of the co-operative movement by the end of the 1960s does not 
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necessarily imply that the basic ideas behind co-operation should be 
abandoned. For although the implementation was disastrous, the ideas still 
deserve proper attention. 
2.3.5 Outlook for the future 
The bottleneck in the failure of the co-operatives was, thus, the "blueprint" 
approach, forced upon the farmers by governments. The poor performance 
of those state induced co-operatives resulted in an even tighter 
governmental control. By the 1970s, according to Lele and Christiansen 
(1990), most co-operatives - that survived - had become state controlled 
entities that did not represent the interests of peasants. 
This unsatisfactory performance has usually been attributed to bad 
management, corruption at all levels, inefficient procedures and 
consequently too high operation costs, and to the virtual lack of priority for 
improving the level of education of members and management. This has 
resulted in a lack of participation of member farmers when formulating 
goals and finding ways of working together. Lack of participation, or the 
problem that members were neither capable nor interested in influencing 
the operation of co-operatives might also have been related to the size of 
the co-operative (Lele and Christiansen, 1990). The organization could 
have been too large to allow proper communication or dedication to the co-
operative. Another constraint for co-operative organizations is formed by 
what Cliffe and Cunningham (1973) have called the "we-they" system. 
When there is mutual suspicion between the manage^eaders of a co-
operative and its members/participants, tensions may occur. This might take 
place when the distance between the managers and the members is too 
large, when there is hardly any communication and when the long-term 
strategies of the management do not necessarily coincide with the short-
term vision of the membership. This "we-they" system can be avoided by 
establishing a close contact between the two parties and when the 
identification with and participation in the co-operative is secured. Finally, 
an economic environment unfavourable to the viability of co-operatives 
may also (partly) explain the limited success of co-operatives (COPAC, 
1988). 
Although some critics, such as Gyllström (1991), go so far as to advocate 
the complete abolition of co-operatives, most authors on co-operatives hold 
the view that co-operation in Sub-Saharan Africa still deserves full support 
(Gentil, 1986; Braverman et al., 1991; Byombuka, 1991), provided that co-
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operatives will be allowed to develop under favourable conditions. 
Compared with the success story of the co-operative movement in the 
industrialized countries, the African experience is very disappointing. 
However, farmers in industrialized countries recognized themselves the 
need to form commercial organizations, such as co-operatives, in order to 
improve their welfare and well-being. Their success is also based on the 
time span they have had to develop into the successful organizations they 
are now (some of the currently most successful ones were started over a 
century ago). Most of these started as small, local organizations, which 
over the years amalgamated with other small associations, which then 
developed into the large, efficient, economically viable institutions they are 
now (COPAC, 1988). The whole co-operative movement in the 
industrialized world was allowed to grow slowly. This was contrary to the 
experience in Africa where a complete co-operative system was to be 
established at all levels, all at once. 
Unfortunately, there is no standard recipe for successful co-operatives. Still, 
we can now derive some of the preconditions which can help co-operatives 
to succeed. First, the common notion held is that the major obstacle to co-
operative progress is formed by undue control and interference from 
governments in the day to day running of co-operatives. Therefore, this 
obstacle has to be removed, i.e. co-operatives should be controlled by their 
members. However, farmers' involvement is the most important 
precondition for co-operatives to succeed. The commitment of farmers can 
only then be assured when they are dedicated to the establishment of the 
co-operative from the start. This means that they themselves should be the 
ones to start the co-operative. A related prerequisite is the notion among 
members that an improvement in their well-being could best be achieved 
with co-operation. Another precondition for success might be the co-
operation between co-operative societies, especially when common interests 
are at stake or when economies of scale can be obtained. Furthermore, in 
order to be self-sustainable, a substantial part of their operational capital 
and funds should be coming from their members. Co-operatives should not 
rely too much on outside loans or grants. 
2.3.6 Co-operative societies and marketing 
Inherent in the commonly accepted characteristics of the peasant concept 
was the fact that peasants produce, at least partially, for the market. They 
are, thus, incorporated in a marketing system or structure. The farmers 
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became more and more marginalized. 
If small farmers are entitled to some form of marketing power, and in 
our opinion they are, they need some sort of means in order to achieve it. 
Provided the process is initiated and controlled by the farmers themselves, 
co-operation building might be a suitable instrument for farmers to defend 
themselves against the injurious consequences of their incorporation into 
a given marketing system. By organizing themselves into co-operatives, 
producers can gain a stronger position in negotiations with either the state 
or private traders. Co-operative organizations might function as agents of 
change and they can play an important role in the education and training 
of farmers. In addition, co-operatives can create economies of scale, for 
example, in the use of transport facilities for evacuating the produce. In 
this way they provide small scale farmers with more economic strength. Of 
course, this stronger economic position can also be achieved by the, usually 
higher, prices that co-operatives pay for their members' produce. Finally, 
co-operatives may be useful in order to distribute the proceeds of 
marketing produce fairly among member farmers. 
Van der Laan (1989) distinguishes three stages of marketing (see also 
section 2.2.4). For each of the stages he selects the most suitable marketing 
actor. According to him, primary co-operatives are pre-eminently suitable 
for the primary stage of trade, i.e. the marketing activities in the production 
areas. Unfortunately, he does not think that co-operatives can play a 
positive role in the final stage of the marketing process, at least, he is not 
considering co-operatives as a possible solution for the final stage. It might 
be that the division in stages that Van der Laan is making, representing 
also differences in scale levels, prohibits him from considering co-
operatives for the final stage. He seems to regard only primary co-
operatives in his search for the most suitable actor. Primary co-operatives 
are active and organized at the local level, thus, Van der Laan seems to 
make only the link between the locally based organization and the 
applicable scale level. Nevertheless, he does mention tertiary or apex co-
operative organizations as the appropriate actors at the national level 
(which corresponds to the final stage), but omits them from his final 
analysis. We think that the co-operation between primary co-operatives into 
co-operative unions may yield suitable marketing actors for the final stage 
as well. An important prerequisite is then that these apex organizations are 
genuine co-operatives, and not merely organizations performing 
administrative functions. 
It is important for the sustainability of co-operatives that the 
organizations are economically viable. By exporting themselves, instead of 
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functioning merely as buying agents (be it for parastatale or for private 
exporters), co-operatives have a better chance of survival. They will be 
capable of earning more profit, hence, provide their member farmers with 
better prices, but they also have better prospects of surviving as 
organizations, being better able to finance their overheads. 
With regard to the marketing of export crops at the primary stage, the 
assumption is made that producers of export crops face very complex 
marketing problems. When co-operatives intend to solve these problems for 
their members, they need to be active in those areas that now limit farmers' 
marketing opportunities. Factors of central concern to smallholders would 
then have to include the co-operative's ability to realize favourable 
producer prices, the provision of necessary inputs (credit, fertilizers and so 
on) and in general the assurance of organizational accessibility and 
credibility (Gyllström, 1989). For example, farmers are often dependent on 
certain traders or middlemen for obtaining credit or other necessary inputs. 
Farmers may be forced to sell part or all of their produce to these traders, 
in order not to endanger any possible future appeal for help. A marketing 
co-operative that provides those services instead of traders, can break the 
dependency of the farmers on those traders. 
By providing a comprehensive package of services to members, for 
example, marketing facilities, loans and the sale of food at moderate prices, 
a co-operative organization may be called multi-purpose. However, there 
is a danger in becoming too multi-purpose. Examples have shown that, 
especially in the early years of the organization, a co-operative should not 
become too complex nor become over-ambitious (see, for instance, 
Braverman et al., 1991; Byombuka, 1991). By trying to undertake too 
much too soon, operations become complicated. Usually, co-operative 
management simply is not capable of tackling the difficulties that are 
involved in supplying many diverse services. Single-purpose co-operative 
societies are simply structured organizations, which have the disadvantage 
of not covering all those fields in which they are needed. Multi-purpose 
societies, however, do cover most of those fields, but their management is 
complicated and they run the risk of over-running themselves. Braverman 
et al., (1991), suggest combining the advantages of both types of co-
operatives by creating different organizations for different activities, which, 
however, should be encouraged to co-operate closely. This might create 
new complications in tuning the different organizations. There is no 
definite solution to this dilemma, other than that the co-operative has to be 
careful with the tasks it wants to achieve in its nascent stages. 
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2.3.7 Conclusions 
Co-operative societies are meant to improve the socioeconomic position of 
their members. They may provide basic needs, such as food, by being 
either food production co-operatives or consumer co-operatives. They may 
also provide essential services, such as farm inputs, when they are service 
co-operatives. Finally, they provide marketing services that would not 
easily be available to individual farmers in the case of marketing co-
operatives. 
We have shown that there are many different forms of co-operatives, 
which undertake only one or some of the activities mentioned above and 
which can be active at different levels. Moreover, we have tried to argue 
that co-operation building should be taken seriously as a potential means 
for peasants to resist the detrimental effects of incorporation in general and 
agricultural commercialization in particular. 
We do agree with the notion held by supporters of the modernization 
theory on economic development, that agricultural commercialization is a 
necessary condition for development. But we also agree with the adherents 
of the political-economic approach that this alone is not sufficient. Co-
operatives may provide the vehicle for peasants to share in the benefits of 
commercialization. Co-operatives may play a role in trying to achieve a 
more equitable allocation of the fruits of agricultural commercialization. 
Small scale producers of export crops especially, have always had little 
marketing power. They were dependent on traders, whether private or 
government appointed buying agents, for the sale of the proceeds of their 
labour. In this common type of marketing system, producers are price 
takers, with no say over the price of their crops, and are at the mercy of 
the benevolence of traders. In addition, these traders are often the only 
source of credit, in either cash or kind, for small farmers. These relations 
are sometimes almost monopolistic in nature, and often monopsonic. In 
many cases farmers have no or hardly any alternative in selecting the trader 
of their choice, but are dependent on the few traders that visit them. 
There have been various studies on governments and their marketing 
policies as important actors in marketing systems. There have also been 
many studies on the role of traders in marketing systems. But in the 
numerous studies on agricultural marketing systems, little or no attention 
has been paid to the producer of agricultural crops. In this study, we try to 
overcome what, in our view, is an omission in the marketing literature. 
Producers are taken into account as actors in the marketing system of 
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export crops in Sierra Leone. Moreover, we describe and analyze co-
operative organization building as an instrument to improve the position of 
small scale farmers within the system. 
3 
A Concise Introduction of Sierra Leone and the 
Research Area 
Frank Sellies 
The first part of this chapter provides a general description of the main 
characteristics of the Sierra Leonean society. Special attention is paid to the 
economic performances, especially the agricultural sector, in the last 
decades. Emphasis is laid on the economic decline in recent years, its 
causes and the impact of the structural adjustment programmes imposed by 
the World Bank which should lead to economic growth. 
The second section provides a brief introduction to the research area. 
It presents the general administrative division and the demographic features 
of the regions in which the research took place. In this respect, it provides 
the context for subsequent chapters. 
3.1 The country 
The Republic of Sierra Leone is a relatively small country located on the 
west coast of Africa, between 7 and 10 degrees northern latitude and 10 
and 13 degrees western longitude (see map 3.1). Its total area encompasses 
72,325 square kilometres, of which 71,740 square kilometres is land. Sierra 
Leone is embedded between the Republic of Guinea in the northwest, north 
and northeast (with a borderline of 650 kilometres) and the Republic of 
Liberia in the east and southeast (this borderline is 250 kilometres). In the 
west and southwest, it is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean, giving it a 
coastline of 350 kilometres. 
3.1.1 Physical geography 
Sierra Leone can be subdivided into four physiographic regions. These are, 
according to Harrison Church (1980), the Freetown Peninsula, the coastal 
swamps, the interior plains and the interior plateaux and mountains. These 
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regions all stretch from the northwest to the southeast. 
The Freetown Peninsula is 40 kilometres long and about 16 kilometres 
wide. It has steep hills and mountainous areas, up to almost 900 metres, 
with forest vegetation (there is a forest reserve on the hills). At the base of 
the hills, in the northern part, are the mouths of several rivers and the 
natural harbour of the capital Freetown is located there as well. In the 
southern part one finds small islands just off the coast, lagoons and sandy 
beaches. Great potential exists here for tourism development. On the 
Peninsula, the descendants of freed slaves, the Creoles ("Krios") are settled. 
Many Creole settlements, with their characteristic street plans and house 
types, have typical Anglo Saxon names (e.g. Sussex, York and Kent). 
A second physiographic region is formed by the coastal swamps, 
stretching from the Peninsula along the coast to the southeastern border 
with Liberia. This region averages 30 kilometres in width and is liable to 
wet season flooding. The vegetation mainly consists of mangrove swamps 
and riverine grasslands (see also chapter 4). Swamp rice is cultivated, but 
piassava1 is also a main product from the coastal swamps. 
The third region constitutes the interior plains. These extend 
approximately 160 kilometres inland from the coastal swamp area, 
gradually rising to about 120 metres above sea level. This area is 
characterized by low, secondary forests and patches of savannah. Oil palm 
and rice (upland and swamp) are cultivated, and ginger is grown in parts 
of the Moyamba and Bo Districts. The interior plains are relatively sparsely 
populated in the centre and southern parts, and are associated with poor, 
leached soils. The northern part is more densely populated with towns such 
as Makeni and Port Loko. Much of Sierra Leone's mineral wealth is found 
in the interior plains (e.g. rutile, bauxite and, formerly, iron ore). 
Finally, there are the interior plateaux and mountains, which form the 
rest of the country, northeast of the interior plains. This region is 
characterized by mountain ridges and flat plateaux. Mount Bintumani in the 
Loma Mountains is the roof of the country (1,948 metres). Diamonds are 
found in alluvial gravel areas, lying under a top soil of usually less than 
one metre. The southern part of this area has an annual rainfall of over 
2,540 millimetres, and the vegetation is secondary forest. In the northern 
part the annual rainfall is less, resulting in savannah. A number of food 
crops, such as rice and palm oil, as well as a number of cash crops, such 
as coffee and cocoa are grown here. 
Piassava is a fiber from a type of the raphia palm. It is mainly used for making 
the bristles of brooms and brushes. 
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Its proximity to the equator ensures that Sierra Leone has a tropical 
climate with a summer wet season (May until October) and a winter dry 
season (November until April). The wet, or rainy, season starts with heavy 
thunderstorms. The heaviest rains fall between July and September. The 
highest rainfall is registered on the Peninsula (over 5,575 millimetres) 
because of the presence of the steep mountain ridge. Rainfall decreases 
from the coastal area (3,000 millimetres) inwards to the interior (2,500 to 
3,000 millimetres) and the northern savannah (1,900 to 2,500 millimetres). 
Along the coast, humidity levels can reach 90 per cent at the end of the 
wet season. 
Temperatures rise from the coast to the interior, although variations are 
minor (e.g. the annual average for Freetown is 29.3 degrees Celsius, 
compared with 31.2 in Bo and 32.0 in Makeni). The dry season lasts from 
mid-December to mid-February, and is relatively cool, with the dry and 
dusty Harmattan winds blowing in from the Sahara. The heavy rainfall in 
the wet season causes erosion and leaching of the soils, while the 
vegetative growth is suspended for four to six months during the dry 
season. Both factors lead to a naturally poor secondary forest vegetation, 
which has, in addition, been degraded by man. 
3.1.2 Population 
The last population census in Sierra Leone was conducted in December 
1985. At that time, the population was set at 3.5 million, representing a 
population density of 49 inhabitants per square kilometre. However, this 
figure was believed to be lower than the actual figure, hence, an upward 
adjustment of 5 per cent was made. This adjustment corrected the total 
population number to 3.7 million, equalling a population density of 52 per 
square kilometre. For 1994, the total population is estimated to be 4.6 
million (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994). Hence, the current population 
density would be 64 per square kilometre. 
The regional distribution of the population is unequal, due to the 
physical and economic differences. The highest population densities, are 
found in the Western Area. The capital Freetown has a density of 995 
inhabitants per square kilometre. The second highest population density is 
found in the Eastern Province, due mainly to its coffee and cocoa 
cultivation potential and alluvial diamond mining: 62 inhabitants per square 
kilometre. The two other Provinces, Northern and Southern, have densities 
below the national average with 35, and 38 inhabitants per square 
kilometre, respectively. Note that these are all figures from the National 
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Population Census of 1985, which have not been adjusted by 5 per cent 
(MANR&F/PEMSD, 1986). Furthermore, one has to take into account that 
the rebel war has currently (August 1996) displaced an estimated one 
million people, while a further 300,000 people have sought refuge in 
neighbouring countries, especially in Guinea. Both the displaced people and 
the refugees are mainly inhabitants from the Eastern and Southern 
provinces. Moreover, Sierra Leone hosts refugees from Liberia, who have 
fled the rebel war on several occasions. 
The urbanization of the country has developed rapidly since the 
beginning of the 1960s. The Census of 1963 showed that 19 per cent of the 
population was living in urban areas, growing to 32 per cent in 1985 (ibid.) 
and 34.6 per cent in 1992 (World Bank, 1995b). This increasing 
urbanization is caused mainly by rural-urban migration, especially to the 
capital Freetown (due, in part, to the economic and educational 
opportunities there, but also because of the general attractiveness of urban 
life). More people inhabit Freetown than the four next largest cities (Koidu, 
Bo, Kenema and Makeni) put together, hence, making it a primate city. 
Another indication of the growing urbanization is the increasing number of 
settlements with populations over 2,000. These have increased in number 
from 60 in 1963, to 89 in 1985 (MANR&F/PEMSD, 1986). 
The crude birth rate is still high with 48.2 per thousand, while the 
crude death rate stands at 21.6 per thousand (1990-95 estimated average) 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994). These figures are very high, leading to a 
natural population growth of 2.7 per cent per annum. This, in itself, is a 
relatively moderate figure compared with the Sub-Saharan Africa average 
of 3.0 per cent per year (World Bank, 1995a). Sierra Leone's population 
growth would be higher, if it were not for the high death rate and the high 
infant mortality rate of 163.6 per thousand (World Bank, 1995b). Sadly, the 
average life expectancy at birth of 39.4 years (1993) is one of the lowest 
in the world (ibid.). As in most developing countries, a large part of the 
population is younger than 15 years (43.9 per cent), while the proportion 
of elderly (above 65 years) is estimated at a mere 1.7 per cent (World 
Bank, 1995a, 1993 figures). 
Sierra Leone is an ethnically diverse nation, with 15 distinct tribes within 
its boundaries. No one tribe is dominant in numbers. However, the two 
most important are the Mende, mainly based in the Eastern and Southern 
Provinces, and the Terrine, based mainly in the Northern Province. Both 
represent approximately 30 per cent of the population. The third largest 
tribe, the Limba, make up 8.4 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994). 
The Creoles and Lebanese form minority populations which deserve 
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separate mention. The first descend from freed slaves who settled in the 
"Crown Colony" from the end of the eighteenth century onwards (see 
section 3.1.3). They developed their own culture and language ("Krio"). 
Due to Sierra Leone's specific colonial history, in which the Creoles were 
favoured by the British, they have dominated the country's political and 
economic scene for decades. The role of the Creoles is less important 
nowadays, although Krio is still the lingua franca in Sierra Leone. The 
second minority group, the Lebanese community, dominates the wholesale 
and retailing sector. In this respect, they have largely replaced the Creoles. 
The first Lebanese arrived at the end of the last century. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century on they moved from the Crown Colony 
to the interior ("the Protectorate"), where they established trading posts and, 
gradually, replaced the European trading houses. Their later dominance in 
trade originates from there. Currently, out of a population of about 35,000 
(as of before March 1991 when the rebel war started), there are only 8,000 
Lebanese left (West Africa, 1995). Three-quarters of the Lebanese 
community has fled the country due to the threats of the rebel war. 
3.1.3 History and recent political developments 
Sierra Leone derived its current name from a Portuguese trader who 
baptised the Peninsula "Serra Lyoa" or "Lion Range" in 1462. Legend has 
it that this was either because the mountain ridge remembered him of a 
crouching lion, or because the sound of thunderstorms among the peaks 
sounded like roaring lions. It seems more plausible, however, that the 
Peninsula was home to many lions in the fifteenth century. 
At the end of the eighteenth century, British philanthropists, among 
them Granville Sharpe, founded the "Colony of Freedom" to create a home 
for freed slaves. After the American War of Independence, many slaves 
had deserted from their southern plantation owners to the British and later 
ended up in London, Liverpool and Bristol. Some of these were assembled 
and shipped to the Peninsula, where the town of Freetown was founded. 
During the next decades, these first settlers were joined by other former 
slaves, either freed at sea by the British navy or coming from Northern 
America. In 1808, the Colony became a British territory because the 
financial difficulties of Granville Sharp cum suis made it impossible to run 
the colony any longer. Sierra Leone (i.e. that part of it what is now the 
Western Area) became a "Crown Colony". During the next decades, the 
interior still was of no importance to the colonial administration. This 
changed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, during the general 
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scramble for Africa. The British felt the need to define the boundaries with 
Liberia and French Guinea. Thus, in 1896, the Protectorate (with its 
inhabitants being British protected persons, not British civilians as in the 
Colony) came into existence, and Sierra Leone's present-day territory was 
created. The legal division between the inhabitants of the Colony (mainly 
Krios) and the Protectorate was also reflected in the higher educational, 
social and political status of the former. In this period, Freetown also 
became the main British naval base for West Africa and the administration 
centre for other colonial territories along the coast. Many Krios were 
employed in the government service. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Sierra Leone had become 
a complex state, subdivided in two, unequally developed areas. Initially, the 
Krio minority was relatively powerful, due to its head start in education 
and business. Later on, the population of the Protectorate gained better 
access to educational facilities, while the arrival of the Lebanese 
diminished the Krio importance in trade. Gradually, the Krio lost their 
position as a dominating class. This was reflected in a change in the 
balance of political power after the second World War. The new 
constitution of 1947 gave the Protectorate 14 seats on the Legislative 
Council, while the Colony had to be satisfied with only seven. The power 
struggle that followed was fought mainly between the Sierra Leone 
People's Party (SLPP), representing the Protectorate and the Krio-based 
National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL). The two brothers Milton and 
Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens were the founding members of SLPP. The 
elections of 1951 were clearly won by SLPP, which gradually took over 
power from the colonial administration. Just before Independence in 1961, 
Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens left SLPP, and founded opposition 
parties. Stevens formed the All People's Congress (APC) and was detained 
by Milton Margai in his capacity as Prime Minister, during the transition 
period before independence. The general elections of 1962 were still won 
by SLPP, but confirmed a massive support for APC. After Milton Margai 
died in 1964, he was succeeded by his returned brother, Albert. During the 
next year, SLPP became less and less popular because it seemed to 
squander foreign funds and was not concerned with thriving corruption. As 
a result, the general elections of 1967 were won by APC and Stevens was 
appointed Prime Minister. Immediately, a military coup took place and 
Stevens went into exile. In April 1968, after a mutiny in the lower ranks, 
a counter coup was staged and Stevens was invited to assume power again. 
The following years were characterized by the accumulation of power 
and personal wealth by Siaka Stevens. He used his mixed (Vai-Limba) 
background to divide and rule and to effectively dismantle the opposition. 
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This led to the declaration of a one-party state in 1978, and the absorption 
of SLPP into APC. During the Stevens era, the country experienced high 
inflation rates and the economy deteriorated. This was topped in 1980, 
when Stevens hosted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference, 
which has cost approximately US Dollars 100 million. Many of the 
economic problems of later years could be traced back to the hosting of the 
OAU Conference. In 1985, Siaka Stevens was succeeded by Major General 
Joseph Momoh. Stevens chose Momoh himself, thus bypassing his two 
vice-presidents, Sorie Koroma and Francis Minan. Momoh's "New Order" 
government was received enthusiastically at first, but declined in popularity 
when it appeared to be not so very different from the Stevens rule. The 
economy was still in disarray, corruption remained massive and political 
unrest and an alleged coup attempt led to the execution of 18 of the coup 
plotters. A state of economic emergency was declared at the end of 1987 
and the national currency, the Leone (Le), was devaluated one year later. 
However, the economic performance hardly altered. This did not improve 
when in March 1991, rebel forces invaded the country from Liberia. 
Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL), the main rebel faction there, was widely thought to have instigated 
this rebel war. The invading rebels called themselves the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), and were led by a former corporal in the Sierra 
Leonean army, Foday Sankoh. Apparently, the invasion was meant to 
destabilize Sierra Leone, because it had actively supported the military and 
political actions of the Economic Community of West African States 
(Ecowas) to stop the rebel war in Liberia. However, Sankoh himself 
claimed that RUF wanted to liberate Sierra Leone from the APC tyranny 
and to establish a multi-party democracy. 
Initially, RUF made rapid advances, especially in the Eastern Province. 
The Sierra Leonean army was not capable of issuing effective resistance 
against the rebels, because the soldiers were ill-equipped and poorly 
motivated. After the rebel advances of the first three months, the war 
lingered on in a deadlock situation, in which neither the army, nor the 
rebels gained the upper hand. In the first months of 1992, front soldiers 
were getting tired of the lack of material support and of not receiving their 
salaries, and decided to travel to Freetown. There, 400 of them demanded 
better conditions and their pay. The government declared the demands 
unfounded, and stated that the soldiers would be punished. To avoid their 
almost certain death, the soldiers toppled the Momoh regime, although this 
was apparently not their initial intention. They set up the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), a military junta, to stop the rebel war 
rapidly and to pave the way for multi-party elections. The NPRC members 
Concise Introduction 69 
were all very young. Captain Valentine Strasser became Head of State at 
the age of 27. Many in Sierra Leone felt that NPRC manifested an 
inevitable reaction against the former APC government, and the 
"Revolution" was greeted with great enthusiasm (Strasser was even 
nicknamed "the Redeemer", and his face was seen on posters, wall 
paintings and t-shirts all over the country). Cleaning days were announced, 
on which every Sierra Leonean was expected to clean up the vicinity of his 
house. Furthermore, in all public places (including bars and restaurants) 
letter boxes were placed in which letters to NPRC could be dropped with 
"suggestions to improve society". After the initial public appreciation and 
visible changes, the enthusiasm somewhat faded away, because NPRC was 
not capable of ending the rebel war. Sankoh's aim to overthrow the APC 
government became more and more of a farce, because RUF refused to halt 
their attacks, although the APC regime no longer existed. 
In spite of the unsolved conflict, the military junta was put under an 
immense pressure from the western donors to re-introduce the (western) 
democratic principles and organize multi-party elections. Parliamentary and 
presidential elections were held in February and March 1996. The new 
President became SLPP's Tejan Kabbah. Immediately after the elections, 
President Kabbah continued the peace negotiations which NPRC and RUF 
started several months before elections. A cease fire was concluded, but so 
far (August 1996) no definitive peace accord had been reached yet. This 
prevents Kabbah from implementing the proposed programmes of 
reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. One of the major 
bottlenecks in the negotiations is the presence of the Executives Outcomes. 
This South African group of mercenaries has been brought into the country 
by NPRC to protect the diamond-rich Kono District, probably in exchange 
for mining rights for South African mining firms. In 1995, the mercenaries 
drove the RUF out of Kono District, cutting off its most important source 
to continue its armed operations. Therefore, RUF wants the Executive 
Outcomes to leave the country before a peace accord can be signed. 
To date (mid 1996), several armed groups rebels are still at work on 
the countryside attacking food convoys, villages and towns, mostly for 
profit but often to find food and medicines and to create panic and 
confusion among the local population. At the moment several armed groups 
can be identified, such as the "sobéis" who are soldiers by day and rebels 
by night. Others are armed young bandits with support of officers of the 
Sierra Leonean Army. An important group to be named are RUF fighters 
who disagree with the negotiations and who are not controlled any more 
by RUF leaders. They roam the country to attack villages and create havoc. 
These groups are able to gain economically from the war. The political 
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motive, if it has ever existed, has since long been replaced by economic 
motives. 
3.1.4 Administrative structure 
After the proclamation of the Protectorate in 1896, Sierra Leone did not 
only consist of two socially, economically and politically different areas, 
but these were governed differently as well. The system of local 
government in the Colony was based on the British model, and was a form 
of direct rule. In the Protectorate, however, the indirect rule system was 
applied. On the one hand, this was an economic necessity, Britain could 
not afford the large number of European officials needed to administer the 
interior. On the other hand, it did not seem wise to deprive the local chiefs 
abruptly of their traditional authority. Furthermore, the population of the 
Protectorate was not used to British laws and customs, while the Colony 
had already experienced a century of British rule before 1896. 
The system of traditional leaders and institutions as it existed in the 
Protectorate had to be modified to a certain extent. Indirect rule was meant 
to ensure peace and stability (for the colonizers) and could do without 
distasteful activities, such as ritual executions. But the administrative 
organization also had to be adapted. The Protectorate was divided into 
districts, which were headed by British District Commissioners. Later, 
Provinces headed by Provincial Commissioners and consisting of several 
districts, were introduced. The districts were divided into chiefdoms, which 
were to be led by local rulers, who were called "Paramount Chiefs". The 
legal system was hierarchically reorganized into three types of Courts. The 
Paramount Chiefs were to be responsible for the "Court of the Native 
Chiefs", or "Native Court". This lowest placed Court in the legal hierarchy 
had to deal with civil cases of the local population. This system remained 
in effect until 1937. Then, the "Native Administration" system was 
formally introduced. This system was meant to specify the chiefdom 
administration. The chiefdom was designated "Tribal Authority", consisting 
of all the chiefs, councillors and older men elected by the chiefdom 
population, with the Paramount Chief as head. The main responsibilities of 
the Native Administration were to maintain law and order, to exercise 
control over chiefdom land, the collection of local tax and the provision of 
certain local services as primary education and local sanitation. In the 
Colony, consisting of the Peninsula, some of the coastal islands and a small 
rural area, the administration was by means of direct rule. The Freetown 
City Council, the Rural Areas Council and the Sherbro Urban District 
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Council were the implementing bodies. 
The Tribal Authorities Act of 1964 defined the local administration as 
it is still known today. The "Tribal Authorities" were renamed "Chiefdom 
Councillors" while the "Native Administration" was now called "Chiefdom 
Administration". The Chiefdom Councillors together formed the Chiefdom 
Council, and comprised the Paramount Chief, the other chiefs and the 
ordinary councillors, who were elected on the basis of being representatives 
of every 20 taxpayers. The daily affairs of the chiefdom would be cared for 
by the Chiefdom Committee, which was appointed by the Chiefdom 
Council from their midst. The chairman of the Chiefdom Committee was 
the Paramount Chief, while the Chiefdom Speaker, the vice-head of a 
chiefdom, was the vice-chairman. Important to note is that the Chiefdom 
Administration is traditionally organized and, hence, familiar to the 
chiefdom population. The hierarchical chieftaincy structure is more trusted, 
and complied to, than the formal government. This also means that any 
locally based initiative, be it the implementation of a development 
programme or the start of a co-operative, for example, even nowadays has 
to start with the consultation of the Paramount Chief. So, the Chief can be 
instrumental in the success or failure of such a venture. 
The current administrative division of Sierra Leone is as follows (see map 
3.2). There are now four main administrative regions, i.e. three provinces, 
formerly the Protectorate, and the Western Area, formerly the Colony. The 
Western Area consists of the Western Urban Area, i.e. Freetown, and the 
Western Rural Area, consisting of Freetown's surroundings and some 
islands off the Peninsula Coast. The provinces are the Northern, Southern 
and Eastern provinces. These are each divided into districts. Each district 
is divided into chiefdoms. There are a total of 12 districts and 148 
chiefdoms in Sierra Leone today (MANR&F/PEMSD, 1986). 
3.1.5 Economy 
In the 1995 Human Development Report, published by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Sierra Leone was ranked as number 173 
out of 174 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1995). 
Since colonial times, the economy of Sierra Leone has been largely based 
on the export of primary products, notably mineral and agricultural crops. 
Despite its substantial mineral resources and amply available arable lands, 
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it is one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita GNP2 of 
US Dollars 150 in 1993 (World Bank, 1995b). Moreover, this income is 
unevenly distributed, 68 per cent of the population were living in absolute 
poverty in 1990 (World Bank, 1994b). 
In the 1960s already, the exports increased less rapidly than both 
imports and government expenditures. This resulted in a financial crisis that 
was attempted to be remedied by implementing an IMF stabilization 
programme between 1966 and 1969. In the 1970s, the performance of the 
economy was very much influenced by rising import prices for oil and 
manufactured goods, but also for food, especially rice. At the same time, 
the government's uncontrollable expenditures led to liquidity crisis after 
liquidity crisis. Besides government expenditures, debts were the only parts 
of the economy that were growing. In the first half of the 1980s, the 
situation became even worse. Declining exports led to decreasing imports 
and both led to the diminished tax base for the government, hence, to 
shrinking revenues. Investment in infrastructure came to a virtual standstill, 
inflation accelerated and real wages eroded, moreover, civil servants were 
often not paid their salaries. The US Dollar value of imports, which 
showed a record 300 million in 1980/81 due to the hosting of the OAU 
Conference, fell to 123 million in 1985/86 (ibid.). At the end of the 1980s, 
Sierra Leone's economy could be characterized by low productivity levels, 
low domestic investments, high unemployment and intense smuggling of 
diamonds and cash crops due to an overvalued exchange rate. It then 
became increasingly clear that something had to be done. 
Structural Adjustment 
The first attempts to improve the structural imbalances of the economy 
were implemented in 1989 by the Momoh regime, without external 
financial backing. The measures were aimed at, amongst others, the 
liberalization of foreign and domestic trade. In practice this meant, as far 
as the agricultural produce trade is concerned, that from January 1989 
onwards, private traders were allowed to purchase coffee and cocoa from 
producers at their own prices. The system of official producer prices was 
thus abolished. It was argued that this would lead to more competition 
between traders and, hence, to higher prices for farmers. We will see later 
whether this was indeed the case. 
2
 Gross National Product. World Bank (199S) defines it as 'the total domestic and 
foreign value added claimed by residents' (p. 11). It consists of GDP (see note 
3) and the net factor income from abroad. 
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Although the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) had 
lost their purchase monopoly, the Board remained the sole exporter of 
coffee and cocoa (see also section 6.3). Private traders were also allowed 
to import rice with their own foreign exchange, 40 per cent of the coffee 
and cocoa export proceeds was paid to them in foreign exchange by the 
Board. Other measures included adjustments of the exchange rate. The 
Leone was first devalued in March 1989 and January 1990, followed by the 
introduction of a market determined exchange rate in April 1990. As a 
result of these early adjustment measures, inflation slowed down and 
government revenues increased. 
These positive macroeconomic results, in addition to the donor 
community's appreciation of the government's efforts and good will, led 
to the approval of a Rights Accumulation Programme (RAP) for the years 
1992 and 1993 by IMF. The objectives of RAP were to restore 
macroeconomic stability, to improve resource allocation and to strengthen 
the balance of payments position (World Bank, 1992b). Under RAP, the 
government could earn "Rights" to credit at the end of the two year period. 
These "Rights" were equivalent to its outstanding arrears to IMF, valued 
at US Dollars 119 million at the time. Also in April 1990, the World Bank 
approved a "Reconstruction Import Credit" (RIC) of almost US Dollars 50 
million to support the structural reforms. RIC provided foreign exchange 
to be used to import essential raw materials, including oil and petroleum 
products, spare parts and rice, which would have a stabilizing effect on the 
economy (ibid.). Furthermore, under RIC, the Public Enterprise Reform and 
Divestiture Commission (PERDIC) was established to implement the 
privatization and restructuring of parastatale, including SLPMB (GOSL, 
1993). 
The re-establishment of the formal relations with the World Bank and 
IMF took place shortly before the April 29 coup. To ensure external 
credibility, some of the initial appointments to ¿he NPRC junta were 
reckoned to soothe foreign creditors. Notably the decision to keep Jim 
Funna as Minister of Finance and Abdul Turay as the Governor of the 
Bank of Sierra Leone (the Central Bank), were well received. It worked. 
The new government managed to earn the confidence of the international 
donor community, although this was temporarily halted at the end of 1992. 
On December 31 1992, 26 alleged coup plotters (linked with APC) were 
executed on one of Freetown's beaches, without a proper trial or legal 
representation. Western governments protested heavily against the 
execution and the United Kingdom, France and Italy even suspended their 
aid to the country. The release of political prisoners, the demobilization of 
child-soldiers, as well as several cabinet reshuffles led to the resumption 
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of credit and aid flows in 1994. 
At the macroeconomic level, the structural reforms seem successful. 
The budget deficit went down from 12 per cent of GDP3 in 1990, to 7 per 
cent of GDP in 1993. Inflation rates decelerated from (often) well over 100 
per cent per annum in the 1980s, to less than 25 per cent in 1993, and even 
to 15 per cent in 1994. Moreover, the government announced that it had 
laid off more than one third of the civil service (World Bank, 1994a). The 
government had further made it known that it was well on its way to 
privatizing and restructuring about 40 public enterprises (including SLPMB, 
the Sierra Leone Petroleum Refinery Company and several hotels). In 
addition, in 1993 a Public Investment Programme (PIP) for 1993/94 to 
1995/96 was announced. PIP aimed to restore the physical and social 
infrastructure, easing the structural problems of the economy, and to 
rehabilitate the war-affected areas (GOSL, 1993). Total costs were 
estimated at US Dollars 400 million, for which the World Bank, the 
European Union (EU), the African Development Bank (ADB) and World 
Food Programme (WFP) had committed funding. 
Both the efforts and the achievements of the government were 
appreciated. In February 1994, IMF announced that Sierra Leone had 
successfully completed the conditional terms of RAP. A month later, the 
Consultive Group for Sierra Leone, a World Bank-led donor group of 14 
organizations and six countries, was ready to provide further loans. In 
March 1994, US Dollars 350 million (of which 130 million was project 
aid) was made available to the country for the running year (World Bank, 
1994a). Furthermore, on March 28, it was announced that a Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF) of US Dollars 38 million for one year and an 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of US Dollars 125 million 
for ten years, was agreed on. Both SAF and ESAF were loans, repayable 
in ten years after grace periods of six months and five years, respectively, 
at an annual interest rate of 0.5 per cent. 
So, the new government has been able to restore its credibility with 
external creditors during the past three years. This has resulted in 
considerable amounts of credit and aid flowing into the country again. 
These are badly needed. Substantial amounts of foreign funding are 
3
 Gross Domestic Product. It is defined as the aggregated output of goods and 
services for final use. It can be calculated in the local currency (as is here the 
case). It can also be calculated in another, more stable, currency, when inflation 
rates blur a clear vision, notably in the case of comparisons between countries. 
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required to reverse the trend of stagnation and recession. However, the 
continuing rebel war makes the sectoral recovery of the economy extremely 
difficult. Exports, both of coffee and cocoa, but also of diamonds, have 
dropped considerably. Private foreign investment remains low, partly due 
to the on-going rebel war. We will now see that, besides the structural 
bottlenecks at the macro level, there are also sectoral problems to 
overcome, macroeconomic measures being necessary but insufficient to 
improve the position of the population as a whole. 
Mining, industry and services 
Mining has for decades been the dominant sector of the Sierra Leonean 
economy. It started in the 1930s, and soon after became the country's 
largest export earner. In 1990/91, 89 per cent of all export earnings came 
from the mining sector. However, its share of GDP, 10 per cent in the 
same year, is far less than the share of the agricultural sector. 
Diamonds, rutile and bauxite are Sierra Leone's three most important 
mined minerals. Gold is officially mined on a small scale, but hardly 
contributes to either GDP or export earnings. Illicit gold mining, however, 
is believed to occupy some 25,000 to 40,000 people (World Bank, 1993). 
Up until 1975, iron ore was also mined at Marampa, but it was stopped due 
to technical difficulties and a depressed market. The mine reopened briefly 
in 1981, but financial, management and technical difficulties led to a 
suspension of operations in 1985. 
Traditionally, the principal mineral export earner was diamond mining. 
Alluvial diamonds are found mainly in the Kono District of the Eastern 
Province, around Yengema and Koidu. The diamonds were mined by both 
the, partly state-owned, Diamond Mining Company (DIMINCO) and 
individual miners. After 1971, revenues from diamond mining began to 
decline, which was caused both by a decrease in official output and by 
lower market prices. Illegal output was smuggled abroad, especially to 
Liberia. The smuggling, euphemistically called "parallel market activities", 
has increased steadily since the 1970s, due to low prices paid by the local 
buying centres. DIMINCO was succeeded by the National Diamond Mining 
Company (NDMC) in order to streamline mining operations and to halt 
parallel market activities, to no avail, however. In 1990/91, diamonds 
accounted for 19 per cent of the total export value of minerals, compared 
to 66 per cent in 1980/81 (Minster/Abco, 1993b). 
Bauxite has been mined since 1964 in the Mokanji Hills (Moyamba 
District) by the Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company (SffiROMCO), a 
subsidiary of a Swiss company. The output of bauxite has gradually 
expanded, and its export value exceeds that of diamonds since 1987/88. In 
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1990/91, bauxite accounted for 21 per cent of total mineral export earnings, 
compared with 12 per cent in 1980/81 (ibid.). 
Also rutile, or titanium dioxide, has overtaken diamonds as most 
important mined mineral (since 1985/86). It is used for making titanium, 
but is also an ingredient for white paint and non-sticking layers in frying 
pans. Sierra Leone possesses apparently the largest proven reserve of rutile 
in the world. The American owned company Sierra Rutile Limited started 
rutile production in 1979 near Bonthe. Also more to the west, around 
Rotifunk, rutile was discovered, and in 1991 production started there. In 
1980/81, rutile export earnings accounted already for 21 per cent of total 
mineral export earnings. This proportion steadily increased to 57 per cent 
in 1990/91, mainly due to the decline in value and volume of diamonds 
(ibid.). Although a major foreign exchange earner, Sierra Rutile was 
increasingly criticised for causing environmental damage. As a result, the 
company now provides funding for rehabilitation projects in their area of 
operation, implemented by CARE, an international NGO (see also section 
9.2). 
So, the mining sector is still the main source of government revenue 
and export earnings, but it is changing as far as the importance of its 
component parts is concerned. But although the mining sector is of 
considerable export earning importance, it employs barely 1 per cent of the 
total labour force and contributes only 10 per cent to GDP (Minster/Abco, 
1993a). Currently, all mining operations have been virtually halted due to 
the rebel war. At first, only diamond mining was affected. Official output 
became zero when NDMC stopped operating in 1993, due to both the 
government's commitment to privatization, and the rebel activities in the 
Kono area. However, this does not mean that diamond mining operations 
stopped completely. Both the army and RUF (and other) rebels have been 
accused of mining illegally. Furthermore, in January 1995, RUF attacked 
the mines of Sierra Rutile and SIEROMCO, and abducted many hostages, 
including foreigners. Since then, both mines have ceased their operations. 
It will take a significant period before Sierra Leone will receive benefits 
from these mines again, even if they are reopened soon, because the mines, 
especially the Sierra Rutile mine, have suffered considerable damage. 
Despite the many attempts since independence to develop the 
manufacturing industry by means of import substitution strategies, this 
sector is still a small contributor to GDP, with only 5 per cent in 1990/91 
(CSO, 1992). Most firms are producing consumer goods for the domestic 
market and are in the field of light manufacturing. Typical goods are 
cigarettes, beer, stout and soft drinks, plastic footwear and small furniture. 
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The heavy reliance on imported capital goods and semi-raw materials, often 
coupled with a scarcity of foreign exchange, has negatively affected output. 
Furthermore, the declining domestic economy eroded domestic demand, 
resulting in stagnating and declining sales. Of course, the rebel war is also 
not helping in this respect. 
When looking at the contribution to GDP, the service sector is the 
largest economic sector in Sierra Leone at 46 per cent (ibid.). The 
wholesale and retail trade and the hotels and restaurants account for about 
half of this percentage, with finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services contributing significantly. Tourism has a great growth potential, 
but its development is currently hindered by both the on-going rebel war 
and the lack of infrastructure (notably transport and accommodation 
facilities). There are plans to invest millions of US Dollars in order to 
develop tourism in Sierra Leone, but these plans are presently frozen due 
to the lack of security. 
Agriculture 
As in almost all developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
agricultural sector in Sierra Leone dominates the economy. It contributed 
38 per cent to GDP in 1990/91 (CSO, 1992) and 9 per cent to export 
earnings in the same fiscal year (Minster/Abco, 1993a). Even more 
important is the fact that it employs the overwhelming majority of the 
labour force: 62 per cent in 1988/89 for the whole of Sierra Leone, but 78 
per cent for the rural areas (CSO, 1992). This discrepancy between the 
percentage contribution towards GDP and the employment generated is an 
indication of the sector's low productivity. Although still of considerable 
importance, the share of export crops in total export earnings has been 
declining from 1988/89 onwards. This is not only due to a lower 
performance (in US Dollars) of the production of export crops, but also to 
the increasing importance of the mining sector, especially rutile. 
In concordance with the current mainstream in development thinking 
(see, for example, Johnny, 1985; World Bank 1989 and 1991; ILO/JASPA, 
1990) and given the importance of the agricultural sector in the rural areas, 
agriculture must be considered the prime potential engine of growth. More 
particularly, it seems to be the only sector capable of absorbing the growth 
of the labour force and the increasing number of unemployed. 
Agricultural production in Sierra Leone is dominated by small scale 
farmers, who primarily try to produce enough food to maintain themselves 
and their families. This means that the average Sierra Leonean farmer is 
subsistence-oriented. Once in a while he may produce a coincidental 
surplus, depending on external factors, of which the weather is the most 
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important. This is not to say that the same average farmer only produces 
for home consumption. Most farmers are forced to produce at least partially 
for the market because the increasing monetarization of the economy 
requires them to earn at least a small amount of cash. First of all, every 
Sierra Leonean citizen is compelled to pay local tax, but also the education 
(school fees) and health systems (medical fees) are nowadays important 
cash demanders. In short, a farmer usually grows part of his production 
with the intention of selling it, so he is practising what we call the semi-
commercial type of commercial agriculture (see section 4.1.4). The type of 
product he is producing with the intention of selling, typically depends on 
the regional context of the farmer: a farmer from the north will generally 
produce groundnuts for the market, while a farmer who originates from the 
southeast will most commonly try to produce coffee, cocoa or oil palm 
products as a means of obtaining a cash income. 
Food production 
The agrarian sector of Sierra Leone is potentially capable of producing 
enough food to feed the entire population, and even of producing a surplus 
which could be exported. Until the mid 1950s, for example, the country 
produced enough rice to meet internal demand, and even an occasional 
exportable surplus. Since 1954, however, the government has been forced 
to import ever increasing amounts of rice to close the gap between food 
production and national demand. Table 3.1 shows the self-sufficiency ratio 
of the national rice production and its decline since the end of the 1970s, 
leading to increased levels of rice imports4. 
In general, the following reasons can be given for the declining food 
production, more specifically of rice. First of all, there is the population 
growth, which was 1.9 per cent per annum between 1963 and 1974, 2.3 per 
cent between 1974 and 1985 and 2.7 per cent between 1990 and 1994 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994). This, together with the phenomenon of a 
growing non-agricultural labour force, resulted in relatively fewer farmers 
having to produce food for ever increasing numbers of people. In other 
words, the productivity in the agricultural sector has had to increase in 
order to keep up with the demand. Implicitly this has meant that the 
subsistence-oriented farmer has had to convert himself into a more market-
oriented, surplus-producing farmer. Given the available technology, input 
4
 The self-sufficiency ratio is represented by the figure of the domestically milled 
rice production, expressed as a percentage of the total rice supply (i.e. 
production plus imports). 
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provision structures and extension services in Sierra Leone, this was too 
much to be asked. 
Table 3.1 Rice supply and demand in Sierra Leone (metric tons), 
1977/78-1991/92 
Year 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
Domestic 
paddy (1) 
620.0 
641.0 
598.9 
556.0 
523.5 
523.5 
460.2 
504.5 
430.0 
525.0 
547.9 
493.1 
517.8 
543.7 
411.1 
Production 
milled (2) 
325.4 
336.4 
336.4 
314.4 
291.9 
274.8 
274.8 
167.4 
225.8 
275.6 
287.7 
258.9 
271.9 
285.4 
215.8 
Imports 
(3) 
15.0 
6.7 
22.5 
76.5 
53.1 
91.1 
23.7 
73.6 
118.3 
67.7 
75.6 
120.1 
123.7 
141.1 
107.2 
Total 
(4) 
340.4 
343.1 
358.9 
390.0 
345.0 
365.9 
298.5 
241.0 
344.1 
343.3 
363.3 
379.0 
395.6 
426.5 
323.0 
Self-sufficiency ratio 
(2) as % of (4) 
95.6 
98.0 
93.7 
80.4 
84.4 
75.1 
92.1 
69.5 
65.6 
80.3 
79.2 
68.3 
68.3 
66.9 
66.8 
Sources: PEMSD (1986; 1993); Minster/Abco (1993a); authors' calculations. 
Second, the fact that the non-agricultural labour force has been growing, 
is directly related to the attractiveness of the mining sector. The 
legalization of private alluvial diamond digging in 1956 caused a type of 
rural exodus. According to Levi (1976), between 1956 and 1957, some 
50,000 to 70,000 men were pulled to the mining fields. Even though the 
migration to the mining sites is believed to be less now than it used to be, 
it still continues. Nowadays farmers are still attracted by the thought of 
earning quick money, which is related to the bleak opportunities for 
earning a reasonable income in the agricultural sector. They leave their 
village before, or even during, the planting season for rice, to work in the 
mine fields for some months, and return too late to be able to plant rice. 
A more general rural-urban migration, of people in search of more 
profitable (non-agricultural) jobs in towns and cities has also occurred. 
Third, in recent World Bank reports it has been argued that the 
government was depressing the incentives to produce rice domestically. 
This was achieved by setting the consumer price of rice at a low level, in 
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order to satisfy urban demand (World Bank, 1992a and 1992b). Others see 
this line of argument as less explanatory, because the Sierra Leonean 
government was not capable of controlling the prices that consumers had 
to pay. So, the black market price of rice was higher than the price that 
was set by the government. This leads to the conclusion that because there 
was no administered price, the price of rice was determined by market 
forces, instead of by the setting of a minimum producer price 
(Minster/Abco, 1993a). Hence, notwithstanding the low administered price 
of rice, the black market price could still be an incentive for rice farmers. 
Moreover, Weeks (1992) argues that from the beginning of the 1980s, 
domestic rice prices were almost equal to international prices. This would 
have been exactly the price incentive which the World Bank claimed that 
was missing. 
Finally, the increasing monetarization of the national economy has 
meant that many farmers, at least partly, diverted their attention from rice 
production, and concentrated more on cash crops. Inevitably this led to a 
drop in rice production because, as mentioned before, the labour 
productivity of those remaining in the rice production sector did not 
increase. Consequently, the acreage of the areas cultivated with rice had to 
decline (see table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Cultivated areas of selected crops in Sierra Leone (in 
hectares), 1970/71-1984/85 
Crop 1970/71 1984/85 
Coffee 48,391 64,000 
Cocoa 26,641 39,145 
Swamp rice 83,694 94,881 
Upland rice 243,116 224,011 
Rice total (all ecologies) 326,810 318,892 
Source: PEMSD (1993). 
We see that the total cultivated acreages of rice have decreased. This is 
especially the case for upland rice. 
The conclusion must be that the performance of the rice producing sector 
in Sierra Leone is declining. The total area cultivated with rice is declining, 
labour productivity is not increasing, thus the amount of domestically 
produced rice is decreasing. This means that the amounts of rice that have 
to be imported to feed the population are increasing as well, clearly shown 
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by the trend of a declining self-sufficiency ratio of rice production. 
We have also seen that the decreasing acreage of land cultivated with 
rice has been accompanied by an increase in the area cultivated with 
certain cash crops. The production of cash crops is, therefore, of increasing 
importance for the Sierra Leonean economy. 
Cash crop production 
The agricultural sector in Sierra Leone is not only important for the 
provision of food for the population, but it also contributes to export 
earnings and government revenue. 
The package of agrarian products which are exported consists of only 
a few products, namely kola nuts, ginger, piassava, oil palm products, 
tobacco and, more importantly, coffee and cocoa. The latter two 
contributed 82 per cent of total agricultural exports in 1991 (BSL, 1993). 
During the early 1980s, the export of the first four products almost ceased, 
probably due to too low producer prices. 
Table 3-3 SLPMB coffee purchases, export prices and export earnings, 
1975/76-1987/88 
Year 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
Purchases 
(x 1,000 tons) 
4.6 
10.0 
4.4 
13.3 
10.1 
9.2 
8.6 
5.0 
2.1 
10.0 
5.9 
5.5 
7.6 
Export price/ton 
(x 1,000 Le) 
1,449 
4,668 
4,029 
3,150 
3.885 
n.a.' 
2,246 
2,747 
5,263 
14,189 
12,982 
80,910 
58,605 
Export earnings 
(x 1,000 Le) 
6,665.4 
46,680.0 
17,727.6 
41,895.0 
39,238.5 
-
20,663.2 
13,735.0 
11,052.3 
141,890.0 
76,593.8 
445,005.0 
445,398.0 
Export price figures in Leones for 1980/81 are not mentioned in several 
government and international reports. 
Sources: SLPMB (1993); BSL (1993); authors' calculations. 
For the national economy, cash crop production became more and more 
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important until 1987/88, because of the declining performance of the 
mining sector. Agricultural export formed, on average 15 per cent of total 
export earnings during the first half of the 1970s, but by 1987/88 it reached 
30 per cent (World Bank, 1992b). This increased percentage of the share 
of agricultural exports was due mainly to a rise in prices for export crops, 
rather than an increase in volume, while the prices for minerals remained 
relatively stable. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show, for the period 1975/76 to 
1987/88, the purchases by SLPMB of coffee and cocoa, together with their 
increasing export prices and export earnings. 
From the season 1987/88 onwards, however, the trend reversed. 
Mineral exports became relatively more important, while the share of 
agricultural exports declined again, due to lower world market prices for 
coffee and cocoa. 
Table 3.4 SLPMB cocoa purchases, export prices and export earnings, 
1975/76-1987/88 
Year 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
Purchases 
(x 1,000 tons) 
6.0 
7.4 
6.6 
7.2 
10.5 
9.2 
7.6 
10.0 
9.0 
10.9 
9.1 
8.1 
7.7 
Export price/ton 
(x 1,000 Le) 
1,311 
2,984 
3,487 
3,584 
3,465 
n.a.' 
2,331 
2,747 
5,731 
9,440 
13,056 
82,800 
40,250 
Export earnings 
(x 1,000 Le) 
7,866.0 
22,081.6 
23,014.2 
25,804.8 
36,382.5 
-
17,715.6 
27,470.0 
51.579.0 
102.896.0 
118,809.6 
670,680.0 
309,925.0 
Export price figures in Leones for 1980/81 are not mentioned in several 
government and international reports. 
Sources: SLPMB (1993); BSL (1993); authors' calculations. 
So, the agricultural sector is the dominant economic sector in Sierra Leone. 
Apart from being an important contributor to GDP, the sector also is the 
only possible source of livelihood for the majority of the population of 
Sierra Leone, and it is also the only sector which is capable of providing 
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employment for a vast number of people. However, the labour productivity 
in agriculture is low. Despite the fact that in the past several policy 
measures have been designed to increase the level of agricultural 
production and to improve the labour productivity, low production and 
productivity levels and seasonal underemployment continue to exist. 
Low productivity is caused by several factors, of which a weak 
extension service, limited use and availability of improved seeds, pesticides 
and fertilizers are the most prominent. However, the base for the growth 
potential of the agricultural sector is formed by the physical production 
conditions. In chapter 4 we will elaborate more on the agricultural resource 
base of Sierra Leone, and highlight some of the bottlenecks in increasing 
the production and productivity levels in the sector. 
3.1.6 (Agricultural) development policies since 1961 
The history of development planning in Sierra Leone is characterized by 
the verbal support of the development of the agricultural sector. However, 
as we will see, the actual implementation of the agricultural development 
policy objectives often differed from the statements or even did not take 
place at all. According to Johnny (1985), the successive colonial and post-
colonial Sierra Leonean governments were always concerned with three 
main objectives, namely to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production, to 
increase the income from the agricultural sector and to preserve the 
production potential (i.e. soils and forests) for future generations. 
There have been a few documented agricultural development plans 
during colonial times, which were mainly concerned with the promotion of 
cash crop production (to achieve the second objective that Johnny 
discerned) and the production of sufficient food to feed the population (to 
achieve the first objective). We confine ourselves here to the more recent 
past and describe the different development plans and programmes as they 
have been formulated since Sierra Leone's independence, specifically with 
regard to their attention to, and (intended) impact on, agriculture. 
The (first) National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79 was the first 
comprehensive policy document on development goals since independence 
in 1961. The period since independence was characterized by slow 
economic growth, based largely on the demand for minerals. Due to this 
export concentration, government's revenue, incomes and the country's 
import capacity were vulnerable (Minster/Abco, 1993a). Diversification of 
the economy was seen as necessary, so development efforts were to be 
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concentrated more on the agricultural sector. The most important goals that 
were formulated in the Plan, regarding the agricultural sector, were the 
following: 
1) to achieve an annual growth of agricultural output of 5 per cent; 
2) to become self-sufficient in rice production; 
3) to increase the levels of productivity, incomes and living conditions of 
the rural population; 
4) to reduce food imports and to maximize foreign exchange earnings by 
stimulating exports and by import substitution; 
5) to increase rural employment by stimulating investments in agricultural 
enterprises; and: 
6) to diversificate crop production (GOSL, 1974). 
Later on, two other goals were added (Sandiford, 1991), which determined 
the situation in the agricultural sector for the next decade: 
7) these goals should be implemented through a series of Integrated 
Agricultural Development Projects (IADPs), which were to cover the 
country completely by 1985 (Johnny, 1985); and: 
8) to decentralize the executive functions of the government. 
The World Bank (1981b) judged the Plan as reasonable. At the same time 
the Bank stated that the plan implementation differed from the plan 
objectives. It pointed out that many key development projects were not 
materialized, because they required foreign technology and know-how 
which were hard to attract during a worldwide recession. Also the 
government's priorities for resource allocation did not always coincide with 
the goals of the Plan. Especially the inadequate price incentive structure, 
the lack of farm inputs and a weak institutional structure were seen as 
direct causes for inhibiting a positive supply response from farmers 
(Minster/Abco, 1993a). 
The implementation of the Development Plan through IADPs will be 
briefly dealt with here. The projects were regionally based and large scale. 
Their task was to support small farmers by, for instance, providing farm 
inputs (credit, pesticides, fertilizers and so on), providing training 
opportunities in efficient production techniques and by the provision of 
extension facilities (Binns, 1977). The prototype IADP is a semi-
autonomous regional development authority, not falling under the authority 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). The projects are 
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directly answerable to the Permanent Secretary (of MAF) instead. As a 
rule, project management was headed by expatriates. To increase 
agricultural production by providing free extension advices, combined with 
the delivery of technological packages of improved seeds, pesticides and 
fertilizers is the main objective of all IADPs. 
Table 3.5 Summary of Integrated Agricultural Development Projects 
(IADPs) in Sierra Leone 
Project 
Eastern IADP-I 
Eastern IADP-II 
Eastern IADP-III 
Northern IADP-I 
Northern IADP-Π 
Koinadugu IADP-I 
Koinadugu IADP-Π 
North-Western IADP 
Moyamba IADP 
Magbosi IADP 
Port Loko IADP-I 
Port Loko IADP-Π 
Bo-Pujehun IRDP 
Funding source 
IDA' 
IDA 
IDA 
IDA 
IDA 
E D r 
EDF 
EDF 
ADB"' 
IF AD"" 
EDF 
EDF 
GTZ 
Phasing 
1972-76 
1976-79 
1980-85 
1976-79 
1979-86 
1978-82 
1982-87 
1980-84 
1980-84 
1980-85 
1987-92 
1992-? 
1981-? 
International Development Association, the soft loan affiliate of the World Bank. 
European Development Fund, the development fund of the European Union. 
African Development Bank. 
International Fund for Agricultural Development. 
Although technically not an IADP, this Integrated Rural Development Project 
shares many of the features of IADPs and is usually included in the list of these. 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Co-
operation). 
Sources: GOSL/CEC (1989); Johnny el al. (1986); Minster/Abco (1993a); Williams 
(1985). 
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To enable the farmers to obtain these packages, the projects provided them 
with credit. Generally, the IADPs also tried to tackle infrastructural 
constraints. Most projects consisted of a feeder roads or a rural water 
supply programme as well. In total, seven IADPs and one Integrated Rural 
Development Project (IRDP) were implemented in Sierra Leone, see table 
3.5. 
The first IADP, the Eastern Integrated Agricultural Development 
Project (EIADP), covered a large part of the coffee and cocoa production 
areas. It is also the archetype of all subsequent implemented IADPs. 
The overall impact of the EIADP must be considered to be minimal 
(Cusworth, 1985; Williams, 1985; Johnny et al. 1986; GOSL/CEC, 1989). 
To sum up the major problems of EIADP: 
low loan repayment rates; 
high overhead costs; 
lack of linkages with the Ministry of Agriculture; 
ineffective extension services provision; 
heavy reliance on external funding; 
financial mismanagement; 
relatively small numbers of farmers were reached; 
limited participation of project farmers, and: 
over-design of some of the project's components. 
These project failures are not only valid for EIADP. Without wanting to 
address the other IADPs (and one IRDP) individually, we can make some 
general observations. First and foremost, the idea that if farmers were 
provided with free technical advice and subsidized farm inputs this would 
automatically lead to higher production and productivity levels, proved to 
be a false one. Farmers appeared to be rational beings who were concerned 
with risk-minimauzation and who tried to make optimal use of limited 
resources (specifically labour). IADPs failed to realize this. Second, IADPs 
created "semi-autonomous agricultural development enclaves" throughout 
the country (CID, 1982). They thereby increased inter- and intra-regional 
development differences. Furthermore, the projects had established their 
own implementation structures, parallel to the Ministry of Agriculture. This 
led to a weakening of MAF's regional institutions: any successes of the 
IADPs were at the expense of the relevant institutions (Minster/Abco, 
1993a). Thirdly, the credit provision of virtually all projects suffered from 
high overhead costs and recovery bureaucracy, and subsequently low rates 
of loan recovery (B-PRDP, 1981; Williams, 1985). Credit officials were 
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often corrupt, leading to alienation of farmers and to even greater problems 
of loan recovery. Fourthly, the IADP approach was far too costly, leading 
to substantial increases in the obligations on the government budget (B-
PRDP, 1981). This led to an increase of the country's debt burden. It failed 
to reach the poorest segments of the rural population (CID, 1982) and it 
benefited only a small percentage of the farmers in the project area. The 
large and capital intensive (infrastructural) components of the IADPs must 
be set against their modest performance (Minster/Abco, 1993a). At least US 
Dollars 150 million has been invested in the projects since 1972, servicing 
less than 50,000 farmers (ROSL, 1992). This means that the IADPs spent 
on average more than US Dollars 3,000 per serviced farmer. This amount 
is not reflected in an increase in the national production of agricultural 
crops, nor in becoming nearer to reaching the target of self-sufficiency in 
rice. 
However, there are also some successes to report. The IADP approach 
meant that for first time a substantial amount of aid was flowing to 
smallholder agriculture. The alleviation of poverty came on the agenda. 
Second, the IADPs led to the construction of a significant quantity of 
infrastructure, for example, roads and water wells. Third, the projects 
introduced, without doubt, new technologies and inputs (to some farmers) 
and increased the opportunities (for some farmers) of obtaining credit. This 
enabled a smoother transition from subsistence to commercialized farming, 
at least for these farmers. 
In 1985, the IADPs were merged under a decentralized Ministry of 
Agriculture under the Agricultural Sector Support Project (ASSP, see 
below). However, the government's inability to service its debts to IMF, 
World Bank and ADB led to a suspension of external funding and, thus, 
to a suspension of funding to most IADPs. Of the seven IADPs and one 
IRDP listed in table 3.5, currently only one IADP and the sole IRDP still 
receive foreign capital assistance. Nevertheless, since 1992 new projects 
have been started. The North-Central Agricultural Project (funded by 
IF AD), the Moyamba Agricultural Project (funded by ADB) and the North-
western Agricultural Project (funded by EDF) are currently receiving 
government finance under the Public Investment Programme for 1992/93-
1994/95. Although these new projects have removed the "Integrated" and 
"Development" components from their name, they are just as large scale 
and capital intensive as the original IADPs. It remains to be seen whether 
these new projects have learned from the mistakes and failures of their 
predecessors. 
The government did not succeed, in an economic environment that was 
seriously affected by the first oil crisis, to generate sufficient finance from 
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external sources (sufficient internal resources were unavailable as well). 
Thus, the restructuring of the economy, as intended by the Development 
Plan, was doomed to fail. None of the objectives have been achieved, the 
only visible result were the seven IADPs. 
In 1981, a combined mission of UNDP and FAO made several 
suggestions of items which should be incorporated in the next development 
plan (Sandiford, 1991). The second National Development Plan 1983/84-
1985/86 was only drafted and never formally adopted by government 
(Minster/Abco, 1993a). Again emphasis was placed on rural and 
agricultural development. The four main objectives in the Plan were: 
1) to increase the production and reduce the imports of staple foods, in 
order to achieve self-sufficiency; 
2) to increase output, productivity, rural incomes and employment; 
3) to ensure a balanced regional growth and equitable income 
distribution, and: 
4) to maximize foreign exchange earnings (ibid.). 
In practice, the promotion of domestic rice production in order to achieve 
self-sufficiency was given the greatest emphasis (Sandiford, 1991). A 
number of over-ambitious and inadequately designed programmes were 
attempted. One of them, the Green Revolution Programme, formulated in 
1986, concentrated on the goal of achieving rice self-sufficiency. It 
recognised the mistakes from the first National Development Plan, namely 
the failure to translate good intentions into practical actions, the insufficient 
financial resources that were allocated towards the agricultural sector and 
the lack of an adequate price incentive structure for farmers (Minster/Abco, 
1993a). The Programme aimed to achieve within three years several 
objectives, of which the most significant were the following: 
1) to increase rice production to self-sufficiency levels and, hence, 
eliminate rice imports; 
2) to increase agricultural production of other cereal and root crops; 
3) to provide adequate producer price incentives and appropriate market 
structures; 
4) to review and reorientate the LADP programme, and: 
5) to restructure the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and 
Forestry under the auspices of the Agricultural Sector Support Project 
(ibid, op cit.). 
The Green Revolution Programme was an ambitious Programme, which, 
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however, depended again heavily on external financing that did not became 
available. The Programme was never fully implemented. 
Since the mid 1980s, the influence of structural adjustment policies 
began to be felt in development programme formulations. The desolate 
economic situation of the country drove the government in the arms of 
institutions, such as IMF and World Bank. In order to receive the needed 
credit facilities from the African Development Bank and World Bank, the 
government had to adhere to certain conditionalities, imbedded in so called 
structural adjustment packages. For example, trade had to be liberalized, 
parastatale privatized and a free floating currency had to be introduced. 
Consequently, all subsequent development plans or programmes were 
formulated within this ideology of the Fund and the Bank in order not to 
forfeit potential loans and grants. 
The Agricultural Sector Support Project was part of a structural 
adjustment package that the government was negotiating with the World 
Bank as a precondition for structural adjustment loans (Minster/Abco, 
1993a). ASSP, started in 1984 and funded by the World Bank and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), was formulated 
to reform the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Ministry was 
merged with the Ministry of Natural Resources under ASSP in order to 
strengthen the earlier development strategy and investments in the sector 
(ibid.). The aim was to assist in privatising several of the Ministry's 
operations, reducing the excessive number of daily paid workers and 
establishing a sectoral import programme for essential agricultural inputs. 
Furthermore, tree crop and Inland Valley Swamp development was 
envisaged, just as the reorganization of the Ministry on a regional basis so 
that it could absorb the administrative functions of the IADPs (GOSL/CEC, 
1989). However, the implementation of ASSP was not completed, because 
the World Bank and IFAD suspended their disbursements to finance the 
Project in 1987. The financial support was withdrawn because the 
government was unable to make debt service payments (Sandiford, 1991). 
Not only ASSP was left without finance, also three of the IADPs ceased 
to be funded by World Bank and IFAD. In addition, those IADPs which 
were funded by the European Union lost their support as well. This meant 
that the institutional and policy reforms were not completed and left only 
the German funded Bo-Pujehun Integrated Rural Development Project 
functioning. 
Much ground was lost by the failure of implementing the reforms that were 
stated in ASSP. However, in 1989 the government tried again to make the 
first steps towards restructuring the economy. It formulated the economic 
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and financial Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for the period 1990/91-
1992/93. The focus of the Programme was on restoring the fiscal and 
financial discipline. It contained broad objectives for the economy as a 
whole, the economy was to be liberalized and made more open and the role 
of government in trade should be reduced. In practice this meant that the 
export monopoly of SLPMB was lifted and that private traders were 
allowed to import rice (Minster/Abco, 1993a). Nonetheless, the emphasis 
was laid on the development of the agricultural sector. PFP stated three 
objectives for agriculture. Firstly, to raise the productivity, output, rural 
incomes and employment; secondly to increase the output of staple food 
crops (particularly rice); and finally, to diversify production and maximise 
foreign exchange earnings (ibid.). The actions to support these objectives 
included: 
1) to improve agriculture's access to credit; 
2) to improve the efficiency of the agricultural marketing system; 
3) to provide assistance to buyers and exporters of agricultural produce 
to enhance their capacity to obtain market information; 
4) to rehabilitate the rural road network; 
5) to improve the availability of agricultural inputs, and: 
6) to support community based agricultural development efforts 
(Sandiford, 1991). 
The PFP was not externally financed. The government was trying to fulfil 
the conditionalities of IMF and World Bank without the financial support 
to implement the measures. In fact, Sierra Leone was living by the rules 
without receiving the benefits in a situation of "shadow" conditionality as 
some have called it (Minster/Abco, 1993a) or a "de facto conditionality", 
according to others (Weeks, 1992). 
The reform measures formulated in the Economic and Financial Policy 
Framework were intended to create the necessary conditions for sustained 
economic development, albeit via the rules of IMF and World Bank. The 
fundamental change with the past was formed by the liberalization of trade, 
hence, by encouraging the private sector to invest. However, the role of 
government in the economy is still stressed as being important. It has an 
important regulatory role in order to make sure that markets function as 
efficient as possible, but it should also invest in certain economic sectors. 
This meant that public investments in social and physical infrastructure 
were seen as necessary preconditions for the development of the private 
sector. 
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One of the programmes formulated within PFP was the Public 
Investment Programme, as a major instrument for the planning and 
allocation of public investments. Initially it would cover a period of three 
years (1992/93-1994/95), but the intention was to extend it on an annual 
basis until 1996/97 (Minster/Abco, 1993a). About 90 per cent of the 
Programme would be externally funded in the form of grants and loans. 
Part of the budget of PIP was allocated to the agricultural sector, but this 
was mainly meant to provide agricultural infrastructure, research and 
extension services. To date, mid 19%, no new agricultural development 
programme has been formulated, let alone is being implemented. 
'Any government interested in overall national development must attain 
two fundamental objectives: it must generate funds for financing 
development and it must pursue strategies which ensure its longevity and 
hence political stability' (GOSL/CEC, 1989, p. 25). It may be clear that 
this statement was neglected in the last two decades of development 
planning in Sierra Leone. Numerous plans and programmes have been 
created, but they relied almost without exception on substantial external 
funding. Manifold are the examples of programmes that faded out when 
external funding was withdrawn. Therefore, the valuable lesson learned in 
the Sierra Leonean context is that development programmes in general and 
agricultural programmes in particular should not be too ambitious (i.e. 
capital intensive and large scale) and preferably be financed by the 
government themselves. 
The continuous thread that is running through the respective agricultural 
development plans and programmes has been twofold, namely the emphasis 
on achieving food (i.e. rice) self-sufficiency and increasing the foreign 
exchange earnings from agricultural commodities (Johnny, 1985; 
GOSL/CEC, 1989). 
Rice self-sufficiency was tried to be obtained through intensifying the 
use of improved inputs and by educating and training farmers to use 
modern technology. At the same time, domestic rice prices were kept low, 
so that there was no price incentive for farmers to produce surplus rice. 
Consequently, domestic rice production was not even sufficient to lower 
rice imports. Also for rice, cross-border trade existed, especially in three 
districts that border Guinea, namely Kambia, Koinadugu and Port Loko. No 
wonder: in July 1987, for example, Sierra Leonean rice traders from Port 
Loko gained over 40 per cent more (in Leones) for their rice when they 
sold it in Guinea (GOSL/CEC, 1989). Since colonial times, the agricultural 
sector has been treated as the major generator of export earnings through 
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export taxes. Because coffee and cocoa have dominated Sierra Leone's 
agricultural exports since independence, agricultural development planning 
has concentrated on these two crops in order to increase agricultural export 
earnings. This was done by trying to provide modem farm inputs and 
extension services to farmers so as to introduce good husbandry practices, 
mainly through IADPs. However, as in the case of rice, the absence of an 
incentive price system was conflicting with the target of increasing foreign 
exchange earnings. Until the season 1991/92, when the rebel incursions 
from Liberia started, government estimated that production figures for each 
crop were in between 20,000 and 25,000 tons per year (PEMSD, 1993). 
Compared with export statistics, this meant that at least 10,000 to 15,000 
tons per year of each crop was 'sold through alternative outlets' (i.e. 
smuggled to neighbouring countries) (GOSL/CEC, 1989, p. 34). We will 
elaborate more on the effects of the produce price system in chapter 6. 
From the foregoing it may be clear that agricultural development 
planning in Sierra Leone has failed in virtually all aspects. What is needed 
are clearly stated, realistic, objectives and lucid policy measures. Until now, 
objectives and measures have been tangled. Some of the policy objectives 
for the agricultural sector were in fact policy measures intended to achieve 
national economic objectives. For instance, "to achieve self-sufficiency in 
rice production" is not an agricultural policy objective, but a policy 
measure in order to achieve lower rice imports. Which is a national 
economic objective. It proved to be difficult to formulate coherent 
agricultural development plans and programmes when policy objectives and 
measures are not clearly stated. Several reports recognized the need for a 
unambiguously formulated agricultural policy (GOSL/CEC, 1989; 
Sandiford, 1991; MAFF/FAO, 1992; Minster/Abco, 1993a) and suggested 
improvements. However, Sierra Leone is to date (mid 1996) still without 
an agricultural policy framework. 
3 2 The research area 
In 3.1.4 we have described the administrative division of Sierra Leone. 
Here we will go more into the specifics and administrative structure of our 
research area. We have used the 1985 Population Census for the 
demographic data (MANR&F/PEMSD, 1986). This census has not yet been 
published completely, so the figures should be considered as provisional. 
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Our research area is located in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone, the 
area that is suitable for the production of coffee and cocoa. The total 
population of this province was almost one million in 1985. It consists of 
three districts, Kono, Kailahun and Kenema (see map 3.3). Kono District 
is the area famous for its alluvial diamond mining, which has made it 
Sierra Leone's most densely populated area outside the Western Area. 
Kenema and Kailahun Districts, particularly the latter, are more 
agriculturally orientated. The whole of Kailahun District is located in the 
heart of the cocoa production area (see chapter 4 and map 4.1). More than 
half of the active labour population5 of the Eastern Province is engaged in 
agriculture. However, these percentages for the agricultural labour force 
still seem to underestimate the importance of the agricultural sector. This 
is because the Census of 1985 only recorded one occupation per person, 
thereby leaving those with more than one job out of consideration. This 
means that, for example, a teacher with a coffee and cocoa farm is 
recorded only as a teacher. However, he is, at least part time, also farming. 
This is a situation which is the rule rather than the exception in the Sierra 
Leonean countryside, but omitted in the Census figures. Furthermore, the 
Census' categorization of occupations is not totally waterproof. For 
example, the category "sales workers" (i.e. "traders") consists mainly of 
women, namely two-thirds for Kenema District, who trade the agricultural 
(food) crops they have produced. They are, in fact, farmers, who also sell 
their crops on the market. Moreover, the male traders mainly sell 
agricultural products, notably cash crops. Examples are coffee, cocoa and 
palm kernels. These are also usually produced by these traders, hence, they 
are also farmers. A more accurate estimate of the number of people 
engaged in agriculture would then be the aggregate of the categories 
"farmers" and "sales workers" (see table 3.6). However, these figures 
include the people fully engaged in trade, hence, present an, although 
minor, overestimation. 
The fieldwork was conducted in several areas in Kenema District. This 
district is economically more diversified than Kono and Kailahun Districts. 
Besides agriculture, gold and diamond mining also takes place, as does 
commercial logging. The capital, Kenema, is a major trading centre, 
located on the road to Monrovia. Cross-border trade with Liberia used to 
"Active Labour Population" is defined here as the number of people, aged ten 
years and older, engaged in labour. Excluded are, thus, the unemployed, the 
handicapped, the youth attending schools, and so on. 
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to start in Kenema. This was the case until the rebel incursions broke out, 
first in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone itself. Kenema District had a 
population of 337,055 in 1985 (MANR&F/PEMSD, 1986) and comprises 
of 16 chiefdoms (see map 3.4). Of its active labour population, 33 per cent 
is engaged in agriculture, which is below that of Kailahun, but above that 
of Kono District (see table 3.7). 
Table 3.6 Main population characteristics of areas in the Eastern 
Province (1985 Census figures) 
Region 
Districts: 
Kono 
Kailahun 
Kenema 
Chiefdoms: 
Dama 
Koya 
Nongowa 
Small-Bo 
Kandu Leppiama 
Area (km2) 
5,641 
3,859 
6.053 
507 
273 
521 
376 
459 
Population 
389,657 
233,839 
337,055 
18,804 
6,847 
90,251 
19,175 
14,328 
Densit 
69 
61 
56 
37 
25 
173 
51 
31 
Sources: MANR&F/PEMSD (1986); CSO (1992); Statistisches Bundesamt (1994); 
authors' calculations. 
Of the 16 chiefdoms in Kenema District, we visited five (see chapter 1). 
We have compiled the main characteristics of these chiefdoms in tables 3.6 
and 3.7. The largest chiefdom, both in area and population, is Nongowa. 
It is also the most densely populated area, with 173 inhabitants per square 
kilometre, more than triple the average density for Kenema District. The 
densities of the other four chiefdoms range between 25 and 51 inhabitants 
per square kilometre. These characteristics of Nongowa Chiefdom are very 
much influenced by the presence of Kenema, the capital of both Nongowa 
Chiefdom, Kenema District and the Eastern Province. Kenema was one of 
the five settlements in the country with more than 20,000 inhabitants in 
1985 (ibid.). 
When looking at the percentages of the active labour population 
actively engaged in agriculture, we do not see much difference between the 
five chiefdoms. Taking the categories "farmers" and "sales workers" 
together, we see that these make up for almost two-thirds of ALP. In the 
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next section, we look somewhat closer at the characteristics of each of the 
five chiefdoms from our research area. 
Table 3.7 Main labour characteristics of areas visited during fieldwork 
periods (1985 Census figures) 
Region 
Kenema District 
Chiefdoms: 
Dama 
Koya 
Nongowa 
Small-Bo 
Kandu Leppiama 
ALP' 
88,674 
13,272 
4,514 
48,505 
11.863 
8,567 
Farmers 
(% of ALP) 
33.4 
29.4 
31.4 
33.6 
37.2 
28.9 
Farmers + traders 
(% of ALP) 
62.2 
64.2 
69.0 
64.6 
69.4 
61.0 
Active Labour Population, see note 5. 
Sources: CSO (1992); authors' calculations (1993). 
Dama Chiefdom 
This chiefdom, with Giema as its capital, was visited in 1990/91 and in 
1992/93. It may be considered as an area with a high production potential 
for both coffee and cocoa (FAO/UNDP/MANR, 1980). 
Dama Chiefdom is not well endowed with coffee and cocoa marketing 
opportunities. The chiefdom does not have a major trading centre within 
its boundaries, i.e., no regional wholesalers are located in the area (see also 
section 6.2.1). Only one Village Marketing Center has been built, but it 
never functioned. In addition, the villages in Dama are not very accessible. 
Although the main road to Monrovia divides the chiefdom into two halves, 
one village was classified as having a low accessibility, while eight villages 
had medium accessibility (see section 7.1.2). 
Both upland and swamp rice are cultivated in Dama, although upland 
rice is more popular among farmers. In 1992/93, less respondents cultivated 
either upland rice or swamp rice, or cultivated both, than in 1990/91. This 
decrease is caused by the rebel war, which affected the chiefdom heavily. 
Several of the selected research villages have been attacked. This led to an 
exodus of some of the village populations to safer areas, which 
considerably disturbed the production of rice. In particular the cultivation 
of swamp rice has decreased. 
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Koya Chiefdom 
This chiefdom was also both visited in 1990/91 and in 1992/93. Its capital 
is Baoma. Koya is an area with a low production potential for both coffee 
and cocoa (ibid.). 
As with Dama, Koya does not possess a major buying centre within 
its borders. It also has only one Village Marketing Center. Like in Dama, 
this Marketing Center has never functioned. Compared with Dama 
Chiefdom, Koya has the further disadvantage of being even less accessible. 
Eight villages that were visited were classified as having a low 
accessibility, while one was classified as medium accessible. All in all this 
means that the marketing opportunities for the farmers of Koya are worse 
than for the other chiefdoms, including Dama. 
Both upland rice and swamp rice are cultivated in Koya Chiefdom. In 
1992/93, less respondents cultivated at least one of the two types of rice, 
compared with 1990/91. This is again explained by the disturbances of the 
rebel war. However, in contrast with Dama, the decrease in total rice 
production is caused by the decrease in the production of upland rice. This 
is explained by the fact that swamp rice is more popular in Koya than 
upland rice. Apparently, in times of trouble, farmers tend to concentrate on 
one type of rice only. For Dama this was upland rice, while Koya farmers 
concentrated more on swamp rice. Moreover, due to the activities of a 
relief agency that brought improved swamp seed rice to one village (out of 
the three we visited in 1992/93), the overall figures for swamp rice are 
influenced upwards. 
Nongowa Chiefdom 
This chiefdom was only visited in 1992/93. Nongowa is centrally located, 
and its capital, Kenema, is the main trading centre in the Eastern Province. 
The chiefdom is an area with a high production potential for coffee as well 
as for cocoa (ibid.). 
Being centrally located between two main urban trading centres, 
Kenema and Segbwema, Nongowa's farmers have excellent marketing 
opportunities. Two villages were classified as having a high accessibility, 
three as medium accessible, while one village had low accessibility. Only 
the villages in Small-Bo Chiefdom scored higher on their accessibility. The 
major advantage of Nongowa Chiefdom is the fact that it has six Village 
Marketing Centers and ten subcenters run by a co-operative. This has 
increased the number of options the coffee and cocoa farmers in Nongowa 
Chiefdom have when selling their produce. 
Nongowa Chiefdom has not been attacked by rebels, which explains 
why a large majority of the respondents cultivated at least one of the two 
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types of rice. Because the farmers were not forced to leave their villages, 
they could concentrate on the production of rice. This is also shown by the 
proportion of farmers who cultivated both upland and swamp rice, which 
is the highest of all chiefdoms. Apparently, many of the farmers of 
Nongowa had the time available to cultivate two types of rice. 
Small-Bo Chiefdom 
This chiefdom was also only visited in 1992/93. The capital is Blama. 
Small-Bo is an area with a high production potential for coffee and low 
production potential for cocoa (ibid.). 
The villages in Small-Bo Chiefdom were all classified as having a high 
accessibility. We can relate this to the fact that the chiefdom is relatively 
small and its capital Blama, the other major trading centre in the research 
area, besides Kenema, is centrally located. Blama is easily reached from all 
the villages. Furthermore, it hosts one Village Marketing Center in 
Joyomie). So, we can conclude that the marketing opportunities in the 
chiefdom are relatively good. 
As was the case with Nongowa Chiefdom, Small-Bo was not attacked 
by rebels, hence, the rice production was not affected. And likewise, a 
large majority of the respondents cultivated at least one of the two types 
of rice. Many farmers also have the capacity to cultivate both upland and 
swamp rice. 
Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom 
The last chiefdom that we have visited (in 1992/93 only) is an area with 
a low production potential for both coffee and cocoa (ibid.). This is not 
only due to the unsuitability of the soil for both crops, but also to the 
attractiveness of diamond mining. Levuma, the chiefdom capital, is also the 
centre of diamond mining activities in the area. 
Despite its comparative unsuitability for coffee and cocoa production, 
the marketing opportunities in Kandu Leppiama are relatively good. For 
example, Koya Chiefdom, a comparable area regarding coffee and cocoa 
production potential, has only one, non-functioning, Village Marketing 
Center while Kandu Leppiama has four. However, two of these were not 
functioning. Still, Kandu Leppiama scores better than Koya, although fewer 
farmers are cultivating either coffee, cocoa or both crops. Moreover, the 
chiefdom scores better than Koya regarding the accessibility of the selected 
villages. One was classified as having high, two villages as having 
medium, and another two as having low accessibility. 
From the chiefdoms that were not attacked by rebels, Kandu Leppiama 
scores lowest on the proportion of farmers who did cultivate one of the two 
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types of rice. As mentioned before, the chiefdom is also a diamond mining 
area, which drains away labour from farming. Furthermore, many farmers 
have decided to cultivate only some cash crops, and divert the rest of their 
time to diamond mining. They argue that with the money thus earned, they 
can buy all the rice they want. Not surprisingly, relatively few farmers 
were producing both upland and swamp rice. 
Appendix 3.1 provides an overview of the villages that were visited during 
these two fieldwork periods, and the number of respondents that were 
interviewed per village. In all, the research area shows differences in 
production and marketing opportunities for the farmers. We show in the 
subsequent chapters whether these differences lead to a differentiation in 
actual marketing behaviour of coffee and cocoa farmers, or whether there 
are also other factors that have to be taken into account. 
4 
Agricultural Production Systems and Producers in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Sierra Leone as a Case 
Frank Sellies 
Agriculture is the most important sector in the economies of developing 
countries. In this chapter, we first provide a general introduction to 
agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. We concern ourselves with both the 
production systems and the producers who carry these systems. 
Secondly, we take a closer look at the general aspects of the 
agricultural sector in Sierra Leone. The emphasis is on the specific features 
of Sierra Lconean agriculture, and on the cultivation opportunities and 
constraints of the environment. Furthermore, we analyze the characteristics 
of the main food production and export crop production systems in the 
country. 
4.1 Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The vast majority of the rural population in Sub-Saharan Africa is directly 
dependent upon the proceeds of their work in the agricultural sector (World 
Bank, 1981a; Dixon, 1990). This work can take the form of cultivating 
crops or herding animals, while a small part of the population makes their 
living by hunting or gathering fruits and nuts. The remainder of the rural 
population are, although not directly engaged in agriculture, still dependent 
upon it, but in a more indirect way. They work in the processing of 
agricultural products, for example, palm oil extraction, the canning of fruit 
or vegetables or the spinning and weaving of cotton. 
In this section, we first describe some general aspects of Sub-Saharan 
agriculture. We also pay attention to the implications these aspects have for 
the population in Sub-Saharan Africa. We then look at the differences of 
land use in the region, on which basis we distinguish different ways of 
working the land. In the last section, we use the goals and aspirations of 
farmers to distinguish between different types of production systems. 
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4.1.1 Some characteristics of Sub-Saharan agriculture 
Generally, agriculture can be divided into two different sectors, the food 
producing and the cash crop producing sector, of which the latter is 
becoming increasingly important. The major problem faced by the food 
crop sector is the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to feed a 
rapidly growing population. The average population growth rate for Sub-
Saharan countries was 2.9 per cent per year between 1980 and 1993, and 
it is not expected to decrease between 1993 and 2000 (World Bank, 
1995c). However, the growth of food production per capita is negative. 
World Bank (1992b) gives Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1988-1990 period, an 
average index of food production per capita of 94 (the base period 1979-
1981 being 100). This clearly shows that the growth of food production 
cannot keep up with the growth of the population, so Sub-Saharan Africa 
is now facing growing deficiencies in food supplies. 
Since the 1950s, the encouragement of the production of export crops 
has been considered a viable option to overcome the decreasing level of 
food production. The idea behind it was that by promoting the expansion 
of relatively modern sectors of the economy (in agriculture this meant that 
investments were centred around export crops) the growth of the national 
product would be high (Gakou, 1987). The export crops produced by those 
African nations which would be unable to feed their own population then 
would enable them to buy food instead. This increased African demand for 
food (i.e. demand which can be paid for) would, in addition, stimulate food 
production in those African states which have a favourable potential for 
growing these crops. The problem was, however, that the export earnings 
of agricultural products were liable to deteriorating terms of trade, which 
meant that the balance of payments position of many Sub-Saharan states 
worsened. So, instead of being able to import sufficient food, it became 
increasingly more difficult to pay for those imports. 
Another way of overcoming food deficiencies would have been an 
increase in productivity by the agricultural sector. But given the low level 
of technology in agriculture, the bleak prospects of technical innovations 
in the short run and the prevailing land use systems in the sector, this must 
be considered a long-term option (Ruthenberg, 1980). After all, in large 
parts of the continent (in both the Sahel, the semi-arid areas and the rain 
forest areas) the system of rotational bush-fallow is still widely practised 
on a (semi-)subsistence basis, which produces no structural, marketable, 
surplus. Periodically, in good years, a surplus is indeed produced, but 
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generally the production is subsistence oriented. In those regions where 
food production is declining the problem is exacerbated by an exodus of 
rural people trying to find their luck in cities by seeking better-paid jobs. 
Urbanization is, therefore, increasing and the agricultural sector, 
consequently, has to feed more and more people with food produced by 
less and less labour, while, in addition, the agricultural labour force is 
aging. This results in less production per capita, requires higher levels of 
food imports and leads to higher food prices and a decreasing average daily 
calorie intake for those who cannot pay the higher prices. 
The current situation of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa is the result of 
several factors, all of which can be classified into two groups. First, there 
is the physical environment or context, which sets the limits for production 
opportunities. Secondly, the socioeconomic environment is important in 
setting the constraints on the one hand, and steering the opportunities on 
the other. 
Both the physical and the socioeconomic factors can be sub-divided 
into numerous sub-factors. To deal with all of these would go beyond the 
scope of this work. Therefore, we highlight only some of the sub-factors 
which are most important in creating the agricultural situation in Sub-
Saharan Africa as it is. First of all, the different types of land use systems 
are dealt with, in themselves already the result of several factors. Secondly, 
we analyze the different aspirations of the farmers and discuss their 
implications for agricultural production systems and the situation in African 
agriculture. 
4.1.2 Different methods of land use 
In the history of agriculture on the African continent, man was probably 
first a collector of wild fruits and nuts, and a hunter of bush and savanna 
animals. There are still small populations who practice this way of life, but 
it is rapidly declining in importance. The next step in the evolution of 
agriculture was the shifting cultivation system. There are also few shifting 
cultivators left, in contrast with the more static form of land use, derived 
from shifting cultivation, namely the rotational bush-fallow system. This 
is a system which is still widely practised. The last phase in the evolution 
of cultivation systems in Africa is the system of permanent cultivation, 
which is gradually becoming more important. 
The herding of cattle takes place in those areas where cultivation 
without irrigation is virtually impossible, i.e. where the rain is less than 650 
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millimetres per year (Pritchard, 1979), and where the opportunities for 
irrigation are bleak due to physical and/or economic constraints. We 
discuss those land use systems which are central to the current agricultural 
production and have left cattle herding out of consideration here. The 
classification of different methods of land use is partly based on 
Ruthenberg (1980), partly on Anion (1981). 
Shifting cultivation 
The universal rule is that, when man cultivates the soil, soil depletion 
occurs. Several strategies can be used to overcome this depletion, of which 
the abandoning of the impoverished land and the migration to a new spot 
is the simplest one. The most basic form of this type of land use is shifting 
cultivation, which is mainly practised in scarcely populated areas. 
First, the cultivator selects the particular plot he wants to farm on, 
which he then burns down. After burning, he sows the seeds in the mixture 
of ash and soil. He then gives little attention to the crops until they are 
ripe, and harvesting can take place. After, at most, two or three years, 
when yields are declining, indicating the exhaustion of the soil, the patch 
is abandoned and a new area is selected. The plot lies fallow, allowing it 
to regain its plant cover. The soil nutrients are built up again over a period 
of about twenty years. After that period, the farmer (or more likely another 
farmer) may cultivate the plot again (Ruthenberg, 1980). 
This type of cultivation requires large amounts of cultivable land, 
because every two or three years new land has to be cleared, and 
abandoned land cannot be used again for about twenty years. This means 
that if a farmer needs two hectares of land to cultivate his crops, he has to 
have at least 22 hectares available to be able to complete the entire 
cultivation and fallow cycle. In addition to this, it should be noted that not 
all the available land will be suitable for cultivation, so that even more than 
22 hectares might be needed (Grove and Klein, 1979). 
Because such large amounts of land per farmer are needed, it is 
necessary to move the settlements in which the farming family lives, 
otherwise those settlements would become too isolated from the fields. This 
means that settlements tend to be small and only temporary, and it also 
implies that little communication can take place between different 
settlements and, hence, few trade relations exist. 
There are certain advantages linked to this type of land use system. 
The constant move from site to site ensures the opening up of new areas 
and lessens the risk of disease. Because relatively small plots are 
cultivated, soil erosion is not so serious. Nevertheless, although the 
abandoned plots are left to regain their fertility for some twenty years, 
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valuable timber is wasted, and it may take a hundred years or more to 
replace it (Harrison Church, 1980). 
The system of shifting cultivation was once a common form of land 
use in tropical Africa, but is, as a rule, now only occurring in those parts 
of central and east Africa where the average population densities are less 
than ten persons per square kilometre (Grove and Klein, 1979). Increasing 
population pressure led to shorter fallow periods, and in many areas, the 
shifting cultivation system had to be abandoned. 
Rotational bush-fallow cultivation 
Where population densities became higher and land shortages occurred, it 
was no longer possible for people to move around in search of cultivable 
land. Other options had to be considered, and a new form of cultivation 
had to develop. 
In large parts of Africa, a modified form of shifting cultivation is now 
being deployed, the rotational bush-fallow system. As with shifting 
cultivation, this cultivation practice involves short periods of tilling which 
are followed by periods of fallow. This fallow period is shorter than it is 
in the system of shifting cultivation, a period of ten years is usually 
considered ideal (Pritchard, 1979). Consequently, the soil is not allowed to 
completely re-establish its fertility. The fallow periods are shorter, because 
the cultivator, forced by population pressure, returns to the plot he once 
abandoned. This is an essential difference with the practice of shifting 
cultivation, where a closed system of fields is not recognised. The third 
marked difference with shifting cultivation is that the farm/family unit is 
fixed to one spot, and lives in a permanent settlement. 
As permanent settlements have appeared, certain methods can be 
employed to make the best use of the physical environment. For example, 
the land close to the settlement is often enriched with household waste, 
crop residues and manure from the domestic animals one finds in every 
village. Those areas are favoured, because the soil nutrients are constantly 
replaced and, hence, the land can be cultivated without a fallow period. 
These gardens, as they are often called, are planted with particular crops 
which either are frequently used in cooking, or which need constant 
attention during their period of growth. This is made possible by their 
location near to the houses, whilst the staple crops are produced in the 
main fields. These are located further away from the village, and hence, 
receive less attention (Grove and Klein, 1979). 
Another aspect of permanent settlement is that relationships between 
settlements can develop, and trading can more easily occur. Also 
individual, usufruct, rights over land are gradually retained, especially with 
Agricultural Production Systems 107 
regard to the gardens. Plots are demarcated and the land that lies fallow is 
now considered to belong to a particular cultivator, because after a certain 
fallow period he will re-use it. 
In the main fields, a diversity of crops is grown, usually under the 
system of mixed-cropping or inter-cropping. Several crops are grown along 
each other, which have different soil requirements. Such systems of mixed-
cropping cause a more balanced depletion of soil nutrients, whilst a 
constant vegetative cover of the land also discourages soil erosion (Arnon, 
1981). Another advantage of mixed-cropping is that the rapid spread of 
diseases is prevented, which means that the risk of a completely damaged 
crop is averted. In this way, by cultivating a wide range of crops, the 
cultivator will at least produce some food every year, because it is highly 
unlikely that the circumstances which are unfavourable for a certain crop, 
will also be unfavourable for the other crops. 
The rotational bush-fallow system can also support relatively large 
population densities, up to 2S0 persons per square kilometre (Grove and 
Klein, 1979). The system can be considered a transitional phase between 
the shifting cultivation system and the system of permanent cultivation. The 
latter resulted again from growing population densities, especially in 
marginally productive lands. It also developed because of specialization in 
more commercialized forms of agriculture, i.e. surplus production, and the 
introduction of perennial cash crops. In the near future, it will become 
gradually more important, thereby often replacing rotational bush-fallow 
cultivation. 
Permanent cultivation systems 
In those areas where the fields are cultivated without a fallow period, the 
land is under permanent cultivation. Keeping the land cultivated every year 
requires much more effort by farmers, although the tedious job of 
periodically clearing new land for cultivation is not needed any more. If a 
successive year-to-year cultivation of the land is to succeed, then a way of 
overcoming the depletion of soil nutrients has to be found. For this reason 
permanent cultivation is often found in extremely productive areas, such as 
where fertile volcanic soils exist. The application of fertilizers also enables 
producers to start permanent cultivation, although the costs are generally 
a severe constraint. Land can also be liable to seasonal flooding, whereby 
an amount of silt periodically restores the soil fertility. In those places 
where perennial crops can be cultivated, permanent cultivation can take 
place. This is because the fruits of the perennials are harvested, not the 
crop itself, which demands less from the soil nutrients. It also causes less 
soil erosion, because the soil is constantly covered. 
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Fanners can use several techniques to maintain soil fertility. They may 
use the animal and vegetable manure that is available or fertilizers. They 
can also employ irrigation or drainage practices to cultivate the land 
permanently. The yields per acre are greater under permanent cultivation 
than under other systems, but the output per man hour is said to be less, 
although the figures available are inconclusive (Grove and Klein, 1979). 
There is also no conclusive evidence to show whether permanent 
cultivation indeed is a result of growing population pressures alone. For 
although there is some evidence that groups of people who moved from 
areas with high population densities to areas which were scarcely 
populated, reverted their permanent cultivation system to rotational bush-
fallow, it is not to say that this was not also a result of the higher fertilities 
in the new area (ibid.). In that case, this higher fertility did not necessitate 
permanent cultivation. However, it seems more logical that the combination 
of growing population pressures and a change in the goal orientation of 
farmers resulted in permanent cultivation. When producers become more 
commercially oriented, i.e. want to produce surpluses, the shifting 
cultivation and rotational bush fallow systems are insufficient. So, both the 
limits of the physical environment (which were tested by growing 
population pressures) and the socioeconomic context of the producer, for 
example, the need to earn a cash income or the colonial introduction of 
cash crops, may push the farmer towards permanent cultivation. 
The garden type of permanent cultivation has already been briefly dealt 
with in the section on rotational bush-fallow. An additional type of 
permanent cultivation is formed by the perennial crop systems. A 
distinction can be made between those perennial crops which are mainly 
used for home consumption purposes, for example, the oil palm or the kola 
nut tree, and those perennial crops which are purposely cultivated for sale 
or export, i.e. cash crops. The former are usually not purposely cultivated 
for food production, but are either wild varieties, or planted for other 
reasons. The proceeds of oil palm (palm fruits, palm wine) are commonly 
collected "in the bush" from the wild oil palm. When oil palms are 
deliberately cultivated, i.e. are planted by the farmer, then their proceeds 
are usually meant for sale. Kola trees are not cultivated primarily for their 
fruits (the nuts), they are more a by-product (although greatly appreciated 
in many regions) from their functioning as shade trees. For example, the 
kola tree provides shade for cocoa trees, hence, protecting it from intense 
sunlight. 
There are also perennial crops which are deliberately produced in order 
to be sold either domestically or for the world market. Examples of the 
first are groundnuts and pepper. The advantage of these crops is that their 
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fruits can be consumed when the price on the domestic market is 
considered to be too low. Examples of the perennials which are produced 
almost solely for the world market are cocoa, coffee and rubber. For these 
types of crops, domestic demand is negligible. 
Some permanent cultivators employ advanced techniques in order to 
produce these export crops on a commercial basis. They use numerous 
inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides), which generally have to be 
imported from countries outside Africa, and they may specialize their 
production to specific crops, or even organize it as a large scale plantation. 
Specialization is a specific aspect of cash crop production and care has to 
be taken to replace the specific nutrients required by each crop (here 
fertilizers come in, costly as they may be). Another aspect of specialization 
is monoculture and, hence, the danger exists that the single stands of 
certain crops are completely destroyed by particular diseases or pests. For 
example, "swollen shoot", a virus disease which can be found mainly on 
cocoa trees, but also on the silk cotton and wild kola trees, could wipe out 
the total cocoa tree population of Ghana, if the disease would be left 
unchecked (Harrison Church, 1980). 
At the beginning of this section, we called the transition of the different 
systems of land use "evolutionary". This term is usually considered a value 
judgement, implicating in this context that one cultivation system would be 
better than another. We do not necessarily value one system "better", "more 
modern" or "more advanced" than another, but wanted to make clear that 
the transition of one system to another is a historical, almost inevitable 
process. Although, of course, one system does not always completely 
replace another, they may regionally exist side by side. 
For example, we have argued that rotational bush-fallow may have 
resulted from the shifting cultivation system, because of the emergence of 
higher population densities. The higher population density in a given area 
has led to shortage of land, which has resulted in a more labour intensive 
form of agriculture. We have also argued that the combination of reaching 
the physical limits of an environment and a changing socioeconomic 
perspective of farmers have led to different cultivation systems. Other 
factors also have to be considered as determining the causes of changes in 
the different land use systems. Ruthenberg (1980), for example, also cites 
technical processes, the development of urban purchasing power and the 
changes in human aspirations as important factors. We, thus, consider the 
changes of land use systems as a historical process, which is influenced by 
several factors. 
So, like Boserup (1965), we see the different forms of land use as 
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certain stages in the evolution or development of agriculture. But whereas 
Boserup claims that the different forms of land use are stages in a process 
of agricultural progress, we consider this process more neutral: a certain 
stage is different from the next, but not necessarily worse or better. 
We now examine the characteristics of the farmers themselves and the 
factors which influence these characteristics, as determinants of their 
production behaviour and, hence, as determinants of the condition of the 
agricultural sector. 
4.1.3 Different goal orientations of farmers 
The way farmers cultivate their crops, and the goal for which they cultivate 
specific crops, are determined by the interaction between the physical and 
socioeconomic environment they live in, or more specifically, by the way 
farmers perceive this interaction. The physical environment consists of 
climatic, soil and biological conditions (Ruthenberg, 1980). Those three 
factors determine to a large extent the technical freedom of choice, and 
consequently the decisions made by farmers regarding their production 
behaviour. 
The climate of an area determines, to a large extent, the production 
opportunities of producers. Furthermore, the seasonal patterns of, 
especially, rainfall and winds, also exert a great influence on production 
choice by determining the length of the cropping cycle. A climate which 
enables the cultivation of many different types of products (such as most 
tropical climates), gives the farmer a large economic flexibility and gives 
more scope for the spreading of risks. On the other hand, a semi-arid 
climate type more or less forces the farmer to confine his activities to 
hunting, collecting, nomadic pastoralism or irrigated agriculture. 
The soil characteristics of a certain area can be subdivided into two 
dimensions. First of all, the physical characteristics of the soil are of 
importance, because they determine its natural fertility and, hence, the 
yields. The type and amount of nutrients, the "sandiness" or "clayness" of 
the soil and its drainage capacity, for example, are all important with 
regard to the choices the farmer has and the decisions he is able to make. 
Secondly, there is a socioeconomic aspect of soil. For example, the 
geographical location of the soil is an important factor for a farmer, 
because the distance to the market influences the choice a farmer can make 
for producing a particular crop. Two equally fertile patches of land, one 
located close to a market for a certain product, and one located far away 
from that market, will probably lead to a different choice of product. 
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Another example of an important socioeconomic factor is the land tenure 
system. It may be clear that in those areas where the title to land is 
insecure, farmers will be reluctant to plant perennial crops, especially those 
crops which only bear fruits several years after planting. This is not to say 
that a producer needs a land title on paper. Communal land tenure systems, 
where the farmer is not a de facto land owner, can also provide land 
security to land users. 
Finally, the biological environment sets certain limits on production 
opportunities. Biological factors are related to climatic conditions. In areas 
with high temperatures certain weeds, fungi and parasites can survive, often 
in relation to high moisture levels. The rapid growth of weeds makes it 
necessary to constantly clear and weed, causing a heavy demand on, often 
scarce, labour resources. In addition, almost all farming activities expose 
crops to pests and diseases, forming a constant nuisance and health threat 
for farmers. 
Thus, these physical factors all influence the choices and decisions of 
farmers. In addition to these important constraints, we would like to add 
the role that governments can play. Governments can, by using a whole 
range of policy instruments, influence the production environment of 
farmers positively as well as negatively. Three aspects deserve special 
mention. First, governments can provide certain institutional services, or 
create a healthy environment for those services. They can, for example, 
establish a good extension services network or provide agricultural credit 
facilities. Second, by means of legislation, governments are in a position 
to influence the socioeconomic environment of the farmer. They can create 
certain conditions for land reforms or can set limits on the amount of land 
a farmer can cultivate with a particular crop. Finally, by issuing a certain 
market and price policy, a government can influence the reward farmers 
receive for their work, and by doing that, also "guide" farmers to or away 
from a particular crop. 
This whole spectrum of physical and socioeconomic factors can 
influence the ultimate actions of the farmer. The above mentioned factors 
are considered to be external, i.e. environmental or context factors. 
However, there are also internal factors to be mentioned. For example, the 
goals a farmer and his family pursue, their aspirations, also influence the 
choice of crops (Ruthenberg, 1980). A farmer may prefer to produce 
mainly food crops, because he considers food to be of paramount 
importance to feed his household. On the other hand, another farmer may 
prefer to produce mainly cash crops, because the monetary proceeds make 
it possible for him to buy those items he cannot produce, including food 
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stuffs. Aspirations are related to the socioeconomic position of farmers. 
Usually, whenever farmers have limited access to capital and labour, their 
aspirations will be subordinated to risk minimalization by means of risk 
spreading, because those farmers simply cannot afford to target for profit 
or output maximization. For these farmers, therefore, specializing in cash 
crops, for example, will not be a viable option. 
In the end, the interaction of all these factors leads to a certain system 
of production. Two main types then occur, subsistence and commercial 
agriculture, and both can be broadly subdivided into two forms with 
different stages of development. The classification is partly based on 
Wharton (1970), and partly on Huizenga (1959). 
Subsistence agriculture 
Most farmers in Africa were originally only subsistence producers, they 
farmed their land or herded their stock primarily to provide food for 
themselves and their families, not for the market (Ruthenberg, 1980). 
For the cultivator farming on a subsistence basis, it is very important 
that he grows enough food every season, for he has little or no cash 
income to supplement any shortfall in production with bought foodstuffs. 
This means that his main goal is food security, not earning the largest 
possible cash income. In addition, as a means of risk spreading, the farmer 
will favour producing different crops on different plots and will prefer 
mixed-cropping. 
In general, the inputs used are limited to land and family labour, and 
minimal capital will be used (Arnon, 1981). Land is abundantly available 
in most areas and is usually communally owned. The cultivator does not 
personally own the land he cultivates, but he is entitled to the output of the 
crops he cultivates on it (i.e. usufruct right). The land under cultivation 
does not usually form a coherent area, but consists of small plots (each one 
called a "farm"), scattered over a larger area. Thus, it is possible for a 
farmer to select different plots with different characteristics, suitable for 
different crops. 
The seasonal nature of the work, the fact that no form of hired labour 
is used and the overlapping of the different farm activities for the different 
crops, means that the busiest period of the season sets the upper limit of 
what a farmer and his family are capable of cultivating. This often leads 
to slack periods, which are important for doing non-agricultural work. 
Because the subsistence producer is not integrated into the money 
economy, he has little or no cash available, which means that he has to 
build and maintain dwellings, storage bins and fences, for example, by 
himself. Furthermore, tools, clothing, pottery, furniture, and so on, also 
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have to be made, and the whole family is usually also involved in their 
manufacture. 
Subsistence agriculture exists in many forms, leading to different 
systems of production. For a more exhaustive overview on subsistence 
agriculture, see for example, Wharton (1970) or Amon (1981). Here, we 
merely distinguish two types of subsistence agriculture, after Wharton 
(1970), pure subsistence agriculture and semi-subsistence agriculture. 
Pure subsistence agriculture is a production system which may be 
considered the foundation from which other agricultural systems in Africa 
have evolved. Pure subsistence agriculture has become rare nowadays, 
except in certain isolated areas. Production in this type of agriculture is 
oriented towards the provision of food needs for the farming family. A 
diversity of crops is produced. The producers of the food are also the 
consumers, so no trade relations have developed. 
Semi-subsistence agriculture is a more mature form of pure subsistence 
agriculture. The main goal remains the food provision for the family, but 
in good years a small surplus is produced, which is traded. This is 
considered to be the first step towards agricultural commercialization 
(ibid.), which means that non-agricultural products can also be bought or 
bartered with the proceeds from the traded surplus. 
Commercial agriculture 
The other main form of production system is commercial agriculture, of 
which again two types can be distinguished, differing in their level of 
commercialization. The commercial cultivator depends more on 
socioeconomic, external, factors than on the limits set by physical factors. 
The physical environment is still obviously important to the commercial 
cultivator for selecting the crops he grows. For example, cocoa cannot be 
grown in savanna areas, while cotton or groundnuts can. However, the 
socioeconomic environment is of greater importance to the commercial 
producer than to the subsistence producer, simply because the former has 
to take the demand for his surplus production into account. 
Commercial agriculture is linked to the production of cash crops, crops 
that are marketed. Conceptually, food crops can be cash crops as well, as 
long as they are specifically produced for the export or domestic markets. 
However, the cash crops produced in Sub-Saharan Africa are generally raw 
material crops, produced specifically for overseas markets, and for which 
the domestic market is negligible or non-existent. This is considered a 
legacy from colonial times (Myint, 1965), or more specific, from the 
mercantile, capitalist character of colonization (Gakou, 1987). For the sake 
of this research, we treat cash crops as raw material, export crops, and use 
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these concepts interchangeably. 
Many of the cash crops popular nowadays were brought from the 
Americas by the Portuguese from the sixteenth century onwards. Examples 
are cocoa, groundnuts, tobacco and rubber. The Portuguese and other 
colonial nations, were also responsible for the introduction of new food 
crop varieties, such as maize, cassava and pumpkins (Grove and Klein, 
1979; Harrison Church, 1980; Grove, 1989). These new varieties were 
fitted into the existing agricultural systems, and played a vital role in the 
increasing importance of African agricultural (especially export oriented) 
production. 
As communication improved, making the link between production 
areas and markets possible, the cash crop became a more and more 
important element in the African cultivation systems. Producing for the 
world market became very important for West Africa, Egypt and the Sudan 
(the regions which had traditionally the closest contacts with markets in 
Europe and North America) since the beginning of the century, and in 
many other countries since the 1930s (Grove and Klein, 1979). 
Because areas which produce a surplus for a market have to be linked 
with that market, it is necessary that the transfer of production to the 
market is feasible at the lowest possible cost. That is why areas of 
commercial agriculture in tropical Africa are, in general, associated with 
areas with a relatively well-developed infrastructure (Gakou, 1987). 
There is a wealth of literature on commercialization, commercial 
agricultural production and on the definitions of this concept, which we 
have dealt with elsewhere (see section 2.1). Here we want to confine 
ourselves to two different types of commercial agriculture, which we call 
semi-commercial agriculture and pure commercial agriculture (after 
Wharton, 1970). For a more refined classification of commercial agriculture 
and the resulting types of production units, see, for instance, Huizenga 
(1959). 
The provision of food for the family is still an important goal in the 
semi-commercial production system, but increasingly only the staple crops 
(rice, maize, sorghum, and so on) are produced. The growing need for cash 
has resulted in the frequent and deliberate production of marketed 
surpluses. Employment outside of agriculture has also become important. 
Although the trade relations with the non-agricultural sectors of the 
economy have gained importance, they are not yet very strong. However, 
as the farmer becomes more and more dependent on the market, he may 
fall back into what we have called semi-subsistence agriculture, when the 
economic situation is weak. 
The second type of commercial agriculture can be called pure 
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commercial agriculture. For this type of production organization, the main 
production goal is no longer the provision of food for the family, but the 
acquisition of a certain cash income. There might still be some production 
meant for home consumption, but this is no longer the sole aim. The 
integration into the market economy is complete, and the farmer has 
become fully dependent on market demand, and sensitive to price 
decreases. Agriculture has become business, and farmers are acting as 
businessmen. 
The continuum from pure subsistence agriculture, via semi-subsistence 
agriculture and semi-commercial agriculture to pure commercial agriculture 
can, in theory, be considered to be the logical evolutionary process of 
agriculture towards commercialization. Here, we have confined our brief 
description to those agricultural systems that are managed by a family, i.e 
family farms. A further differentiation could be made towards fully 
commercialized farming types (for example, large scale plantations, aimed 
completely at maximizing profits). 
Again we must stress the fact that "evolution" in this context does not 
imply a value judgement. We do not consider a certain form of production 
system better than another. But, it cannot be denied that more commercial 
types of production systems are potentially more productive, and most 
probably will yield higher production levels. This is because marketed 
surpluses bring in income, which cannot only be used for acquiring goods 
for consumption (including food) but can also be applied to productive 
purposes as well. The producer may buy capital goods or hire labour, for 
example. So, a commercial farmer has at least some amount of income, 
which may be spent productively. The subsistence farmer has less 
opportunities for that, simply because he does not earn enough cash to 
invest productively. This also means that food production on a commercial, 
more productive, basis is capable of alleviating, at least partly, the growing 
food deficiencies that the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly 
faced with. But it is not enough to consider this a bright prospect, and 
simply conclude that commercialization is the perfect panacea by itself. 
There are numerous social, infrastructural and economic conditions that 
have to be fulfilled if the commercialization of agriculture is to become 
successful (see also chapter 2). 
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42 Agriculture in Sierra Leone 
In this section, we present a more refined overview of the characteristics 
and demands of the different production systems, by presenting the case of 
Sierra Leone. The physical characteristics are dealt with first. We then look 
at the types of production systems which resulted, to a certain extent, from 
this physical environment. We end by highlighting one of the important 
socioeconomic factors that may determine production behaviour, the land 
tenure system. 
4.2.1 The agro-ecological zones 
Potentially, there is enough scope for Sierra Leone to expand its 
agricultural production. The total land area of the country is 7.23 million 
hectares, of which almost 75 percent (5.36 million hectares) is arable 
(ILO/JASPA, 1990). But, only 384,000 hectares, or 7 per cent of this 
potential, was under cultivation in 1990/91, as table 4.1 shows. 
Table 4.1 Distribution of arable lands for food production in Sierra 
Leone, by agro-ecological zones, 1990/91 (x 1,000 hectares) 
Ecology 
-Uplands 
-I.V.S.' 
-Mangrove 
swamps 
-Bolilands 
-Riverain 
grasslands 
Total 
Crop 
suitability 
rice and 
perennials 
rice and 
vegetables 
rice 
rice, tubers 
and vegetables 
rice, tubers 
and vegetables 
Total area 
(a) 
4,300 
630 
200 
120 
110 
5,360 
Percentage 
of total 
80.2 
11.8 
3.7 
2.2 
2.1 
100.0 
Cultivated 
area (b) 
263 
94 
12 
7 
8 
384 
Percentage 
(b) of (a) 
6.1 
14.9 
6.0 
5.8 
7.3 
7.2 
Inland Valley Swamps. 
Sources: OSRO (1985); ILO/JASPA (1990); PEMSD (1993); authors' calculations. 
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Thus, there is an enormous potential for increasing the amount of arable 
land, in order to expand the total production, and generate more employ-
ment and income. 
The arable land in Sierra Leone is usually divided into upland and 
swamp farm land. The latter can be subdivided into inland valley swamps, 
mangrove swamps, bolilands and riverine or riverain grasslands. 
The upland area 
The upland area comprises the largest area of cultivated land. It consists of 
relatively well drained, dry land, but with poor fertility. The main crops 
cultivated are rice and perennials (mainly tree crops). Considering the first, 
it is doubtful whether primitive upland production of rice can support (i.e. 
make self-sufficient) a population of more than 23 inhabitants per square 
kilometre (Harrison Church, 1980). This density is not only below the 
average for Sierra Leone, which is 64 persons per square kilometre (see 
section 3.1.2), but is also below that of such rural regions as Kono District, 
69 per square kilometre, Kailahun, 61 per square kilometre, and Kenema 
District, 56 per square kilometre (figures for 1985, see section 3.2). 
Rice is cultivated in the whole upland area, whilst perennials are 
confined to specific suitable areas. For example, coffee and cocoa are 
grown in the southeast. Coffee has a greater range to the north and west 
than cocoa. Ginger, however, is cultivated mainly in the Moyamba area and 
groundnuts are found mainly in the northwest of the country. 
The most important use of upland fields is for rice cultivation, the 
country's staple food. Sierra Leone's annual rainfall of 2,000 to 4,200 
millimetres per year (Minster/Abco, 1993b) favours rice growing. Almost 
every producer cultivates rice for home consumption. 
Upland rice production in Sierra Leone is mostly done under the 
rotational bush-fallow system. This is an extensive system of land use 
which substitutes land (the abundant production factor) for capital (the 
scarce production factor). In such a system, the farmer cultivates a field for 
one or two years, after which it is left to lie fallow for some years in order 
to regain its fertility (usually a period of at least ten years is recommended, 
see section 4.1.2). The length of the fallow period is constrained by the 
population density of the area. Because the upland area of Sierra Leone is 
relatively densely populated, it becomes more and more difficult for most 
farmers to leave the field fallow for longer than ten years. The selection of 
a new field is the outcome of a compromise between the benefits of high 
potential fertility (i.e. "old bush", characterised by heavy vegetation) and 
the costs of labour needed to clear the site. 
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After the cultivator has chosen the plot on which he wants to make his 
upland farm, he begins brushing it in December. Grasses, small trees, 
weeds and so on, are cut down with the cutlass (a type of machete), and 
the bigger trees are felled with an axe. The farmer keeps brushing and 
felling until March, when (depending upon the weather conditions) the 
burning of the field takes place, just before the rainy season starts. In April, 
the field will be cleared. All the unbumt remains of the trees are then 
removed, although stumping is rarely practised. Starting in this same 
month, until about June, the cultivator ploughs in the rice in the gravel-free 
areas. The rice seed is broadcast first, and the soil is turned over lightly 
with a hoe so that the seeds will be covered. Weeds are also removed then. 
As inter-cropping can take place on upland rice fields, other crops are also 
planted now. Examples of additional crops are sorghum, millet, maize 
(corn), guinea corn, yams, cassava, onions, beans, peas, okra, garden eggs 
and so on. Inter- or mixed-cropping is preferred by most farmers. Mixed-
cropping makes better management of soil and water resources possible. It 
also results in relatively secure yields, provides a variety of food and offers 
better control of weeds and diseases (see, for instance, Harrison Church, 
1980; Ruthenberg, 1980, and Nippold, 1988). Sometimes as many as 30 
different crops are planted on a field, but generally the number of crops 
lies in between ten and 20, with one or two crops dominating besides rice. 
From August onwards, the farmer tends his field by fencing it (to 
protect it from animals); and scaring birds. The second period of weeding 
also starts. Depending on the weather and on the type of rice used, 
harvesting begins in October. The rice is processed by threshing it with a 
pestle and mortar. Thereafter, the grains are dried in the sun. Finally, in 
December, the brushing of a new upland farm starts again (see Appendix 
4.1). 
In a report by the Agricultural Sector Review Programming Mission 
(MAFF/FAO, 1992), yields for upland rice were reported as varying 
between 268 and 983 pounds per acre'. For the season 1984/85, an 
average yield of 867 pounds per acre was observed (PEMSD, 1993)2. The 
absolute yield levels have declined over the last five years due to a 
decrease in the area planted with upland rice, and also from decreasing 
productivity levels (MAFF/FAO, 1992). The latter has been caused by the 
impact of the rotational bush-fallow system. Shorter periods of fallow have 
1
 Recalculated in pounds per acre. MAFF/FAO gives the yields as varying 
between 300 and 1,100 kilograms per hectare. 
2
 PEMSD gives the yield as 970 kilograms per hectare. 
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led to declining soil fertility, hence, to lower yields. This is accompanied 
by an increase in tree crops production, and the production of food crops 
other than rice, that can withstand the poor soil conditions. 
The other main crops on the upland fields are the perennials. When 
perennials are cultivated, the bush-fallow cultivation system has been 
abandoned for permanent cultivation. Tree crops, such as oil palm, coconut, 
coffee and cocoa, are not very demanding on soil nutrients (see 4.1.2), 
because the fruits of the trees are harvested, not the trees themselves. 
In Sierra Leone, cocoa is mostly grown on small scale farms (about 
1.0 to 2.5 acres). It is rarely cultivated in sole stands, but is usually mixed 
with coffee. Initially, cocoa was planted in the coastal areas. However, 
growth conditions turned out to be unfavourable. Later, cocoa was grown 
mainly in the southeast forest zone of the country (see map 4.1). The first 
cocoa variety introduced was the Amelonado variety, and the plantations 
were planted with seeds from unselected parents (MAFF/FAO, 1992). 
Seedlings planted in more recent years are raised from Upper Amazon 
varieties, introduced in the early 1960s (ibid.), and which originated from 
Ghana (Minster/Abco, 1993b). 
The crop needs to be protected from strong winds and the young plants 
need shade trees, which are usually kola nut trees. Ideally, cocoa needs a 
rainy season of at least nine months, so the rainfall distribution in Sierra 
Leone, where the rainy season lasts only five months, may be 
disadvantageous. Cocoa can only tolerate the long dry season when there 
is at least 2,540 millimetres of annual rainfall (Harrison Church, 1980). 
This is another reason why cocoa is confined to the southeast. Moreover, 
the soils should be loamy and well drained. In the southern part of the 
country the soils are too poor or cultivation is inhibited by swamps (ibid.). 
Cocoa is subject to a variety of pests, including capsids, stem borer 
and termites. Black pod disease, caused by the fungus Phytophthora 
palmivora, is the most serious disease and can result in the loss of an entire 
crop (MAFF/FAO, 1992). The high incidence is associated with high 
humidity and poorly maintained plantations (Minster/Abco, 1993b). 
For 1984/85, the average yield in Sierra Leone was reported as being 
366 pounds per acre (PEMSD, 1993)3. Later figures mention lower 
averages: in between 201 (MAFF/FAO, 1992) and 250 pounds per acre 
3
 PEMSD gives the yield as 410 kilograms per hectare. 
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(Minster/Abco, 1993b)4. These productivity figures are low compared with 
the average yields elsewhere in (West) Africa, which range from 357 to 
500 pounds per acre (Grove and Klein, 1979)5. For cocoa, improved 
husbandry practices could more than double yields within five years 
(MAFF/FAO, 1992). The measures required are shade management, 
pruning and pest and disease control. However, the on-going rebel war in 
the country has distorted the picture. The current productivity figures have 
dropped even below those mentioned above. 
After a "plantation" has been established, i.e. a specific plot has been 
planted with cocoa, the husbandry practices are limited to specific periods. 
These are usually just prior to and during harvesting, as hardly any pruning 
and spraying against diseases is carried out. However, when a new field of 
cocoa is established, considerable work has to be done. So, the peak labour 
requirement periods are restricted to the planting and harvesting periods, 
and generally overlap with the harvesting periods of upland and inland 
valley swamp rice (Kireta-Katewu, 1984) (see also Appendices 4.2 and 
4.3). 
A plot that is selected for a new plantation is prepared in the same 
way as for upland rice production. So, brushing takes place in December, 
and brushing and felling continue from January to March, when the 
remaining trees are burnt. Normally, cocoa seedlings are nursed in nursery 
beds from February onwards, and the pre-germinated seeds are planted on 
the cleared field in June and July. These are allowed to grow for up to one 
year, before they are transplanted at specific intervals in the upland fields. 
After five to seven years, the first cocoa harvest can be obtained. Under-
brushing has to take place prior to the harvesting of cocoa. The harvesting 
period starts in August or September, and may last until February. The 
pods are cut by men with a knife on a long stick (the so-called "go-to-
hell") after which women and children collect the pods and bring them to 
the village. The pods are then opened and the beans removed. About 30 to 
40 white beans with an adhering sticky pulp are collected per pod. Cocoa 
husks are sometimes burnt and the ashes are used in soap making (Leach, 
1990). The fresh beans are then fermented by heaping them and covering 
the heaps with banana or plantain leafs for five to seven days. The 
fermented beans are then dried in the sun for a further seven to ten days. 
4
 MAFF/FAO gives the yield as 225 and Minster/Abco as 280 kilograms per 
hectare. 
5
 Grove and Klein give the yields as varying between 400 and 560 kilograms per 
hectare. 
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Coffee is the other main cash crop cultivated in the upland area in Sierra 
Leone. The most widely grown variety is Robusta, which requires similar 
physical conditions to cocoa*. Unlike cocoa, however, it can withstand 
some drought (Harrison Church, 1980), which explains its more 
northwesterly distribution compared to cocoa (see map 4.2). It also 
tolerates lighter soils. Therefore, the area cultivated with coffee exceeds the 
area cultivated with cocoa. 
As was with cocoa, the early plantings of coffee started on the wrong 
footing. Initially, Arabica seedlings were introduced (MAFF/FAO, 1992), 
but this variety needs higher altitudes than are available in Sierra Leone. 
However, with the introduction of Robusta, exports began to rise rapidly. 
Nevertheless, productivity remains low because plantations are poorly 
maintained and little is known about the source of planting materials. In the 
1960s, some high-yielding hybrid seeds were introduced, which are now 
extensively grown (ibid.). Pests and diseases are not very significant in 
Sierra Leone, although the occurrence of black ants may make harvesting 
unpleasant or even impossible. 
The average yields used to be relatively low, 348 pounds per acre in 
1984/85 (PEMSD, 1993)7. Later figures indicate an even lower 
productivity of 201 pounds per acre (MAFF/FAO, 1992 and Minster/Abco, 
1993b)8. Compared to an average yield of up to 625 pounds per acre 
elsewhere in Africa (de Graaff, 1986)9, coffee production in Sierra Leone 
scores comparatively worse than cocoa. For coffee, as for cocoa, improved 
shade management and regular brushing and pruning could increase yields 
(MAFF/FAO, 1992). However, the opportunities to brush are constrained 
by the availability and cost of labour, while pruning is a maintenance 
practice in which many farmers still lack relevant skills and knowledge. 
After a coffee plantation has been established, the husbandry practices are, 
as with cocoa, limited to specific periods, usually before and during harvest 
time. The most labour intensive period is when a new field of coffee is 
planted. The selected plot has to be treated in the same way as the plots for 
upland rice and cocoa cultivation. This means that in December brushing 
6
 Besides Robusta, another, minorly grown variety is cultivated, Liberica, 
indigenous to Liberia (Harrison Church, 1980). This explains its predominance 
in the border area of Sierra Leone with Liberia. 
7
 PEMSD gives the yield as 390 kilograms per hectare. 
' MAFF/FAO and Minster/Abco give the yield as 225 kilograms per hectare. 
' De Graaff gives the yield as 700 kilograms per hectare. 
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starts. Brushing and felling continue from January to March, when the 
remaining trees are also burnt. The coffee seedlings are nursed in nursery 
beds from February onwards, and the pre-germinated seeds are planted in 
June and July. The seedlings stay in the field for one year, then they are 
transplanted at specific intervals. The first coffee harvest can be expected 
after four or five years. As with cocoa, underbrushing takes place prior to 
harvesting. It is a much more labour intensive activity for coffee than for 
cocoa as sunlight can penetrate the coffee fields more easily than the cocoa 
fields, and sunlight encourages the undergrowth. Coffee harvesting usually 
begins in December and can continue to May (see also Appendix 4.3). The 
berries are picked by men and women and transported to the village. After 
seven to ten days of sun-drying, the coffee is either sold as cherries (i.e. 
dried berries), or hulled (i.e. the dried shells are removed). Hulling is done 
mechanically or by hand. In the latter case, women hull the cherries with 
a wooden pestle and mortar. 
The swamp area 
The swamp fields comprise about one-third of the total cultivated area. 
Two forms of swamp cultivation can be distinguished, inland valley and 
coastal swamps. The first are located in the valleys bordering the uplands 
and comprise almost 80 per cent of the whole area of swamp cultivation 
(see table 4.1). They are either flooded permanently, or just during the 
rainy season. The soils of the inland swamps are compact and easy to 
clear, and mainly rice is cultivated. 
Unlike upland rice cultivation, which is prone to soil erosion, the 
inland valley swamps are areas of deposition. Because of their location, 
bordering the uplands, the eroded materials from the uplands are deposited 
in these swamps during the rainy season. In this way, the soil fertility, 
which was reduced during previous cultivations, is restored. Another 
advantage of swamp rice cultivation is that the yields obtained can be 
several times higher than in upland rice cultivation (see section 5.1). 
Although the higher rice yields of swamp fields might suggest that 
farmers would be attracted by that prospect, and, hence, would increasingly 
cultivate swamp rice, the expansion of the cultivated area under swamp rice 
has been marginal. Although between 1970/71 and 1990/91 the cultivated 
upland rice area decreased from 243,000 hectares to 224,000 hectares, the 
cultivated swamp area increased only from 89,000 hectares to 94,000 
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hectares (PEMSD, 1993)10. The diminishing area of land planted with 
upland rice can be explained by the increased area under coffee and cocoa 
trees (see section 3.1.5), but also by increasing labour shortages. 
According to Alie (1990), swamp rice cultivation in Sierra Leone was 
first started in the late nineteenth century by Terrine farmers in the Scarries 
river area, in the northwest of the country. Some of these farmers were 
later deployed to help start swamp rice cultivation in other areas. By 1928, 
swamp rice was cultivated spontaneously in inland valley swamps. 
However, farmers still preferred cultivating upland rice. For, although 
swamps brought higher rice yields, the work was more labour intensive and 
the taste of the rice considered inferior to upland rice (Leach, 1990). 
Coastal swamp rice cultivation can be subdivided in three types. First, there 
are the mangrove swamps. These are located in the coastal areas and in the 
mouths of the large rivers. The cutting down of the mangrove trees and the 
use of protective bunds against the ingress of salt water enables the 
production of rice. The clayey soils are perfect for holding the water, but 
salinity can be a problem (Harrison Church, 1980). Rice production is still 
possible, because heavy rainfall and river water can be used to make the 
soil salt-free. The yield per acre between 1986/87 and 1990/91 varied 
between 907 and 2874 pounds (PEMSD, 1993)". 
The second type of coastal swamp rice cultivation is formed by the 
bolilands. These are swamp areas which are situated in low lands, 
intersecting the country from the northwest to the south. They are flooded 
once a year to as much as two meters. They are usually rather infertile and 
require the use of fertilizers. Rice is mostly cultivated on them, but 
sometimes tubers and vegetables are also grown (Harrison Church, 1980). 
In the period between 1986/87 and 1990/91, their productivity varied 
between 907 and 1814 pounds per ton (PEMSD, 1993)12. The bolilands 
are not expected to play a major part in future rice production, because of 
their relatively low yields, poor soil conditions and the need for fertilizer 
application (MAFF/FAO, 1992). 
Finally, there are the riverain or riverine grasslands. Those areas are 
10
 However, the same source gives, as presented in table 3.2, as the total cultivated 
area for inland valley swamps 83,694 hectares (in 1970/71), which proves that 
the data collected by government institutions should be treated carefully. 
However, the main point here is that the trend is made clear. 
" PEMSD gives the yields as varying between 1.00 and 3.17 metric tons per 
hectare. 
12
 PEMSD gives the yields as varying between 1 and 2 tons per hectare. 
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found along the large rivers (Sewa and Wanji), above the tidal zone. The 
soils are light and periodically flooded during the rainy season, up to six 
meters (only when the rivers are swollen). Rice is mainly grown here, but 
in the drier parts, sweet potatoes and early cassava are also grown during 
the dry season (Harrison Church, 1980). Between 1986/87 and 1990/91, 
their yield per acre varied between 571 and 1423 pounds (PEMSD, 
1993)13. 
Inland valley swamp rice can be produced in two different ways. First, 
there is the traditional swamp rice cropping pattern, whereby the swamp is 
brushed from April to June. The debris is burnt and the planting starts in 
July, lasting until August. Farmers usually nurse and transplant the rice 
seedlings (Leach, 1990), although the seeds are sometimes broadcast. In 
September weeding and fencing takes place, while as a rule, harvesting 
starts in January (see also Appendix 4.1). The main difference with the 
second swamp rice cropping pattern, the partially or fully developed 
swamps, is that no form of water control is practised, and the stumps are 
not removed. 
Most developed swamps are found in the areas which have been under 
the influence of either Integrated Agricultural Development Projects (see 
section 3.1.6) or one of the swamp development projects financed by the 
People's Republic of China. The cultivation practices in the developed 
swamps may sometimes include the use of fertilizers, the removal of tree 
stumps, the nursery of seed rice and the transplanting of seedlings, and 
some form of water control. This is normally achieved through the 
construction of earthen bunds and small channels for the discharge and 
supply of water. Thus, it is possible to control the water effectively, and it 
may enable the production of more than one rice crop per year. The 
average yield in 1990/91 was 2022 pounds per acre (PEMSD, 1993)14. 
Inland valley swamps have the highest potential of all rice growing 
ecologies for sustained rice production (MAFF/FAO, 1992). Attempts to 
develop swamp rice production have failed until now, however, due to the 
poor extension and support services to farmers after the development phase 
(ibid.). A strategy which aims at growing only one rice crop per season 
should be encouraged. This should be followed by the cultivation of dry 
land food crops, such as vegetables and grain legumes, instead of aiming 
13
 PEMSD gives the yields as varying between 0.63 and 1.57 metric tons per 
hectare. 
14
 PEMSD gives the yield as 2.23 tons per hectare. 
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at two rice crops per season (ibid.). The one rice crop strategy is more 
profitable and can augment soil fertility. 
There are several reasons why farmers are not very enthusiastic about 
inland valley swamp rice cultivation. First of all, inter-cropping is not 
possible in swamps, which means that other food crops have to be 
produced separately. However, sequential cropping is feasible. It is possible 
to use the swamp for production of fast maturing vegetables after the rice 
is harvested. They must be fast maturing, because the period from rice 
harvesting until the next rains rarely exceeds four months. Second, upland 
rice is also considered to be superior in taste compared to swamp rice. In 
addition, the work in swamps is unpleasant, and may be unhealthy 
(Harrison Church, 1980; Binns, 1982). Finally, swamp rice cultivation is 
more labour intensive than upland rice cultivation (MAFF/FAO, 1992). In 
areas where there is a shortage of labour, this is a serious impediment. 
Less than 10 per cent of Sierra Leone's arable land is under cultivation. 
Although a substantial part of the country is mountainous, the country has 
a considerable potential for expanding the acreage under cultivation. 
Considering the fact that, on the one hand, part of the upland area is under 
permanent cultivation, and on the other hand, that a large part of it should 
lie fallow, the scope for expansion is primarily to be found in the swamp 
areas. However, this is not to say that expansion is possible per se, because 
constraints, such as labour or capital shortages, may limit expansion 
opportunities. 
Expansion of arable area is not the only strategy that could be pursued 
in order to increase rice production. Productivity increases are also 
possible. In the upland areas the productivity might be increased by using 
fertilizers. Mechanization in order to increase labour productivity levels, 
does not seem to be suitable in the Sierra Leone context. This is because 
the underdeveloped infrastructure hinders the frequent availability of spare 
parts and maintenance facilities. Training facilities, in order to help farmers 
acquire the skills necessary to use machinery, are also unavailable. Finally, 
the fact that the overwhelming majority of farmers are smallholders and 
that their plots are often scattered, is detrimental to successful 
mechanization and would make it in many cases inefficient. 
The main tree crops, coffee and cocoa, are cultivated on upland fields. 
They are the country's largest foreign exchange earning agricultural 
products. Because coffee and cocoa are dependent on particular climatic 
and ecological conditions, the potential expansion of the acreage of both 
crops is limited. However, a higher production level may be obtained by 
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improving the productivity. At present, the agricultural productivity is 
lower than in comparable countries. Productivity increases might be 
obtained by applying pesticides and insecticides. However, the first step 
towards raising productivity levels would be to ensure good husbandry 
practices. This means, particularly, that sufficient labour has to be 
available, in order to ensure complete brushing (and even harvesting, as we 
show in chapter 5). The problem of labour shortage, however, is not easy 
to solve. 
Besides the physical characteristics, other, non-physical factors are of 
importance in characterizing the agricultural sector in Sierra Leone. In 
4.1.3, we have seen that the goal orientation of farmers determines, to a 
certain extent, their production choice. In the next section, we deal with the 
prevailing land tenure system in Sierra Leone. It shows that rural Sierra 
Leone is in the process of change from a pure communal land ownership 
system, via certain transitional stages, towards, ultimately, individual land 
rights. In itself, this process reflects the change from subsistence agriculture 
to commercial agriculture, as well as the transition from shifting cultivation 
to more permanent types of production systems. 
4.2.2 The land tenure system 
The land tenure system in most areas of Sierra Leone, except in the 
Western Area (i.e. Freetown and its surroundings), is based on usufruct 
rights. In the Western Area, individual land property is permitted, and the 
buying and selling of land from one individual to another is the standard 
and takes place according to the principles of Roman Law. In the rest of 
the country, the provinces, communal ownership dominates, except in those 
areas where the national government has created national game and forest 
reserves, or in urban environments. 
The different land tenure systems in the provinces of Sierra Leone can 
be broadly classified into four categories, i.e. pure communal ownership, 
semi-communal ownership, family-based ownership and, finally, private 
ownership. It is worth noting that the latter is only of importance at the 
moment in the urban areas, not in the rural regions. 
Communal ownership is a system whereby the land is owned by a 
group rather than held by an individual. The responsibility for the alloca-
tion of the land-use rights within this system lies with either the Paramount 
Chiefs or with the heads of important families. There are minor variations 
within the communal tenure system, resulting from different circumstances. 
For instance, the allocation of land in a densely populated area turns out 
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to be different from the allocation of land in a sparsely populated area. 
This has led to differentiations in the types of communal land ownership 
systems. The characteristics of the population that dominates a certain area 
will also have considerable influence on the type of land tenure system that 
evolves. 
Pure communal ownership 
With the system of pure communal ownership a whole community forms 
the land-holding group. In this case, the Paramount Chief is the de jure 
owner of the land, and not only the caretaker within his territory (Elias, 
1962). Any chiefdom inhabitant may make a farm wherever he wishes, and 
is limited only by the boundaries of his chiefdom, but not of his village. 
He may farm on the selected spot for at least the coming season, provided 
no other farmer has already demarcated the plot. Such a system exists best 
wherever land is plentiful available, i.e. in the north of Sierra Leone. This 
system is found especially among the Kono, Koranko and Yalunka tribes, 
(Johnson, 1976). 
Semi-communal ownership 
The second type of communal ownership is called semi-communal 
ownership (May-Parker and Deen, 1978). The main difference with pure 
communal ownership is that in this system the boundaries between villages 
within a given chiefdom are demarcated, and as such limit the area in 
which a farmer can select a plot to farm on. The community of a certain 
village, represented by the Town Chief, allocates the land use rights within 
these village boundaries. A farmer of village X cannot automatically select 
a plot on the territory of village Y. If he wants to farm within the 
boundaries of village Y, he must obtain the permission from the town chief 
of Y. This form of landownership is mainly found among the Kissi and 
part of the Limba tribes (Johnson, 1976), but is also common among the 
Mende. This indicates that, compared to pure communal ownership, semi-
communal ownership is found in more densely populated areas. 
Family-based ownership 
The most widespread form of communal ownership is called the family-
based ownership system. Here, the allocation of land is executed by the 
head of the extended family, as he is the representative of the extended 
family who owns the land. It is estimated that 80 per cent of the total farm 
lands of Sierra Leone are cultivated under this system (May-Parker and 
Deen, 1978), and it is found among the Mende, Temne and Sherbro tribes 
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(Johnson, 1976). The right of a particular family to the land is based on the 
fact that either their ancestors were the first to settle in the area, and 
claimed the land, or that they are the descendants of the individual who 
first brought the land under cultivation. 
The head of the family is the caretaker of the family land, and is 
obliged to make sure that the land is properly used, so that future family 
generations will still be able to make use of the land. It is also the head's 
responsibility to make sure that every family member's rights to the land 
are respected. 
Although within the system of family-based ownership many different 
patterns of land allocation exist, broadly speaking two main patterns can 
be discerned. First, there is the "family head system". In this system, all the 
family land is reallocated every year. Before the beginning of the new 
farming season, every member of the family who wishes to make a farm 
that season, applies to the head of the family. When the head has received 
all the applications, he will consult the senior members of the family, i.e. 
all the "elderly and wise" family members who have a say in family 
affairs, in order to decide which member may farm which piece of family 
land, and for how long. In this system, the head not only has tremendous 
power over the decisions about the distribution of land among family 
members, but also about the decisions concerning the future use of the land 
(for example, which part of the land will have to lie fallow for a certain 
period of time). He also controls the transfer of land to family outsiders. 
This may give rise to the thought that family heads can misuse their power, 
in reserving the best plots for themselves, for example. But the head is 
clearly the caretaker of the land, the manager, and he may even, in extreme 
cases of abuse, be removed by the family council (ibid.). 
The second main form of land allocation is the "block system". With 
this method, the land is not distributed at certain short-term intervals by the 
family head, but on a more "permanent" basis. The family land is divided 
into a number of blocks, and then allocated among the senior family mem-
bers. Each senior family member may sub-divide the one or more blocks 
that are designated to him in turn to members of his own family, without 
consulting the family head. However, the title to the family land is still 
formally vested with the head, and he has to give his formal consent for 
the sub-division in due course. This system is, therefore, a refinement of 
the family-based communal land ownership system. 
We have to add a note here on the descriptions of the different communal 
land tenure systems. Consideration has to be made for the fact that these 
tenure systems are specifically valid for land on which annual crops are 
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grown. Those areas can be redistributed on a yearly basis. This is different 
with land planted with perennials (i.e. coffee, cocoa and oil palm). Those 
areas are considered to be "demarcated" by the individual who planted the 
trees. In fact, the land still belongs to the head of the particular social unit 
relevant to the land distribution (i.e. Paramount Chief, Town Chief or 
family head). But the planter of the trees, by his demarcation, has obtained 
the usufruct rights for an unspeciñc period. Only after the death of the 
planter, will the land be returned to the original caretaker. In practice, the 
family of the deceased will manage the plantation: it becomes a family 
plantation, of which the fruits are shared by the family members. 
Private ownership 
Private land ownership is not confined solely to the Western Area. A type 
of private land ownership also occurs in the provinces. There, a land 
market does exist, but it is based on the principles of traditional land law, 
not on Roman Law. Individuals can obtain a piece of land by first looking 
for a family which would be willing to sell a piece of their family land. 
Then negotiations start about the acreage and the price of the land, after 
which both buyer and seller rum to the local Ministry of Housing and 
Planning, where a standard contract is signed. Although after the signing 
of this contract the land is officially sold by the family, it does not mean 
that the family has no say over the land any more. For instance, when the 
new owner wants to sell the newly acquired land again to a third party, he 
has to have the consent of the family to which the land originally belonged. 
Normally, the family does not object to a resale of the land, but they still 
have a right of about 15 to 20 per cent of the resale price (Nippold, 1988). 
Other ways of obtaining farm land 
Besides buying land or obtaining the usufruct right of a plot through one 
of the different forms of communal ownership systems, there are other 
ways of acquiring the use of farm land. 
First, there is the way of "begging" land from another farmer. If 
somebody, for whatever reason, is not capable of obtaining enough land for 
himself, he can ask a fellow farmer, who could possibly be a relative, for 
a piece of land. When this fellow farmer is not able to farm all the land he 
is entitled to, then it is customary that he "lends" a plot to the beggar. In 
exchange for a token fee, the beggar then receives a piece of land, which 
he normally uses for one year. This means that tree crops are not allowed 
to be grown on begged land. The fee for the use of land should not be seen 
as rent, but rather as an acknowledgement of the fact that the beggar does 
not own the land, so as to forestall future claims on the land (Johnny, 
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1985). 
A second way of obtaining farm land is by pledging it. Pledging can 
formally take place in two forms, of limited (i.e. for a specified period of 
time) and of unlimited duration. The former is rare. The most common 
form of pledging involves an unlimited duration. The pledgee has obtained 
the usufruct right of the land (which can be a tree crop plantation, but also 
a rice field), because the pledger owes him a debt. Until the debt is repaid, 
the pledgee has the right and even the obligation to make proper use of the 
land (for if the pledgee does not farm the land, the Tribal Authorities may 
intervene and cancel the contract). Two varieties of pledging of unlimited 
duration can be distinguished, either the debt is repaid with the proceeds 
of the pledged land, or the pledgee has the right to use the land until the 
pledger has repaid the debt. In the former case, the duration of the pledge 
depends on the proceeds of the pledged land, in the latter on the pace of 
debt repayment by the pledger. In addition to the repayment of the debt, 
the pledgee receives an interest compensation for the initial amount he has 
lent to the pledger. 
Finally, a person may also obtain land by purchasing it or receiving it 
as a gift from somebody. Such transactions do not occur very often, 
because, theoretically, communal land cannot be bought or sold. But, 
according to Turay (1980), due to the expansion of provincial urban areas 
and the consequently rising demand for land, land sales around such areas 
(principally for building and not for farming purposes), are not unknown. 
These kinds of land sales seem to belong to the category of private 
ownership, but are still based on traditional land law, and are informally 
arranged. 
The prevailing land tenure system in the rural areas of the provinces in 
Sierra Leone, indicates that no freehold system exists. Individual ownership 
does not exist, because land is of more than mere economic value to rural 
people. Land is seen as 'a sacred trust, held by the present generation on 
behalf of the dead ancestors, for the use of future generations' (May-Parker 
and Deen, 1978, p. 226). 
Thus, communal ownership is the dominant form of land tenure, 
whereby three different types can be distinguished, and which have 
developed according to the living and working circumstances in the areas 
concerned. The prevailing type of land tenure in a given area is, for 
example, related to the population density of that area. The rights to land 
become increasingly individualized in those areas where the population 
increases. Pure communal ownership does not pose a problem as long as 
there is abundant land available. Wherever an area becomes more densely 
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populated, another form will have to develop. Also the changes in the goal 
orientation of producers have resulted in individualization of land rights, 
which may ultimately lead to private property. The increasing importance 
of cash crops, which are almost exclusively perennials, has led to an 
increase in the duration of land use. The planter of, for example, coffee 
acquires the right to use the land as long as the coffee is bearing. The 
planter has, thus, demarcated the land for his household. 
The assumption that the individualization of land ownership is 
favourable for the rise of production and productivity levels in agriculture, 
is widely acknowledged in literature (see, for example, Saul and Woods, 
1971, Hinderink and Sterkenburg, 1987 and World Bank, 1992a), but not 
necessarily proven. The fact that in customary land ownership the producer 
has a special bond with the land (through ancestral lines) can be considered 
a condition for good husbandry as well. 
We have seen several of the physical and socioeconomic factors that may 
influence the choice of a farmer for a certain form of production. In the 
next chapter, we see how these factors have influenced the production 
systems in our research area, and what types of producers can be discerned. 
5 
Producers and Production Systems in the Research 
Area 
Frank Sellies 
The most important food crop production systems in Sierra Leone are 
upland and swamp rice cultivation. In section 5.1, we analyze the main 
characteristics of these two systems with data from our research area. In 
section 5.2, we provide an analysis of the two main export crop production 
systems in our research area, coffee and cocoa cultivation. We also 
differentiate the research area on the basis of the levels of coffee and cocoa 
productivity. Following the analysis of the main agricultural production 
systems, we turn our attention in section 5.3 to the main actors working 
within these systems, the agricultural producers. On the basis of several 
selected socioeconomic aspects, we distinguish the different types of 
producers. We end the section by providing a socioeconomic differentiation 
of the coffee and cocoa producers1. 
5.1 Characteristics of main food production systems in the 
research area 
Rice is the most important food crop in the Sierra Leonean diet and as the 
saying goes 'a Sierra Leonean hasn't eaten, if he hasn't eaten rice'. This 
feeling contributes to the fact that almost every farmer produces rice, 
mainly for home consumption. There are two methods of rice cultivation, 
upland and swamp rice. In this section, the characteristics of both 
production types in our research area are analyzed. 
1
 The figures provided are mainly taken from the 1992/93 survey, unless 
otherwise slated, and relate to the 1991/92 cropping season. Likewise, figures 
from the 1990/91 survey relate to the 1989/90 cropping season. 
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5.1.1 Upland rice cultivation in the research area 
Upland rice was cultivated by 58 per cent of the respondents in 1991/92. 
Half of these upland rice producers were, in addition, cultivating swamp 
rice. In 1989/90, the percentage of upland rice cultivators amounted to 60 
per cent. Again, half of the upland rice producers were cultivating swamp 
rice as well. 
On average, upland rice was cultivated on 2.6 acres of land. Those 
respondents who cultivated only upland rice, cultivated it on a slightly 
smaller scale than those who cultivated swamp rice as well. When we 
differentiate the acreages per region, we see that the largest average 
acreages were found in Small-Bo and Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom. There, 
fewer farmers were cultivating coffee and cocoa, hence, could concentrate 
more time and land on rice production (we will see later that these farmers 
did not compensate their higher upland rice acreages by cultivating less 
swamp rice). An additional reason for the higher upland rice acreages, 
especially in the case of Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom, might be due to the 
influence of diamond mining. This highly attractive income earning activity 
has enabled more farmers to withdraw (partly) from agriculture, especially 
from rice cultivation. The lowest proportion of respondents that cultivated 
upland rice, for example, was found in Kandu Leppiama (excluding Koya 
Chiefdom, which was greatly affected by the rebel war). Consequently, 
those that still cultivated upland rice had more land available and, hence, 
could cultivate larger acreages. 
As well as acreages, yield levels and productivity figures are also important 
indicators. On average, upland rice cultivators obtained 876 pounds of husk 
rice from their upland rice farm in the research area. This equals 337 
pounds of husk rice per acre, taking the average upland rice acreage of 2.6 
into account. This is a low figure compared with the yield range given for 
the whole country by MAFF/FAO (1992) and PEMSD (1993) (see section 
4.2). When we differentiate the general productivity figure between the five 
chiefdoms, we see that these then range between 229 pounds per acre in 
Dama, to 495 pounds per acre in Nongowa Chiefdom (see table 5.1). 
The low figures for Dama and Koya are explained by the influence of 
the rebel war. For instance, the farmers from Dama still obtained 301 
pounds per acre two years earlier, i.e. in 1989/90, while the productivity 
figure for Koya then amounted to 326 pounds per acre. 
When taking the special positions of Koya and Dama into account, all 
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the average upland rice productivity figures for the research area are to be 
found in the lowest 30 per cent range as provided by MAFF/FAO (1992). 
This can be explained by the influence of the production of cash crops in 
the research area, which is far more intense than in the traditional rice 
growing areas (such as in the northwest of Sierra Leone). 
Table 5.1 Average upland rice production (yield per farmer) and 
productivity (yield per acre), for selected upland rice 
producers, differentiated by chief dom, 1991/92 (in pounds) 
Chiefdom 
Dama 
Koya 
Nongowa 
Small-Bo 
Kandu Leppiama 
All 
Production 
480 
498 
990 
1.266 
1,074 
876 
Productivity 
229* 
262" 
495 
366 
285 
337 
301 in 1989/90. 
" 326 in 1989/90. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The coffee and cocoa cultivation competes with the production of upland 
rice for agricultural labour and suitable land. Other constraints to upland 
farming include diamond mining. Periods of peak labour demand by the 
industry tend to coincide with the initial stages of upland farm preparation. 
In total, 31 per cent of the respondents who did not cultivate any 
upland rice, claimed that lack of labour was the reason for not doing so. 
Approximately half of this percentage was related to diamond mining 
activities. In some areas, mining not only competes with upland rice for 
labour, but for land as weJJ. Fertile bush is sacrificed in the hunt for these 
precious stones. In addition, the cultivation of any crop is inhibited for 
many years in areas where mining has been practised. Another negative 
factor affecting the production and productivity of upland rice is the 
growing migration to urban centres. Young villagers leave their village 
either for work, or to attend schools in the larger towns. The decline of 
fallow periods, often cited as an important cause of the diminishing 
production of upland rice, does not seem to be a problem in the research 
area. We found that upland rice producers cultivated their land after an 
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average fallow period of 10.5 years, while ten years or more is usually 
considered to be ideal under a rotational bush fallow system. The only 
chiefdom that experienced average fallow periods below the ideal ten years, 
was Nongowa, with 8.8 years. However, this is also the chiefdom which 
showed the highest level of productivity for upland rice. So, it seems that 
the averagely lower productivity figures in the research area are not in the 
first place caused by physical production factors. Later, we look more at 
the socioeconomic factors which may play a role. 
Finally, when we look at the inputs that are used by the upland rice 
producers, it becomes clear that the rice is still mainly cultivated in a 
traditional way. Only one respondent used fertilizers on his upland farm, 
and he was also the only farmer who used insecticides. As a rule, upland 
rice producers neither have the means (they are too expensive), nor the 
possibility (they are unavailable), to obtain these modern inputs. 
Furthermore, they are not trained to use these inputs. The same may be 
said for the use of improved upland rice varieties. We found that these 
higher yielding varieties were used by only 8 per cent of all upland rice 
cultivators. Approximately one third of these farmers also used local 
varieties in order to spread the risk of a bad harvest. Improved varieties 
are, like pesticides and fertilizers, hard to obtain, while at the same time 
the taste of local upland rice varieties (referred to as 'Mende rice') is 
preferred. 
5.1.2 Swamp rice cultivation in the research area 
The most important swamp rice ecology in our research area is inland 
valley swamp rice cultivation. Swamp rice was cultivated by 52 per cent 
of the respondents in 1991/92, a decrease from the 63 per cent who 
cultivated it in 1989/90. On average, 1.1 acres of land was under swamp 
rice. Differentiating the average acreages per chiefdom, we see that the 
largest acreages under swamp rice were found in Koya Chiefdom2. 
On average, swamp rice cultivators obtained a harvest of 678 pounds 
of husk rice from their farms, equalling 617 pounds per acre, taking the 
2
 However, half of all the swamp rice cultivators in Koya come from only one 
village, Joi. This can be explained by the fact that Joi was the focus of attention 
for a relief agency. This organisation stimulated the cultivation of swamp rice, 
and brought also the means for it (seed rice). Thus, farmers from Joi were 
capable of cultivating swamp rice on a relatively large scale. This is in contrast 
with the other two villages, which are located on non-motorable roads and, 
hence, received no assistance. 
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average swamp rice acreage of 1.1 into account. Compared with upland 
rice, the production per acre of swamp rice is almost twice as high. 
However, compared with the national average swamp rice productivity that 
was reported by PEMSD (1993), 2,022 pounds per acre, this is significantly 
below the national average. And again, when we differentiate the general 
swamp rice productivity of the research area between the chiefdoms, we 
see remarkable differences between them. The yields in pounds per acre 
range from between 335 in Dama to 897 in Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom 
(see table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Average swamp rice production (yield per farmer) and 
productivity (yield per acre), for selected swamp rice 
producers, differentiated by chiefdom, 1991/92 (in pounds) 
Chiefdom 
Dama 
Koya 
Nongowa 
Small-Bo 
Kandu Leppiama 
All 
Production 
300 
972 
768 
528 
1.002 
678 
Productivity 
335' 
640" 
767 
459 
897 
617 
527 in 1989/90. 
" 720 in 1989/90. 
Source: Authors* survey (1993). 
The low score of Dama can be easily explained by the influence of the 
rebel war. In 1989/90, the productivity still amounted to 527 pounds per 
acre. At the same time, however, it is clear that the production and 
productivity of swamp rice in Koya Chiefdom has not been affected to the 
same degree, it is still above the average for the whole research area. In 
1989/90, the productivity in Koya was 720 pounds per acre (see note 2). 
The score for Kandu Leppiama is outstanding. In this chiefdom, 
relatively more respondents concentrated on the cultivation of only swamp 
rice, partly because of the influence of diamond mining - as the peak 
labour demand period coincides with the preparation phase of the upland 
field. So, many respondents were not capable of starting an upland farm. 
The cultivation of swamp rice alone enables a higher productivity than 
when the two types of rice are cultivated, because the farmer does not need 
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to cope with the overlapping activities of upland and swamp rice. This 
means that the average swamp nee productivity in Kandu Leppiama could 
become higher than in the areas where it was more common to cultivate 
both upland and swamp rice. However, even the relatively high 
productivity of Kandu Leppiama remains far below the national average. 
As was the case with the cultivation of upland rice, cash crop farming, the 
rural-urban exodus and diamond mining also influence the availability of 
agricultural labour for the cultivation of swamp rice. So, the resulting lack 
of agricultural labour negatively affects the productivity of swamp rice as 
well. 
Finally, the level of inputs used by the swamp rice producers may 
explain the low level of productivity for swamp rice. Swamp rice is 
produced virtually without the use of modern inputs, as was the case with 
upland rice. Only one respondent used fertilizers, while nobody used 
insecticides on their swamp farm. As we already mentioned in the section 
on upland rice, chemical inputs are both scarce and expensive, hence, not 
within reach of the average rice farmer. Compared to upland rice, the use 
of improved swamp rice varieties was slightly more widespread. We found 
that 12 per cent of all respondents were using high yielding varieties, due 
to the activities of relief agencies in the war stricken regions in our 
research area. These agencies did not supply upland seed rice, but only 
improved swamp seed varieties. 
The last factor that might influence productivity levels for swamp rice 
concerns the method of distributing the seeds in the swamp. Basically two 
methods are possible, broadcasting and transplanting. To achieve good 
results, the transplanting method is superior. However, this is very time 
consuming. First, the seed has to be nursed in nursery beds, after which the 
seedlings have to be planted in the swamp. When farmers are running late 
or feel they do not have enough time to transplant, they might simply 
broadcast the seeds in the swamp. This, however, will result in a rather 
high loss of seeds and, hence, lower yields. Of all swamp rice producers, 
24 per cent broadcast the seeds, while 60 per cent was able to transplant. 
This leaves 16 per cent who practised both methods. The latter might either 
be due to time constraints, being unable to transplant the whole swamp 
area. It might also be because they felt that part of the swamp was not 
good ("stony", or "sandy"), and they did not want to waste their time and 
efforts on rice which would not yield well anyway. Thus, they decided to 
broadcast the remaining rice. Differentiating between the chiefdoms shows 
that the lowest proportion of transplanters was found in Small-Bo, 39 per 
cent. Excluding Dama (because of the impact of the rebel war), this was 
also the chiefdom with the lowest swamp rice productivity. The positive 
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relation between the transplantation of the swamp seedlings and 
productivity, is shown by the two chief doms with the highest productivity 
figures, Nongowa and Kandu Leppiama. These also show the highest 
percentages of transplanters, 71 and 65 per cent, respectively. 
5.2 Characteristics of main cash crop production systems 
Besides the production of rice, cash crop production is important for Sierra 
Leone. This is not only significant at the national level, but for the 
individual farmers as well. Cocoa and coffee are the major cash crops in 
Sierra Leone, and major sources of agricultural cash income for farmers in 
our research area. 
A third major cash crop is oil palm. There are two major distinctions 
between this cash crop and both coffee and cocoa. The first main 
difference is that the palm produce is usually collected in the bush from the 
wild oil palm. Coffee and cocoa are not found in wild varieties in Sierra 
Leone. The second main difference with coffee and cocoa is that the 
proceeds of the oil palm (palm fruits, palm wine) can also be consumed 
domestically. For coffee and cocoa, there is little domestic demand. This 
implies that the "producer" of oil palm has several options. First, to 
consume the proceeds himself and, secondly, to sell the proceeds on the 
local market. Finally, the proceeds, notably palm oil, are demanded 
overseas, so might be exported. 
The cultivation of cocoa and coffee started in the early 1900s (Alie, 
1990), but exports rarely exceeded a few hundred tons until 1940. In 
section 3.1.5 we dealt with the financial importance of both crops as 
contributors to the national export earnings. Here we examine the 
cultivation practices of both crops in our research area. 
5.2.1 Cocoa cultivation in the research area 
In 1989/90, cocoa was cultivated by 198 respondents in our research area, 
of which 196 were also cultivating coffee. In 1991/92, 307 respondents 
cultivated cocoa and 302 of these cultivated coffee as well. This large 
proportion of cocoa cultivators also cultivating coffee, reflects two possible 
forms of cocoa cultivation. 
In the first place, cocoa can be cultivated in sole stands. This means 
that the plot consists of only cocoa trees. Some food crops are usually 
planted as well, which provide food during the periods of work on the 
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farm. Pineapple is sometimes used to demarcate the field from other cocoa 
fields. In the second place, cocoa can be inter-cropped with coffee. The 
plot is then planted with an approximately equal number of cocoa and 
coffee trees. Food crops may also be found on inter-cropped farms. Of all 
selected cocoa producers in 1991/92, 48 per cent cultivated their cocoa 
inter-cropped with coffee, while 33 per cent cultivated it in sole stands. A 
further 19 per cent had fields with both sole stands and fields inter-cropped 
with coffee. 
The average acreages per farmer of these two forms of cocoa 
cultivation differ. Cocoa farms cultivated in sole stands amounted on 
average to 3.1 acres. When inter-cropped with coffee, cocoa was cultivated, 
on average, on 4.7 acres. If it is assumed that the inter-cropped area 
consists of an equal number of coffee and cocoa trees, this results in an 
average cocoa acreage of almost 2.4. When differentiating between the five 
chiefdoms, it becomes clear that the highest cocoa acreages per farmer are 
found in Dama and Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom. The high cocoa acreages 
for Dama correspond with the high cocoa production potential of the area. 
For Kandu Leppiama, selected as a low production potential area for cocoa 
(see section 1.3.1), the explanation is different. There, the high acreage 
figure is strongly influenced by the results of one village, Bandah3. The 
acreage figures in the chiefdom as a whole drop by almost 40 per cent 
when we leave the cocoa acreage of Bandah out of consideration. The 
lowest overall chiefdom acreages of cocoa are to be found in Small-Bo and 
Kandu Leppiama, both considered low production potential areas for cocoa. 
It is also important to look at production and productivity figures. All 
cocoa producers obtained, on average, a harvest of 331 pounds of cocoa, 
equalling a productivity of 92 pounds per acre. This figure is far lower than 
the reported national average of PEMSD (1993) (see section 4.2). However, 
the productivity of the research area as a whole is negatively affected by 
the results of Dama and Koya because of the influence of the rebel war 
(see table 5.3). When leaving these two chiefdoms out of consideration, the 
average yield per acre increases to 98 pounds, still far below the national 
average. 
Pool (1987), found similar results. In his study, the yield per acre for 
' This village is located on the edge of Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom, which is 
bordering a high cocoa production potential area. In fact, Bandah lies in a high, 
instead of in a low production potential area, and is, in that respect, atypical for 
the region. 
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cocoa in 1985/86 amounted to 150 pounds. Although higher than we have 
found in the same area in 1991/92 (Nongowa Chiefdom, see table 5.3), 
Pool's figure is also remarkably low compared with the national figures. 
It might be possible that these differences originate from the method of 
data collection used. In our study, productivity is calculated by dividing the 
total production by the number of acres on which a farmer has actually 
worked. It might be that his farm was fully harvested. However, it is also 
possible that the farmer harvested only part of his total acreage. In that 
case, the total number of acres was still calculated in the productivity 
division (excluding that part of the cocoa which was still young, i.e. not 
bearing fruit yet). Only those farmers who did not harvest their farm at all, 
were left out in our calculations. We suspect that some sources, such as 
reports of the Planning Evaluation Monitoring and Services Division and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, only calculated the 
amount of acres that were fully harvested. This, in our view, presents an 
unrealistic picture of the level of productivity. 
Table 5.3 Average cocoa productivity (yield in pounds per acre), for 
selected cocoa producers, differentiated by chiefdom, 1989/90 
and 1991/92 
Chiefdom 1989/90 1991/92 
Dama 128 87 
Koya 78 51 
Nongowa n.a. 107 
Small-Bo n.a. 73 
Kandu Leppiama n.a. 102 
All 115 92 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Kandu Leppiama, which was selected as an area with a low production 
potential for cocoa, shows a remarkably high productivity figure. For a 
large part, this can be explained by the performance of Bandah (see note 
3). However, excluding the data from this village puts the productivity for 
the chiefdom at 100 pounds per acre, still above average for the research 
area. We must attribute this to the relatively few farmers who cultivated 
cocoa in Kandu Leppiama. These few farmers did not have to compete as 
much for land and labour as the cocoa farmers in the other chiefdoms. 
Furthermore, the cocoa trees in this chiefdom were planted more recently 
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than those planted in more traditional cocoa growing areas, such as Dama. 
Hence, the relatively high productivity score in Kandu Leppiama (although 
it is still low compared to the reported national average). At the end of this 
section, we present a more refined differentiation of the production 
potential of different areas. 
The comparatively low productivity figures can also be partly attributed to 
the effects of the rebel war. This can be made clear by looking at the 
proportions of farmers who actually harvested (whether partly, or fully) 
their total cocoa area in 1991/92. In total, 61 per cent of all cocoa 
cultivators harvested their cocoa. When differentiating between the five 
chiefdoms, we see that this percentage ranges from only 25 per cent in 
Koya, to 83 per cent in Small-Bo Chiefdom. The percentage for Koya is 
extremely low, and neither does Dama score highly (51 per cent). The low 
scores for these two chiefdoms are related to the effects of the rebel war. 
Of all the reasons for not harvesting that were mentioned by cocoa farmers 
from Koya, 46 per cent were related to the rebel war. In Dama, this 
percentage dropped to 41. The reasons given ranged from not being 
allowed by the army to go to the farms, to being too afraid of rebel attacks 
to consider going there. 
In Kandu Leppiama, a relatively high percentage of respondents was 
not able to harvest their cocoa farms. There, however, the main reasons for 
not harvesting were not related to the rebel war, but to having young 
plantations which were not yet bearing fruit. Many farmers in this 
chiefdom had recently planted cocoa. Another factor cited for not 
harvesting cocoa in Kandu Leppiama was labour shortage. This shortage 
was attributed to other time-consuming activities, such as trading and 
diamond mining, and to ill health. A lack of money for hiring labour may 
also lead to labour shortages. 
Looking at the reasons for not harvesting gives us some insight into 
the low productivity figures for cocoa. We can also look at the reasons for 
decreasing cocoa yields, as stated by the cocoa producers themselves. For 
1991/92, we see that 79 per cent of all cocoa producers experienced either 
a drop in yield from the previous season, or no yield at all. 
Of all the producers who reported a lower yield, 28 per cent mentioned 
maintenance problems as the most important reason for the decrease. This 
relates mainly to the general condition of the cocoa trees (e.g. the age, or 
the height of the trees). In some cases, it also has to do with lack of 
technical knowledge, and in other cases with the non-availability or 
expense of certain inputs, such as pesticides. 
The second most important cluster of reasons for the decrease of cocoa 
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yields relate to problems with the weather (19 per cent of all reasons). 
Examples for this category include untimely rains (which can inhibit the 
flowering of the cocoa) and storms, which have damaged the cocoa trees. 
The third most important category is labour shortage, which was 
mentioned by 13 per cent of the cocoa producers with a lower yield. This 
category can be further sub-divided into several clusters of reasons. First 
of all, there are those reasons concerning the lack of resources to hire 
labour. Secondly, there are the reasons connected with the lack of available 
labour to be hired; for example, in those villages where diamond mining 
is practised, young men generally prefer to dig for these stones, rather than 
to be hired to brush cocoa or coffee farms. Finally, we identified a cluster 
of reasons that was connected with other activities of the respondents. The 
activities referred to here include other agricultural activities, such as rice 
farming, but also mining and trading. 
The last category of reasons for the decrease in cocoa yield is formed 
by animal damage. Reasons include all damage done to the cocoa trees by 
animals, be it insects, rodents (for example, squirrels), or monkeys. In total 
12 per cent of all the producers who experienced lower yields mentioned 
reasons from this category. 
However, for both Dama and Koya Chiefdom, these four clusters of 
reasons are relatively less important. In these areas the rebel incursions are 
by far most important factors affecting cocoa yield, and as such have 
pushed the importance of the other categories of reasons mentioned by the 
farmers into the background. 
Although not mentioned by farmers, the lack of using so-called "modern" 
cultivation practices might also provide part of the explanation for the low 
productivity figures of cocoa in our research area. Of the modem farm 
inputs, fertilizers were used by only two respondents, while nobody used 
any insecticides. As was mentioned before, both the expenses involved, and 
the limited availability of these chemical inputs, are barriers to their 
widespread usage. The situation is somewhat different with regard to the 
use of improved cocoa varieties. Of all the cocoa farmers who had planted 
new cocoa seedlings the season before, 18 per cent planted only local 
varieties, 46 per cent planted only improved varieties, while 35 per cent 
planted both types of cocoa. The improved cocoa variety used, Upper 
Amazon, is relatively widely spread in our research area, but, apparently 
as yet, has no positive effect on the yield levels. Access to improved 
varieties is barely constrained by availability or expense. Seventy-seven 
percent of all cocoa farmers who planted new improved cocoa seedlings 
obtained the seedlings from their own farms. A further 17 per cent received 
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the seedlings from relatives or friends, without being charged for them. 
Thus, only 6 per cent needed to buy seedlings. 
The last aspect we take a look at is the maintenance practices for both 
the whole farm and the separate trees. In the latter case, pruning is 
important. Pruning is necessary in order to control the length of the tree in 
general and its branches in particular. When either the tree or the branches 
are allowed to grow too long, the yield is negatively affected, because the 
cocoa pods remain under their normal size. Moreover, when the cocoa trees 
are too long, harvesting of the mature pods, located higher up in the trees, 
becomes increasingly difficult. What remains then, is to collect the pods 
when they have fallen down, which affects their quality. Pruning was 
practised in the last five years by 20 per cent of the cocoa producers. Most 
of the cocoa farmers who did not prune their cocoa mentioned that they 
either did not know how to prune (35 per cent), or were afraid that the 
trees would die from pruning (28 per cent). Thus, the majority of 
respondents who did not prune, did so because of insufficient knowledge 
of pruning techniques. 
Rehabilitation of the cocoa is related to the whole farm, not only to the 
separate trees, and was practised by 30 per cent of the cocoa producers in 
the last five years. The main type of rehabilitation is shade management, 
i.e. the removal of those shade trees that give too much shade, and hence, 
affect cocoa production negatively. Of those cocoa farmers who did not 
rehabilitate their cocoa, almost half (45 per cent) did not do so because 
they lacked the knowledge. Thus, agricultural extension, focused on both 
pruning and rehabilitation, could contribute to higher yields of cocoa. 
However, the current situation of agricultural extension services in Sierra 
Leone, leaves much to be desired. 
5.2.2 Coffee cultivation in the research area 
We found that 228 respondents were cultivating coffee in the research area 
in 1989/90. Of all the coffee producers, 196 were also cultivating cocoa. 
In 1991/92, a total of 347 respondents cultivated coffee, of which 302 
cultivated cocoa as well. Coffee cultivation is more widespread than cocoa 
cultivation, a phenomenon that was to be expected considering the fact that 
coffee can be produced in a larger area than cocoa (compare maps 4.1 and 
4.2). 
As with cocoa, we first need to distinguish between two types of 
coffee cultivation, sole stands and inter-cropped. Coffee can be cultivated 
in sole stands, with the usual addition of one or more types of shade trees, 
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often kola nut trees. Additional food crops, especially citrus, may also be 
found among the sole stands of coffee, providing food during brushing and 
harvesting times. Pineapple may sometimes be used to demarcate the land. 
When inter-cropped with cocoa, approximately the same number of coffee 
and cocoa trees are planted on one field. Shade trees, food crops and 
boundary demarcators are also found on inter-cropped fields. Of all coffee 
producers, 41 per cent cultivated it in sole stands, while 23 per cent 
cultivated coffee inter-cropped with cocoa. The remaining 36 per cent 
cultivated fields with both sole stands, and fields of coffee inter-cropped 
with cocoa. Farmers more often cultivated coffee in sole stands, compared 
with the numbers of farmers cultivating cocoa in sole stands. This can be 
explained by the fact that farmers are risk spreaders, and perceive cocoa as 
a weaker crop than coffee. Coffee, they argue, is better suited to stand on 
its own than cocoa. When we look at the differences between the five 
chief doms, we see that coffee cultivated in sole stands ranged from 33 per 
cent of all coffee cultivators in Nongowa and Koya to 58 per cent in 
Kandu Leppiama. Here we see that in Kandu Leppiama cultivating coffee 
in sole stands is more common, mainly because this chiefdom is not very 
suitable for the cultivation of cocoa. 
The differences in average acreages between the two types of 
cultivation are less pronounced than they were in the case of cocoa. Sole 
stands coffee averaged 4.3 acres, while the acreage of coffee inter-cropped 
with cocoa amounted to 4.7 (which means that the average coffee acreage 
of inter-cropped areas is almost 2.4, assuming an equal number of coffee 
and cocoa trees on the inter-cropped area). When differentiating for the five 
chiefdoms, we see that the highest coffee acreages per farmer are found in 
Koya and Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom. In these marginal coffee and cocoa 
production areas, farmers cultivated coffee more often as their sole cash 
crop, representing their sole source of earning a cash income from 
agriculture. These areas are even more marginal for cocoa cultivation than 
for coffee cultivation, hence, farmers cultivated coffee more often than 
cocoa. They needed to cultivate coffee, to earn at least a small amount of 
cash. 
As with cocoa, we also take a look at the production and productivity 
figures for coffee in the research area. The coffee yield is calculated in 
clean (i.e. hulled) coffee. On average, the producer of coffee obtained a 
yield of 257 pounds of clean coffee, or 49 pounds per acre. Compared to 
the reported national average of PEMSD (1993) (see section 4.2), this 
figure is extremely low. Even when we leave the two rebel affected 
chiefdoms, Dama and Koya, out of consideration, the productivity barely 
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increases, to an average of 54 pounds per acre. This is not a significant 
difference, and still not much closer to the national average. The average 
coffee yield per acre as reported by Pool (1987), was 58 pounds for 
Nongowa Chief dom in 1985/86. This is almost the same as the productivity 
we found for that chiefdom for 1991/92 (namely 60 pounds per acre, see 
table 5.4), and comes close to the average productivity of the research area. 
For an explanation of the higher figures of other sources (e.g. MAFF/FAO, 
1992; Minster/Abco, 1993b and PEMSD, 1993), we can only refer to our 
suspicion that these sources use unrealistic methods to calculate the 
productivity figures (see our remarks on cocoa). 
Table 5.4 Average coffee productivity (yield in pounds per acre), for 
selected coffee producers, differentiated by chiefdom, 1989/90 
and 1991/92 
Chiefdom 1989/90 1991/92 
Dama 
Koya 
Nongowa 
Small-Bo 
Kandu Leppiama 
67 
45 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
49 
29 
60 
43 
56 
All 62 49 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Surprisingly, Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom shows the second highest 
productivity figure for coffee, although the chiefdom was classified as an 
area with a low production potential for coffee cultivation. The same 
happened in the case of cocoa, where the results of one village strongly 
influenced the overall picture. In the case of coffee, the results of two 
villages (Kuranko and Masahun) with productivity figures of over 100 
pounds per acre greatly influence the overall average. An additional reason 
for these relatively high productivity figures could be the younger age of 
the coffee trees in this chiefdom compared with the coffee in other 
chiefdoms. Like we do for cocoa, we present a more refined differentiation 
of the production potential for coffee of the different areas later on in this 
section. 
The low productivity figures for coffee can partly be attributed to the 
effects of the rebel war. When we first look at the proportion of farmers 
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who actually harvested their coffee farms either partially or fully, we see 
that 78 per cent did so. This is a higher percentage than in the case of 
cocoa (which was 61 per cent). Differentiating between the five chiefdoms, 
we see that the proportions of harvesters range between 61 per cent in 
Koya, to 82 per cent in Small-Bo Chiefdom. These differences are less 
pronounced than with cocoa. Again, Koya and Dama (78 per cent) score 
lowest, due to the consequences of the rebel war. Sixty-eight percent of all 
the reasons, mentioned by coffee farmers from Dama for not harvesting, 
was related to the rebel war. For Koya, this percentage amounted to 33 
percent. 
Overall, it is clear that farmers harvested coffee more often than they 
harvested cocoa. This is because, first of all, cocoa is more vulnerable to 
external factors than coffee. Farmers say that cocoa is weaker than coffee. 
This means that untimely rains, storms, damage caused by animals, and 
even labour shortages affect the cocoa yield more than the coffee yield. 
Second, the rebel war affected the harvesting of cocoa more than that of 
coffee. The height of the rebel war, in the second half of 1991, overlapped 
the harvesting period of cocoa in the season 1991/92. At the beginning of 
1992, the war entered a relatively calm period, which coincided with the 
start of the coffee harvesting period. Hence, in 1991/92, cocoa harvesting 
was more distorted than coffee harvesting. 
The reasons for a decrease in coffee yields, as mentioned by the 
producers, can give us further insight in the factors that negatively affect 
the coffee productivity. In 1991/92, 81 per cent of the coffee producers 
experienced a lower yield of coffee compared with the season before, or 
even had no yield at all. Of all the coffee producers with a lower yield, 30 
per cent mentioned labour shortage as the most important category of 
reasons for the decrease. This category consists of reasons connected with 
the lack of resources to hire labour, the lack of available labour to be hired 
and the other activities of the coffee farmers (mainly diamond mining). 
The second most important category of reasons for the decrease of 
coffee yields is formed by those related to the rebel war, 22 per cent of all 
reasons cited. However, this high percentage can almost exclusively be 
attributed to the coffee farmers from Dama (49 per cent of all reasons) and 
Koya (41 per cent). This category is of minor importance in Nongowa 
(with 9 per cent) and Kandu Leppiama (with 2 per cent), while in Small-
Bo none of the farmers attributed the lower coffee yield to the rebel war. 
The third most important cluster is formed by maintenance problems, 
which was mentioned by 17 per cent of the coffee producers with a lower 
yield. In contrast, more cocoa producers cited maintenance problems as the 
main reasons for the decreased cocoa yield. This relative lack of 
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importance in the case of coffee, can be attributed to the fact that cocoa, 
as mentioned earlier, is more susceptible to external factors than coffee. 
Cocoa is, thus, a mote difficult crop to maintain. This can also be seen by 
looking at the category of reasons related to the damage to the crop caused 
by animals. Although the third most important cluster for cocoa, only 2 per 
cent of the coffee producers said that it caused the decrease in their coffee 
yield. This is another indication for the greater strength of coffee as 
compared with cocoa. 
Finally, we deal with the limited use of modern inputs and subsequent 
effects on production and productivity levels of coffee. As with cocoa, we 
also include the degree of maintenance by using improved cultivation 
practices as an indication of the reasons for the low coffee production and 
productivity figures. 
Briefly, none of the coffee producers used either fertilizers or 
insecticides on his coffee farm. Besides the familiar remark about the 
limited availability of both goods and the high expenses involved, we must 
draw attention to the specific agronomic needs of coffee. Coffee does not 
need either fertilizers or insecticides to the same degree as cocoa, as it is 
a much hardier crop. This is also clear from the lesser importance placed 
on maintenance problems of coffee in the research area. Coffee farmers do 
not consider the lack of these inputs as a serious problem in coffee 
cultivation. The use of improved coffee varieties also differs from the use 
of improved cocoa varieties. Only 3 per cent of the coffee producers who 
had planted new coffee seedlings the season before, planted improved 
seedlings. Both improved and local varieties were planted by 1 per cent, 
while the large majority, 96 per cent, planted local coffee seedlings. So, the 
use of improved coffee seedlings in the research area is still very limited, 
contrary to what MAFF/FAO (1992) reported for the country as a whole. 
As was the case with cocoa, the non-availability and costs involved are not 
determining factors in this respect. All coffee farmers who planted new 
improved coffee seedlings obtained these from their own farms or acquired 
the seedlings for free from relatives and friends. None of the farmers 
needed to pay for improved coffee seedlings. 
Finally, we deal with the use of improved cultivation practices by the 
coffee producers. The indicators which we use are the maintenance 
practices for both the whole farm and the separate trees. As with cocoa, 
pruning is important for the coffee trees. By pruning, the height of the tree 
and the length of its branches can be controlled. In the five years before 
the survey, coffee pruning had been practised by 33 per cent of the coffee 
producers (compared with 20 per cent of the cocoa producers who pruned 
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their cocoa). Of the coffee producers who did not prune their coffee, 38 per 
cent mentioned that they did not know how to do it, while a further 18 per 
cent were afraid that the trees would die. Thus, a majority of the farmers 
who did not prune, did so because they lacked the requisite knowledge of 
pruning. 
The rehabilitation of coffee farms occurred more often (45 per cent of 
the farmers), than the rehabilitation of cocoa farms (30 per cent). For 31 
per cent of the coffee farmers who did not rehabilitate their coffee, lack of 
knowledge on rehabilitation was the reason, which is 14 per cent less than 
was the case with cocoa. Apparently, there were more producers of coffee 
who knew how to rehabilitate coffee, than farmers who knew how to prune 
it. Furthermore, both pruning and rehabilitation are practised more on 
coffee than on cocoa. This makes sense, given the perception of farmers 
that cocoa is more vulnerable than coffee. Farmers are less afraid to prune 
or rehabilitate coffee than cocoa. Still, even in the case of coffee, there is 
sufficient scope for improving the cultivation practices, in order to obtain 
higher levels of production and productivity. 
Further differentiation of coffee and cocoa production areas 
Before we started our fieldwork, we selected the different fieldwork areas 
according to their accessibility, but also according to their potential for 
producing coffee and cocoa. The production potential of a given area could 
be high or low. The chiefdoms which were classified as possessing a high 
production potential for coffee were Dama, Nongowa and Small-Bo 
Chiefdom. Those with a high production potential for cocoa were Dama 
and Nongowa. Hence, Dama and Nongowa possessed high production 
potentials for both coffee and cocoa, while Koya and Kandu Leppiama 
possessed low production potentials for both coffee and cocoa. Small-Bo, 
finally, was classified as an area with a low production potential for cocoa 
and a high production potential for coffee. 
In section 5.2, we have described the main characteristics of the 
production systems of both coffee and cocoa in the research area. One 
aspect of this description, the level of productivity of both crops, can be 
used to refine the differentiation of the fieldwork areas. We can classify the 
different villages according to their average productivity levels. Those 
villages which achieved higher than average productivity figures for cocoa 
for the whole research area, were classified as possessing a high production 
potential. Those villages that achieved productivity figures below the 
average were classified as having a low production potential for cocoa. We 
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did the same for the production potentials for coffee, see table 5.54. 
Table 5.5 Classification of coffee and cocoa production potentials of the 
27 selected villages from the research area, 1992/93" 
Coffee Cocoa 
high" 
Mano Kotehun (Ν.) 
Masahun (S.B.) 
Kuranko (K.L.) 
Siama (D.) 
Saama (S.B.) 
Lilema (D.) 
Ngelahun (N.) 
Barveh (N.) 
Dia (Ν.) 
Tewo (D.) 
Joyomie (S.B.) 
Baoma (D.) 
Yibaima (D.) 
Kpeima (N.) 
low"* 
Beobu (D.) 
Yovohun (S.B.) 
Bandah (K.L.) 
Majihun (D.) 
Serabu (K.) 
Potehun (N.) 
Gandorhun (S.B.) 
Patama (D.) 
Joi (K.) 
Gangama (K.L) 
Yoni (K.L.) 
Saliema (S.B.) 
Bangoma (K.) 
high" 
Mano Kotehun (Ν.) 
Beobu (D.) 
Barveh (Ν.) 
Bandah (K.L.) 
Ngelahun (N.) 
Gangama (K.L.) 
Lilema (D.) 
Majihun (D.) 
Dia (Ν.) 
Kuranko (K.L.) 
Masahun (K.L.) 
low*" 
Joyomie (S.B.) 
Saliema (S.B.) 
Yoni (K.L.) 
Kpeima (N.) 
Saama (S.B.) 
Gandorhun (S.B.) 
Yibaima (D.) 
Bangoma (K.) 
Baoma (D.) 
Potehun (N.) 
Yovohun (S.B.) 
Patama (D.) 
Joi (K.) 
Serabu (K.) 
Siama (D.) 
Tewo (D.) 
The chiefdoms are represented by the abbreviations between brackets: 
(D.): Dama Chiefdom 
(К.): Koya Chiefdom 
(K.L.): Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom 
(N.): Nongowa Chief dorn 
(S.B.): Small-Bo Chiefdom 
Villages with higher than average productivity levels. 
Villages with lower than average productivity levels. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
We can observe from table 5.5 that a majority of the villages from both 
Nongowa and Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom, were classified as belonging to 
the high production potential category for cocoa. For Nongowa, this 
4
 We perceive high, respectively, low actual productivity figures as indicators for 
the production potential of a given area. Hence, we maintain the concept 
"potential'' in our description, because the productivity figures we found are, to 
a certain extent, negatively affected by the rebel war. 
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corresponds with our earlier selection. Kandu Leppiama, however, deviates 
from our selection criterion, due to the influence of Bandah (see section 
5.2.1). The majority of the villages from Dama, Koya and Small-Bo were 
classified as located in areas with a low production potential. Because of 
the rebel war, Dama does not correspond with our earlier expectations, but 
Koya and Small-Bo do. For coffee, we see that a majority of the villages 
from Dama and Nongowa were classified in the high production potential 
category. A majority of the villages from Koya, Small-Bo and Kandu 
Leppiama were classified as having low production potential. This 
classification fits in with our earlier selection, because the rebel war did not 
influence the production of coffee as much as it did with cocoa. 
Table 5.6 Classification of cash crop production potentials of the 27 
selected villages from the research area, 1992/93 
High level* 
Мало Kotehun 
Barveh 
Ngelahun 
Lilema 
Dia 
К uranico 
Masahun 
Medium level" 
Bandah 
Beobu 
Gangama 
Majihun 
Joyomie 
Kpeima 
Saam a 
Yibaima 
Baoma 
Siama 
Tewo 
Low level"" 
Saliema 
Yoni 
Gandorhun 
Bangoma 
Potehun 
Yovohun 
Patama 
Joi 
Serabu 
Villages with high production potentials for both coffee and cocoa. 
Villages with high production potentials for either coffee or cocoa. 
Villages with low production potentials for both coffee and cocoa. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
By basing our observations on table 5.5, we can now distinguish those 
villages which possess high production potentials for both coffee and 
cocoa, and those that possess low production potentials for both of these 
crops. The first category of villages are labelled "high cash crop level 
areas", while the second can be labelled "low cash crop level areas". The 
remaining villages, which scored a high production potential for either 
coffee or cocoa, as well as a low production potential for one of these, are 
named "medium cash crop level areas". This categorization is shown in 
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table 5.6. 
The majority of the villages in Nongowa can be classified as high cash 
crop level areas, which corresponds with our selection. However, Dama is 
under-represented, mainly because the rebel war affected the cocoa 
cultivation there. All the villages in Koya and a majority of the villages in 
Small-Bo were classified as low cash crop level areas, which corresponds 
with our selection for Koya, but not for Small-Bo. 
For the medium cash crop level areas, the majority of villages in Dama 
did not correspond with our initial selection, due to the effects of the rebel 
war. This differentiation of villages according to their cash crop production 
potential is used in the section 5.3. There, we relate certain socioeconomic 
characteristics of farmers to the cash crop potential of the area in which 
they are located. 
5.3 Main socioeconomic characteristics of the agricultural 
producers in the research area 
In chapter 8, we analyze the marketing behaviour of coffee and cocoa 
producers. We look at the reasons why farmers choose to sell their coffee 
and cocoa to a particular trader. The socioeconomic position of farmers, to 
a certain extent, influences this choice. In this section, we analyze the 
agricultural producers who carry those systems. We confine this description 
to several socioeconomic aspects which define the socioeconomic position 
of these agricultural producers. To make the socioeconomic position of 
coffee and cocoa producers more clear, we compare a selection of their 
socioeconomic characteristics with those of the farmers who do not possess 
mature coffee and cocoa farms. 
In chapter 1, we already identified several factors which affect the 
marketing behaviour of coffee and cocoa producers. Here, based on the 
information of the farmers, we elaborate on these factors and add others 
which may have important implications for their marketing behaviour. 
5.3.1 Selected social and demographic characteristics 
Measuring the age of the population of Sierra Leone is a complicated 
exercise. Most Sierra Leoneans do not know either the date or the year of 
their birth. Among the Mende, especially those living in villages, the date 
of birth is a concept which is strange to them. However, in this study, we 
have approximated ages by using age classes. Dates of birth can be 
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estimated by asking about certain events that took place in, or near the year 
of birth. Examples of these events are the nation's independence (1961), 
or World War Π ("the Big War"). 
Table 5.7 presents, in the first column, the age classes of all producers. 
In the second and third column, the different age classes of those producers 
who possess coffee or cocoa farms which were bearing yield ("Type I 
farmers"), and those without coffee or cocoa or with young plantations 
which were not yet bearing ("Type II farmers"), are represented 
respectively. More than half of the respondents without mature coffee or 
cocoa were under 40 years old, while more than three-quarters of the 
respondents who did cultivate coffee or cocoa, were 40 or older. So, coffee 
and cocoa farmers are usually older than those that either do not cultivate 
coffee or cocoa, or who possess young plantations. The latter group 
consists of young farmers at the beginning of their farming careers. They 
have recently married and have only just started a household of their own. 
They have become independent from their fathers and, therefore, need their 
own sources of income. 
Table 5.7 Age distribution of different categories of selected farmers, 
1992/93 (in percentages) 
Age classes 
<20 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
>60 
N' 
All fanners 
0.3 
6.4 
21.9 
25.9 
25.9 
19.7 
375 
Type I farmers 
0.3 
4.7 
18.8 
26.9 
27.5 
21.9 
320 
Type Π farmers 
0 
16.4 
40 
20 
16.4 
7.3 
55 
Absolute number. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The age differences between these two categories are also reflected in the 
differences in their household sizes. "Household" is a difficult concept. In 
this study, it is defined as "all those people for which the head of 
household, i.e. the (usufruct) owner of the land, is responsible, and who are 
eating from the same pot". This does not necessarily mean that the 
household is living in the same dwelling, but it does imply that the head 
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of the household has the household members as a labour force at his or her 
disposal. Neither does it mean that all household members are related to 
the head of household. In some areas, for instance, the heads of household 
had employed workers for their diamond mining activities. This implied 
that they had to take full care over these miners by providing food and 
clothing for them. In return the miners not only had to perform their 
mining work, but had to do additional agricultural work as well. Another 
example is formed by the "Koranic boys". Some farmers were also Koranic 
teachers, they taught children how to chant and read Koranic verses. These 
boys were often sent by their parents from surrounding villages, and were 
received into the Koranic teacher's household and were completely under 
his responsibility. These boys could also be mobilized into the agricultural 
work force. 
The average household size came to 9.2 members for all farmers. This 
can be further sub-divided into 4.7 adults (besides the household head) and 
3.5 children5. We have further calculated that the average agricultural 
labour force within the household was 4.4 members. The agricultural 
labour force is defined here as those adult members of the household who 
are potentially capable of doing (agricultural) work for the head of the 
household. It is clear that the average household sizes of the farmers who 
did not cultivate (mature) coffee or cocoa were smaller than those of 
farmers who did cultivate it. The households of the latter group of farmers 
had on average 2.3 members more than those in the first group. The 
average agricultural labour forces also differed. The older group of coffee 
and cocoa farmers had potentially 4.5 agricultural workers at their disposal, 
whilst the younger farmers had 3.6 workers. 
5.3.2 Educational characteristics 
The level of education of the heads of household may be an important 
factor in explaining not only differences in cultivation practices, but also 
in marketing behaviour of farmers. The education system in Sierra Leone 
is not well developed. Formal education is based on the British (colonial) 
system, and is taught in English. This makes it very hard for pupils in 
villages to catch up quickly with the curriculum. An additional problem is 
5
 The dividing line between childhood and adulthood was set at ten years of age. 
Children were, thus, defined as being less than ten years old, while adults were 
defined as being ten years or older. In practice, the age of ten is seen as the 
watermark between childhood and adulthood in rural Sierra Leone, and persons 
of ten years and older are considered as adult workers. 
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the irregular salary payments to the teachers, especially to those that teach 
in villages. Therefore, the level of teacher motivation is, as a rule, not very 
high. In only 12 of the 27 villages we visited in 1992/93, was a primary 
school established. Secondary level education is only available in large 
towns, such as Kenema. Informal education is more widespread. For 
example, in almost every village there is at least one Koranic teacher, 
teaching "local Arabic". Young boys are taught how to sing and read the 
verses of the Koran (in Arabic). Agricultural cultivation practices are also 
taught, as the boys have to work on the teachers' farms (see also Stadler, 
1986). This happens also in the case of primary education, especially when 
teachers have not received their salaries for long periods. 
Of all farmers, 37 per cent have never received any type of formal or 
informal education. However, local Arabic was studied by 38 per cent. 
Formal education in the form of primary (14 per cent) and secondary or 
vocational education (12 per cent), lagged far behind. As a rule, younger 
farmers had received more often education than the older ones. For the 
younger farmers, educational opportunities were far better than they had 
been for the older farmers. Educational opportunities seemed to have 
improved over time. However, this trend has not continued. Nowadays, the 
prospects for receiving education are worsening again, caused in part by 
the ongoing rebel conflict, but also because of educational budget cuts. 
Extension services can be important in improving the cultivation 
practices of food and cash crop farmers. Normally, the extension activities 
are implemented by extension workers of the Ministry of Agriculture. In 
eastern Sierra Leone, however, these activities are virtually non-existent. 
The governmental extension workers are not very motivated, due to the 
limited availability of transport, lack of information resources, and low and 
irregular salary payments. Several international development organizations 
have decided to fill the gap left by the Ministry, and have started their own 
extension activities. 
Between 1988 and 1993, only 30 per cent of the farmers received 
some information on the cultivation of either food or cash crops from 
extension workers. The majority of them were coffee and cocoa producers. 
Only 11 per cent of those farmers who did not cultivate mature coffee or 
cocoa also received information. So, the extension activities were more 
directed towards cash crop farmers, a phenomenon which is not uncommon 
in other developing countries (see, for instance, Chambers, 1985, on the 
bias towards cash crop farmers). 
The information that was provided by extension agents concerned the 
cultivation of food crops in general and swamp rice in particular. This also 
shows that the farmers receiving the extension services were selected more 
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because of their accessibility and visibility than because of the type of 
information that was provided. After all, cash crop farmers are more easily 
reached than non-cash crop farmers. The emphasis on food crop production 
was strongly related to the activities of relief agencies in the rebel affected 
chiefdoms. In the research area, these were Dama and Koya Chiefdom. In 
Dama, as many as 85 per cent of all farmers received information on 
fanning practices between 1988 and 1993, while this was only 28 per cent 
between 1986 and 1991. The figures for Koya show the same pattern, 
although these are already much lower. Here, 29 per cent of all farmers 
received information between 1988 and 1993, conpared with 17 per cent 
between 1986 and 1991. The other three chiefdoms show far lower 
percentages. Between 1988 and 1993, only 2 per cent of the farmers in 
Nongowa, 3 per cent in Kandu Leppiama and 9 per cent in Small-Bo, 
received new farming information. If an area was not directly affected by 
the rebel conflict, no attention was paid to it by the development agencies 
and, hence, no extension services were offered. 
Thus, the extension activities were directed towards cash crop farmers, 
and concerned food crop production. However, both types of farmers, those 
planting only food crops and those cultivating (also) coffee and cocoa, had 
similar demands for access to new information. Almost 90 per cent of all 
farmers in both groups wanted to receive this information. Furthermore, the 
majority in these two groups wanted to receive more information on the 
cultivation of cash crops, notably coffee, cocoa and oil palm. We may 
conclude that, looking at the demand for information on farming practices, 
extension activities should be directed towards all farmers and should 
encompass information on cash crop farming as well, for example, on 
maintenance practises. 
5.3.3 Cultivation characteristics 
The most important food crops that were cultivated in the research area are 
upland and swamp rice, which were mainly grown to satisfy domestic 
consumption. The farmers in the research area were not deliberately trying 
to produce a rice surplus, in order to market it. Often, the production is not 
even sufficient to satisfy the household demand. Almost 99 per cent of all 
farmers had to buy extra rice. To refrain from producing coffee and cocoa 
does not lead to self-sufficiency in rice, because all those farmers without 
(mature) coffee and cocoa farms had to buy additional rice as well. On 
average, all the farmers bought 4.7 bags of rice extra per year. 
Rice, almost exclusively imported rice, can usually be bought in two 
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ways. First of all, it can be bought per bag. The regional wholesalers and 
local merchants in the towns always sell the rice per bag. Sometimes, 
bagged rice is also offered in villages, usually by petty traders or agents of 
regional wholesalers. Most of the time, however, rice is sold in villages per 
butter-cup6. It is usually sold by itinerant rice hawkers, often women, but 
also children. A bag of rice contains approximately 180 to 200 butter-cups, 
depending on the condition of both the bag and the butter-cup. More than 
half of the farmers who bought rice (52 per cent), bought it per bag. Rice 
bought per butter-cup came to 11 per cent, while 37 per cent of the rice 
buyers bought it partly per bag, partly per butter-cup. 
Besides upland and swamp rice, a whole range of other crops were 
cultivated in the research area. These are minor crops, in the sense that 
they are cultivated on the side of either coffee, cocoa or rice. 
Table 5.8 Proportions of farmers cultivating ten major agricultural crops, 
differentiated by categories of selected farmers, 1992/93 
Age classes 
Oil palm 
Cassava 
Groundnut 
Banana 
Plantain 
Oranges 
Citrus 
Mango 
Kola nut 
Vegetables 
Others 
All farmers 
49.9 
43.7 
16 
86.9 
70.7 
80.3 
36.5 
63.2 
95.5 
69.3 
1.1 
Type I farmers" 
46.3 
44.7 
16.9 
88.1 
69.7 
84.7 
39.1 
63.8 
98.4 
68.1 
0.9 
Type Π farmers" 
50.9 
38.2 
10.9 
80 
76.4 
54.6 
21.8 
60 
78.2 
76.4 
1.8 
Farmers who possess yield bearing coffee and or cocoa farms. 
Farmers who do not possess (mature) coffee or cocoa farms. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
In total, we have distinguished ten different crops, which are listed in table 
4
 To weigh agricultural crops, farmers (and traders) use a wide range of 
measuring objects, such as different sizes of butter-cups, kerosene tins, three­
pence pans and even oil drums. In fact, these objects measure volume, not 
weight. In the rice trade, the butter-cup is the most common way to measure the 
rice volume (see also chapter 6). 
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5.8. Oranges, citrus and kola nut were more frequently cultivated by coffee 
and cocoa farmers than by farmers without mature coffee and cocoa. Kola 
nut trees are almost always found in coffee or cocoa farms, because they 
function as shade trees. It is not surprising, therefore, that almost all coffee 
and cocoa farmers grow them. Kola nuts are also in demand as they are a 
stimulant, and popular for chewing. Chewing kola nut drives away fatigue 
and feelings of hunger. Sixty percent of the farmers without (mature) 
coffee and cocoa (the "Type II farmers" of table 5.7), cultivated young 
stands, whilst 78 percent cultivated kola. So, a considerable number of 
farmers without coffee or cocoa grew kola as well. 
We have sub-divided citrus into oranges and the rest of this family of 
crops (e.g. grapefruit, lemon and lime), because oranges are by far the most 
popular variety of citrus, and deserve to be mentioned separately. Both sub-
categories are often found in coffee and cocoa farms, because they can 
provide food during the work in the plantations (especially brushing). All 
the ten listed crops are, in first instance, used for home consumption, but 
the surpluses are marketed, usually by women. This is especially true for 
palm oil, extracted from palm fruit. Oil palm can be deliberately planted 
or palm produce can be collected from the wild oil palm "in the bush". The 
oil of the latter, "red palm oil", is preferred for its taste. The first, 
domesticated, variety has a higher fat content, and is used in soap making. 
Palm oil is used in all cooking, which makes it a highly desirable product. 
For those farmers without coffee and cocoa yields, oil palm is the only 
crop that can earn them a sizeable income. In times of shortages, just 
before the new harvest, its price rises enormously. Therefore, palm oil has 
a good potential to be cultivated as a cash crop, which can be sold both 
domestically and abroad, making it a true export crop. 
So, the cultivation of food crops in general, and rice in particular, is very 
important for the farmers in the research area for their daily provision of 
food. However, as a source of income, the cultivation of cash crops, 
especially coffee and cocoa is even more important. After all, the 
cultivation of food crops alone is insufficient for most farmers to meet their 
food requirements. 
In section 5.2, we have differentiated the several fieldwork areas 
according to their production potential for both coffee and cocoa. This 
differentiation is based on a classification of the average productivity levels 
per village for both crops. However, we have to bear in mind that 
productivity alone is not always sufficient in order to explain a certain 
marketing behaviour of coffee and cocoa farmers. It is the amount of 
produce a farmer has for sale that largely determines his attractiveness to 
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traders. The amount for sale is only partly dependent on the productivity 
of the land and labour. When the area planted with cash crops by a farmer 
is large enough, a low productivity level will not hinder a relatively large 
level of production. Still, there also exists a strong relation between 
productivity level, and level of production. Therefore, we differentiate these 
farmers according to their location in high and low production potential 
areas for coffee and cocoa respectively. 
When we look at the average area of cocoa that was partly or fully 
harvested in the high production potential areas, we see that this amounted 
to 3.9 acres. In the low production potential areas, it was 3.7 acres. There 
appears to be little difference between the two areas. However, when we 
look at the average amount of cocoa production per farmer, another picture 
emerges. In the high production potential areas, this amounted to 425 
pounds, while the farmers in the low production potential areas obtained 
an average of 213 pounds. This clearly shows that the cocoa farmers of the 
high production potential areas have twice as much cocoa to sell, hence, 
may expect more attention of traders. Furthermore, they have more 
opportunities to travel to urban trading centres with their produce, because 
their proceeds will be higher and they can afford the higher transport costs. 
For coffee, the average acreage that was (partly or fully) harvested in 
the high production potential areas amounted to 4.0. In the low production 
potential areas, the harvested acreage was larger, at 7.3 acres. We can 
explain this difference by looking at one of the characteristics of coffee. 
The crop is considered a strong one compared to cocoa. This means that 
the farmers in the low production potential areas did exactly what we 
stated before: they plant larger areas of coffee, in order to obtain a sizeable 
yield. This would be far more difficult with cocoa, because it is more 
sensitive to adverse external conditions than coffee. Hence, to plant more 
acres of cocoa would necessitate additional efforts which would not be 
compensated for by a sizeable yield. 
The effect of planting larger acreages of coffee is reflected in the 
levels of production per farmer. For the high production potential areas this 
amounted to 282 pounds clean coffee, while in the low production potential 
areas it came to 220 pounds. The difference in production level per farmer 
between the two types of areas is less pronounced than was the case with 
cocoa. The lower production potential areas have less than half the 
productivity per acre, compared with the high production potential areas, 
but this disadvantage was largely compensated for by planting a larger area 
of coffee. 
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5.3.4 Labour characteristics 
The availability of labour determines, to a large extent, the amount of work 
that can be done. There are several aspects to be looked at in this respect. 
On the labour supply side there is, on the one hand, the agricultural labour 
force of the household, i.e. available family labour. On the other hand, 
there is the availability of agricultural labour to be hired from outside the 
household, i.e. hired labour. This is strongly related to the size of the 
labour pool from which hired labour can be drawn, and especially to the 
cost of labour (or better, the ability to pay these costs). 
On the labour demand side, it is the type and amount of planted crops 
that determine the amount of labour needed. Annual crops need attention 
at certain times during a limited period. Perennial crops need attention in 
certain periods as well, but such attention is needed every season for years 
to come. For the former, this means that for each year or season, depending 
on the choice and quantity of annual crops to be planted, the labour 
requirements can be re-calculated. Hence, the cropping pattern can be 
adapted for the next season, if necessary. For perennials the story is 
slightly different. After they have been planted, the labour required to look 
after them when they have matured, remains the same for decades. The 
only choice a farmer has when the labour requirements become too heavy 
to cope with, is to work on only part of his perennial crops, or even leave 
the farm alone completely. This neglect of the crops leads to a deterioration 
in their quality. 
There exists a division of agricultural labour between men and women. 
Typical male activities include brushing (for coffee, cocoa and upland rice 
farms); tree felling, clearing and ploughing (all for upland rice) and fence 
making (for upland and swamp rice). The weeding (for upland and swamp 
rice); tidying up the farm after ploughing (for upland rice) and preparation 
of the rice before storage (for both upland and swamp rice) are typical 
female activities, as are the harvesting activities for all crops. Cooking 
activities deserve a separate mention. These are especially important when 
labour groups are working on a farm. One or two meals are included in the 
labour payment for the labour groups (see later on). The taste and quality 
of the food prepared by the women determines, to a certain extent, the 
amount of work that will be done. Finally, there are also specific tasks for 
children, notably bird scaring. Children are also supposed to assist the 
women by fetching water and firewood, for example. Children provide 
valuable extra labour. 
The timing of male and female farming activities also differs, (see also 
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Appendices 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). However, there seems to be little difference 
in the workloads of both men and women. In contrast with the prevailing 
views on the agricultural workload of women in Africa, which is 
considered heavier than for men, it seems that men and women work 
equally hard in agriculture. Spencer (1976) and Richards (1986) also make 
this point. But although the workload between men and women may be 
approximately equal regarding the farm work, the women's work does not 
end here. They also have to raise the children, do other domestic activities, 
such as cooking and laundering, while the men enjoy the tranquillity of the 
hammock. 
For all farmers, the potentially available household labour force was 
5.4 adult members, including themselves (see 4.3.1). For most farmers, this 
was an insufficient number to finish all the farming work. A majority of 
82 per cent hired additional labour at least once (on average, 1.3 times). 
Additional (hired) labour is especially important for the brushing of coffee, 
cocoa and upland farms, and is also regularly used for the ploughing of 
upland rice seeds and the harvest of both upland and swamp rice. 
There were four main types of labour that could be hired or employed 
in the research area, namely communal labour groups, workgangs, contract 
labour and individual labourers. The type of labour hired most often was 
individual labour. This was followed by communal labour groups and 
workgangs. Contract labour is a relatively new phenomenon, and occurred 
the least. In the following sections, we describe the general characteristics 
of these four forms separately. 
Communal labour groups 
These are groups of farmers who join their labour forces together on a 
rotational basis. The members of such a group work in turn on each other's 
farms. Hence, the group provides a type of reciprocal assistance. The 
advantage for the members is that no direct cash payments, in the form of 
salaries or wages, are involved7. However, the day the group works on the 
farm of a certain member, this member is expected to provide at least one, 
but usually two meals per group member. These meals have to be well 
prepared and sufficient. For example, one butter-cup of rice is usually 
taken as the standard amount per person when meals are prepared. In the 
7
 Formally, communal labour groups can not be hired, and the labour of the 
groups can not be employed by non-members. However, because of the costs 
involved in feeding the group members, we will still use the term "labour 
hiring", when dealing with communal labour groups. 
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case of labour groups, however, usually two or three butter-cups per person 
are used. One respondent provided even five butter-cups of rice per worker 
for the labour group he had hired, "to show them that I am a generous 
man." The fact that he was a stranger (i.e. not bom in the village), and that 
"the people did not know him well yet" (after living in the village for over 
15 years), contributed to his attitude. Still, although food may be 
generously available, a general complaint about communal labour groups 
concerns the working attitude of the members. Some farmers stated that 
communal labour group members only work hard on their own farms, not 
on the farms of the other members. This mistrust of each other strengthens 
this behaviour. 
Communal labour groups come in different sizes, and are typically 15 
to 20 members. Some are much smaller and have less than five members. 
These are then often relatives or neighbours8. The amount of work that 
will or can be done by a communal labour group depends both on the size 
of the group (its number of workers) and on the number of working days 
the group is employed. To be able to compare the different group 
engagements, we have translated the group sizes and number of working 
days into man-days. 
In 17 per cent of all the times that labour was hired in 1991/92 by the 
farmers we interviewed in 1992/93, it was in the form of communal labour 
groups. The average number of man-days involved in hiring a communal 
labour group came to 29.6. The costs of feeding the group were 7,862 Le9, 
or 266 Le per man-day (only food had to be provided for the groups, no 
cash10). Remarkably, the younger farmers without mature coffee and 
cocoa farms hired, on average, the groups for 42.8 man-days. Their feeding 
costs amounted to 13,944 Le, or 326 Le per man-day. Those farmers with 
mature coffee and cocoa, hired communal labour groups for only 26.9 
man-days on average, with a feeding cost of 6,603 Le (246 Le per man-
8
 Communal labour groups should not be mistaken for "Community labour 
groups", or "Groups for communal development". These groups carry out 
communal or town development projects on a town or section basis (see 
Gerretsen and Sellics, 1989). Examples of these projects include the building of 
a bridge or a school, the clearing of roads and the digging of a water well. 
' For the exchange rates of the Leone per US Dollar: see Appendix 7.3. 
10
 The amount that was spent on food was calculated by adding up two 
components. First, the cash that was needed to buy certain ingredients. Second, 
the monetized value of items that were not bought, because the respondent who 
hired the labour had it in stock (e.g. rice). 
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day). The higher relative and absolute labour costs incurred by the first 
group of farmers may be explained by their specific social and 
demographic characteristics. These were the younger farmers, who had just 
started their farming career. On the one hand, this meant that they were 
relatively inexperienced in using communal labour groups, hence, did not 
know exactly what was expected of them regarding food provision. To stay 
on the safe side, they might have decided to be generous. On the other 
hand, as new, independent farmers it might have been difficult to convince 
the older farmers of their capacity to work and of their trustworthiness of 
showing up for work (and do the work satisfactorily). The generosity of 
food provision could well have been a deliberate effort to overcome this 
mistrust. 
Workgangs 
Workgangs are also labour groups, but these do not function on a rotational 
basis. The gang usually consists of young men, who either still belong to 
their father's household, or do not possess mature coffee or cocoa farms. 
This means that they do not have many opportunities for obtaining a cash 
income. The workgang functions as a means to obtain this cash, because 
farmers may hire a workgang for a fixed amount of cash, and in addition 
have to provide the group with, usually, one meal per working day. As was 
the case with communal labour groups, the amount of rice used in the meal 
is higher than standard (two to three butter-cups per person). Workgangs 
sometimes specialise in a single activity, such as brushing or ploughing. 
Workgangs were used for 14 per cent of all the times that labour was 
hired by our respondents. The average number of man-days involved in 
hiring a workgang amounted to 31.4. The costs for providing food to the 
members was 2,546 Le, or 91 Le per man-day. Furthermore, the workgangs 
were paid on average 11,881 Le in cash (which are the actual hiring costs). 
This equals 378 Le per man-day. As a rule, all types of farmers hired 
workgangs for about the same number of man-days. However, as was the 
case with communal labour groups, the farmers with mature coffee and 
cocoa farms spent less money on the feeding of the workgang members, 
than those farmers without (mature) coffee and cocoa. The costs of feeding 
for the latter group of farmers amounted to 4,470 Le (146 Le per man-
day), compared with 2,546 Le, or 81 Le per man-day, for the coffee and 
cocoa producers. Again, the younger farmers apparently needed to impress 
the workgang members, possibly to safeguard their future assistance. 
The picture for the cash payment for the workgang labour is different. 
On average, farmers without (mature) coffee and cocoa paid only 9,110 Le 
for the labour, which is 298 Le per man-day. The coffee and cocoa farmers 
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paid 12,414 Le, equalling 393 Le per man-day. Part of the explanation for 
this difference might be that the latter group of farmers generally used 
workgangs on their coffee and cocoa farms, which is a visible potential 
source of cash income. This might be acknowledged by workgangs, by 
demanding a higher price. This leads to a higher overall cost of hiring 
workgangs for this group of farmers, compared with those without (mature) 
coffee and cocoa. When we calculate the total costs for hiring workgangs, 
by adding the monetized costs of feeding the workers to the cash payments, 
we see that the coffee and cocoa farmers spent, on average, 14,960 Le (or 
473 Le per man-day). For the group of farmers without (mature) coffee and 
cocoa, this was 13,580 Le on average, which comes to 444 Le per man-
day. The difference between the two groups of farmers then virtually 
disappears. 
Contract labour 
This is a relatively rare type of hired labour. One or more people, 
sometimes even a group, are "contracted" to undertake a specific task, for 
example, to brush a coffee farm of ten acres. The fee consists of a fixed 
amount of cash only. The farmer who issues the contract does not usually 
provide meals during the work. Usually, the work has to be done within a 
specific time frame, but the contracted workers are relatively free in 
deciding their working hours. This made it impossible to calculate the 
number of man-days involved. Generally, contracts are issued for specific 
tasks, not for specific periods. Of all the times that labour was hired by our 
respondents, 8 per cent was in the form of contract labour. However, the 
contracts were almost exclusively issued by coffee and cocoa farmers. Only 
one farmer without mature coffee and cocoa issued a contract. 
Contracts can be executed by one or more people. The average number 
of workers per contract was 1.4. Of all the contracts issued, two-thirds 
excluded the provision of meals for the worker(s). The average cost per 
contract was 4,557 Le. Those contracts which included meals for the 
workers, were more expensive at 5,738 Le. Furthermore, the costs of food, 
on average 1,584 Le, had to be added, so that the total costs of the 
contracts which included food provision, amounted to 7,322 Le. These 
contracts involved more money, because they were issued for a larger 
amount of work. 
Individual labour 
Agricultural labour as full-time employment is non-existent in the research 
area. However, young men who are not yet married, but live in their 
parental households, may be engaged as part-time agricultural workers. For 
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these young men, this work is one of the few opportunities to earn a cash 
income. This is also the reason why some strangers hire themselves out as 
agricultural labourers. Strangers are usually not allowed to plant perennials 
(i.e. coffee and cocoa), hence, have less opportunities for earning money. 
They hire out their labour to supplement their existing, meagre, income. 
Individual workers are hired per day, but sometimes for more days in a 
row. Meals are included, although the amount of rice may not be as 
abundant as is the case with communal labour groups and workgangs. 
Individual labour was by far the most popular form of hired labour, 
and was used 60 per cent of all the times that labour was hired. The 
average number of man-days involved in hiring individual labour came to 
24.0. The average amount that was spent on meals was 3,910 Le, equalling 
163 Le per man-day. The amount that was paid in cash to the individual 
workers was on average 5,247 Le, or 219 Le per man-day. The total costs 
of hiring individual labour, thus, came to 9,157 Le, which is 382 Le per 
man-day. 
The price of individual labour was more fixed than the price for the 
other three forms of hired labour we have distinguished. The reason for this 
is that individual labour is hired per worker, while the other labour types 
represent the hiring of groups of workers (excluding contract labour, which, 
however, is paid according to a particular task, not on the time that is 
worked). The price for hiring group labour not only depends on the number 
of group members (which, to a large extent, determines the amount of 
work that can be done), but also on the group's reputation (see also 
Richards, 1986). 
We can now evaluate the four different types of labour which we have 
discerned. Shortage of labour is a real problem in the research area, 
especially when we look at the high proportion of farmers who had to hire 
additional labour. Less than 20 per cent of all farmers did not hire labour, 
and less than half of these claimed that they did not need it (the household 
labour was enough to finish the work). However, 45 per cent of all farmers 
who did not hire labour said that they could not afford it. 
Table 5.9 presents both the absolute and the relative costs of the four 
types of labour that was hired by the selected farmers. These average 
figures show that communal labour is the cheapest form of labour to be 
hired, excluding the contracts. However, this low average figure is strongly 
influenced by the coffee and cocoa producers. For the farmers without 
mature coffee and cocoa, this type of labour was the most expensive. This 
does not mean that this type of labour is not popular among these farmers. 
After individual labour, it was the second most popular type of hired 
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labour. It seems that using communal labour can also be seen as an 
investment in social relations, although it might cost large amounts of 
money. Later on in their farming career, after they have established 
themselves as experienced coffee and cocoa farmers, this investment might 
be paid off by lower communal labour costs. 
Table 5.9 Absolute (in Leones) and relative (in Leones per man-day) 
costs of different types of labour for selected farmers, 1991/92 
Absolute costs Man-days Relative costs 
Communal labour 
Workgang 
Individual 
Contract (excl. food) 
Contract (incl. food) 
7,862 
14,738 
9,157 
4,557 
7.322 
29.6 
31.4 
24.0 
-
-
266 
469 
382 
-
-
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The low absolute costs of contract labour does not make this type of labour 
more accessible for farmers without (mature) coffee and cocoa. First of all, 
contracts are almost exclusively issued for work on cash crop farms and, 
secondly, are also often only an additional form of hired labour. This 
means that in more than half of all the times that contracts were issued, it 
was alongside other types of hired labour. Furthermore, two-thirds of all 
contracts were issued in only two chiefdoms, namely Nongowa and Kandu 
Leppiama. The reason may be that both these areas have relatively 
monetized regional economies; Nongowa, because of the cultivation of cash 
crops and the location of Kenema, as a major regional trade centre, within 
its boundaries. Kandu Leppiama's regional economy is relatively monetized 
because of the strong influence of diamond mining in the area. 
The absolute costs of labour are important, because their amount 
determines, to a large extent, whether a farmer is able to pay for the 
labour. However, the relative costs are important in determining the 
economic cost-efficiency of the labour input. We then see that communal 
labour groups have the lowest cost per man-day, followed by individual 
labour. Workgangs are relatively the most expensive form of hired labour. 
However, we mentioned before that communal labour groups are, for 
farmers without mature coffee and cocoa, the most expensive form of 
labour in absolute terms (in relative terms, it is also for them the cheapest 
form of labour). This may inhibit their use to some extent. Furthermore, 
communal labour groups are relatively scarce. The groups existed in only 
168 Who Pays the Price? 
11 out of the 27 research villages in 1992/93. 
Communal labour groups are, thus, the economically most cost 
efficient type of labour, which does not necessarily mean that they work 
most efficiently as well. Sometimes, group members are less motivated to 
work on the farms of their colleague members, than they are on their own 
farms. Some authors are clearly in favour of their use (e.g. Richards, 1986; 
Nippold, 1988). However, they are not always available. Furthermore, the 
high absolute costs involved in engaging these groups make them a less 
realistic option to solve the labour shortages of the poorer farmers without 
mature coffee and cocoa. Nevertheless, for those who can afford them, 
these groups provide a valuable additional source of labour supply. 
Besides agricultural work, there are other occupations for farmers to keep 
them busy. These additional, often necessary income earning activities, 
consume extra time and labour. Hence, they may negatively affect both 
food and cash crop farming. The majority of all farmers, 70 per cent, 
mentioned that they had at least one other occupation besides their farming 
work. However, there are not many opportunities to earn an additional 
income in the Sierra Leonean countryside, which is reflected by the limited 
number of different types of occupations mentioned. The most popular 
occupation was diamond mining, with 31 per cent of all farmers being 
engaged in mining. The harvesting of wild palm fruit in the bush was 
relatively widely practised, by 26 per cent of all farmers. The third most 
popular additional income earning activity was the trading of consumer 
goods. Examples of these goods are kerosene, tomato paste, matches, razor 
blades, and so on. This was practised by 17 per cent of all farmers. The 
last occupation to be mentioned is the trading in coffee and cocoa. Of all 
farmers, 10 per cent were engaged in the purchase of one or both of these 
cash crops. However, this activity was almost solely practised by coffee 
and cocoa producers. Only one respondent without mature coffee and cocoa 
traded in these crops. 
5.3.5 Credit characteristics 
Income is associated with spending or purchasing power, whether for 
consumer goods or for productive investment. Usually, credit is not seen 
as income, although it is related to purchasing power as well. Access to 
credit increases the purchasing power. When credit is available, it can be 
spent to invest (e.g. to hire labour) or it can be used for consumptive 
purposes (e.g. to buy food). Elsewhere, we argue that there is no clear line 
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between these two forms of using credit (see section 10.2). However, it is 
clear that farmers who have no access to credit are less able to invest 
productively than farmers who do have access. 
Credit can either be provided in the form of money (cash) or in kind. Of 
all the loans issued to our respondents, more than two-thirds (71 per cent) 
was in cash, and the remainder in kind. Almost all the loans in kind (93 
per cent), were in the form of rice. We can distinguish two types of rice 
loan. Rice was primarily loaned as consumption rice (81 per cent of rice 
loans), but also in the form of (upland or swamp) seed rice. 
The repayment of the loans can also be in cash and in kind. The latter 
is usually in the form of coffee (either in the form of cherries, or as clean 
coffee), cocoa and palm oil. Of the loans that were provided in cash, more 
than half (54 per cent) was repaid in cash as well. However, 41 per cent 
was repaid in the form of cash crops, often palm oil (see table S.10). The 
seed rice loans were exclusively repaid at harvest time, with a part of the 
rice harvest. Of all the consumption rice loans, 54 per cent was repaid in 
cash. Furthermore, cash crops were also used to repay the rice. 
Table 5.10 Types of repayment for credit in cash and credit in kind for 
selected farmers, 1992/93 (in percentages) 
Repayment type Cash loans Consumption псе loans 
Cash 54 54 
Palm oil 20 11 
Cocoa 8 9 
Coffee cherries 9 26 
Clean coffee 2 
Others 6 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The cash crops which were used to repay either the credit in cash, or the 
credit in kind, were in almost all cases also produced by the creditors 
themselves (one farmer, who did not produce coffee, was an exception. He 
bought coffee cherries from another farmer in order to repay the credit he 
took from a petty trader). This means that those farmers without coffee or 
cocoa have fewer options to repay loans. However, they can use palm oil 
(whether produced by themselves, or collected in the bush) to repay the 
credit they took. Approximately one-third of the loans that were repaid 
with palm oil were borrowed by farmers without mature coffee and cocoa. 
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The repayment periods of all the types of loans were usually below 
one year. The cash loans which had to be repaid in cash as well had an 
average repayment period of five months. The cash loans which were 
repaid with produce had an average repayment period of seven months. For 
the consumption rice loans it made no difference whether they were repaid 
in cash or in produce: both had repayment periods of six months. These 
repayment periods reflect the difference between the hungry season in July 
August and the selling time of the produce. Most of the cocoa is sold 
between November and February, while most coffee is sold between 
January and April. By far, most of the loans were taken in August, namely 
49 per cent. This percentage varied between 42 per cent for the cash loans 
repaid in cash, and 69 per cent for the consumption rice loans repaid in 
produce. Of all the loans, 75 per cent was taken in the months July, August 
and September, which clearly reveals the effects of the hungry season. 
If we look exclusively at the cash loans which were repaid in produce, i.e. 
coffee or cocoa, we see that 40 per cent of these were repaid in cherries, 
and 38 per cent in cocoa. These high percentages (compared with the 
repayment in clean coffee at 12 per cent) reflect the timing of repayment. 
Cocoa is the first cash crop harvested in the season and, hence, provides 
the first crop with which the credit can be repaid. Coffee in the form of 
cherries is popular as a repayment type because the lender does not need 
to wait for the hulling, so receives the produce earlier (and the borrower 
can forfeit the hulling effort). On average, against every bag of cherries 
that was to be repaid, a loan of 4,274 Le was received. Two and a half 
bags of cherries equal one 210 pounds bag of clean coffee. Hence, if 
converted into clean coffee, this means that the farmer received 51 Le per 
pound. One bag of clean coffee, on average, assured a loan of 12,833 Le, 
which equals 61 Le per pound. Lastly, a bag of cocoa of 175.5 pounds, 
assured a loan of, on average, 7,227 Le. This means that the farmers 
received 41 Le per pound for their cocoa when they borrowed in cash. 
Giving credit in rice is the domain of the produce traders. Petty traders 
provided 50 per cent of all consumption rice loans. Regional wholesalers 
from Blama, Kenema and Segbwema provided 20 per cent, while the 
agents of these wholesalers loaned another 11 per cent of these rice loans. 
All in all, 85 per cent of the consumption rice was obtained from the 
several types of produce buyers. These traders provide necessary consumer 
goods during the hungry season (July and, especially, August). However, 
the price that has to be paid for this service might be high. The produce 
trader as rice provider may demand that the coffee or cocoa of the 
borrower must be sold to him. The consumption rice, then, may also be 
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repaid in cash and not in coffee or cocoa. Of all the cash repayments for 
consumption rice loans, 43 per cent was in the form of a deduction of the 
proceeds of either the coffee or cocoa that was sold to the credit source. 
Looking only at the rice credit which was repaid in coffee or cocoa, 
we see that no loan was repaid in clean coffee. A majority of 75 per cent 
was repaid in unhulled coffee, while 25 per cent was repaid in cocoa. The 
most common form of exchange was the swap of one bag of rice, received 
in the hungry season, against one bag of either cherries or cocoa, repaid at 
their respective harvest time. Those farmers who could repay the bag of 
rice they borrowed with a bag of cherries, were best off. From November 
1992 until May 1993, a bag of rice cost 9,000 Le. They therefore received 
9,000 Le for one bag of cherries, which comes to 107 Le per pound. For 
the farmers who traded one bag of cocoa against one bag of rice, this is a 
different story. They received 51 Le per pound for their cocoa. 
The best type of credit that could be obtained, when converting the 
produce into the price per pound, appeared to be the repayment of rice with 
coffee cherries. Farmers who repaid their cash or rice credit with clean 
coffee, were also better off than farmers who repaid their loans with cocoa. 
Of all farmers interviewed in 1992/93, 63 per cent obtained a loan in the 
preceding year. There is hardly any difference in the proportion of farmers 
with and without mature coffee and cocoa who received loans. We 
expected that the coffee and cocoa farmers would more often receive loans, 
especially from produce traders. These farmers usually have a more secure 
income source and are potentially better able to repay the credit. However, 
this was not the case. 
Although the proportional differences of obtained credit were 
negligible between the two groups of farmers, the alternatives for obtaining 
credit were not the same for them. There are few actors available who can 
provide credit. The mere fact that the farmers with mature coffee and cocoa 
farms produce these crops, makes them interesting for produce traders. 
These traders can offer credit, but may ask either a certain amount of 
produce in return, or demand that the borrower sells the produce to him. 
Often, farmers have no choice other but to accept these conditions, at least 
when they want to secure a loan. This means that the price they pay for 
obtaining credit restricts their choice of trader. Still, these farmers have 
potentially a better access to a loan than farmers without mature coffee and 
cocoa farms, by having a wider choice of credit sources. 
This is reflected in table 5.11, which provides an overview of the 
different credit sources for both those farmers with ("Type I farmers") and 
those without mature coffee and cocoa ("Type Π farmers"). The main credit 
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sources for all the farmers were relatives (35 per cent) and friends (20 per 
cent). There is a profound difference between the two groups of farmers. 
Those farmers without mature coffee and cocoa obtained almost 70 per 
cent of their loans from these two sources. 
Table 5.11 Proportions of different types of credit sources, differentiated 
by categories of selected farmers, 1992/93 
Credit source 
Relatives 
Friends 
Local merchants' 
Petty traders 
Regional wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Credit groups 
Others 
N " 
All farmers 
35.1 
20.1 
2.6 
24.8 
10.6 
2.4 
2.4 
1.9 
379 
Type I farmers 
34.7 
18.4 
2.8 
26.4 
11.6 
2.8 
2.2 
1.2 
326 
Type Π fai 
37.7 
32.1 
1.9 
15.1 
3.8 
-
3.8 
3.8 
53 
These were especially produce traders who were employed by either private export 
companies or other regional wholesalers (Lebanese as well as Sierra Leonean). 
They might or might not have been provided with purchasing capital and or rice 
(which also can be used for supplying credit to farmers). 
Absolute number of loans. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The coffee and cocoa producers obtained credit less often from relatives 
and friends, although these sources still accounted for more than half of the 
times that credit was obtained. Almost 21 per cent of the loans which were 
obtained by farmers without mature coffee and cocoa, were obtained from 
actors active in the trade of coffee and cocoa (notably petty traders). This 
is due to the fact that the majority of these farmers (60 per cent) possessed 
farms with young coffee and or cocoa trees. They were seen as potential 
suppliers of produce by the traders. Hence, it was worthwhile to risk some 
amount of capital in order to give loans to these farmers. In this way, 
relationships were established, which would secure a stream of produce in 
the near future. Relatives formed the most important source of credit for 
the coffee and cocoa producers as well. However, more than a quarter of 
those relatives were also actively engaged in the produce trade (compared 
with 6 per cent of the relatives of those farmers without mature coffee and 
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cocoa). This means that the coffee and cocoa producers could obtain credit 
from more sources than those without mature coffee and cocoa. They have 
a more diverse spectrum of credit sources to choose from. However, this 
is not to say that credit is abundantly available. 
Coffee and cocoa producers are often dependent on a single source, 
which is usually a trader in produce. They are, thus, dependent on the 
conditions this produce trader is giving them. The farmers are not normally 
able to compare the loan conditions of different credit sources, or choose 
between these different sources. When credit is urgently needed, they can 
do little but accept the prevailing loan conditions. However, farmers 
without coffee and cocoa do not even have this opportunity. The farmers 
without mature coffee and cocoa have to rely more on relatives and friends 
than the coffee and cocoa farmers. This also means that they can borrow 
less, because produce traders usually have more cash or rice available to 
loan to farmers. 
Having said that the different credit sources are limited in number, we 
now turn to the reasons for not obtaining credit. Over 90 per cent of all 
farmers who had not received a loan in the year before, stated that they did 
not need it. Only a very small proportion, 5 per cent, said that they could 
not find a source for the credit they needed. The fact that a large majority 
of farmers stated that they did not need to borrow, does not necessarily 
imply that they had saved enough money, it simply means that they could 
just manage with the resources they had. A total of 18 per cent of the 
farmers said that they had saved money in the previous year. Remarkably, 
the percentage of farmers who saved money is higher for producers without 
mature coffee and cocoa (22 per cent), than for the coffee and cocoa 
producers (17 per cent). Although the latter group of farmers had more 
income sources than the first group, they also had more responsibilities, 
hence, had to spend more of their income. 
The last aspect we look at in this section is formal agricultural credit. For 
decades, the government and numerous NGOs have tried to reach rural 
clients to serve them with agricultural credit. The intention was that the 
supply of cheap credit would enhance productive agricultural investments 
and, hence, boost agricultural production (see also section 10.2). However, 
these agricultural credit programmes and schemes failed to reach the 
majority of farmers. This is confirmed by the results of our survey. Only 
15 farmers (4 per cent) had ever obtained a loan from an official credit 
source (all these formal loans were received years ago). So, farmers have 
little or no access to formal agricultural credit sources, and hence, are 
dependent on informal credit sources, of which produce traders on the one 
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hand and relatives and friends on the other, are the most important 
exponents. 
5.3.6 Income characteristics 
The characteristics we have described in the preceding sections, are all 
more or less dependent on, or at least related to, the financial situation of 
the respondents. Having an income and its size determines to a large 
extent, the number of bags of rice a farmer can buy, the type of education 
he can provide for his children and the amount and type of labour he can 
hire. Nowadays it is virtually impossible to survive without cash in the 
largely monetized Sierra Leonean rural society. 
The most important sources of income for all farmers are provided by 
the cultivation of the three main cash crops in the research area. These 
crops were, in order of importance, coffee, oil palm and cocoa (see table 
5.12). Of course, coffee and cocoa can only be the major sources of 
income for those fanners who possess mature farms of these cash crops 
("Type I farmers"). When looking at the group of farmers without mature 
coffee and cocoa ("Type II farmers"), we see that the domestic cultivation 
of oil palm (or the collection of wild palm fruit "in the bush") is by far the 
most important source of income. Oil palm is virtually the only cash crop 
that can be cultivated in the research area, besides coffee and cocoa. This 
corresponds with the remarks we have made in section 5.3.5 on the 
repayments in kind of loans for this group of farmers. Furthermore, 
diamond mining is also an important source of income. 
However, the aggregate figures of table 5.12 disguise certain regional 
differences. Cocoa, for example, is the second most important income 
source for all coffee and cocoa producers, but it is not listed in the top 
three of major sources in Small-Bo Chiefdom. So, aggregate figures have 
to be treated carefully. The trend is clear, however. Coffee and cocoa are 
very important income earners in the research area. 
Coffee and cocoa are two of the few opportunities available to farmers 
to earn a cash income from agriculture in the research area. Alternatives in 
the form of employed labour barely exists, neither in agriculture nor in any 
other sector. So, the best opportunities lie in self-employment, more 
particularly in diamond mining and in selling (i.e. trading) agricultural 
crops. The latter source of income requires some amount of purchase 
capital when it concerns trading in cash crops (coffee, cocoa, kola nut and 
oil palm products). Hence, it remains unattainable for many farmers. 
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Table 5.12 Main sources of income, differentiated by categories of 
selected farmers, 1992/93 
Income source 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
(wild) Oil palm* 
Diamond mining 
Crafts 
Kola nuts 
Other crops" 
Trading 
Hiring out labour 
Contributions'" 
All farmers 
25.7 
15.5 
19.8 
12.0 
7.8 
8.0 
5.6 
2.7 
0.8 
2.1 
Type I farmers 
30.1 
18.1 
16.3 
10.7 
6.6 
8.5 
5.3 
2.2 
0.3 
1.9 
Type Π fai 
_ 
-
40 
20 
14.6 
5.5 
7.3 
5.5 
3.6 
3.6 
Includes not only palm oil, but also other palm tree products, such as palm 
kernels, as well as palm fruit (not yet processed into palm oil), from both the wild 
and the domesticated oil palm tree. 
Income from (selling) other crops than coffee, cocoa, oil palm and kola. 
Monetary endowments from, usually, relatives. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Income is a sensitive issue in many cultures, including the Mende culture. 
This made it difficult to obtain quantitative data on incomes. However, we 
collected information on the actual and desired spending of incomes of the 
farmers. This sheds some light upon the needs and wants of the research 
population. 
The farmers' income was, as a rule, mostly spent on only five different 
types of goods and services. In order of importance, these were food, 
medicines, labour, clothes and ceremonies. Food was by far the most 
important item on which money was spent. Clothes were relatively more 
often mentioned by those farmers without (mature) coffee and cocoa, than 
by the coffee and cocoa farmers. This is probably directly related to 
younger age of the farmers without coffee or cocoa. Younger people take 
greater care of their outward appearance than older people, and are 
prepared to spend more money on clothes. The reverse is true for 
ceremonies. These were mentioned more often by coffee and cocoa farmers 
who, on average, were older, than by the farmers without (mature) coffee 
and cocoa. The income spent on ceremonies is directly related to the age 
of the respondents. In rural Sierra Leone, ceremonies are solemn occasions 
associated with religion (for example, burials and marriages) or secret 
176 Who Pays the Price? 
societies (for example, initiation rites). Older people especially often 
contribute to these ceremonies. There are two aspects related to age in this 
context. First, it is often expected of older people, with a certain standing 
and respect in society, to function as "patrons", i.e. they are expected to 
pay contributions to a certain festivity. These contributions are often 
substantial, because their size determines the level of respect for a patron. 
The younger farmers without mature coffee and cocoa had not yet reached 
the status of patron, so were not expected to pay very much for 
ceremonies. Furthermore, the nature of the ceremonies also imply a certain 
age. For example, the contributions for the initiation rites in a secret 
society can be an expensive occasion. Fathers are paying often huge 
amounts to have their children, whether sons or daughters, initiated in such 
a society. Younger people tend not to have young teenage children, the age 
at which initiations usually take place. Also, older people are more likely 
to have burial ceremonies. Hence, older people have to contribute more to 
ceremonies than younger people. 
Typically, only one out of the five different types of goods and 
services most frequently mentioned as items on which most of the income 
was spent, can be called productive. The other four items are consumptive, 
although one could argue that food, for example, is necessary to be able to 
work and, thus, can be considered a productive investment. Furthermore, 
none of the items can be called a luxury". Still, the preference for this 
package of goods and services reflects the low incomes of the farmers in 
the research area. The higher the income, the higher the proportion of 
income that is spent on luxury goods. The low income levels are also made 
clear by the list of goods and services on which the farmers would prefer 
to spend most of their income. This list does not deviate from the list of 
goods on which most of the income actually was spent. This means that 
the farmers' actual spending was considered insufficient by them, and that 
they still needed more of the goods and services on which they already had 
spent most of their income. 
5.3.7 Differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of agricultural 
producers 
In the preceding sections, we have differentiated the agricultural producers 
11
 Some might argue that expenses made for ceremonies are unnecessary expenses. 
However, in Sierra Leone, ceremonies are very important in local communities. 
Evading these ceremonies is, in many cases, socially unacceptable. 
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from the research area into coffee and cocoa producers (the "Type I 
farmers"), and those producers without (mature) coffee and cocoa (the 
"Type II farmers"). In this section, we present an overview of the 
differences between these two groups of farmers. These differences also 
show the specific socioeconomic characteristics of coffee and cocoa 
producers. 
Coffee and cocoa producers are, as a rule, older than the farmers 
without mature coffee and cocoa farms. The latter group consists of 
farmers who stand at the beginning of their farming career. Coffee and 
cocoa farmers have already had time to start their own household, after 
which it became necessary to plant cash crops. It takes at least four or five 
years after planting before the plants bear fruit and can be harvested. The 
age of the coffee and cocoa producers is also reflected in the size of their 
households. The households of the older farmers tend to be larger, not only 
because they have married more wives and had more children, but also 
because some of them have taken on the responsibility for Koranic boys, 
or employed diamond miners. 
The older coffee and cocoa producers have received less school 
education than the farmers without mature coffee and cocoa farms. The 
coffee and cocoa producers belong to a generation which had poorer 
educational opportunities than the following generations. However, the 
activities of extension agents have been focused more towards these older 
farmers. The mere fact that they cultivated cash crops led to a bias in 
favour of coffee and cocoa producers, although virtually all extension 
activities concerned the production of food crops, specifically rice. This 
policy ignores the fact that other types of farmers may also have an interest 
in food crop production. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that coffee and 
cocoa producers have also a clear interest in extension information on the 
cultivation of coffee and cocoa. 
Coffee and cocoa are the two most important cash crops in the 
research area, the third being oil palm. The farmers without mature coffee 
and cocoa cultivated oil palm more often than the coffee and cocoa 
producers. They simply had to, because they did not (yet) harvest any 
coffee and cocoa. For them, oil palm was one of the few remaining 
opportunities available for making cash. This also means that coffee and 
cocoa producers did not have to spend much more time on other income 
generating activities. The most important other potential source of income, 
besides oil palm, was diamond mining. Coffee and cocoa producers were 
also less often occupied with mining than the producers without (mature) 
coffee and cocoa. 
Because the households of the older coffee and cocoa producers tend 
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to be large, they have a bigger pool of potential labour than the newly-
established farmers. However, as these farmers often cultivate large areas 
of land they still have to hire additional labour to cope with the demands 
of large farms. As they were more experienced farmers than the younger 
ones without mature coffee and cocoa, the older coffee and cocoa farmers 
had lower (relative and absolute) costs when they hired a communal labour 
group. Furthermore, a specific form of labour, contract labour, was almost 
exclusively hired by coffee and cocoa farmers. This is due mainly to the 
nature of coffee and cocoa cultivation, their main agricultural activities. 
Contract labour is paid in cash, and concerns a specific task, not a period 
of time. A contractor is usually employed to brush a particular amount of 
land under coffee or cocoa. 
Table 5.13 Summary of main differences in socioeconomic characteristics 
of selected "Type I" and "Type Π" farmers, 1992/93 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
Age 
Household size 
Education 
Extension activities 
Other income generating 
activities 
Potentially available 
household labour 
Acreages 
Credit received 
Type I farmers: 
older 
larger 
received less 
received more 
generated less 
more available 
cultivated more 
more often 
Type 11 farmers: 
younger 
smaller 
received more 
received less 
generated more 
less available 
cultivated less 
less often 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The specific nature of the agricultural activities of coffee and cocoa 
farmers also influences their opportunities for obtaining credit. Although 
there was no substantial difference between the two groups of producers 
regarding the relative numbers of farmers who obtained a loan, there was 
a difference regarding the number of credit sources to choose from. Coffee 
and cocoa farmers were more eligible to obtain credit from produce traders 
than the farmers without mature coffee and cocoa. This was especially the 
case with credit in kind, more specifically, consumption rice loans. A large 
majority of the consumption rice loans was provided by traders in produce. 
These traders were more interested in lending the rice to coffee and cocoa 
farmers than to farmers who would not be able to repay the rice credit in 
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coffee or cocoa. Table 5.13 provides a summary of these socioeconomic 
differences between coffee and cocoa fanners ("Type I fanners"), and 
farmers without (mature) coffee and cocoa farms ("Type Π fanners"). 
This section has presented some of the main socioeconomic 
characteristics of agricultural producers in the research area. The next 
section is used to refine this differentiation further, and concentrates on the 
producers of coffee and cocoa. This more refined differentiation, is then 
used in chapter 8 to explain the marketing behaviour exhibited by these 
farmers, when they sell their coffee and cocoa to different types of produce 
traders. 
5.3.8 Socioeconomic differentiation of coffee and cocoa producers 
In chapter 1, we have presented some of the factors which were expected 
to serve as an explanation for the marketing behaviour of coffee and cocoa 
farmers. These factors should explain the extent to which farmers have the 
freedom to choose a certain type of trader in coffee and cocoa. More 
specifically, these factors may explain why underpayment occurs and, 
moreover, explain why certain farmers receive higher prices for their 
produce than others. The factors presented were: 
the distance to buying stations; 
the amount of coffee or cocoa farmers have for sale; 
the credit relations between farmers and traders; 
the social relations that exist between farmers and traders, and: 
the level of education of farmers. 
The first factor, distance to buying stations, is dealt with in chapter 7, 
where we develop an accessibility index. On the basis of this index, the 
research villages are classified into groups according to their relative 
distance to buying stations. The fourth factor, social relations, is treated in 
chapter 8. Furthermore, by looking at the reasons farmers use to select a 
particular produce trader, we determine whether he is restricted by selecting 
these traders. The factors "amount of coffee and cocoa", "credit relations" 
and "level of education" are first discussed in this section. Here, we 
differentiate groups of coffee and cocoa farmers on the basis of these three 
factors. 
Amount of produce 
One of the most crucial factors for determining the socioeconomic position 
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of coffee and cocoa producers, is the amount of coffee and cocoa they 
produce. This determines, to a certain extent, the amount of produce they 
have for sale. It seems also more logical to look at the amount of produce 
(i.e. coffee and cocoa combined) they produced, than to look separately at 
the amounts of coffee and the amounts of cocoa produced. It is, for 
example, rather the amount of produce in general that a farmer has 
produced which determines his eligibility for obtaining credit, than the 
amount of either coffee or cocoa. 
Table 5.14 Overview of the different class sizes of selected produce 
farmers, 1991/92 
Number Percentage 
Small farmers 119 41.3 
Medium farmers 99 34.4 
Large farmers 70 24.3 
N* 288 
This absolute number of farmers does not correspond fully with the number we 
stated in chapter 1 (namely 305) because it appeared that, although being selected 
as produce selling farmers, they did not sell coffee or cocoa. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The amount of produce harvested determines the size of a farmer in the 
eye of a produce trader. Here, we have defined "small farmers" as those 
farmers who produced one bag of produce or less. Producers were 
classified as "medium farmers", when they produced one to three bags of 
produce. Finally, the "large farmers" were those producers who were able 
to produce more than three bags of produce (see table 5.14). 
Credit relations 
Of all coffee and cocoa producers interviewed in 1992/93, 63 per cent 
obtained a loan the year before, of which 44 per cent was directly received 
from traders in produce12. Relatives were an important source of credit, 
they provided 35 per cent of all loans (of which 27 per cent was obtained 
from relatives who were also trading in produce). The same situation 
occurs with friends, 18 per cent of all credit was obtained from friends, of 
12
 These figures are based on the number of loans, not on the number of farmers. 
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which 32 per cent were also active in the trading of produce. Overall, this 
means that 59 per cent of all credit obtained by coffee and cocoa farmers, 
came from credit providers who were also produce traders. 
Hence, we can further sub-divide the coffee and cocoa farmers on the 
basis of their different sources of credit. First, there are the coffee and 
cocoa farmers who did not obtain credit. Second, there are those producers 
who obtained credit from people who were not trading in produce. Third, 
there is the group of farmers who obtained credit from sources who were, 
at the same time, traders in either or both coffee and cocoa (see table 5.15). 
Table 5.15 Overview of the numbers of selected produce farmers with 
and without credit, 1991/92 
Coffee/cocoa farmers: Number' Percentage 
-Without credit 111 38.5 
-With credit 177 61.5 
of which: 
-With credit from 
produce traders 123 69.5 
-With credit from 
non-produce traders 54 30.5 
These figures are based on the number of farmers. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
We have named the credit that was obtained from produce traders 
"produce-related credit", while the credit obtained from people who were 
not involved in produce trading is called "other credit". 
The amount of produce that a farmer has harvested, influences his 
opportunities of receiving credit. Table 5.16 shows that the larger farmers 
less often obtained credit than the small and medium farmers. It also shows 
that the majority of the large farmers who obtained credit, obtained it from 
sources active in the trade of produce (i.e., obtained produce-related credit). 
We assumed that large coffee and cocoa producers might be more 
eligible for obtaining loans. Their scale of operations would made them 
attractive to lenders. After all, farmers who produce relatively large 
amounts of produce will, in general, have less difficulties repaying loans 
than farmers who produce small amounts. Furthermore, because these large 
farmers produce such large amounts, produce traders will be more willing 
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to provide these farmers with credit, because credit relations may secure 
them a sizable flow of produce. 
Table 5.16 Overview of the numbers of selected produce farmers by size, 
with and without credit, 1991/92 (in percentages) 
Small farmers 
Medium farmers 
Large fanners 
N 
No credit 
39.5 
34.3 
42.9 
111 
Produce-related credit 
39.5 
40.4 
51.4 
123 
Other credit 
21.0 
25.3 
5.7 
54 
N 
119 
99 
70 
288 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
However, it appeared that large farmers less often obtained credit than the 
small and medium farmers, which is related to the larger amount of 
produce they harvested. Large farmers less often needed to loan. Yet, 
whenever the large farmers obtained credit, they obtained it in majority 
from produce-related sources. Produce traders relatively loaned more often 
to large farmers, than to small and medium farmers. 
Education 
A similar exercise can be conducted for levels of farmer education. Of all 
coffee and cocoa farmers, 39 per cent received no education at all, while 
24 per cent received formal, and 37 per cent received informal education 
in the form of local arabic training. Of all those farmers who received 
formal education, 53 per cent attended primary school (or 13 per cent of 
all coffee and cocoa farmers), while 47 per cent attended secondary school 
(12 per cent of all coffee and cocoa farmers). 
We can now differentiate the coffee and cocoa farmers on the basis of 
the education they have received. The first group consists of the farmers 
who have not received any education at all, while the second group 
consists of those farmers who have received some form of informal 
education. The third and final group consists of those farmers who have 
received some form of formal education, whether primary or secondary 
(see table 5.17). 
We can further differentiate the farmers who did or did not receive 
some form of education, by taking the amount of coffee and cocoa they 
produced into account. It appears from table 5.18 that the small farmers 
received less often some form of education than the medium and the large 
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farmers. 
Table 5.17 Overview of the numbers of selected produce farmers with 
and without education, 1992/93 
Coffee/cocoa farmers: Number Percentage 
-Without education 
-With education 
of which: 
-With informal education 
-With formal education 
108 
180 
106 
74 
37.5 
62.5 
58.9 
41.1 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
We may conclude that the large and medium farmers received more often 
some form of education than the small farmers. Furthermore, large farmers 
more often received formal education than both the small and medium 
farmers. 
Table 5.18 Overview of the numbers of selected produce fanners by size, 
with and without education, 1992/93 (in percentages) 
Small farmers 
Medium farmers 
Large farmers 
N 
No education 
40.3 
35.4 
35.7 
108 
Formal education 
25.2 
23.2 
30 
74 
Informal education 
34.5 
41.1 
34.3 
106 
N 
119 
99 
70 
288 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Education also influences the marketing knowledge of farmers, notably the 
knowledge regarding the price levels of coffee and cocoa. In order to 
assess the level of marketing knowledge of the produce farmers, we asked 
them whether they knew the current producer prices of these crops. The 
major difficulty with the measurement of the price levels of coffee and 
cocoa was that the official (government announced) minimum price system 
had been abandoned in October 1991, so there were no fixed prices any 
more. Since then, the coffee and cocoa purchase prices were set by 
purchasers. Hence, the price knowledge we tried to determine, was 
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knowledge about the highest prices farmers would be able to receive. These 
were the prices that were paid in the urban trading centres. 
Of all coffee and cocoa farmers, 38 per cent claimed to know either 
or both of the, then current prices for coffee or cocoa. Farmers from those 
areas we have classified as high production potential areas for cash crops 
(see section 5.2) could more often name a price for one or both of these 
crops than farmers from the other areas (56 per cent). For those farmers in 
the medium and low production potential areas, these percentages were 41 
and 20 respectively. It is not very useful to differentiate the knowledge of 
cash crop prices into the price knowledge for coffee (in clean as well as 
cherry coffee) on the one hand, and cocoa on the other, because of the 
timing of our fieldwork. The fieldwork period stretched from December 
1992 until May 1993, encompassing the harvesting seasons for both cocoa 
and coffee. The cocoa harvesting season starts in August or September, and 
lasts until January, while the coffee harvesting season starts in December, 
lasting until May. Allowing some time for processing, this means that 
cocoa can be sold until February or March. Coffee is sold from February 
onwards. This means that the cocoa selling season fell in the first half of 
the fieldwork period, while the coffee season fell in the second half. Not 
surprisingly, then, cocoa prices were more often known in the first half of 
the fieldwork period, while the prices of coffee were more often known in 
the second half (from March onwards, the prices of coffee were more often 
known than those of cocoa, before March it was the reverse). Farmers have 
obvious problems with memory recall. 
Usually, price knowledge refers to prices per pound. Because many 
fanners are not familiar with weights, but use volumes, we asked whether 
they knew the prices per bag, per three pence pan (of various sizes) and 
per pound. In the urban trading centres, produce is purchased entirely per 
pound. In villages, the bag (especially for coffee cherries) and different 
types of pans are used. We then assumed that when farmers mentioned 
coffee or cocoa prices as prices per bag or per pan, they were referring to 
the prices that were offered in the villages ("bush prices", see section 7.3). 
This also means that those prices which were mentioned as prices per 
pound, were referring to the prices in the urban trading centres. In total 13 
per cent of the coffee and cocoa farmers (or 35 per cent of all the farmers 
who claimed to know one or more prices) referred to coffee or cocoa 
prices as prices per pound. Remarkably, more than half of these farmers 
obtained their price knowledge from an official of a co-operative. 
The current prices per pound for coffee and cocoa were reasonably 
well known by the farmers who mentioned prices per pound. Sixty-five per 
cent of the farmers who mentioned prices per pound, stated a correct price. 
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The influence of the activities of the co-operatives in Nongowa and Small-
Bo Chiefdom (see section 9.1) in disseminating the price levels for coffee 
and cocoa, must be considered beneficial. Still, this leaves many farmers 
without price knowledge. Furthermore, price knowledge in itself is not 
sufficient to avoid low payments. Farmers should understand the working 
of hanging or platform scales and calculators as well, in order to be better 
protected against the fraudulent practices of certain produce traders. 
However, the knowledge of these prices in pounds is also related to 
the educational background of the farmers. Of the farmers who stated a 
price per pound, relatively more had received some form of formal 
education, 45 per cent, than of the total group of farmers, which amounted 
to 26 per cent. So, education seems to be an important precondition for 
farmers in order to help them understand and remember prices per pound. 
We have differentiated the coffee and cocoa producers according to the 
amount of produce they have produced. We have seen that the large 
farmers less often obtained credit than the small and medium farmers. 
Moreover, whenever the large farmers obtained credit, they obtained it 
mostly from produce-related sources. 
It also became clear that medium and large farmers more often 
received some form of education than the small farmers. Furthermore, the 
large farmers more often received formal education than the small and 
medium farmers. We have also seen that formal education is an important 
precondition for farmers to help them understand and remember prices 
(notably the prices per pound of produce). This means that the large 
farmers, who received more often some form of formal education, also 
more often knew the current producer prices for coffee and cocoa. 
Of all the produce farmers, it seems that the large farmers have the 
best position within the marketing system of coffee and cocoa in Sierra 
Leone. On the basis of the differentiation according to amount of produce, 
credit relations and education, we have discerned several groups of farmers. 
These different groups are used in chapter 8 to explain the marketing 
behaviour of these farmers. There, we consider especially the extent to 
which these factors influence the selection of produce traders by the coffee 
and cocoa producers. 
6 
The Marketing System for Coffee and Cocoa in Sierra 
Leone 
Jos Wanders 
This chapter describes the structure of the marketing system for coffee and 
cocoa and the different actors that can be identified in the system. An 
overview is given of the changes that have occurred in the marketing 
system since the introduction of coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone, 
emphasizing the changes that have taken place at both the national and 
regional levels. This chapter is divided into three broad sections. Section 
6.1 describes the system during colonial times, when foreign private trading 
houses dominated the market. Section 6.2 deals with the period from 1948 
until 1987, when a state-controlled marketing board dominated the export 
trade for cash crops. In section 6.3 we describe the changes that have 
occurred in the marketing system for coffee and cocoa since 1987, when 
privatization policies were implemented to improve the performance of the 
Sierra Leonean economy. 
6.1 The European dominated export trade, 1896-1948 
In 1896, Sierra Leone became a Protectorate, effectively extending British 
rule to the interior. European trading companies gradually expanded their 
trading activities. The trading activities of these companies were twofold, 
consisting of a two-way trade system. On the one hand, they bought and 
exported agricultural produce such as palm oil, kola nuts, piassava and 
ginger, and on the other hand, they sold manufactured consumer goods 
from overseas. These trading activities were intensified by the construction 
of a railway network and the introduction of coffee and cocoa in the 1920s 
and 1930s (Valeton, 1981). The railway network covered the major crop-
producing areas and was the most important infrastructural provision that 
the colonial government implemented during this period. It enabled the 
trading companies to move into the interior and to establish branches in 
provincial towns. These were located along the railway, navigable rivers 
or motorable roads. A simple form of export and import trade arose. As the 
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trading companies were branches of manufacturing companies in Europe, 
they were able simply to buy export crops for processing in the European 
factories and to sell only goods imported from those factories. Their main 
goal was to make short term profit. No attention was paid to improving the 
quality of the cash crops or to processing these raw materials locally. 
According to Zack-Williams (1982), this period was characterized by 
a tendency towards concentration of power in the hands of a small number 
of important trading companies. Only six European trading houses 
controlled between 82 and 95 per cent of the total produce trade in the 
mid-1950s. They used smaller European, Lebanese and, to a lesser extent, 
African traders as their agents (ibid.). This was caused partly by the 
Depression in the late 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, during which 
most of the smaller European trading companies were eliminated, and 
partly by means of mutual agreements. European trading firms were able 
to divide the crop-producing areas among themselves for the purchase of 
the export crops. This meant that the companies were free to offer any 
price that was in line with the company's policy of profit maximization 
(ibid.). 'European traders, with access to greater capital resources, were 
soon to edge the Africans out of the produce business' (ibid., p. 76). 
However, African traders also had to face competition from the Lebanese 
trading community. The Lebanese traders had been involved in produce 
trade since the tum of the century. As with the European trading 
companies, the Lebanese traders had greater financial means than their 
African colleagues, which they could invest in buying produce. Moreover, 
they had better access to credit obtained from banks, as opposed to the 
African traders who often failed to provide collateral. 
At the end of the 1930s, the colonial authorities in British West Africa 
realized that the flow of capital out of the country was not being met by 
the necessary investments in the Sierra Leonean economy. Policies were 
developed to expand the economic role of the national government. One 
consequence of this changing policy was the introduction in 1942 of the 
West African Produce Control Board (WAPCB) which was created to 
handle and control the produce trade of the British West African colonies 
of Nigeria, Ghana, the Gambia and Sierra Leone. This meant that the large 
expatriate trading houses became subject to control by the colonial 
governments. The WAPCB became the sole purchaser of cash crops and 
the trading houses were appointed as its buying agents. The prices of the 
cash crops and their export were controlled by local boards which in turn, 
were under the control of the WAPCB. The WAPCB itself was directed by 
the British Ministry of Food. 
This period was also characterized by the gradual withdrawal of the 
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private trading houses from up-country produce buying. Van der Laan 
(1978) mentions several reasons for this. First of all, the trading companies 
were dissatisfied with the level of commissions and allowances they 
received from the marketing boards. Secondly, because of increasing 
economic welfare in Europe, it became more difficult to recruit European 
staff to manage the buying stations. This led to a gradual replacement of 
the European staff at the buying stations by Lebanese and African traders. 
Some of these former agents of the private companies became the new 
managers of the buying stations. They kept on trading with their former 
employers in return for the use of the buying stations against a low rent 
and for the latter's supply of credit (ibid.). However, most of the new 
tenants failed to do profitable business in the produce trade, and in the end 
the buying stations were sold to independent traders, most of whom were 
Lebanese businessmen. The last private European trading company 
withdrew from buying produce up-country in 1970 (ibid.). 
After World War Π, the national governments took over control from 
the WAPCB and the surplus capital was divided among the West African 
countries, who established their own national marketing boards. The 
establishment of the state-controlled national marketing boards heralded the 
end of the colonial free trade system, which had been dominated by the 
European trading companies. 
6.2 State-controlled marketing, 1948-1987 
With its proceeds from the dispersal of the WAPCB, the Government of 
Sierra Leone established the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board 
(SLPMB). In 1949, the SLPMB took control of agricultural produce 
marketing from the foreign trading companies. 
6.2.1 The Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board 
Until 1987 the SLPMB was the principal commodity marketing institution 
in Sierra Leone and retained the export monopoly for cash crops such as 
cocoa, coffee, palm kernels, ginger, benniseed, rice and palm oil. In its first 
years of operation the SLPMB traded mainly in palm kernels and small 
quantities of groundnuts, cocoa, coffee and ginger. Later on, coffee and 
cocoa became the main contributors to the export earnings of the Board. 
The SLPMB also was the sole purchaser of cash crops. It performed 
this task by appointing certain private entrepreneurs as Licensed Buying 
The Marketing System in Sierra Leone 189 
Agents, who made purchases from farmers either directly or through 
subagents. At the beginning, LBAs were mainly expatriate trading 
companies. The participation of indigenous traders was relatively limited. 
Later as the European trading houses gradually withdrew gradually from 
produce buying, more Sierra Leoneans and Lebanese traders were 
appointed as LBAs to buy the commodities on behalf of the SLPMB. The 
LBAs were instructed to buy produce at a minimum guaranteed producer 
price, which was announced for each crop at the beginning of the 
harvesting season. The LBAs were supplied with rice, bags and twine and 
received a road freight allowance to cover their transport costs between 
their stores and the SLPMB warehouses. The LBAs had to arrange finance 
through the banking system themselves, to pay the minimum guaranteed 
producer price to the farmers. The remuneration was a commission per ton 
of produce purchased. 
In general, the Licensed Buying Agents could be divided into private 
LBAs, mostly Lebanese and African businessmen, and institutional LBAs, 
i.e. buying agents working for and financed by governmental institutions 
such as the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Co-operative Department of the 
Ministry of Trade. Only the LBAs were allowed to buy from the producers, 
at a price no lower than the minimum set by the Government at the 
beginning of the buying season. LBAs purchased produce in two ways: 
either directly from producers at their stores, or indirectly from local 
merchants who acted as their agents. These agents were contracted by the 
LBAs to work for them as itinerant village-level buying agents. Figure 6.1 
presents a schematic outline of the marketing system in the period 1949 
until 1987. In the following section we describe the functions of the actors 
involved in the purchase and sale of coffee and cocoa within this system 
at both the national and regional level. 
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PRODUCERS 
LOCAL 
MERCHANTS 
(agents of 
wholesalers) 
ITINERANT 
TRADERS: 
subagents 
village 
level 
ITINERANT 
TRADERS: 
petty traders 
village 
level 
REGIONAL WHOLESALERS 
(private and institutional LBAs) 
regional 
level 
SLPMB national 
level 
OVERSEAS TRADING COMPANIES 
international 
level 
Figure 6.1 Marketing channels for coffee and cocoa under the state-
controlled marketing system in Sierra Leone, 1987. 
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Notes figure 6.1 
1. Producers sell their cash crops in the village or a nearby village to a local 
merchant or to the agent of private or institutional LBAs. 
2. Producers sell their cash crops in the village or a nearby village to a petty trader's 
agent. 
3. Producers sell their cash crops in the village or a nearby village to a petty trader. 
4. Petty traders provide relatives or friends with money and/or rice to purchase on 
their behalf in the nearby villages. 
5. Local merchants sell their produce in an urban centre to a private or institutional 
LBA. 
6. Petty traders sell their produce in an urban centre to a private or institutional LBA. 
7. Petty traders sell their produce in the village or a nearby village, to a local 
merchant, or petty traders have been prefinanced to purchase on behalf of the local 
merchant. 
8. Private and institutional LBAs sell their produce in the capital Freetown to the 
SLPMB in return for a commission and transport cost allowances. 
9. SLPMB sells the produce to overseas buying companies. 
Source: Authors (1993). 
The functioning of the SLPMB 
As we have seen in the previous section, SLPMB maintained a monopoly 
on the export of cash crops. The importance of these agricultural exports 
can be seen clearly in tables 6.1 and 6.2, which indicate the value of the 
major domestic agricultural export crops for the Sierra Leonean economy 
in the 1980s. The export of coffee and cocoa formed the major contribution 
to total agricultural exports. In the first half of the 1970s, the contribution 
of coffee and cocoa varied between 62 and 75 per cent, and in the second 
even varied between 90 and 95 per cent (PEMSD, 1986). In the 1980s, as 
table 6.2 shows, the contribution of coffee and cocoa decreased slightly but 
still constituted more than 80 per cent of the total agricultural exports. 
The SLPMB therefore had a firm grip on the revenues from the 
agricultural exports. However, the contribution of the export earnings of the 
Board to the total national export earnings began fluctuating during the mid 
1980s and dropped seriously towards the end of the decade as the SLPMB 
ceased to operate. 
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Table 6.2 Contribution of major agricultural export crops to total 
domestic exports from Sierra Leone, 1980-1992 (in 
percentages) 
Period 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Contribution of coffee 
and cocoa to total 
agricultural exports 
96.5 
89.1 
93.0 
80.6 
86.3 
97.0 
98.4 
90.1 
89.1 
84.5 
88.5 
81.7 
62.4 
Contribution of 
agricultural exports to 
total domestic exports. 
25.5 
26.5 
29.0 
24.6 
24.6 
36.3 
19.3 
27.6 
31.3 
15.2 
11.5 
7.5 
4.7 
Source: BSL (1992). 
By 1968, the SLPMB had accumulated substantial surpluses due to a 
period of steady world market prices. These funds were used in the 
beginning of the 1960s to finance extensive agricultural and agro-industrial 
projects, such as palm oil plantations, palm oil mills and an instant coffee 
mill. However, these projects could not generate immediate revenue, lacked 
proper management and were a drain on the liquid resources of the 
SLPMB1. 
Therefore, when world market prices for several cash crops were 
beginning to decline sharply in 1967, the Board was on the verge of 
bankruptcy and had few resources left to finance purchasing activities. The 
SLPMB was even unable to pay the LBAs when they delivered produce. 
The LBAs in tum, issued papers to producers promising to pay them later. 
As a consequence, the Board was reorganized in 1967 to build up its 
working capital. It began to restrict its agricultural investment programme 
by closing down several projects and handing over plantations to the 
Moreover, SLPMB met the full costs of investments without any other 
institutional participation. 
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Ministry of Agriculture. Activities were confined to produce buying and 
exporting. Producer prices for coffee, cocoa and palm kernels were 
lowered. 
In the following years, SLPMB recovered financially, due to increases 
in world market prices and low producer prices. In 1979, the Board 
extended its marketing activities with the incorporation of the Rice 
Corporation and became the sole importer and distributor of rice in Sierra 
Leone. Before hand, the Rice Corporation functioned as a food marketing 
board and was the government's main instrument for regulating local rice 
production and the import of rice, by establishing producer, wholesale and 
consumer prices. This meant that the SLPMB became a food marketing 
board as well as an export crop marketing board, although both types of 
boards differ widely in their objectives and operations (Hesp and Van der 
Laan, 1985). An important reason for this merger was to conceal the 
deficits in rice trading by writing them off against the surpluses gained by 
export marketing. The import of rice was a heavy drain on the 
government's budget and to mask this situation, the SLPMB could use its 
foreign exchange, obtained from the sale of export crops, to buy rice 
abroad. From 1979 onwards, an increasing part of SLPMB's export 
earnings were spent on the import of rice2. Furthermore, the Board could 
not ensure an equitable distribution of rice stocks to consumers. Although 
they selected and appointed rice dealers and supplied rice to them, they 
could not control the retail transactions of those dealers. This led to the 
withdrawal of the SLPMB's monopoly of the rice importation and 
distribution in 1983, when the foreign exchange reserves of the SLPMB 
had fallen to very low levels (West Africa, 1983). 
Besides these marketing activities, the SLPMB restarted investments 
in agro-industrial projects. In 1976 and 1977, two large palm oil mills were 
established and a palm kernel crushing mill, established in 1966, was 
reopened after reorganization and technical improvements. Three rice 
processing mills were also inherited from the Rice Corporation. To promote 
the production of coffee and cocoa, the Board also became involved in 
agricultural extension services. Before 1980, they had supplied the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Natural Resources with chemicals for the extension 
service programme to farmers. In 1980, SLPMB took over the extension 
programme from the Ministry in order to improve the services offered. The 
main objective of the extension programme was to concentrate on the 
2
 In 1981/82, SLPMB needed 75 per cent of its export earnings to pay for rice 
imports (West Africa, 1983). 
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rehabilitation of cocoa and coffee farms and to intensify the control of 
pests and diseases that affected the trees. The cocoa programme consisted 
of spraying cocoa trees with chemicals to control diseases, such as 
blackpod and capsid. The coffee programme was concerned mainly with 
pruning the trees. In 1982, the extension programme was handed back to 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which had established 
Integrated Agricultural Development Projects for better implementation of 
extension programmes at district level (see section 3.1.6). 
In 1979, the SLPMB created two subsidiaries to promote export crop 
production. The Sierra Leone Agricultural Production Company (SLAPCO) 
was started to promote the production of coffee and cocoa by establishing 
a number of large scale plantations which served as demonstration centres. 
The National Produce Company (NAPCO) was established to promote the 
production of groundnuts and ginger. It developed a groundnut seed 
multiplication programme, to enable a large number of farmers to produce 
groundnuts for export. To further stimulate the groundnut production, 
NAPCO began a credit programme in 1980, for farmers wanting to start or 
extend their groundnut production. The loans had to be repaid with a 
certain amount of groundnuts or rice. NAPCO was also engaged in the 
purchase of other cash crops such as chilies and ginger for export, rice-
trading and supplying building materials for the construction of stores and 
drying platforms. In 1981, NAPCO, as an institutional LBA, extended its 
marketing activities to the purchase of coffee and cocoa, as we shall see in 
section 6.2.2. 
Following the negative experiences in 1967, SLPMB investments in 
the agricultural sector, either to maintain or increase production levels, 
remained low throughout the remaining period of its operation 
(Mukonoweshuro, 1990). 
Pricing policy of the SLPMB 
The main official goal of the SLPMB was to raise the income levels of 
small farmers' households. To realize this goal, the Board pursued a policy 
to stabilize producer prices in order to protect producers against 
fluctuations of the world market prices for cash crops. It also tried to 
reduce the role of middlemen in the purchase of cash crops. 
To start with the first policy, before the beginning of the buying 
season for each crop under schedule, the SLPMB made recommendations 
to the government for the minimum guaranteed price to be paid to the 
producers. This recommended price was based on the estimate of free on 
board (f.o.b.) prices to be realized that year for that particular crop. The 
producer price was determined after taking into account the likely f.o.b. 
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prices and factors, such as the commission and transport allowances for 
LBAs, export duty, administrative overheads and funds to be retained for 
agricultural development and price maintenance funds. 
Table 63 Producer prices for coffee and cocoa as percentages of f.o.b. 
prices in Sierra Leone, 1970/71-1990/91 
Period 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
Coffee: 
f.o.b. 
price 
(Le/ton) 
640.0 
513.2 
744.0 
843.0 
859.1 
1,449.1 
4,668.5 
4,029.0 
3,150.0 
3,885.0 
n.a. 
2,246.5 
2,746.6 
5,262.8 
14,189.0 
12,982.0 
80.910.0 
58,605.0 
109,200.0 
89,825.0 
171,000.0 
producer 
price 
(Le/ton) 
313.6 
313.6 
313.6 
448.0 
560.0 
716.8 
1,496.8 
1,612.8 
1,747.7 
2,016.0 
1,792.0 
1.344.0 
1,904.0 
3.472.0 
8.501.6 
8,960.0 
49,280.0 
53,760.0 
53,760.0 
71,680.0 
89.600.0 
ratio 
(in %) 
49 
61 
42 
53 
65 
49 
32 
40 
55 
52 
n.a. 
60 
69 
66 
60 
69 
61 
92 
49 
80 
52 
Cocoa: 
f.o.b. 
price 
(Le/ton) 
560.0 
387.0 
523.0 
999.2 
1.405.8 
1,310.8 
2,984.5 
3,487.0 
3,584.4 
3,465.0 
n.a. 
2,330.9 
2,746.6 
5,730.8 
9,440.1 
13,056.0 
82,800.0 
40,250.0 
63,700.0 
120,928.0 
205,200.0 
producer 
price 
(Le/ton) 
313.6 
313.6 
313.6 
425.6 
672.0 
672.0 
1,209.6 
1,568.0 
2,128.0 
2,128.0 
1,456.0 
1,456.0 
1,531.0 
3,024.0 
4,928.0 
6,720.0 
30,240.0 
30,240.0 
30,240.0 
44,800.0 
100,800.0 
ratio 
(in%) 
56 
81 
60 
43 
48 
51 
41 
45 
59 
61 
n.a. 
62 
56 
53 
52 
51 
37 
75 
48 
37 
49 
Source: Minster/Abco (1993b). 
After the government had accepted the recommended price, the official 
minimum producer prices to be paid by LBAs were announced in the 
media. In the announcement, LBAs were always reminded to pay the 
correct minimum producer price. If anyone should be reported underpaying 
the farmer, and the charge is proven, the LB A might lose his or her licence 
(SLPMB, personal communications, 1991). During the course of the buying 
season, when f.o.b. prices could rise significantly, a review of producer 
prices, commissions and transport allowances was made to determine 
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whether these prices should also be increased. If world market prices were 
declining, the SLPMB could use its stabilization fund to maintain producer 
prices at the same level. This stabilization fund was, for a large part, 
supplied by the profits the SLPMB had made in the years when world 
market prices increased. From 1979 to 1982, a decline in world market 
prices for coffee and cocoa caused strong fluctuations in domestic producer 
prices, so the Board was forced to deplete its stabilisation fund to subsidise 
producer prices. 
In general, however, as table 6.3 shows, this policy did not work to the 
advantage of the producers. Although it was the Board's intention to pay 
the producers at least about 60 per cent of the f.o.b. prices and to stabilize 
the producer prices, it appeared that in recent decades the producer prices, 
as percentages of the f.o.b. prices, showed strong fluctuations. The 
substantial increases in the producer prices in the 1970s and 1980s served 
mainly to compensate for the effect of inflation. Furthermore, for many 
years, the producer prices were less than 60 percent of the f.o.b. prices. 
Bowbrick (1986), argues that producer prices as percentages of the 
f.o.b. prices were even lower if the "invisible taxes" are taken into account. 
These invisible taxes arise from the use of the official, over-valued 
exchange rates when producer prices are set, instead of the real exchange 
rates in the informal market. In Sierra Leone, the f.o.b. price, expressed in 
US Dollars, was converted into the local currency at the official exchange 
rate. However, from 1980 onwards, this official exchange rate did not 
reflect the true value of the national currency. Instead, a parallel exchange 
rate was largely used in the Sierra Leonean economy. Therefore, since 
producer prices were calculated at the official exchange rate and producers 
had to purchase their necessary inputs at black market rates, producers 
appeared to be heavily taxed. Table 6.4 shows the ratio between producer 
prices and f.o.b. prices using the parallel exchange rate. This invisible tax 
aggravated the negative effect low producer prices had on the earnings of 
producers. While the producer is paid according to official exchange rates, 
he has to pay for his farming inputs and other consumer goods according 
to the black market rates. The amount producers received as returns for 
their labour and invested capital was not sufficient to induce profit 
motivated innovations. 
Furthermore, because of low and decreasing producer prices in real 
terms compared to neighbouring countries, parallel market activities 
increased when producers tried to smuggle their produce to Liberia, where 
higher producer prices were paid and where the producer prices followed 
the world market prices more closely. In order to prevent severe 
smuggling, SLPMB often had to revise its producer prices after the start of 
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the buying season because of the increasing prices in Liberia. But 
smuggling became even more attractive in the middle of the 1980s, when 
farmers did not receive prompt payment for their produce because of 
liquidity problems in the Sierra Leonean banking system. 
Table 6.4 Producer prices for coffee and cocoa as percentage of f.o.b. 
prices using the parallel exchange rate in Sierra Leone, 
1981/82-1990/91 
Period Ratio parallel Ratio producer price/f.o.b. price using, 
rates/official parallel exchange rates 
exchange rates 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
240 
476 
280 
286 
380 
124 
163 
149 
145 
125 
Coffee 
25.3 
14.6 
23.5 
20.9 
18.2 
49.1 
56.3 
33.0 
55.0 
41.9 
Cocoa 
26.0 
11.7 
18.8 
18.3 
13.5 
29.5 
46.1 
32.1 
25.6 
39.3 
Sources: Minster/Abco (1993b); table 6.3. 
The revision of prices during the buying season brings us to another aspect 
of the SLPMB's pricing policy that had a negative influence on the 
farmers' cash crop earnings, namely the timing of producer prices 
announcement. Although it was the intention of the SLPMB to fix the 
producer prices before the start of the harvesting season and keep them 
constant during the season, table 6.5 shows that they could not always 
fulfil that promise. The Board announced the new producer prices several 
times after the start of the buying season and also increased the producer 
price, especially at the end of the cropping season. In this way, more profit 
could be secured at the expense of the producers. For the farmers these 
changes in producer prices were made too late in the season. Most 
producers had sold their crops immediately after harvesting against old 
prices, because of immediate need for money and lack of storage facilities. 
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Table 6.5 Date of changes in the official producer prices set by SLPMB, 
1968-1990 
Date Coffee producer Date Cocoa producer 
Feb. 01 '68' 
Feb. 01 '73' 
Mar. 02 '74' 
Sep. 13 '74 
Feb. 01 '76' 
Aug. 01 '76 
Feb. 12 '77' 
Mar. 12 '77' 
Jun. 19 '79 
Feb. 21 '80' 
Feb. 13 '81' 
Apr. 01 '81' 
Jan. 01 '82 
Jan. 01 '83 
Jul. 01 '83 
May 12 '84' 
Jul. 09 '84 
Feb. 18 '85' 
Feb. 20 '86' 
Apr. 18 '86' 
Jul. 15 '86 
Jan. 21 '87' 
Feb. 01 '87' 
Jul. 01 '89 
Jul. 01 '90 
price (Le/ton) 
313.6 
336.0 
448.0 
560.0 
716.8 
1,013.4 
1,478.4 
1,612.8 
1,747.2 
2,016.0 
1,792.0 
1,612.8 
1,344.8 
1,904.0 
3,472.0 
4,256.0 
5,376.0 
8,960.0 
11,200.0 
17,920.0 
35,840.0 
40,320.0 
53,760.0 
71,680.0 
89,600.0 
Dec. 15 '68' 
Nov. 01 '70 
Nov. 01 '73 
Dec. 06 '73' 
Sep. 13 '74 
Oct 12 '74 
Aug. 25 '76 
? '77 
Nov. 01 '77 
Nov. 01 '78 
Dec. 01 '80' 
Apr. 01 '81 
Sep. 01 '82 
Jan. 01 '83' 
Jul. 09 '83 
Jul. 09 '84 
Feb. 18 '85 
Jan. 20 '86' 
Apr. 18 '86 
Jul. 15 '86 
Oct 23 '86 
Jul. 01 '89 
Oct. 01 '90 
price (Le/ton) 
302.4 
313.6 
358.4 
425.6 
582.4 
672.0 
985.6 
1,209.6 
1,568.0 
2,128.0 
2,016.0 
1,792.0 
1,456.0 
1,568.0 
3,024.0 
4,928.0 
5,600.0 
6,720.0 
8,960.0 
26,880.0 
30,240.0 
44,800.0 
100,800.0 
These changes in producer prices occurred during the buying season. The majority 
of producers sell their coffee and cocoa during the periods January-May and 
November-January, respectively. 
Source: SLPMB (1991). 
These price revisions gave the LBAs the opportunity to make profits by 
purchasing as much produce as possible at the beginning of the harvesting 
season against old prices and keep their stocks until the new prices were 
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released. Moreover, LBAs made unfair profits as they continued to pay the 
farmers the old price rather than the revised price. 
We have seen that the producer prices for coffee and cocoa showed 
strong fluctuations and changed even during the buying seasons. In general, 
we may conclude that the pricing policy of SLPMB did not seem to 
stabilize the producer prices and to raise the income of farmers, but rather 
seemed to tax the agricultural sector. In the long run, this policy had severe 
repercussions for the volume of coffee and cocoa exported. Low producer 
prices do not stimulate the farmers to maintain or increase their farms. 
Although it is difficult to give reliable data of the actual national volumes 
for produce, we have summarized attempts of several studies to indicate the 
yearly production volumes for coffee and cocoa in table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 Estimated production volumes of coffee and cocoa, 1980/81-
1992/93 (x 1,000 metric tons)* 
Period 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92" 
1992/93" 
Coffee 
20.3 
18.5 
16.5 
18.0 
26.0 
23.1 
24.2 
25.3 
25.6 
25.8 
36.0 
7.9 
8.1 
Cocoa 
8.6 
14.5 
10.0 
14.5 
15.0 
18.6 
20.9 
23.5 
21.2 
24.4 
24.2 
5.3 
5.4 
These figures are based on estimated cultivated acreages and yearly yield forecasts 
of extension workers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
The rebel incursion, which started in March 1991, has affected the most productive 
coffee and cocoa growing areas in the country and consequently, the estimated 
national production volumes for coffee and cocoa have declined significantly. 
Source: CSO (1989; 1992); Minster/Abco (1993b); PEMSD (1993). 
However, when we compare these figures with the actual amounts of 
coffee and cocoa exported, as shown in table 6.7, it appears that the 
volumes of coffee and cocoa exported are far below the estimated 
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production volumes for both crops. It has to be taken into account 
however, that although the farmers have certain acreages planted with 
coffee or cocoa trees, not all of them harvest the whole plantation. Lack of 
labour and low producer prices force most farmers to harvest only a part 
of their plantation. Moreover, in some years farmers decide to harvest less 
acreages due to unfavourable weather conditions. 
Table 6.7 Volume of coffee and cocoa exported by SLPMB and private 
exporters*, 1968/69-1992/93 (x 1,000 metric tons) 
Period 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
Coffee 
8.23 
5.99 
8.43 
7.32 
11.99 
3.15 
4.48 
10.16 
n.a. 
4.48 
13.51 
10.26 
9.35 
Cocoa 
4.06 
4.16 
4.98 
7.42 
6.70 
7.72 
6.10 
6.50 
n.a. 
6.10 
7.42 
10.57 
8.23 
Period 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
Coffee 
8.74 
4.98 
2.13 
10.16 
8.00 
5.00 
8.03 
5.16 
0.79 
7.33 
3.98 
2.87 
Cocoa 
7.72 
10.16 
9.04 
11.07 
9.00 
8.00 
7.80 
7.57 
8.85 
6.08 
2.93 
2.17 
Before 1986/87, the SLPMB was the sole exporter. From 1986/87 until 1991/92, 
coffee and cocoa were purchased by both the SLPMB and private exporters, but 
exported via SLPMB. From 1991/92 onwards, only private exporters purchased 
and exported coffee and cocoa. 
Source: PEMSD (1986; 1993); BSL (1993). 
Another explanation for the differences between the estimated production 
figures and the export volumes for coffee and cocoa might be the 
substantial cross border trade between Sierra Leone and Liberia by traders 
as well as producers because of the higher producer prices paid in Liberia. 
As well as the policy of stabilizing producer prices to raise farmers' 
incomes, the SLPMB formulated a policy to reduce the role of middlemen, 
both petty traders and subagents, in the purchase of cash crops. However, 
the Board did not in fact organize the internal marketing of cash crops. 
They only purchased produce from Licensed Buying Agents, who were 
obliged by the Board to pay the stipulated prices set by government to the 
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producers. These LBAs received a commission per ton of produce and a 
road freight allowance for the transport costs they made, travelling from 
their buying stations to SLPMB warehouses. The Board increased 
commissions and road freight allowances several times to encourage LBAs 
to purchase more produce and to cover operating costs, such as transport, 
empty bags and interest on borrowed capital. However, according to the 
LBAs, the commissions and road freight allowances were too low to cover 
their trading costs and obtain a reasonable trading margin (Debouillé and 
Wanders, 1987). The SLPMB frequently delayed their purchases due to 
lack of bags, storage or transport facilities. This led to extra losses being 
incurred by the LBAs, which they in turn made up for at the expense of 
the producers (Klomberg and van Riessen, 1983). 
The SLPMB did not interfere at all in the purchase of produce at local 
level. Surveys carried out in 1979, 1982, 1985 and 1986 in the main coffee 
and cocoa production areas, revealed that about 40 per cent of all farmers 
sold their coffee and cocoa to traders other than LBAs (Bolder et al., 1980; 
Klomberg and van Riessen, 1983; Donhauser, 1986; Debouillé and 
Wanders, 1987). Of course, these other traders, in turn, sold their coffee 
and cocoa to the LBAs. Therefore, in order to make some profit, they paid 
the farmers less than the official producer price. 
The traders who obtained licences from the SLPMB to purchase 
produce on their behalf, were located mainly in a small number of larger 
towns, and used their own agents and petty traders to do the purchasing 
work in the villages. Although the number of LBAs seemed high for a 
small country such as Sierra Leone, they were not evenly spread over the 
producing areas3. Most LBAs combined their purchasing activities with 
other commercial activities, such as the merchandise of commodities, and 
were therefore situated in larger towns. Several LBAs were located in the 
capital Freetown, because in the end, all produce had to be conveyed to 
Freetown for shipment abroad. This led, as map 7.1 shows, to an uneven 
spatial distribution of the official buying stations which were situated 
mainly in the urban trading centres within the coffee and cocoa growing 
areas. As a consequence, it was difficult for the farmers, especially in the 
more remote areas, to reach the urban trading centres for an affordable 
transport cost. 
Although the SLPMB recognized that the buying stations should be 
3
 The number of LBAs fluctuated from 69 in 1968, 35 in 1973, 80 in 1974, 106 
in 1979/80 and about 120 in 1986/87 (GOSL, 1974; Jabatí, 1978; Peperkamp, 
1984, and Debouillé and Wanders, 1987). 
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spread more evenly over the coffee and cocoa areas, they failed to achieve 
this objective. The only contribution the Board made to a more dispersed 
pattern of buying stations was the establishment in 1982 of 11 NAPCO 
buying stations. Their main objective was to purchase more produce 
outside the urban trading centres. However, four of the NAPCO stations 
were located in the four largest urban trading centres, and three NAPCO 
stations were located near the border with Liberia to prevent smuggling. A 
more dispersed pattern of buying stations was apparent in 1986, compared 
to the situation at the end of the 1970s. This might be explained by an 
increasing number of LBAs who had started buying produce in the smaller 
trading centres to avoid competition from larger LBAs (Bolder et al., 1980; 
Debouillé and Wanders, 1987). 
To conclude, it appeared that the SLPMB was only interested in 
purchasing produce from the LBAs in the urban trading centres at low 
producer prices. The Board did not seem to be interested in a fair 
remuneration for the work of the producers and was barely involved in the 
actual purchase of produce beyond the regional level. 
6.2.2 The functioning of LBAs 
As already mentioned, the SLPMB appointed LBAs to provide all services 
between up-country purchase and delivery to the stores of the Board. These 
services consisted of examining and weighing the produce, paying the 
producers, bagging and storage of produce, and transporting the produce 
to the SLPMB stores. The LBAs were rewarded for their services with a 
fixed amount of commission per ton of produce delivered and a road 
transport allowance, per ton which varied with the distance. 
To become a LBA, traders had to fulfil the following requirements: 
First of all, they should have a storage capacity which fulfilled the 
minimum quality standards set by the Ministry of Agriculture and National 
Resources. Second, they needed financial proof of ability to purchase at 
least 150 tons of produce per year. Third, transactions had to take place at 
their buying stations. Fourth, the produce delivered by producers had to be 
weighed in the presence of the producer, on a scale which was supposed 
to be checked annually for accuracy. Finally, producers should be paid 
according to the officially stipulated producer price announced by the 
government. 
To control these requirements, the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources set up the Produce Inspection Branch (PIB), which operated 
independently from the SLPMB. Its main functions were to control the 
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quality of produce at time of delivery to the store, to inspect the store and 
the scales and to look after correct measurement of the produce. 
Considering these requirements to become a LBA, it is obvious that 
those people who were already involved in the cash crop trade or in the 
retail trade were the most important candidates for obtaining a licence. 
However, besides private entrepreneurs, in the course of time governmental 
institutions also applied for a licence to buy produce, the so-called 
institutional LBAs. Let us first consider the private LBAs. 
Private LBAs 
When the SLPMB was established in 1949, the foreign trading firms, who 
by then controlled the purchase of produce, became the first LBAs. They 
used indigenous and Lebanese traders as their subagents. Following the 
independence of Sierra Leone, the foreign trading firms ceased to buy 
produce and their role was taken over mainly by Lebanese and a few 
African traders who had been appointed as LBAs (Van der Laan, 1975). 
As we have seen in section 6.2.1, those LBAs who purchased the 
largest quantities of produce were located mainly in the largest population 
centres of the coffee and cocoa producing areas. Because exports had to 
pass almost entirely through Freetown, some large traders in the capital 
also became LBAs, using local branches up-country or subagents to buy on 
their behalf. Kenema had the highest number of LBAs because it 
functioned as the main commercial centre in the Eastern Province and it 
was located in the heart of the coffee and cocoa growing area (Bolder et 
al., 1980; Debouillé and Wanders, 1987). Most LBAs were located in the 
main commercial centres because of their traditional retail function and to 
gain as large a sphere of influence as possible to purchase produce. The 
majority of LBAs owned one or more lorries for transporting the purchased 
produce to the stores of SLPMB. They used three methods to attract as 
much produce as possible. 
First, they used the lorries to collect produce in the villages and to take 
the producers and their produce to their stores where they would weigh the 
produce and transact business with the fanners. Although it was not 
permitted, several LBAs conducted transactions with producers in the 
villages, using hanging scales to weigh the produce. Second, they used 
subagents and petty traders to purchase on their behalf by supplying them 
with cash or rice and sometimes transport. Third, they tried to attract the 
larger producers by supplying them with credit, often in the form of rice, 
to support them maintaining their large plantations. In return, they asked 
these producers to sell their produce to them. They were not very interested 
in small scale producers, because they could not produce enough coffee or 
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cocoa to cover their loans. 
LBAs tried to attract as much produce as possible, because officially, 
their profit in produce trade depended solely on the commission per ton of 
produce they received from SLPMB. Although the Board supplied them 
with rice to sell to farmers in rerum for produce, these rice supplies were 
not enough to meet the needs of all their customers. 
The amounts purchased by the LBAs fluctuated from year to year, 
depending on the following factors. First, climatic conditions for coffee and 
cocoa growing vary from year to year. Second, competition was strong 
because of increasing numbers of LBAs and the establishment of 
institutional LBAs. Third, fuel shortages caused transport costs to fluctuate 
several years running. Many LBAs complained that, in spite of several 
increases, transport allowances and commissions were too low to cover 
their operating costs and to obtain a trading margin. Fourth, any delays in 
buying by the SLPMB, due to lack of bags, transport facilities and 
financial resources resulted in extra losses for the LBAs. They had to 
extend storage periods and lend extra money so that they could continue 
their own purchasing activities. 
To counter these problems, the LBAs made use of speculative 
activities by holding up their purchased produce whilst awaiting the latest 
increases in producer prices. Another common practice was to take their 
trading margin at the expense of the producer by paying less than the 
stipulated producer price. Finally, LBAs tried to smuggle their produce to 
Liberia. Due to the high transport costs and bad roads to the SLPMB 
stores, some LBAs, especially those located near the border with Liberia, 
took the shortest way to Liberia where they could obtain higher prices paid 
in Dollars. 
Institutional LBAs 
Besides the numerous private LBAs, we can identify three types of 
institutional LBAs which were active in produce buying during the period 
under review. 
The first institutional LBA to be mentioned is NAPCO. As a 
subsidiary of SLPMB, NAPCO was an instrument designed to achieve the 
following objectives: to spread buying stations more evenly throughout the 
crop-producing areas; to eliminate the role of middlemen; to increase 
competition with the private LBAs and to prevent smuggling. In 1986, 11 
NAPCO stores were registered as official buying stations which met the 
official requirements (MANRF, 1986). The majority of these stations were 
located in the major trading centres. NAPCO also used local branches for 
purchasing produce and appointed Master Farmers to buy crops on their 
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behalf. Like the private LBAs, they used lorries to convey fanners to the 
buying stations, to transact business and to give them the opportunity to 
buy rice and other consumer goods. Credit, in the form of rice, was only 
issued to larger farmers. 
So, although NAPCO did not really succeed in spreading the buying 
stations more evenly over the producing areas, at least they tried to 
diminish the role of middlemen. Moreover, NAPCO competed seriously 
with the private LBAs in the sense that they could obtain larger quantities 
of rice in order to attract farmers to their stores. 
The second type of institutional LBA was the National Co-operative 
Development Bank (NCDB).
 m the 1950s and 1960s, marketing co-
operatives played an important role in the purchase of produce in Sierra 
Leone. These marketing co-operatives were established at village level 
under the auspices of the Co-operative Marketing Federation of the 
Department of Co-operatives within the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
The main objective of the marketing co-operatives was to purchase the 
produce of their members in order to assure higher prices and to give 
members control over the weighing and grading of produce. The capital 
required was as loans supplied by the Department of Co-operatives and, 
from 1971, by the newly established NCDB. In the early 1960s, 50 per 
cent of all cocoa exported was sold through marketing co-operatives 
(GOSL, 1962). At the end of the 1960s however, marketing co-operative 
purchasing decreased significantly. Johnston (1968) and Jabati (1978) 
mentioned the following causes: first of all, the transport costs to the 
buying stations increased, because the Co-operative Marketing Federation 
lacked sufficient transport means and private transport owners abused the 
situation to charge higher transport costs. Furthermore, the co-operatives 
lacked sufficient financial means to pay their members immediately on 
delivery. Farmers therefore preferred to sell their produce to the LBAs who 
paid them at once. The Co-operative Marketing Federation finally collapsed 
in 1967, due to a lack of suitably trained staff and embezzlement by senior 
officers. 
After the collapse of the Co-operative Marketing Federation, the Co-
operative Development Bank continued to credit the remaining co-operative 
societies and extended its activities to the purchase of produce from 
marketing co-operatives as well as from individual farmers. Most produce 
purchased by the NCDB came from individual farmers. The company 
established two buying stations in Kenema and Pendembu. As well as 
encouraging farmers to come to its stores, the NCDB made use of 
subagents. Credit was only issued to subagents and farmers after inspecting 
their farms to ensure that they would have enough produce to repay the 
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loan. In the first half of 1980s, the total amount of coffee and cocoa bought 
by NCDB varied between 1 and 6 per cent of total SLPMB purchases 
(Debouillé and Wanders, 1987). The amount of produce purchased was 
limited due to financial restrictions and lack of transport. Moreover, they 
were not able to get sufficient supplies of rice from SLPMB to meet the 
demands of their subagents and the farmers who came to the stores. 
The third type of institutional LBA identified is the Farmers Finance 
Company (FFC), established in 1976. It was formed by the credit 
department of the Eastern Integrated Agricultural Development Project to 
supervise the credit issued to farmers for the development of their rice 
farms and their coffee, cocoa or palm oil plantations. The main objective 
for buying produce was to make sure that farmers would derive full benefit 
from their investments in cash crop plantations and to prevent farmers from 
selling their produce to middlemen for less than the official producer 
prices. FFC started buying produce in 1981. They made use of three 
buying stations located outside the larger buying centres. Apart from 
purchasing directly from the farmers who came to these stores, FFC, like 
NAPCO and NCDB, used subagents to purchase produce by supplying 
them with money and rice. No official contracts were signed with the 
buying agents and they received no guidelines for their purchasing 
activities. This meant that there were no guarantees for the farmers that 
they would receive the stipulated price for their produce. The amount of 
coffee and cocoa bought by FFC was limited and did not exceed two per 
cent of total SLPMB purchases in the first half of the 1980s. Again, most 
producers did not sell their produce to any of the FFC buying stations 
because the rice supply at the stores was limited and only allocated to 
subagents or those large farmers whose plantations had been inspected. The 
FFC had limited transport means, with only one lorry available to convey 
produce. 
To conclude, the institutional LBAs had the common objectives of 
offering farmers the official producer price and to increase the competition 
with private LBAs. In 1986, all three institutional LBAs were paying on 
average 90 to 100 per cent of the official producer prices to farmers while 
private LBAs were only paying, on average, 80 to 90 per cent of the 
official producer prices (Debouillé and Wanders, 1987). 
However, the marketing activities of institutional LBAs did not differ 
very much from those of private LBAs. Although they could establish 
some buying stations outside the main urban trading centres, they still 
made use of numerous subagents to buy produce, without exerting control 
over their buying practices. This meant they could only offer official 
producer prices to those producers who were able to come to their buying 
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stations. These institutional LBAs did not appear to cause major changes 
to the marketing system for coffee and cocoa. Unlike the private LBAs, 
they failed to supply producers with enough credit and consumer goods and 
they had limited transport facilities. This led to the closure of the marketing 
activities of FFC. NCDB also stopped buying produce and one of their 
buying stations was handed over to the local marketing co-operative, the 
Nongowa Co-operative Growers and Marketing Association, which itself 
became an LB A in 1987. Only NAPCO continued to purchase produce, 
although on a restricted scale. 
63 Transition to a privatized marketing system, from 1987 
onwards 
Since 1987, changes have occurred in the state-controlled marketing system 
for coffee and cocoa at the national and regional level in Sierra Leone. In 
1986, faced with a bankrupt economy, the Government negotiated a long-
term structural adjustment programme with the IMF. However, these 
negotiations stopped for several years because the government failed to 
repay the interest on external debt arrears and responded to the poor 
performance of the economy by restrictive regulations which discouraged 
private investors (Zack-Williams, 1990). Finally in 1990, after 
comprehensive economic reforms had been introduced by the government 
in 1987, negotiations with the IMF were once again on the agenda 
(Wambia, 1990). As a consequence of the government's acceptance of the 
structural adjustment programme as a condition to receive the necessary 
IMF loans, several sectors of the economy, amongst others the export trade, 
underwent significant reforms aimed at their privatization. 
6.3.1 Privatization of export trade 
The IMF-induced economic reforms consisted of reducing the size of the 
civil service sector, limiting the growth of government expenditures, 
abolishing subsidies on basic commodities and devaluing the national 
currency. The government also privatized the import of rice, which was 
formerly a monopoly of SLPMB, and completely ended the SLPMB's 
monopoly in the purchase of coffee and cocoa on the domestic market 
(ibid.). Under pressure from the IMF, the government had to divest itself 
of a number of SLPMB cash crop plantations and had to restructure and 
privatize several operations of the Board from 1990 onwards. In order to 
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ensure competitiveness with the private sector and to maximize returns to 
producers, the World Bank also put the government of Sierra Leone under 
pressure to increase producer prices for coffee and cocoa to a level no less 
than 60 per cent of the f.o.b. prices from September 1991 onwards (ibid.). 
These policy changes and the consequent abolition of the monopoly 
position of SLPMB, led to a stronger impact of the private trade on the 
marketing system since 1987. A few private trading companies and large 
LBAs obtained licences, not only to buy coffee and cocoa from producers, 
but also to export the produce themselves on the world market, albeit via 
SLPMB. From the 1987/88 buying season until 1992/93, the Board handled 
the produce before shipping and acted as mediator between the private 
trading companies and the buyers overseas. Three percent of the receipts 
in foreign exchange had to be handed over to SLPMB to cover the Board's 
handling and quality control costs. Another 60 per cent had to be converted 
into the national currency at the official rate through the Bank of Sierra 
Leone. The private exporting companies were free to dispose of the 
remaining 37 per cent of the agreed price in foreign currency. In 1992, 
restrictions on trade were further removed. Licenses were no longer 
required for the import and export of most goods, except for gold and 
diamonds, and exporters were no longer obliged to convert part of their 
exports into the national currency through the Bank of Sierra Leone. 
Since the 1987/88 buying season, the share of private traders in the 
total volume of coffee and cocoa exports increased significantly to 70 per 
cent for coffee and 75 per cent for cocoa in 1990/91 (BSL, 1992). The 
total amount of produce purchased by SLPMB on the domestic market 
decreased by approximately 53 per cent in volume between 1987/88 and 
1988/89. For coffee alone, the decrease in the same period amounted to 65 
per cent (Wambia, 1990). In 1990/91, SLPMB only purchased 8 per cent 
of the total amount of coffee exported and 15 per cent of the total amount 
of cocoa. In the 1991/92 buying season, the purchase and export activities 
of SLPMB came to a complete standstill. This was mainly caused by the 
lack of cash, needed by the SLPMB for its buying operations. Furthermore, 
the Board faced serious competition from the private companies who had 
ready cash at their disposal and possessed better means of transport. In the 
end, the government's privatization programme of parastatale led to the 
decision to abolish all SLPMB activities and to freeze all assets of the 
Board in July 1992, as the Board could no longer operate profitably 
following the loss of its monopoly. 
The role of SLPMB as sole exporter of coffee and cocoa has since 
been taken over by several private trading companies. Referring to the 
situation in the coffee and cocoa sector, we see that in the 1987/88 buying 
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season only one private exporter, James International Ltd., was purchasing 
and exporting produce, and was still operating alongside SLPMB. In 
1989/90, in spite of the fact that more companies received an export 
licence, James International still exported 80 per cent of the total private 
export of coffee and cocoa (Wambia, 1990). As table 6.8 shows, this 
picture changed significantly in the 1991/92 and 1992/93 buying seasons, 
when more Lebanese and African trading companies became involved in 
coffee and cocoa export. 
Table 6.8 Market share in coffee and cocoa of private trading 
companies, 1991/92 and 1992/93 (in percentages) 
Company 
Volcafé Lid. 
F.T. Saad 
James Int. 
Bekfos 
Saad Group 
Saad Brothers 
Dalcon 
Leona 
Frandia 
Coffee: 
1991/92 
75.8 
6.5 
5.3 
-
7.0 
1.9 
3.5 
-
-
1992/93 
23.4 
41.8 
14.6 
2.9 
13.9 
-
-
1.7 
1.7 
Cocoa: 
1991/92 
35.0 
21.6 
23.0 
3.9 
13.1 
3.4 
-
-
-
1992/93 
7.5 
48.0 
27.7 
-
14.5 
-
-
-
2.3 
Source: BSL (1993). 
Table 6.8 also shows however, that the export trade for coffee and cocoa 
is largely dominated by only three or four private companies. Moreover, 
in 1991/92 the coffee sector was even dominated by a single company with 
a market share of approximately 75 per cent. In 1992/93, both the coffee 
and the cocoa sector were dominated by one private company with a 
market share between 40 and 50 per cent. This is an indication that the 
monopoly position of SLPMB in the export of agricultural produce has 
been replaced by an oligopoly position for a few large trading companies. 
According to Hoogvelt (1989), since the beginning of the parastatal 
privatization programme, the import and export trade in Sierra Leone is 
almost entirely in the hands of a small group of about 30 Lebanese, Afro-
Lebanese and Sierra Leonean traders, of whom only a few are seriously 
involved in the export of coffee and cocoa. 'Each large commercial 
operator has organised a network of smaller traders (suppliers and retailers) 
in a way that defies any law or method of free capitalistic enterprise'. 
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Moreover, 'as a group, these commercial operators have achieved 
monopolistic positions in every sector of the economy' (Hoogvelt, 1989, 
p. 83-84). It is questionable as to whether any other traders will have the 
resources to compete with them in future. The limited access of other small 
traders to financial resources further aggravates this situation. So far, as we 
can conclude from table 6.8, only a few large trading companies have 
come to dominate the export of coffee and cocoa since the abolition of the 
SLPMB monopoly. However, it might be premature to draw these 
conclusions considering the short time span since abolition. 
Another major consequence of the end of the state-controlled 
marketing system has been the abolition of officially guaranteed minimum 
producer prices for coffee and cocoa, set by government. Private traders are 
free to determine the price they want to pay to the producers. Although, as 
advised by the World Bank, the producer prices should be at least 60 per 
cent of the f.o.b. price, it soon became clear that not all farmers were being 
paid this price. Although several private trading companies showed us how 
they calculated the producer price at a rate of at least 60 per cent of the 
f.o.b. price, it did not necessarily mean that they did indeed pay that price 
to all farmers, as is shown in chapter 7. Furthermore, as in the days of a 
state-controlled marketing system, the producer prices, as percentages of 
the world market prices, showed significant fluctuations during the buying 
seasons. 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the development of the producer prices as 
percentages of the world market prices for the 1991/92 and 1992/93 buying 
seasons for cocoa and coffee, respectively. Since the privatization of the 
produce trade, we have divided the producer price into a leading producer 
price and a minimum producer price. The leading producer price is the 
highest price the farmers might expect to obtain when selling their produce 
to one of the urban-based private export companies. The minimum 
producer price is the price which should be obtained from the other traders 
without an export licence, also operating in the urban trade centres (see 
also chapter 7). 
As the privatization process of the produce trade had been completed 
just before the start of the 1991/92 buying season, the same fluctuations 
occurred as in the days of the state-controlled produce buying. This was 
especially so at the beginning of the season, when the producer prices are 
relatively low as the traders await new developments in world market 
prices. During the season the producer prices generally increased because 
of increases in world market prices, the competition among the private 
trading companies and the desire among the traders to fulfil the 
requirements of their overseas trading partners. 
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Since the privatization of the produce trade, the parallel market activities 
have almost disappeared. This has meant that the parallel producer prices 
did not differ very much from the official producer prices. In spite of 
increasing producer prices during the buying season which might be, at 
certain moments, even more than 60 per cent of the f.o.b. prices, one needs 
to pose the question whether the traders actually pay these producer prices 
and whether all farmers are in the position to profit from these 
developments. The answer is given in chapter 7. 
6.3.2 New types of traders at the regional level 
Together with the elimination of SLPMB, the concept of Licensed Buying 
Agent also disappeared. This did not mean, however, that the LBAs 
withdrew from produce buying altogether. In the period 1987-1992, most 
of the private and institutional LBAs were already selling part of their 
produce to other private trading companies, who offered better prices or 
were able to provide them with ready cash, more rice supplies and even 
means of transport. Later on, they either became independent produce 
buyers, selling their produce to any private exporter, or they became an 
agent of one of these private companies. Some of the larger private LBAs 
became exporters themselves. 
Another major change in the marketing system occurred when CARE, 
together with the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, started the 
Village Marketing Project. The main goal of this project was to improve 
the marketing conditions of small producers through the development of 
sustainable, farmer-operated, village marketing systems. Subsequent 
objectives were to increase the income of producers and their families, to 
improve their market related knowledge and to promote additional 
production-oriented activities (Molitor and Ghandi, 1987). A pilot project 
was started in 1986. Two storage buildings, the so-called Village Marketing 
Centers, were established in two villages. The intention was that these 
Marketing Centers should function as a central buying point for the 
producers in the neighbourhood of the Center. Later on, by setting up 
marketing committees, the intention was also that the farmers themselves 
would run and operate the Marketing Centers and appoint an agent or 
trader to do the actual produce buying. The aim of the Village Marketing 
Project was to construct a total of 120 Centers in Kenema and Kailahun 
Districts, the main coffee and cocoa producing areas. When the project 
phased out in 1992, 36 Centers had been constructed. However, as we 
outline in chapter 9, most of the Centers experienced difficulties in 
The Marketing System in Sierra Leone 2IS 
organizing the actual purchase of produce and were not operational. 
Although this Village Marketing Project was not so successful in 
achieving its objectives, it formed a major contribution to the extension of 
the trading activities of the newly formed chiefdom-level marketing 
associations that took over the role of NCDB as an institutional LBA. In 
the same year in which CARE started its Village Marketing Project, a new 
type of marketing co-operative was established at the chiefdom level to 
purchase coffee and cocoa from producers. The first marketing co-operative 
to be established was in Nongowa Chiefdom with Kenema as its main 
headquarters. They started officially in 1987 as institutional LBA for 
SLPMB but, just like other private LBAs, in subsequent years they started 
selling part of their produce to a private company who supplied them with 
more cash and vehicles. Finally, in 1993, they began exporting part of their 
produce on their own. Business growth was aided by the take-over of the 
Village Marketing Centers built by CARE. The co-operatives used clerical 
staff to run the Centers, who bought produce on behalf of the co-operative 
and its members. More marketing co-operatives were established in 
Kenema and Kailahun Districts. There are ten co-operatives altogether at 
the chiefdom level, giving farmers more opportunities to sell their produce 
in the villages. 
Since the beginning of the drive to privatize the produce trade, a 
greater diversity of actors can be found operating at village, regional and 
national levels. The demise of the SLPMB and its official, fixed producer 
prices and the subsequent increase in actors appearing on the scene, should 
by all accounts, have resulted in increased competition and higher regional-
level prices. With the introduction of the Marketing Centers there then 
appeared to be many more options for the farmers to sell their produce and 
receive better prices. However, the private LBAs and exporters were found 
to be still using subagents, petty traders and large farmers to perform the 
bulk of their business, and as before, they exercised little control over their 
agents' transactions. 
In the following chapter we analyze the different marketing channels 
that have opened up since 1991, to see whether marketing opportunities for 
producers have indeed been improved and whether the farmers are actually 
able to profit from the increased competition among traders. 
6.3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have given an historical outline of the changes that have 
occurred in the marketing system for coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone 
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since the introduction of these cash crops in the 1920s. Emphasis has been 
placed on changes that have taken place at the national and regional level 
and on the different types of traders involved in the purchase and export 
of cash crops. Beginning with the marketing system during the colonial 
period, it became clear that the purchase and export of agricultural produce 
was largely dominated by the European private trading houses. In the 
1930s and 1940s the European trading houses gradually withdrew from 
produce buying and their role was taken over by national marketing boards. 
This marks the beginning of the period when the trade in coffee and 
cocoa was a state-controlled activity operated by the SLPMB. However, 
private traders, as Licensed Buying Agents, were allowed under certain 
rules to control the purchase of produce at the regional level. Although the 
SLPMB was set up to improve the producers' income from cash crops by 
fixing guaranteed minimum producer prices, the Board's policies failed to 
fulfil that objective. In Sierra Leone, a large part of the revenues from the 
export of produce was not used to the benefit the producers. On the 
contrary, by means of low producer prices, the producers were heavily 
taxed to finance the government's expenditures. Furthermore, the marketing 
board had no control at all over the buying practices of the LBAs, to 
ensure that producers actually received these producer prices. Although 
during this period of state-controlled marketing new types of traders, acting 
as LBAs, emerged at the regional level, no significant changes in the 
marketing channels could be identified. The larger traders became agents 
of SLPMB and continued to use subagents and petty traders to do the 
actual purchase of produce. 
Like most developing countries, Sierra Leone also had to accept the 
conditions imposed upon many debtor countries by the World Bank and the 
IMF under a programme of economic structural adjustment. One of the 
measures to be taken was to limit the influence of parastatal organizations 
and to privatize the marketing of export crops and other goods. The 
monopoly of the state-controlled SLPMB, therefore, disappeared from 1987 
onwards, leading to a complete standstill of all activities of the Board in 
1992. From 1987 onwards, private traders were again allowed to take part, 
not only in the purchase, but also in the export of cash crops. At both the 
national level and regional level, we have seen new types of produce 
traders emerged, such as private trading companies and marketing co-
operatives. At first sight, the involvement of more types of traders seems 
to increase the competition in produce buying and seems to enlarge the 
marketing opportunities for producers. But all these traders, apart from the 
marketing co-operatives, still use the same purchase methods as before. In 
spite of the privatization of the produce trade, it is still questionable 
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whether the fanners actually received the producer prices they were entitled 
to and whether their marketing conditions and opportunities have been 
improved. 
7 
The Marketing System at the Regional Level 
Jos Wanders 
In the previous chapter, we described the marketing system for coffee and 
cocoa in Sierra Leone and the changes that took place under the influence 
of the privatization of the export trade at the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. In this chapter, we concentrate more on the 
functioning of the marketing system for coffee and cocoa at the regional 
level. First of all, we describe the infrastructure of the coffee and cocoa 
producing areas in general and of our research area in the Eastern Province 
in particular. In section 7.2 we give an overview of the different types of 
traders involved in the purchase and sale of coffee and cocoa. Section 7.3 
presents the results of the transactions carried out between the different 
types of traders identified and the producers. 
7.1 The infrastructure in the producing areas 
As we have seen in chapter 4, the cultivation of coffee and cocoa in Sierra 
Leone takes place mainly in the Eastern Province and, in particular, in 
Kailahun District and Kenema District1. The producers of coffee and cocoa 
are mainly small scale farmers who live in villages dispersed over the area. 
The majority of the produce buying companies, however, are concentrated 
in a few urban commercial centres where they can combine their produce 
buying activities with other commercial activities, such as the sale of 
consumer goods. So, a spatial gap exists between the suppliers of coffee 
and cocoa and the purchasers of coffee and cocoa. However, as maps 7.1 
and 7.2 show, since the middle of the 1980s the average distance between 
supplier and purchaser has narrowed. This is mainly due to an increasing 
number of buying stations outside the main urban centres, in smaller towns 
1
 As maps 4.1 and 4.2 show, the farmers who cultivate coffee or cocoa can also 
be found in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone, but the suitability of the soil 
for the cultivation of coffee and cocoa is less compared to larger parts of the 
Eastern Province. 
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and even in villages. Several factors have contributed to this more 
dispersed pattern of buying stations. 
First of all, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in the middle of 
the 1980s, in a period when the purchase of coffee and cocoa was still 
solely controlled by the government, SLPMB developed a policy to spread 
the buying stations more evenly over the coffee and cocoa producing areas. 
Their objective was to enlarge the opportunities of the producers to sell 
their produce directly at the buying stations. However, according to 
Debouillé and Wanders (1987), this policy was not very successful. In 
practice, SLPMB indeed granted more licenses to traders to purchase 
produce, but the majority of them were also based in the main urban 
trading centres and some smaller trading centres. The only significant 
contribution of SLPMB towards a dispersed pattern of buying stations was 
the establishment of several new buying stations, run by its own subsidiary 
NAPCO, outside the main commercial centres2. 
A more significant change in the spatial pattern of buying stations took 
place from 1986 onwards. At that time, the international NGO CARE, in 
co-operation with the Government of Sierra Leone, started the Village 
Marketing Project which led to the establishment of numerous buying 
stations in villages, dispersed mainly over Kailahun and Kenema Districts 
in the Eastern Province. This enabled the farmers to sell their produce in 
their own village or at a shorter distance from their own village. Whether 
the Village Marketing Project was successful in improving the marketing 
opportunities for the producers is discussed in chapter 9. With regard to the 
spatial pattern of buying stations it became clear that, at the beginning of 
the 1990s, more buying stations were established outside the main urban 
trading centres. However, some regions within the coffee and cocoa 
growing areas in the Eastern Province show a higher concentration of 
buying stations than other areas. 
In spite of a more dispersed pattern of buying stations, the distance 
between suppliers and purchasers could still, in some cases, be up to 40 
miles. This means that either party has to travel to make transactions 
possible. This brings us to the distance factor and the demand for transport 
services which play an important role within the marketing infrastructure 
for cash crops. 
1
 In their research in 1986, Debouillé and Wanders (1987) noticed that out of the 
11 NAPCO buying stations, registered as licensed buying agents, only two 
actually purchased produce. Furthermore, four NAPCO buying stations were 
located in urban market centres and three buying stations were established near 
the border with Guinea and Liberia, to prevent smuggling of produce. 
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7.1.1 The road network and transport means 
When we confine ourselves to the transport situation between the main 
urban market centres with their large concentrations of buying stations and 
their hinterland, we may conclude that the only means to convey produce 
is by road. The coffee and cocoa growing areas are intersected by several 
rivers, but these are only suitable for small canoes, which can convey only 
small amounts of produce. Rail travel is now no longer possible, though 
the Eastern Province was once linked to the country's railway network. The 
railway was built in 1895 and was originally intended as a means of 
opening up Sierra Leone, to facilitate the transport of tropical products 
from the interior to Europe. The Eastern Province was joined to the railway 
in 1908, and the linkage definitely contributed to the social and economic 
well-being of the region. However, the Stevens regime decided to close 
down the railway in 1971 as by then expenditure was exceeding revenue 
(Kaindaneh, 1993). The railway only linked a few urban towns, and could 
only transport goods in bulk. It was unable to compete with road transport, 
which could reach many more towns and villages and convey more goods 
and passengers3. 
Maps 7.3 and 7.4 show the road network in the Eastern Province and 
in our research area. Although one might conclude from the pattern of 
roads on the maps that the region is quite accessible, a closer look at the 
types, condition and maintenance of the roads shows that the road 
transportation system is still poorly developed and transportation costs are 
relatively high. Only one tarred road leads from Kenema, the provincial 
capital, to Freetown. Only this road can be used to evacuate produce from 
the coffee and cocoa producing areas to Freetown, where it can be shipped 
abroad. However, due to the high maintenance costs of the tarred roads, the 
Freetown-Kenema highway has numerous potholes, which increase the 
transport time considerably. It leads to many vehicle breakdowns and 
consequently, high operating costs. Sometimes, especially in the rainy 
season, the flow of traffic is disrupted for several days. However, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, a large road improvement programme, financed by 
the European Union, is on its way to improving the one and only highway 
3
 Originally, the road network developed as a complementary system of secondary 
and tertiary roads serving the railway. In the 1960s, together with the phasing 
out of the railway, the main primary roads were widened and paved and became 
independent of the railway network (Kaindaneh, 1993). 
The Marketing System at Regional Level 223 
W* Hlvrf 
Main riven 
Main roads (latente) 
Main roads (surfaced) 
miks 
50 
I 
Π 
30 
Map 7.3 The road network in the Eastern Province, Sierra Leone 
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connecting Freetown with the main provincial capitals in the northern, 
eastern and southern parts of the country. The majority of the roads are 
latérite ones, characterized by deep gullies, steep hills, dangerous curves, 
narrow palm tree bridges and ferry crossings. They suffer from increased 
surface deterioration due to the action of wind and water and lack of 
maintenance. On some parts of the laterite roads, remains of the tarmac 
surfaces laid in the 1960s can still be seen. However, because of 
Government neglect of road infrastructure maintenance, the tarmac has 
gradually been replaced by laterite, causing great inconvenience to 
passengers and vehicles alike. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the government financed the 
construction of feeder roads connecting isolated villages and productive 
agricultural areas to the highway or other main roads. The programme was 
based on the principle of self-help, in which the villagers took the matter 
into their own hands to solve these communication problems. An extra 
incentive was given by CARE who constructed and improved about 425 
miles of feeder roads between 1974 and 1977 (Kaindaneh, 1993). 
Unfortunately, lack of maintenance by both the government and the 
villagers, led to the condition of these feeder roads gradually becoming 
worse and in some parts inaccessible to vehicles. 
In spite of the construction of feeder roads and the improvement of the 
highway, many villages and parts of the coffee and cocoa producing areas 
still remain inaccessible to vehicles and can only be reached on foot, using 
bushpaths. This brings us to the issue of the types of transport available to 
coffee and cocoa producers and buyers. From the producers' perspective, 
the transport opportunities consist of either headloading, using public 
transport or a combination of both. The inhabitants of the villages that can 
only be reached by bushpaths, have no other option than to carry their 
loads on their heads, to either the nearest motorable road or even to the 
nearest buying station. Several studies have advocated that the maximum 
distance a farmer should headload, in order to reach a buying station, 
should be no more than five miles (Abbott and Creupelandt, 1966; Bolder 
et al. 1979; Dawson, 1979, and Peperkamp 1984). This would imply that 
buying stations or motorable roads should be within a radius of five miles 
from every village. In villages where this is not the case (see Appendix 
7.1), this means that the farmer is forced to sell to an intermediary in his 
own village or in a nearby village. In reality, however, when observing the 
location of transactions involving the respondents in our survey, the 
farmers did not seem to follow this pattern. 
Table 7.1 shows that in the 1989/90 produce buying season, 192 or 43 
per cent of all transactions for both coffee and cocoa took place outside the 
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255 
196 
451 
village. Within this category, in 78 cases, farmers either decided to 
headload their produce to a certain location where they could join another 
means of transport or they decided to headload the whole route to the 
trader of their choice. It appeared that in 43 cases (55 per cent) the farmer, 
sometimes with the help of relatives, headloaded more than five miles. 
Table 7.1 Transactions of respondents by location and crop for the 
1989/90 and 1991/92 buying seasons 
Outside 
Buying season Village village Total 
abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. 
1989/90 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Total 
1991/92 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Total 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
In the 1991/92 produce buying season, 283 or 47 per cent of all 
transactions for both coffee and cocoa took place outside the village. 
Within this category, in 173 cases, farmers decided to headload their 
produce partly or completely to their final destination. It appeared that, 
still, in 64 cases (37 per cent) the farmers and their relatives headloaded 
more than five miles. So, compared to the 1989/90 buying season, fewer 
farmers seemed to have headloaded their produce for more than five miles. 
This is mainly explained by the fact that in the 1991/92 buying season 
more villages were included in our research. Several of these new villages 
were within a five miles range of a buying centre or Village Marketing 
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Center4. We can still conclude that it is not exceptional to find farmers 
headloading their produce for more than 5 miles or sometimes even up to 
20 miles, in order to reach a buying station. Apart from the lack of money 
to pay for public transport, they also decide to headload because they can 
make use of cheap labour offered by their sons or young relatives. In the 
1989/90 buying season, out of the 79 farmers who decided to headload 
their produce, 19 (24 per cent) headloaded without any help. The remaining 
60 farmers (75 per cent) were helped by their wives, sons or other 
relatives, for only small remunerations. Twelve farmers (15 per cent) 
received or demanded free help from their wives or children. In the 
1991/92 buying season, 22 (13 per cent) out of the 173 farmers who 
decided to headload their produce, headloaded without any help. The 
remaining 151 (87 per cent) received help from their wives, children, other 
relatives or Koranic students from the local Islamic schools. Twenty five 
per cent of the farmers received or demanded free help from their wives 
and children. 
Another transport opportunity for the producers to reach the buying 
stations is offered by the public transport system. Public transport services 
consist mainly of the so-called poda-podas. These are lorries originally 
designed for transporting all kinds of goods. Most of them have been 
adapted to carry passengers as well, by fixing some wooden benches in the 
lorry. The poda-podas travel from the main commercial urban centres to 
the smaller towns or to smaller trading places, mining areas or other places 
of economic importance. In general, they travel on the main and secondary 
roads, and stop in all the villages on their way, dropping passengers and 
goods and taking on new customers. Often, the poda-podas are piled up 
with goods, and the next passenger is squeezed in with up to 40 other 
people. There is no regular time table for their arrival and departure. 
Generally, the lorries only depart when they are full. Furthermore, 
travelling time may vary because of frequent break downs, lack of spare 
parts and impassable roads during the rainy season. Most poda-podas are 
imported second hand mini-trucks or mini-buses, which are not suited to 
travel on laterite and eroded roads full of rocks, gullies and muddy river 
crossings. As a consequence, transport prices for passengers, as well as for 
goods, vary not only with distance, but also with different road conditions 
4
 Especially our research areas in Nongowa Chiefdom and Kandu Leppiama 
Chiefdom are characterized by a relatively high concentration of Village 
Marketing Centers within relatively short distance of the selected villages. 
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or changing road conditions in the rainy season3. For example, the price 
for transporting a bag of coffee or cocoa by public transport from Kenema 
to Freetown on the highway for 200 miles, is the same or even less than 
the price paid to convey the same quantity of produce from a village to 
Kenema, on a laterite road covering about 20 miles (several traders, 
persona] communications, 1993). 
Another factor influencing transport prices is the availability of petrol. 
In the 1980s, Sierra Leone witnessed several periods of severe petrol 
shortages. The lack of oil paralysed economic activities and led to the 
hoarding of petrol and soaring transport prices. In the 1990s, with the help 
of loans from the World Bank, IMF and EU, the government of Sierra 
Leone was able to purchase enough oil and could stabilize the petrol prices. 
Since then, prices have only been influenced by inflationary pressure. 
During the 1990/91 and 1992/93 coffee and cocoa buying seasons, we 
observed slight increases in petrol prices, which were a consequence of the 
devaluation of the Leone (see Appendix 7.3). 
More interesting is the fact that we observed significant differences in 
transport prices in our research area. During the 1989/90 buying season we 
were able to collect information on the costs of conveying produce by 
public transport for 104 transactions. After converting the transport costs 
into the costs per mile for one bag of produce, it appeared that the 
transport prices for a bag of cocoa varied considerably between 8 and 75 
Leones per mile. For a bag of clean coffee, transport prices varied from 12 
to 55 Leones per mile. For the 1991/92 buying season, we obtained 
transport price information for 89 transactions. For both a bag of cocoa and 
a bag of clean coffee prices varied considerably between 30 and 200 
Leones per mile. This variation can be partly explained by the differences 
in road conditions and the time of the year when public transport is 
available. 
Because of the non-existence of a governmental pricing policy for 
public transport at the regional level, it appeared, however, that pubUc 
transport prices varied considerably between transport routes with the same 
road conditions and distances. In several villages we visited it occurred that 
3
 The start of the buying season for cocoa in September coincides with the end 
of the rainy season, which means that some laterite roads are almost impassable. 
Transport owners often avoid these routes or charge higher prices to convey 
produce. 
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different farmers paid different prices to convey a bag of produce6. 
Furthermore, we found that transport owners charged the same price per 
bag, irrespective of whether the bag of produce was completely full or half 
empty. This, of course, disadvantaged farmers with half full bags or smaller 
bags7. Based on explanations given by the farmers we interviewed, it 
appeared that on some transport routes only one or two transport owners, 
coming from one of the adjacent villages, offered transport services, while 
on similar other routes the number of poda-podas owned by different 
transport owners was much higher. In the first case, transport owners had 
more or less a monopoly position in transport services, which led to 
considerably higher prices compared to the latter situation. These 
oligopolistic characteristics of the transport market have also been 
mentioned by Borren (1986) for the regional rice trade in the Northern 
Province of Sierra Leone and Leighton (1992) with regard to the 
interregional transport of bulky goods. Debouillé and Wanders (1987) 
discovered that in some villages, situated on smaller, less accessible roads, 
drivers or transport owners made arrangements with the local authorities 
to be the sole provider of transport for carrying goods and passengers. 
However, in our research area we did not observe this phenomenon. Still, 
in one remote village, although situated on a feeder road and accessible to 
poda-podas and trucks, it appeared that only one vehicle came to the 
village daily, stayed for the night and drove back the following day to 
Blama, the nearest commercial centre. The vehicle was owned by the 
largest trader in the area, who came from that particular village. In Dama 
Chiefdom we also discovered that only two transport owners were covering 
one particular route. Both transport owners were apparently born and raised 
in that same area. 
So, in general, even on one particular transport route, transport prices 
could vary, as the establishment of transport prices is always the result of 
For example, in Madina, situated on a minor road 17.5 miles from Kcncma, the 
fanners paid from Le 1,600 to Le 3,000 per bag of cocoa during one buying 
season. For a bag of clean coffee, these prices varied from Le 1,200 to Le 
2,400. Because a bag of coffee weighs more than a bag of cocoa, one would 
expect lower transport prices for cocoa. However, because the evacuation of 
cocoa coincides with the end of the rainy season, the roads are muddy and 
vehicles have problems in getting through. Consequently, drivers increase the 
transport fares. 
For example, in the village of Tewo, situated on a main road 12 miles from 
(Cenema, most farmers paid Le 400 per bag of clean coffee. However, those who 
had only half a bag of produce paid the same price. 
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bargaining between passenger and driver. In this respect, the price is not 
only determined by oligopolistic market forces, but also by the type of 
social relation that exists between driver or transport owner and passenger. 
In some cases, it appeared that passengers, who were in one way or 
another, related to the driver or transport owner, paid nothing or far less 
than other passengers. In other cases, passenger and driver became 
customers or were friends, which led to discounts on the transport fares. 
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the not unusual financial 
agreement that exists between several traders in the urban trading centres 
and transport owners, whereby the vehicles stop in front of the traders' 
warehouses, in order to attract the producers to their shop. As we see in 
chapter 8, a large number of farmers mentioned that they sold their produce 
to a particular trader because the vehicle stopped in front of that shop and 
the shop boys just grabbed the produce and brought it to the store. 
So far, we have seen that producers can either headload their produce 
to a buying station or make use of public transport in the form of poda-
podas. The traders on the other hand have additional, regional level 
transport facilities at their disposal. Several regional wholesalers not only 
purchased produce at their buying stations, but also sent their trucks to 
those villages, situated on good accessible roads, to purchase produce. 
Sometimes, these traders could bring the producer and his produce to the 
urban trading centres, to carry out the business at his buying station. 
Normally, they only sent out their trucks to villages where farmers could 
offer large amounts of produce and had been customers in previous years. 
In some cases, when suppliers or customers inform the regional wholesalers 
that they have large quantities of produce for sale, the trader might be 
willing to send out his truck to collect the produce. Some petty traders and 
local merchants (see section 7.2) travel through the area on a motor-bike 
or on a bicycle, to carry out business in the villages. Sometimes they travel 
on foot, accompanied by young family members, to purchase produce and 
to headload the produce to a buying station. The latter group of traders will 
try to reach those areas which are not normally visited by the larger 
traders. 
In the 1980s, during the period of state-controlled produce marketing, 
the most common way of transporting produce was by headloading, the use 
of the poda-poda or a combination of both and, to a lesser extent, large 
scale traders sending their trucks to collect produce in the villages on the 
main roads. However, at the end of the 1980s, after the privatization of the 
marketing of produce, some of the large traders became private exporters. 
Mindful of the competition for produce and their obligations to overseas 
buyers, these traders introduced a variety of pick-up trucks to their routes, 
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to collect produce from the villages. Table 7.2 shows the pattern of 
produce transportation in our research area for both the 1989/90 and 
1991/92 buying season. It also shows that more farmers decided to 
headload in 1991/92 than in 1989/90. However, as explained in chapter 1, 
more villages in other chiefdoms were included in our research in 1992/93. 
Within this new research population, more villages were included that were 
situated at a short distance from a buying centre or a Village Marketing 
Center. 
Table 7.2 Transactions outside the villages, classified by means of 
transport, 1989/90 and 1991/92 
Means of transport Buying season Buying season 
1989/90 1991/92 
abs. (in %) abs. (in %) 
Poda-poda 
Headloading 
Both headloading and poda 
Traders sent vehicle 
Others' 
No idea (sold by relatives) 
Total 
-poda 
82 
39 
38 
23 
4 
6 
192 
(42.7) 
(20.3) 
(19.8) 
(12.0) 
(2.1) 
(3.1) 
56 
129 
49 
32 
9 
8 
283 
(19.8) 
(45.6) 
(17.3) 
(11.3) 
(3.2) 
(2.8) 
This category contains several means used by producers, such as hiring a poda-
poda or asking relatives or friends to send their car to help them. In the 1991/92 
buying season, we observed that some producers made use of the presence of 
trucks from relief and development agencies, and even army trucks were used as 
a safe way of conveying produce. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
This, of course, enabled farmers to headload their produce to that particular 
buying centre. 
Therefore, in order to find out whether any significant changes in the 
choice of transport means have occurred between the 1989/90 and 1991/92 
buying seasons, we compare those villages which have been included in 
our research in both periods. Table 7.3 shows that, between 1989/90 and 
1991/92, very little changed in the pattern of the location of a transaction. 
Slightly more transactions took place inside a village, although the 
percentage of transactions that took place outside the village was 
increasing. 
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Table 7.4 shows the transport use for 11 villages in Dama and Koya 
Chief dom in the 1989/90 and 1991/92 buying season. 
Table 13 The location of transactions in Dama and Koya Chiefdom, 
1989/90 and 1991/92 
Buying season Village 
abs. (in %) 
Outside 
village 
abs. (in 
Total 
abs. 
1989/90 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Total 
97 
66 
163 
(59.9) 
(52.4) 
(56.6) 
65 
60 
125 
(40.1) 
(47.6) 
(43.4) 
162 
126 
288 
1991/92 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Total 
70 (52.2) 
41 (58.6) 
111 (54.4) 
64 
29 
93 
(47.8) 
(41.4) 
(45.6) 
134 
70 
204 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Table 7.4 The means of transport used by producers in Dama and Koya 
Chief dom for transactions outside the villages, 1989/90 and 
1991/92 
Means of transport Buying season 
1989/90 
abs. (in %) 
Buying season 
1991/92 
abs. (in %) 
Poda-poda 
Headloading 
Both headloading and poda-poda 
Traders sent vehicle 
Others 
No idea 
Total 
46 
27 
27 
21 
1 
3 
125 
(36.8) 
(21.6) 
(21.6) 
(16.8) 
(0.8) 
(2.4) 
29 
15 
31 
8 
7 
3 
93 
(31.2) 
(16.1) 
(33.3) 
(86) 
(7.6) 
(3.2) 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
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From this table we can conclude that between 1989/90 and 1991/92, no 
major changes occurred in the type of transport used by producers. 
Nevertheless, two remarks can be made. First, it seems as if farmers 
are considering a more economic use of transport by partly headloading 
and partly taking the poda-poda instead of only headloading or using the 
poda-poda Second, it appears that, in the 1991/92 buying season, traders 
did not send their trucks to the villages as often as they did in the 1989/90 
season. 
This is the opposite of what would be expected to happen, given the 
increased competition and scramble for produce among the traders. 
However, because of security problems outside the main urban trading 
centres in some parts of the crop-producing areas since 1991, private 
exporters lost some of their trucks. Therefore they decided to use their 
remaining trucks less often. 
Generally, we can conclude that no major changes have occurred in 
the location of transactions and the means of transport used by the 
producers between the 1989/90 and 1991/92 buying seasons. Still, transport 
opportunities and transport constraints have a serious impact on the 
farmers' choice where and to whom he should sell his produce. To assess 
this impact, we describe the method we used to express the relative 
distance between the buying stations and the villages, taking into account 
not only the absolute distance, but also the condition of roads and the 
availability and frequency of all types of transport. 
7.1.2 The accessibility of villages 
As has been mentioned earlier, the accessibility of villages or buying 
stations is determined by a combination of absolute distance, the condition 
of the roads connecting the villages with the buying stations, and the 
availability and frequency of transport. Map 7.5 shows the selected villages 
in our research areas, the locations of the most important buying stations 
and it indicates the several types of roads that can be found in this 
particular region. 
The following four types of roads are to be found in our research area. The 
main roads are either the asphalted highway leading from Kenema to 
Freetown, or the broad laterite and partly tarred roads connecting the main 
urban centres in the region. The majority of these roads are graded from 
time to time and are fairly accessible for all types of vehicles. 
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Public transport (poda-podas) cover these routes many times a day'. 
Secondary roads are latérite roads branching off the main routes. They 
are not as broad as the main roads but are still accessible to all types of 
motorized transport. However, although some of them are fairly well 
graded and in good condition, there are others that are barely maintaineand 
show many impassable spots, such as steep rocky hills, deep gullies and 
rotten palm tree bridges. 
In the rainy season, several secondary roads are impassable for 
vehicles. Less public transport covers these routes, perhaps only several 
times per week during the dry season and very seldom in the rainy season, 
depending on the demand for produce and supply of goods. The frequency 
of public transport on less accessible secondary roads is even lower and in 
the rainy season virtually nil. 
Minor roads are small tracks branching off either the main roads or 
secondary roads and are only accessible for smaller vehicles and motor-
bikes. These roads are poorly maintained and sometimes overtaken by bush 
growth. The majority of them are impassable in the rainy season. Public 
transport or smaller traders' vehicles can only be found on these roads on 
request or chartered by the villagers. During the harvesting seasons for 
coffee and cocoa in 1990/91 and 1992/93, we observed hardly any traffic 
on the minor roads, except for bicycles and motor bikes. 
The last type of road is the bushpath. These foottracks are the often 
only way to reach certain villages. They are not accessible for any type of 
transport except for people travelling on foot and headloading their goods. 
To summarize, based on the available means of transportation and on the 
road condition, one can differentiate the villages broadly into four 
categories. The first group consists of villages situated on the main road or 
on a secondary road, along which public transport is available daily at 
regular intervals. The second group consists of villages situated on a 
secondary road, along which public transport is available at irregular 
intervals but at least once a week. The third group comprises villages 
8
 During our research in the 1990/91 and 1992/1993 buying seasons, the main 
road leading from Blama to Boajibu was in a bad condition. In the rainy season 
especially, several parts of the road, often near bridges and on lower elevations, 
were impassable for vehicles and motor bikes. Passengers travelling with the 
poda-poda had to stop at these places, walk through the mud or the water and 
board another poda-poda at the other side of the trouble spot. Several people 
offered their services to headload produce or used bicycles or motor bikes to 
come to the other side of the road, for considerable remuneration. 
236 Who Pays the Price? 
situated on minor roads, where farmers have to make arrangements with 
public transport owners or with traders to come and collect their produce 
during the harvesting season. The last group comprises villages situated on 
minor roads or on bushpaths, which are not accessible for public transport 
or other vehicles, and which can only be reached on foot. 
When considering the absolute distance between the villages and the 
nearest buying stations in the urban commercial centres, the 34 selected 
villages were located at distances ranging from 4.5 to 32 miles. In order to 
measure the absolute distance from a village to the nearest urban trading 
centre, we need to take the following aspects into consideration. The 
absolute distance can be measured by taking into account the distance by 
road from a particular village to the nearest urban buying station. However, 
numerous villages have more than one route to the nearest urban buying 
station, for example, travelling on foot through the bush. In this respect, the 
absolute distance is often shorter. In 12 villages it became clear that 
producers took more than one specific route to an urban buying station. 
The villagers did not always take the shortest route. Moreover, it appeared 
that in seven villages some farmers did not even go to the nearest urban 
trading centre but opted for other places further away, for several different 
reasons. The farmers' decision where to sell his produce and what route to 
take is not only determined by absolute distance but also by criteria such 
as the amount of produce he has to convey, his financial means, the 
available time and labour to headload, the availability and frequency of 
transport, the expectation he has as where to obtain the highest price, and 
the credit or social relations he has with a particular trader. 
To give these criteria consideration we not only measured the absolute 
distance, but also attempted to value the relative distance between a village 
and an urban trading centre. Appendix 7.1 gives an overview of the 
composition and absolute distances of the routes used by the villagers to 
reach their preferred urban buying stations. Furthermore Appendix 7.1 
indicates the availability and frequency of public transport, traders' vehicles 
and private cars entering the selected villages. To measure the relative 
distance between the selected villages and the urban buying stations and to 
group the villages into categories of accessibility, we also took into account 
the condition of the roads and the frequency and availability of public 
transport. 
Using the data from Appendix 7.1 we calculated the relative distances 
for the most common routes between each village and the urban buying 
station. This was achieved by multiplying absolute distance by factor 1 for 
main roads, secondary roads and minor roads with frequent public 
transport; by factor 2 for minor roads only used occasionally, and by factor 
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3 for bushpaths and minor roads inaccessible to vehicles. The results are 
presented in Appendix 7.2 and show both the absolute and relative 
distances of the selected villages from the nearest urban buying station, and 
we have assumed that the farmers would take the most common route to 
the nearest urban buying station. 
Using Appendices 7.1 and 7.2, we classified the 34 selected villages 
into three categories of accessibility, as shown in table 7.5. Although these 
categories seem arbitrarily chosen, they are partly based on Peperkamp 
(1984). He assumed that producers should cover no more than ten miles by 
public transport because transport costs would otherwise limit the farmers' 
ability to reach a buying station. However, in our research area, farmers 
covered more than ten miles by public transport to reach a buying station. 
Table 7.5 Classification of the 34 selected villages according to their 
accessibility" 
High accessibility 
Jovohun 
Joyomie"" 
Barveh" 
Saama 
Saliema" 
Gandorhun 
Kpeima 
Kuranko*" 
Medium accessibility 
Gama 
Tewo 
Mano-Kotehun" 
Siama 
Potehun"* 
Yibaima 
Gbeowobu 
Baoma 
Masahun 
Majihun 
Dia" 
Yoni 
Patama 
Periwama 
Low accessibility 
Bandah 
Ngelahun*" 
Joi 
Nyandehun 
Bogboabu 
Bangoma 
Gangama 
Lilema 
Serabu 
Gorahun 
Segbwema 
Jaluahun" 
The first category of high accessibility represents the villages which are within a 
relative distance ranging from 0 to 10. The second category of medium 
accessibility represents the villages which are within a relative distance ranging 
from 10 to 20. The last category of low accessibility represents villages whose 
relative distance is more than 20. 
Village within a range of less than ten absolute miles of a functioning Village 
Marketing Center or co-operative subcentre. 
Villages with a functioning Village Marketing Center or co-operative subcentre. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
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For the costs farmers had to pay for a poda-poda, we were able to calculate 
the producers' transport costs as a percentage of the revenues for 85 
transactions. The results in table 7.6 show that the transport costs can vary 
widely within the different categories of village accessibility. This suggests 
that transport cost do not only increase because of decreasing accessibility 
of a buying station. As mentioned before, the social relations and the 
power of transport owners in the producing areas also determine the 
transport costs the producers have to bear when selling their produce 
outside their village. 
Furthermore, we were able to calculate the producers' transport costs 
as a percentage of their revenues for 52 transactions where they decided to 
headload their produce to a buying station. It appeared that the headloading 
costs did not exceed 5 per cent of the revenues for 41 transactions. The 
remaining 11 transactions showed headloading costs varying between 5 and 
10 per cent of the revenues. Where the agents sent their trucks to the 
villages, we could only obtain information about the costs charged by that 
particular trader for 9 transactions. The transport costs were less than 10 
per cent of the revenues in 8 out of 9 transactions. 
Table 7.6 Transport costs as percentage of revenues for 85 transactions, 
1990/91-1992/93 
Buying season Accessibility of villages 
high medium low 
1990/91 n.a.' 5-25 10-30 
1991/92 n.a.' 5-25 9-33 
1992/93 9-13 5-27 11-30 
Within this particular category of villages no information could be obtained about 
received producer prices and paid transport costs. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
In spite of the varying transport prices in the different accessibility 
categories, we use the classification of villages according to their 
accessibility, to determine whether the majority of producers, with 
increasing distance from the buying stations, were limited in their choice 
of trader or not. 
So far, we have not included the Village Marketing Centers (see map 
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7.2), as buying stations which might influence the farmers' choice as where 
to sell their produce. At the time of our research, it appeared that out of the 
13 Village Marketing Centers in our research area, only five where actually 
purchasing produce. Moreover, the majority of the functioning Village 
Marketing Centers were in Nongowa Chiefdom within a short distance of 
five selected villages. We have indicated in table 7.5 those villages situated 
within a 10 mile range of a Village Marketing Center. We have used this 
information in chapter 8 to assess the influence a Village Marketing Center 
has on producer selling choices. 
To conclude, the transport system in Sierra Leone is poorly developed. 
Roads are of poor quality and some are inaccessible during the rainy 
season. Public transport and other motorized means of transport are only 
frequently available on the main roads. Transport prices vary not only with 
distance, but also with the quality of the road and the number of transport 
owners covering that particular road. A large number of villages are not 
accessible to any transport. Transport infrastructure varies from village to 
village and varies for each producer, and his choices depend on his own 
financial and labour resources available to convey his produce. Using a 
classification of the selected villages classed according to their 
accessibility, we describe in chapter 8 to what extent the distance to a 
buying station and the availability of transport means influences the 
farmers' choice where and to whom he sells his produce. 
12 The produce traders 
In section 6.3, we briefly described the various actors involved in produce 
buying when SLPMB controlled the purchase and export of agricultural 
produce. We also mentioned the changes that took place with respect to the 
variety and number of trading channels to be found during the period of 
transition from a state-controlled to a deregulated marketing system in 
Sierra Leone. In this section, we describe in detail the different traders 
involved in the coffee and cocoa trade from 1990/91 until 1993/94. 
We can classify the local and regional level traders into three broad 
categories according to the size and geographical scale of their operations. 
The first group consists of regional wholesalers. They operate from their 
main stores in the regional urban centres and cover large parts of the crop-
producing areas. The second group consists of local merchants, the 
majority of whom are agents of wholesalers. They operate from their 
smaller stores or shops in the urban centres or in the smaller towns of the 
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producing areas. Generally, their produce trading activities are prefinanced 
by the regional wholesalers. The largest group consists of small scale, 
itinerant petty traders. In general, they operate independently at the local 
level and their size of produce buying is limited. It depends either on the 
amount of money they wish to invest in produce buying or the prefinance 
they are able to obtain from local merchants or regional wholesalers. 
Of course, a clear distinction between these groups can not be made 
and in all three categories one can discover exceptions of all kinds. Based 
on interviews conducted among 101 traders in 1992/93 and information 
obtained during village meetings and interviews with producers, we 
describe in the following sections, the main characteristics of the different 
types of traders identified9. Special attention is paid to how they have 
organised their produce buying activities and what kind of trade relations 
they have with the suppliers of produce. 
7.2.1 The regional wholesalers 
Regional wholesalers can be, broadly speaking, divided into two groups: 
those who have an export licence, the private exporters, and those 
wholesalers who do not and therefore, sell their purchased produce to 
private exporters. 
The private exporters 
As we have seen in chapter 6, after the privatization of cash crop 
marketing, several trading companies obtained export licences. Some of 
them had already been active in produce buying as Licensed Buying 
Agents of SLPMB. Others entered into the coffee and cocoa trade after the 
monopoly of SLPMB had begun to diminish. 
The group of private exporters is very small. Although about 10 to 15 
trading companies have been registered as private exporters, only a few are 
actually purchasing and exporting produce10. The main private exporters 
are two Lebanese, one Swiss and one Sierra Leonean trading company. 
Apart from these main private exporters, the Eastern Farmers Union 
deserves mention as the only private exporter to start exporting coffee and 
9
 During the buying season 1992/93 we interviewed 8 private exporters, 21 
regional wholesalers, 21 local merchants and 51 petty traders. 
10
 Some registered private exporters even sell their produce to other private 
exporters, because they lacked purchasing capital to gather the requested amount 
of produce demanded by overseas trading partners. 
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cocoa on behalf of its members in 1992. Except for the Swiss company, 
which is only engaged in the purchase and export of coffee and cocoa, all 
private exporters are, to a lesser or greater extent, involved in other 
commercial activities, varying from the import and retail of consumer 
goods and rice, the export of small scale industrial products and 
agricultural produce, to diamond mining operations. Although most private 
exporters have their main offices in Freetown, the actual produce buying 
takes place at their buying stations in the regional commercial centres. The 
bulk of produce purchase takes place at these warehouses, which have 
several platform scales to weigh the produce, concrete drying floors to dry 
or clean the produce and have large storage capacity. The produce is then 
transported to their stores near the port of Freetown. Produce is bought 
either from agents whom they have prefinanced, from independent regional 
wholesalers or from individual producers who can offer at least one or two 
bags of produce". Private exporters often use trucks to be sent out to the 
smaller towns or villages to purchase as much produce as possible. 
As we have learnt from table 6.8, the internal market for coffee and 
cocoa in Sierra Leone is for a large part in the hands of the four above-
mentioned private companies and the top ranking for market share has 
changed frequently among these companies since the privatization of cash 
crop marketing. Right at the beginning James International had the largest 
market share, but by the 1992/93 buying season F.T. Saad, one of the 
Lebanese private exporters had a market share of over 50 per cent. 
Various factors determine the extent of the traders' purchasing 
activities. These include: seasonal climatic variations, which can affect 
annual coffee and cocoa production levels; the amount of capital at their 
disposal and the number of agents they are able to prefinance with cash or 
rice, to purchase on their behalf. The rebel hostilities also caused many 
traders to confine their activities to those areas not yet affected by fighting. 
A rough estimate puts total coffee and cocoa production down by 50 per 
cent from 1991/92. Since then purchase figures per private exporter have 
varied between 30 and 1,000 tons for coffee and between 30 and 1,100 
tons for cocoa (several private exporters, personal communications, 
1992/93). 
The largest four private exporters can be described as follows. James 
11
 In one of our tests to find out what prices are paid for coffee or cocoa in the 
buying season 1992/93, F.T. Saad, the largest private exporter and retailer in 
Kenema, refused to purchase an amount of 20 pounds of cocoa because it was 
too small. 
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International uses warehouses in Freetown, three main branches and several 
transit stores, all equipped with platform scales, storage facilities and 
drying floors. Furthermore, to attract as much business as possible, the 
company lent or assigned mini-trucks, equipped with hanging scales, to its 
agents purchasing produce at the local level. The agents signed a contract 
and were prefinanced with cash and rice. They did not receive commissions 
but were informed only of the price James International would pay for their 
produce. It was left to the agents to make their own price arrangements 
with the producers. The transport costs and maintenance of the vehicles 
were the agent's responsibility. The agents in their turn, charged the 
producers for the transport costs involved conveying the produce to the 
main buying stations. In the 1992/93 season, James International had 29 
agents with a maximum of one million Leones (approximately US Dollars 
2,000) revolving prefinance per agent. There were fewer agents than in 
previous years, as James International lost several agents during the rebel 
incursion in Kailahun District in 1991. Moreover, in the 1990s, James 
International had difficulties obtaining enough cash from the banks to pay 
its agents and producers at the moment of transaction. As a consequence, 
several agents started to sell their produce to other private exporters or 
regional wholesalers who did have enough ready cash. Furthermore, losses 
incurred during the rebel war, forced James International to stop supplying 
its agents with rice to credit producers in exchange for the sale of produce. 
This led also to a reduction in the amount of produce purchased by its 
agents. So, although at its start in 1988 James International took a major 
lead in produce buying, by introducing the small pick-up trucks, its success 
diminished in later years. The Russian-made vehicles suffered maintenance 
problems and there was a shortage of spare parts. Moreover, it appeared 
that many agents abused the vehicles using them for their own transport 
business, such as carrying firewood. In 1993 all vehicles were recalled and 
only allocated to an agent for specific trips on request. 
The Swiss company Volcafé started purchasing produce in the 1991/92 
buying season. Before then, it had been prefinancing PACC, a Liberian-led 
trading company. Accusations that PACC was supporting rebels who were 
invading Sierra Leone from Liberia, by smuggling weapons hidden between 
bags of produce, finally forced Volcafé to end its relationship with PACC. 
Instead it started its own trading company. At that time (August 1991) the 
world market prices were promising and budgeted calculations showed a 
reasonable profit potential (Volcafé, personal communications, 1992). The 
company opened one main store in Kenema and three sub-stations in other 
towns. It contracted regional wholesalers or local merchants who were 
already involved in produce buying and had some storage capacity. These 
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agents were prefinanced with cash, rice, flour, salt and other consumer 
goods needed by the rural population. They received a commission per ton 
of produce purchased and Volcafé took care of the transport from their 
stores to the main buying store in Kenema. Although Volcafé instructed its 
agents as to the producer prices they should pay, it did not bother to check 
the prices these agents were actually paying. At the local level, the agents 
of Volcafé had to arrange the transportation and evacuation of produce 
themselves. Volcafé did not own trucks, but hired vehicles to convey the 
produce either to its main store or warehouse in Freetown. Volcafé also 
bought large amounts of produce from regional wholesalers to meet 
shipment targets. There is always severe competition towards the end of a 
buying season for either coffee or cocoa, to attract as much produce as 
possible from the regional wholesalers, and as we will see in the next 
section, regional prices for coffee and cocoa tend to increase significantly 
at the end of each buying season. 
Like James International, the amount of produce purchased by Volcafé, 
diminished in the 1992/93 buying season. This was not only caused by the 
rebel incursion but also because of problems with its agents. In its second 
year of operation, Volcafé reduced the number of agents because of loan 
defaults and the inability of agents to purchase enough produce (Volcafé, 
personal communications, 1993). 
The third large private exporter is the Saad Group. Since the beginning 
of the trade liberalization, this Lebanese trading company has been one of 
the main importers and retailers of rice, flour, sugar, oil, cement, and other 
commodities. In a bid to expand its trading activities and increase its 
supply of hard currency, used to buy rice on the world market, the Saad 
Group began purchasing coffee and cocoa in the 1991/92 buying season. 
The actual produce purchase was done by three regional Lebanese 
wholesalers who had been involved in produce buying since colonial times. 
The Saad Group prefinances them solely with large amounts of rice. 
Because of the wholesalers' experience in produce buying, the Saad Group 
do not interfere at all in their produce buying activities. The Saad Group 
only takes care of the supply of rice at their stores in Kenema and buys 
their produce at its warehouse in Freetown. The agents handled the 
evacuation of the produce to Freetown in exchange for a transport 
allowance. The Saad Group informs them of the price they would receive 
for their produce and does not interfere or control price arrangements 
between their agents and customers. 
At the time of our study, the largest private exporter was F.T. Saad, 
a Lebanese business woman, active in produce buying since 1960 and a 
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former Licensed Buying Agent of SLPMB12. Apart from produce trading 
she is, like the majority of the traders, engaged in diamond trade and the 
retail of consumer goods. She has exported on her own since the 1989/90 
buying season and has two warehouses of SLPMB in Freetown to store her 
produce. Up-country, her main store is in Kenema and she uses two buying 
stations in smaller commercial buying centres. Since she was an LBA, F.T. 
Saad has made use of agents who purchase on her behalf in smaller 
commercial centres, in towns or villages. In the 1992/93 buying season, she 
was using about 100 agents. She used to employ more but she lost several 
of her agents during the rebel incursions in Kailahun District. Many of her 
agents are local merchants who have a small shop or store. Large scale 
farmers, who are faithful customers and have proved to be yearly suppliers 
of large quantities of produce, have also become her agents. At the start of 
every buying season, she supplies her agents with cash as revolving capital, 
and rice and consumer goods to purchase produce. Just as the agents of 
James International and Saad Group, they are informed about the price F.T. 
Saad will offer them without additional remunerations. Consequently, they 
have to make their own price arrangements with their suppliers. However, 
F.T. Saad always sends one of her vehicles to evacuate the produce from 
the stores of her agents to one of her buying stations, at her own expense. 
She sends out vehicles to individual large scale producers to collect their 
produce, if they can offer large quantities for sale. In the 1992/93 buying 
season, she owned seven trucks with a capacity of seven tons each. Two 
vehicles were lost during the rebel incursion in 1991. Although the amount 
of produce purchased by private exporters is declining, F.T. Saad seems to 
have been less affected than other private exporters. She was the largest 
exporter in 1992/93 for several reasons. Over the years, she has established 
a strong relationship with her agents. As opposed to other private exporters, 
she does not have problems with money, which enables her to provide 
sufficient cash to her agents to purchase produce and to pay her agents 
immediately13. Furthermore, following the privatization of the coffee and 
cocoa trade, most Lebanese regional wholesalers in Kenema sold the 
majority of their produce to F.T. Saad, because she offered ready cash, 
12
 Although both these Lebanese private exporters (the Saad Group and F.T. Saad) 
bear Saad as their family name, the families appear not to be socially related 
(Saad Group and F.T. Saad, personal communications, 1993). 
13
 In the 1992/93 buying season, it appeared that she had a daily purchasing capital 
of 12 to 15 million Leones, equivalent to 24,000 to 30,000 US Dollars (F.T. 
Saad, personal communications, 1993). 
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supplied them with rice and helped them out in case of need14. Among 
the local producers and the small scale African business people she was the 
most popular and best known Lebanese trading partner, not only because 
her store in Kenema was one of the largest, but also because she could 
always supply what the client wanted15. Therefore, producers who sold 
their produce in Kenema often went to her store to sell their produce. 
Furthermore, she can attract a lot of customers because the lorry park 
where many poda-podas stop, is in front of her shop and her shop boys 
rush to the vehicles to carry the farmers' produce to her store, more or less 
compelling farmers to sell to her. 
Finally, we also need to mention the role played by the Eastern Farmers 
Union as a co-operative private export organization. Initially, the Eastern 
Farmers Union was a Licensed Buying Agent. Later on, at the end of the 
1980s, it became an agent of James International, the only indigenous 
private exporter. Since 1993, however, the Union exports produce directly 
to overseas markets. Although its export achievements are still small 
compared to the above-mentioned private exporters, its role in produce 
buying is important from the perspective of the producers, especially in the 
way they have organized their purchase activities. 
The Union makes use of the central stores in Kenema and Blama to 
purchase produce directly from the producer. Since the end of the 1980s, 
the Nongowa Growers Co-operative, as a forerunner of the Eastern Farmers 
Union, has run numerous buying stations at the local level to alleviate the 
farmers' transport problems (see also section 9.1). Its role as produce buyer 
is becoming more important because of growing support from local 
traditional authorities. In those areas where the Village Marketing Centers 
have been established, the Eastern Farmers Union poses serious 
competition to other types of traders. However, because the Eastern 
Farmers Union is only active in a limited area, they are not yet able to 
form any serious competition to other private exporters. Because of the 
important role the Eastern Farmers Union can play in the future to improve 
the farmers' marketing opportunities, it is described in further detail in 
14
 Since the European trading houses gradually withdrew from regional 
wholesaling up-country, the Lebanese traders became the dominant trading class 
in regional wholesaling (Van der Laan, 1975; Leighton, 1992). 
15
 During our interviews and stay with producers and small traders in the villages, 
F.T. Saad was one of the few business people mentioned by name. Many 
farmers and traders know her as Mammy Ток-Tok (i.e. "talk-talk"), because she 
always chatters when doing business, and is rarely silent. 
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chapter 9. 
The regional wholesalers without export licence 
In the previous chapter, we saw that since the privatization of the trade in 
agricultural produce, most regional wholesalers based in the coffee and 
cocoa producing areas kept on purchasing and selling agricultural produce. 
The main difference has been the freedom to set the producer prices and 
the freedom to sell the produce to those private exporters offering the 
highest price. 
However, some regional wholesalers have become agents for one of 
the Lebanese private exporters, either the Saad Group or F.T. Saad, and 
one Lebanese wholesaler decided to become an agent for the African 
private exporter, James International16. 
Most of the African regional wholesalers, who used to be LBAs, have 
stayed in produce business as independent traders. However, some former 
African LBAs decided to offer their services to either James International 
or F.T. Saad. The fact that most LBAs have continued as independent 
produce buyers can be explained by their desire to be independent in their 
trading activities. Being prefinanced would mean that they were more or 
less obliged to sell to their creditor. During the 1970s and 1980s when they 
were acting as LBAs, the regional wholesalers complained that the 
commission and the transport allowances they received from SLPMB were 
too small to make their produce trade profitable (Winter, 1981; Bowbrick, 
1982; Muntjewerff, 1982; Klomberg and van Riessen 1983; Donhauser 
1986). So, many former LBAs continued produce buying on their own and 
fixed their producer prices according to the prices offered by the largest 
private exporters. Moreover, most regional wholesalers had sufficient 
capital to finance their trading operations and had already established a 
network of their own agents during the time as a LBA. It was only 
incidentally that they applied for a loan from one of the larger wholesalers, 
such as F.T. Saad. 
The purchasing practices of these regional wholesalers are similar to 
the private exporters' marketing behaviour. They operate from their stores 
and small warehouses in the urban trading centres. Their main commercial 
activity consists of selling consumer goods and purchasing produce. They 
16
 Of all the interviewed regional wholesalers who became agents of a private 
exporter, only one was selling his complete turnover to his creditor since the 
buying season 1991/92. After selling the requested amount of produce to their 
creditor, most regional wholesalers sold the remaining part of their produce to 
the highest bidder (regional wholesalers, personal communications, 1993). 
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purchase produce either from farmers who come to their stores or they 
prefinance agents to purchase at the village level. They also send out their 
trucks to purchase or collect produce in the interior. At their stores, they 
weigh the produce on a platform scale and pay the farmers after calculating 
the value of the produce according to the current producer prices. 
Sometimes, they make deductions for produce which does not meet the 
necessary quality standards. Price deductions also occur in cases where a 
farmer has an outstanding loan. Before the rebel incursion, it was common 
among regional wholesalers to attract large scale farmers by issuing loans. 
Many of their customers requested loans, either in cash or in kind, to feed 
their family, to pay school fees and to pay the wages of their labourers 
during the coffee and cocoa harvesting season. However, during the rebel 
incursion, most regional wholesalers stopped issuing loans because many 
customers became refugees and were unable to repay their loans. 
In order to attract as much produce as possible, the majority of the 
regional wholesalers provided their agents with purchasing capital, 
consisting of cash and rice, to lend to farmers. Normally, this is a revolving 
fund of capital issued to them at the beginning of the cocoa season. As 
soon as an agent has finished his purchasing capital, he delivers the 
purchased produce the regional wholesaler. Out of the proceeds, the agent 
receives the same amount of money to continue buying produce. The 
remuneration for the agents differs widely. Some will get at the end of the 
buying season, a fixed amount of money for their services. Some agents 
will get a commission per pound of produce they purchase. But there are 
also agents who only get the price offered by regional wholesalers to any 
supplier who comes at their store. This means that these agents have to 
make their profits from the difference in producer price they pay to farmers 
and the price they get from the regional wholesalers. Consequently, 
regional wholesalers are not interested in the way their agents purchase 
produce and neither verify, nor control their measurement and paying 
procedures. 
In general, the contract between wholesalers and traders is not more 
than a piece of paper on which the wholesaler writes down the amount of 
cash and rice he gives to an agent. The contracts are normally restricted to 
one buying season, which means that an agent is not sure whether he will 
continue as an agent next year. The amount of prefinance depends on his 
buying performance, particularly the amount of produce he is able to 
purchase. Moreover, the agents need to have large coffee and cocoa 
plantations on their own which can serve as collateral. However, a large 
number of wholesalers have a core of strong customers who remain reliable 
agents for many years. This latter group is provided with more services to 
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purchase produce on behalf of the wholesalers. For example, transport to 
evacuate the produce to the main urban centres is often arranged for by the 
wholesalers. In some cases, agents even get trucks and weighing equipment 
at their disposal so they can travel around and purchase produce. 
The number of agents varied from wholesaler to wholesaler and 
depended on their financial capacity and interest in produce buying. About 
70 per cent of all the regional wholesalers interviewed used agents, and 
numbers varied from 2 to 25. The remaining regional wholesalers, 
especially those of Lebanese origin, either considered their produce 
business as too small or were sceptical about issuing loans to agents 
because of the fear of loan defaults. They relied solely on producers 
visiting their buying stations. During the period of state-controlled produce 
buying, the majority of the regional wholesalers, acting as LBAs, used 
strong customers as their local agents spread all over the coffee and cocoa 
producing areas. After privatization, they continued using the same local 
traders as their agents under the same agreed conditions. From interviews 
with wholesalers, it appeared that they were interested in increasing the 
number of agents in order to purchase more produce. In reality, however, 
the number of agents decreased because of the rebel incursion. Three of the 
regional wholesalers we interviewed stopped using agents completely 
because of lack of security up-country. As a consequence of the rebel 
activities, most wholesalers lost purchasing capital and equipment in the 
1990/91 buying season. Therefore, they prefinanced, with considerably less 
revolving capital, only those agents in areas not affected by the rebel 
incursion. 
Considering the size of their produce business, it is evident that all 
regional wholesalers have had lower turnover figures since the 1991/92 
buying season. The amount of produce purchased dropped to below 50 per 
cent of the level before the rebel incursion. Since 1991/92, the amounts of 
coffee and cocoa purchased by most regional wholesalers have varied, on 
average, between 20 and 100 tons. However, four of the regional 
wholesalers whom we interviewed, mentioned figures varying from 130 to 
200 tons for cocoa. For coffee, the purchased amounts varied between 130 
and 300 tons. All of them belong to the largest agents of the two main 
Lebanese private exporters. In Blama, one of the main regional urban 
trading centres, the purchase figures of regional wholesalers are 
comparatively low, dropping to levels varying between 1 and 10 tons for 
the 1991/92 and 1992/93 seasons. This can be partly explained by the fact 
that the hinterland of Blama is a minor coffee and cocoa growing area. 
Furthermore, producers believe that the prices paid for their produce will 
be higher in Kenema, a larger urban trading centre, located 12 miles east 
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of Blama. However, according to the regional wholesalers in Blama, they 
faced severe competition from the Eastern Farmers Union, who established 
one of their main buying stations there in 1992. For the 1992/93 buying 
season, this station showed purchase records of 25 tons of cocoa and 70 
tons of coffee (regional wholesalers and Eastern Farmers Union, personal 
communications, 1993). 
In general, since the privatization of the produce trade, competition 
among regional wholesalers has increased. As a consequence, and as we 
see in the next section, producer prices in the urban centres have been 
adjusted by regional wholesalers several times during the buying season to 
attract producers to their stores. The smaller wholesalers complained that 
they can hardly compete any more, because the margin between the 
producer price they need to offer and the prices private exporters offer, is 
narrowing. Moreover, producers can sell their produce directly to one of 
the private exporters and receive the same price or even more as that 
received from regional wholesalers without an export licence. 
7.2.2 The local merchants 
At the village level we found two types of traders, the local merchants and 
the itinerant petty traders. In this section, we describe the local merchants. 
This group consists mainly of small scale traders who have small shops 
either in towns or centrally located villages. Their merchandise consists of 
food items, such as rice, palm oil, fruits and small daily consumer items, 
such as soap, kerosine, canned food and cigarettes. Furthermore, they 
purchase all kinds of agricultural produce, including coffee, cocoa, palm oil 
and kola nuts. Out of the 21 local merchants we interviewed, it appeared 
that since 1991/92, 19 of them had been prefinanced by regional 
wholesalers. We therefore define this group of traders as agents of 
wholesalers. In order to become an agent, the local merchants need to meet 
three requirements. First of all, they need to have been a strong customer 
selling large amounts of produce to that particular wholesaler for many 
years. Second, the agent must have collateral in the form of a large coffee 
or cocoa plantation. Third, those potential agents who are involved in 
merchandising activities and have some storage capacity have better 
chances for prefinancing. 
The agents of wholesalers purchase produce at their shop or travel 
around to get it in the villages. Their ability to purchase in the villages 
depends on their means of transport. Some agents, such as the agents of 
James International and the largest agents of F.T. Saad, have vehicles at 
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their disposal. Others go out on motor-bike or bicycle or even on foot, to 
conduct business. As soon as they have purchased a large quantity of 
produce, they hire a poda-poda or ask the wholesaler to send a vehicle. 
The agents try to supply the farmers with rice on credit during the 
rainy season to attract as much produce as possible. Because most agents 
live with the farmers in the villages, they are the main source of rice for 
the farmers17. In exchange, they ask farmers to sell their produce to them. 
So normally, agents lend the farmers rice, and after the sale of produce the 
costs of the rice will be deducted from the proceeds of the produce. 
Sometimes, agents credit one bag of rice at that time in exchange for a bag 
of cocoa or coffee to be supplied later. In general, the amount of rice 
supplied by wholesalers to their agents determines the amount of produce 
purchased by the agents. As we see in chapter 8, farmers are more attracted 
to traders who can offer them credit, especially in the form of rice. 
Agents also purchase produce from itinerant petty traders, some of 
whom have been prefinanced to purchase produce on their behalf. All the 
agents interviewed used subagents. The number of subagents varied from 
1 to 25 per agent. The number of subagents might also vary from season 
to season, depending on the subagents' purchase achievements and the 
amount of purchase capital available to the agents. Since the onset of the 
rebel incursion, the majority of agents have been using fewer subagents. A 
few of the agents who operated mainly in the areas not affected by the 
rebel incursion, were found to have increased their number of subagents in 
order to expand their produce business. The remunerations for subagents 
varied widely from a fixed amount of money depending on the amount 
purchased, a commission per pound of produce, a carton of cigarettes or 
some bags of rice for services rendered. 
Following the privatization of the produce trade, the role of these 
agents became more important. In their scramble for produce, private 
exporters and other wholesalers used agents more often to buy for them at 
the village level. Many of the agents had been in operation prior to 
privatization, including some who had been independent local merchants. 
However, the improved financial arrangements and transport services 
offered by the private exporters led to many of them becoming agents of 
the private exporters. For example, the large market share James 
International acquired at the start of its operation in 1987, can be explained 
17
 Out of the 21 local merchants we interviewed, 15 resided in the villages. The 
remaining six lived in one of the main urban centres (local merchants, personal 
communications, 1993). 
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by the fact that its agents were equipped with pick-up trucks and supplied 
with rice to purchase in the villages. From our interviews it appeared that 
those agents who were prefinanced by private exporters received, in 
general, more prefinance than agents of other regional wholesalers. 
Consequently, their average amounts of purchased produce during one 
season were higher, varying between 10 and 80 tons of either coffee or 
cocoa (local merchants, personal communications 1993). The average 
amounts of coffee and cocoa purchased per season varied because of 
differing climatic conditions and changing amounts of purchasing capital. 
In spite of the fact that most local merchants were being prefinanced, we 
found that 5 out of 21 agents did not sell all their produce to their creditor. 
Some of the agents of James International and Volcafé, who were either 
regional wholesalers or local merchants, tended not to sell all their produce 
to their creditor. According to several agents, this happened either because 
other private exporters apparently offered higher prices, or because the 
amount of prefinance or assistance decreased compared to previous years. 
Agents also sold their produce to more than one wholesaler to create new 
business relationships and thereby broaden their future credit options. 
Little seems to have changed in agent-farmer relationships since the 
Government relinquished control of the trade and price-setting. As in the 
old days, the agents use hanging scales or three-pence pans to weigh 
produce, both in the stores and out in the villages. The hanging scales, like 
the platform scales, measure in the old British Imperial system of pounds 
and ounces. Most of the educated traders favour this system, whereas those 
traders and farmers with little or no formal education prefer the three-pence 
pan. Since colonial times the three-pence pan has been a widely accepted 
method among farmers of measuring and indicating the price of a certain 
amount of produce. The farmers clearly prefer to measure volumes, instead 
of weights, preferring to count the number of pans to the number of 
pounds. The three-pence pan is a tin bowl, available in different sizes, used 
by both producers and traders to measure the amount of produce. Although 
the farmers may have more insight into the amount of produce they have 
for sale, they are still dependent on the price the trader offers per pan. 
Moreover, different sizes of pans with different weights for coffee and 
cocoa are used. The common size used by producers and traders also 
differs from village to village. In some villages more than one type of 
three-pence pan is used, which can easily lead to confusion and deception 
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about the weight and prices for each type of pan". One of the major 
complaints fanners have is that they are underpaid because traders use 
larger sizes of pans. In some villages this has led to a village by-law that 
only one specific type of pan must be used to measure produce. Another 
problem mentioned by farmers is the use of pans by traders altered to 
enlarge the contents19. 
To conclude, little has changed since the privatization of the produce 
trade in the way local merchants or agents of regional wholesalers purchase 
their produce at the village level. As Büscher (1984) and Donhauser (1986) 
concluded for the rice trade in Sierra Leone, there is a lack of market 
transparency in the coffee and cocoa trade with regard to weighing and 
measurement procedures and price information. There is hardly any control 
over the measurement procedures and calculation of prices at the village 
level by agents and their subagents. Farmers are still at the mercy of the 
trader whether they are paid according to the current producer prices, using 
correct measurement and correct price calculation. Since the privatization 
some producers have gained more options for selling their produce in their 
own village, because of the growing number of local merchants or agents 
who are directly involved in produce buying at the local level. Moreover, 
as we discuss later in more detail, local merchants and itinerant petty 
traders in many areas face more competition from the Village Marketing 
Centers, which are mainly controlled by the producers themselves. 
7.2.3 The petty traders 
The largest group of traders operating in the produce trade are the petty 
" During our research, we discovered the use of six different types of three-pence 
pans. When piled up with produce, their weights varied from 4 to 10 pounds for 
dried cocoa and from 5 to 12 pounds for cleaned coffee. Each type of pan has 
a name. For example, a very common pan is the Margai pan. This pan has been 
used by producers and traders since the days when Milton Margai was President 
of Sierra Leone. Later on, different sizes of pans with other names were 
introduced. Because of the numerous sizes of pans and because all agricultural 
products have specific gravities, a lot of confusion exists among farmers about 
the weight of a certain type of pan of produce. Although they are able to 
distinguish the pans by their names, their estimations of the weights vary 
considerably. 
19
 In one village, a trader was observed using a three-pence pan which was clearly 
deformed to enlarge the contents of the pan. Also Klomberg and van Riessen 
(1983) and Peperkamp (1984) mentioned the use of deformed pans by produce 
traders. 
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traders. These are mainly small scale, itinerant traders who operate at 
village level. They are involved in all kinds of merchandise ranging from 
agricultural produce such as coffee, cocoa, palm oil and kola nuts, to small 
consumer items such as kerosine, batteries, slippers, school notebooks, 
cigarettes, razorblades, soap and canned products such as tomato paste, 
sardines, butter, and so on. Most of them do not have a shop or store and 
travel from village to village. Their transport means are usually limited 
with most petty traders travel on foot. Some may have a bicycle or a 
motor-bike at their disposal. Therefore, the size of their business is limited. 
The range can vary from season to season, depending on financial means 
and the profitability of their merchandise. As a consequence, petty traders 
can be out of business for a while or invest their capital in other goods. 
The group comprising petty traders also include farmers who occasionally 
purchase produce. We found that about 12 per cent of the farmers 
interviewed in 1990/91 and in 1992/93 were involved in the purchase of 
produce20. Sometimes farmers who have made some profit out of diamond 
mining or cash crop farming, decide to invest some capital in the purchase 
and sale of produce. People working in urban centres with a regular income 
also decide to invest money either in mining activities or in produce 
buying. Therefore, the group of petty traders can vary considerably in 
number from buying season to buying season. Out of the 51 petty traders 
we interviewed, we found that only 19 (37 per cent) continuously 
purchased cocoa as well as coffee during the 1991/92 and 1992/93 buying 
seasons. The petty traders mentioned several reasons for not purchasing 
coffee or cocoa on a continuous basis. Some of them preferred to engage 
themselves temporarily in other income-generating activities such as mining 
or tailoring. Others lacked purchasing capital because their creditors had 
stopped financing them or because they could not prefinance them in time. 
Various traders had only purchasing capital for one particular season and 
did not make enough profit to continue produce buying. Some traders 
lacked the physical strength to travel because of sickness. Furthermore, out 
of 32 petty traders who did not purchase produce continuously, 9 (29 per 
cent) decided not to purchase for a while because they felt it was not safe 
to travel because of the threat of harassment or even death at the hands of 
rebels. 
Because of the privatization of the produce trade, one might expect that the 
proportion of trading farmers would be higher in 1992/93. However, in that 
season, we selected more villages nearby Village Marketing Centers run by a 
co-operative. Hence, it was less attractive for farmers to trade in produce there. 
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In general, petty traders operate independently without any prefinance. 
However, it appeared that nine traders (18 per cent) were prefinanced every 
buying season either by local merchants or agents of regional wholesalers. 
Moreover, 10 petty traders (20 per cent) told us that they received some 
prefinance every so often. As mentioned before, the remunerations for 
these so-called subagents could vary widely, from a fixed amount of money 
depending on the amount purchased, or a commission per pound of 
produce, to a carton of cigarettes or some bags of rice for rendered 
services. The fact that some petty traders receive prefinance and some 
support from local merchants, seemed to influence the amount of produce 
they purchase. Approximately 80 per cent of the petty traders purchased no 
more than one ton of either coffee or cocoa per season. However, those 
petty traders who were able to get some prefinance purchased, on average, 
between one and four tons of produce. 
It appeared that as much as 55 per cent of the petty traders we 
interviewed, in their turn prefinanced people to purchase on their behalf. 
The number of subagents per petty trader varied per season between one 
and five depending on the availability of purchasing capital. In many cases, 
these subagents belong to the same family group as the petty trader and 
live in the surrounding villages21. 
To purchase produce, petty traders travel from village to village, 
persuading farmers to sell their produce to them. Seventy five per cent of 
all petty traders interviewed offered farmers small amounts of credit in 
exchange for produce. These loans are often in the form of cash or rice, in 
exchange for the sale of coffee or cocoa. Normally, the value of the loan 
will then be deducted from the value of the produce. In some cases, 
however, farmers are also offered small loans in the form of cash or rice 
which have to be repaid with a fixed amount of produce, such as cocoa, 
coffee or palm oil. In the next section, we describe the impact these credit 
relations have on the actual producer price received by the farmers. 
It appears that farmers have more credit relations with petty traders 
than with other traders, because petty traders always seem to be around 
when farmers are in urgent need of rice or cash. Moreover, they often live 
in the same village or have family ties which makes access to credit easier. 
We agree with Isaac (1981) who, in his research among petty traders in 
Sierra Leone, points out that the petty traders' customers are formed mainly 
along lines of friendship, kinship and residential proximity. These social 
21
 Because women are also involved in all kinds of petty trading activities, some 
petty traders prefinanced their wives to purchase some coffee and cocoa. 
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relations between farmers and petty traders play an important role in all 
socioeconomic activities in the village. Petty traders are often the only 
source of much needed consumer goods, or credit for all kinds of social 
activities in the village. Moreover, as we saw in section 7.1, getting to the 
villages requires time and effort due to the erratic and expensive transport. 
Petty traders are aware of their important economic function and realize 
that, because of lack of competition, supply of credit and purchase of 
produce can be a profitable source of income. Furthermore, they can keep 
the risk on lending capital to a minimum because of the relatively small 
amounts of money involved and because of their social relations with the 
producers. These ensure that the farmers actually repay their loans. 
Petty traders usually use three-pence pans when carrying out the actual 
transaction. Some petty traders also use a hanging scale or, if requested by 
farmers, they use butter-cups and kerosine tins to measure the produce. The 
hanging scale was only used by 12 per cent of the traders interviewed. 
Apart from the fact that most petty traders do not possess a hanging scale, 
it appears that the majority of the producers prefer their produce to be 
measured per pan or butter-cup. Originally, the butter-cup and the kerosene 
tin were used to pack butter and kerosene. The kerosene tin is only used 
occasionally to measure coffee or cocoa. It is more frequently used to 
purchase and sell palm oil. As with the three-pence pans, the butter-cups 
are available in many sizes. When piled up with coffee or cocoa, the 
weight of the different types of butter-cup varies from one to two pounds. 
Butter-cups are traditionally favoured for measuring rice, because farmers 
prefer to buy small amounts for that day. However, as the farmers also 
prefer to sell their produce in small quantities so that they have ready cash, 
they use the butter-cup for measuring coffee and cocoa22. 
Apart from these measures, petty traders sometimes offer a price for 
a full bag of produce without weighing its contents. There are two types 
of bag, the rice bag and the three-bushel bag. Normally, the rice bags 
contain 50 kilogrammes of imported rice and are smaller than the three-
bushel bag. This should contain three bushels of rice, but it is also used to 
pack and measure coffee and cocoa. In spite of the fact that the weight for 
a specific product can differ from bag to bag, traders just estimate the 
contents of a bag and offer a certain price. This phenomenon has also been 
Women often sell coffee or cocoa by the butter-cup in order to buy the daily 
rice requirements to prepare the food for their families. In the search for rice, 
it is not uncommon for people to exchange a cup of coffee or cocoa for a cup 
of rice. 
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observed by Muntjewerff (1983) in the coffee trade in Cameroon, and by 
Akanji (1992) in the cocoa trade in Nigeria. In Sierra Leone, it mainly 
occurs in cases where the farmers sell coffee as dried cherries. Because the 
hulling and cleaning of dried cherries requires much time and labour, 
farmers, especially those who are in urgent need of money, often prefer to 
sell the coffee cherries. The purchase of coffee cherries is usually only 
accepted by petty traders and agents who, in the scramble for produce, 
accept the burden of hulling and cleaning of coffee. 
The lack of market transparency is also exemplified by the absence of 
regular price information at the village level. Petty traders have always 
been free to offer any price for produce, as villagers are rarely informed of 
the current coffee and cocoa prices or when those prices change. Although 
producers seem to have a vague idea of the price for a certain type of 
three-pence pan of coffee or cocoa, they always tend to be the last actor 
within the marketing channel to be informed about increases in producer 
prices. This means it is easy for petty traders to offer the same price for a 
pan of coffee or cocoa in spite of producer price increases in the urban 
trading centres. However, it also appears that the majority of petty traders 
are badly informed of the current producer prices in the urban trading 
centres. This can weaken their bargaining position when selling their 
produce on to any other type of trader. Of the petty traders interviewed, 76 
per cent did not know the current producer price for cocoa in the urban 
trading centres, and 70 per cent did not know the current coffee prices. 
Furthermore, 43 per cent of the petty traders interviewed did not know how 
to use a hanging scale. Seventy per cent were only able to calculate the 
value of the produce by counting the number of pans. 
Petty traders have been involved in produce buying since colonial 
times, acting as intermediary between urban wholesalers and merchants on 
the one hand, and local producers on the other. Irrespective of a state-
controlled marketing system or the current privatization of produce trade, 
the petty traders are able to maintain a strong position in produce buying 
without any control on their purchase activities. However, since 
privatization, they face more competition from other petty traders entering 
the market and agents of the regional wholesalers who buy directly at the 
village level. Moreover, due to an increasing number of competitors, the 
turn-over per trader decreases with increasing marketing costs, such as 
transport and processing, leading to smaller profit margins. In addition, as 
we see in chapter 8, in some regions the establishment of Village 
Marketing Centers has influenced, to an extent, the amount of produce that 
petty traders are able to purchase. 
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So far, we have described in this section the major types of traders which 
can be found in the coffee and cocoa marketing channels since the 
privatization of produce trade at the end of the 1980s. The main marketing 
channels are shown in figure 7.1. 
It appears that the produce flow between the producer and the final 
buyer, i.e. the private exporter, can be characterized by a range of 
marketing channels, varying from a direct transaction between producer and 
final exporter, to marketing channels consisting of up to four levels of 
intermediary actors. In the latter case, produce can flow from subagents of 
petty traders via petty traders and local merchants to regional wholesalers 
who sell the produce on to private exporters. Compared with the period of 
a state-controlled marketing system (figure 6.1), we can observe two major 
changes in the marketing channels. On the one hand, the producer is now 
able to sell his produce directly to a private exporter which can lead to 
increased producer prices. 
On the other hand, although produce can still flow via as many as four 
intermediary actors to the final buyer, more types of traders are functioning 
at the local level. Therefore, since the end of the 1980s, producers have 
more opportunities to avoid some of the intermediaries and sell directly to 
either local merchants, regional wholesalers or even private exporters. 
Of more importance is the conclusion that, in spite of changes in the 
numbers and types of actors involved in produce buying at the local level, 
only slight changes have taken place in the way produce has been 
purchased and sold. From the producers' perspective we noticed that 
although a wider range of traders offered their services in the villages, no 
significant changes in the way traders carried out their produce business 
and in the way the transactions between producer and trader have taken 
place. In spite of the scramble for produce in the 1990s, the producers are 
still in a marginal bargaining position when selling their crops. 
73 Transactions 
We now focus on the outcome of transactions between the different types 
of traders and the producers. The main question asked in this section is 
whether or not the producer actually receives the current producer price at 
the moment of transaction23. 
23
 The same question accounts also for intermediaries in produce trade who have 
to sell their purchased produce to regional wholesalers. 
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Figure 7.1 Marketing channels for coffee and cocoa after the 
privatization of produce trade, Sierra Leone, 1993. 
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Notes for figure 7.1 
1. Producers sell their cash crops in an urban centre to a regional wholesaler or agent 
of a private exporter. 
2. Producers sell their cash crops in the village or in a nearby village to a local 
merchant or an agent of a regional wholesaler. 
3. Producers sell their cash crops in the village or in a nearby village to a petty 
trader's agent 
4. Producers sell their cash crops in the village or in a nearby village to a petty 
trader. 
5. Producers sell their cash crop in the village or in a nearby village at the Village 
Marketing Center run by a co-operative member of the Eastern Farmers Union or 
a locally appointed agent of a private exporter. 
6. Producers sell their cash crop in an urban centre directly to one of the private 
exporters. 
7. Petty traders provide relatives or friends with money and or rice to purchase on 
their behalf in surrounding villages. 
8. Petty traders sell their produce in the village or in a nearby village to the Village 
Marketing Centers. 
9. Local merchants sell their produce in an urban centre to a regional wholesaler or 
have been prefinanced to purchase on behalf of the regional wholesaler. 
10. Local merchants sell their produce in an urban centre to a private exporter or have 
been prefinanced to purchase on behalf of the private exporter. 
11. Petty traders sell their produce in the village or in a nearby village to a local 
merchant or other petty traders who have been prefinanced to purchase on behalf 
of the local merchant. 
12. Petty traders sell their produce in an urban centre lo a regional wholesaler or an 
agent of a private exporter. 
13. Petty traders sell their produce in an urban centre directly to a private exporter. 
14. Village Marketing Centers purchase produce at village level and have been 
prefinanced by the Eastern Farmers Union or other private exporters to purchase 
on their behalf. 
15. Regional wholesalers sell their produce to a private exporter or have been 
prefinanced to purchase on behalf of a private exporter. 
16. Private exporters sell their produce to overseas buying companies or have been 
prefinanced to purchase on their behalf. 
Source: Authors (1993). 
As we have seen in chapter 6, during the period of state-controlled 
marketing, which ended in August 1991, the producer price had to be paid 
to the fanners. This price was fixed by the government at the start of the 
marketing season and should remain, as far as possible, unchanged during 
the season. Since August 1991, however, the marketing of coffee and cocoa 
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has been completely privatized, which has meant that the traders and 
exporters of coffee and cocoa are free to fix the producer prices 
themselves. Therefore, we have conceptualized producer prices for the 
period from August 1991 onwards in the following ways. 
First, the "leading producer prices" for coffee and cocoa are the 
maximum prices which are offered to the producers and the traders by the 
main private exporters in the urban trading centres. Although these leading 
producer prices might differ during certain periods between the private 
export organizations, it appears that they observed each other carefully and 
adjusted their producer prices according to the price changes of their 
competitors. This meant that these leading producer prices did not differ 
significantly between the major private exporters. 
Second, the "minimum producer prices" for coffee and cocoa are the 
prices which are offered to the producers and the intermediaries by the 
regional wholesalers without an export licence. They fix the minimum 
producer prices at a certain level below the leading producer prices taking 
into account their marketing costs, profit margins and the prices they will 
receive from the private exporters. Appendices 7.4 and 7.5 show the 
average monthly producer prices for cocoa and coffee for the 1986/87 to 
1992/93 buying seasons. 
Third, with regard to the transactions which take place at the village 
level, we introduce the concept of "bush prices". The bush prices are the 
producer prices which local merchants and itinerant petty traders at least 
should pay in the villages to the farmers, taking into account marketing 
costs and profit margin. The majority of the local merchants sell their 
produce to the private exporters for the current leading producer price. 
However, numerous itinerant petty traders sell their produce to local 
merchants or regional wholesalers who pay less than either the leading 
producer price or the minimum producer price. Therefore, we set the bush 
price at a certain level below the minimum producer price taking into 
account the transport costs, the storage costs and a profit margin for the 
traders. Although these marketing costs can vary widely between the 
traders, we have based the level of the bush prices on the price information 
gained from farmers, itinerant petty traders and local merchants. It 
appeared that, in general, the bush prices were 20 Leones per pound less 
than the minimum producer price at the time of transaction. 
In this section we present the data of the different transactions that 
were conducted between several types of traders and producers. We use the 
above-mentioned concepts of the producer prices as reference prices for the 
actual prices received by the producers. Furthermore, we describe how far 
the buying practices of the traders might explain the difference between the 
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observed prices and the reference prices at the time of the transaction. We 
used three methods to gain information on producer-trader transactions: test 
sales that we carried out in the main urban trading centres; test sales 
conducted with the help of several farmers and interviews with both 
farmers and traders. 
7.3.1 Results from test sales 
The test sales were carried out in the urban trading centres to compare 
measurement procedures and the reference prices for coffee and cocoa with 
the actual prices paid by private exporters, regional wholesalers and their 
agents. To carry out this test, we weighed a certain amount of produce in 
advance and asked a farmer to go around the town with the produce and 
ask all types of traders to weigh the produce and state the price they would 
offer. For more details about the procedure of this test, see to chapter 1. In 
total, 45 test sales for both cocoa and coffee were carried out. In tables 7.7 
and 7.8, we compare the weight as measured by several traders with our 
own measurement. 
A comparison is made between the value of the produce as offered by 
the traders and the actual value of the produce according to the test weight 
and the current minimum and leading producer prices. From these tables 
we can draw the following conclusions for the weight practices and prices 
offered by the traders for the produce. In 32 out of the 45 test sales (71 per 
cent) the weight as measured by the traders differed from the weight as 
measured by the authors. However, in 13 transactions the traders showed 
a weight which was only one pound less than the test weight. This might 
be explained by the inaccuracy of the platform scales used by the traders. 
Another reason might be that several traders round off the actual weight to 
the nearest, lower, absolute figure, a practice which has also been observed 
by Muntjewerff (1982) among traders in Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria. 
For weights above 100 pounds, this deduction is negligible. However, as 
we see in chapter 8, farmers often have small amounts of produce, less 
than 100 pounds, for sale. This means the deduction can be considerable. 
Furthermore, 17 of the 45 test sales (38 per cent) showed significant weight 
differences detrimental to the seller24. For these latter sales, deductions 
24
 In two transactions traders showed a weight which was seven and eight pounds 
higher than the tested weight. This might also indicate that apart from scale 
inaccuracy, traders or employees of the traders do not weigh the produce 
properly. 
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varied between 2 and 17 per cent. Another reason for weight deduction 
could be that traders deduct too much for the weight of the empty bag. 
Table 7.7 Cocoa test sales in the buying season 1992/93 
Trader Test weight (in lbs) Weight (in lbs) and 
and value (in Le)' payment (in Le), offered 
by the traders" 
private exporter 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
private exporter 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
136 
136 
113 
113 
113 
113 
113 
94 
94 
94 
94 
94 
94 
1,800 
1,800 
1,800 
1,800 
1.800 
13.600 
13,600 
13,560 
13,560 
13.560 
13.560 
13,560 
11.280 
11,280 
11,280 
11,280 
11,280 
11,280 
- 2,160 
-2,160 
- 2,160 
- 2,160 
-2.160 
-16,320 
-16,320 
-15,820 
-15,820 
-15.820 
-15,820 
-15,820 
-13,160 
-13,160 
-13,160 
-13,160 
-13,160 
-13,160 
17 
18 
18 
16 
18 
135 
135 
113 
100 
100 
111 
112 
93 
94 
111 
94 
90 
89 
1,870 
1.800 
1.800 
1.600 
1,800 
16,200 
14.850 
14,690 
10,000 
10,000 
13,220 
12.840 
10,000 
14,000 
16.000 
9.400 
12.680 
9,440 
The test weights have been weighed on a platform scale at one of the stores of 
Nongowa Growers. The value of the produce has been calculated according to the 
minimum and the leading producer prices at the time of the test sales. 
Several farmers were asked to visit several traders in town and to inform us of the 
weight and the price offered by that particular trader. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
This was stated by several farmers during our research, but we were not 
able to verify this practice. In general, it can be concluded that several 
traders deliberately cheated the farmers by indicating a lighter weight for 
the produce. 
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Table 7.8 Coffee test sales in the buying season 1992/93 
Trader Test weight (in lbs) Weight (in lbs) and 
and value (in Le)* payment (in Le), offered 
by the traders" 
private exporter 
private exporter 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
private exporter 
private exporter 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
wholesaler 
agent wholesaler 
84 
84 
84 
84 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
117 
117 
117 
23 
23 
23 
23 
23 
23 
23 
118 
118 
118 
118 
118 
118 
10,920 
10,920 
10,920 
10,920 
4,550 
4,550 
4,550 
4,550 
4,550 
4,550 
4,550 
11,700 
11,700 
11,700 
2,990 
2,990 
2,990 
2,990 
2,990 
2,990 
2,990 
15,340 
15.340 
15,340 
15,340 
15,340 
15,340 
- 12,600 
- 12,600 
-12,600 
- 12,600 
- 5,250 
- 5,250 
- 5,250 
- 5,250 
- 5,250 
- 5.250 
- 5,250 
- 14,040 
- 14,040 
- 14,040 
- 3,450 
- 3,450 
- 3,450 
- 3,450 
- 3,450 
- 3,450 
- 3,450 
- 17,700 
- 17,700 
- 17.700 
- 17,700 
- 17.700 
- 17.700 
83 
83 
83 
83 
35 
35 
32 
43 
32 
30 
35 
110 
115 
114 
23 
22 
22 
19 
22 
23 
22 
118 
118 
112 
105 
109 
115 
8,300 
10,800 
11,000 
10,600 
4,560 
5,390 
4,160 
5,600 
4,000 
4,320 
4,480 
10,000 
11.000 
11,400 
2,730 
2,860 
2,900 
2,400 
2,500 
3,000 
2,600 
17,225 
17,000 
14,560 
16,200 
15,260 
15,490 
The test weights have been weighed on a platform scale at one of the stores of 
Nongowa Growers. The value of the produce has been calculated according to the 
minimum and the leading producer prices at the time of the test sales. 
Several farmers were asked to visit several traders in town and to inform us of the 
weight and the price offered by that particular trader. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
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These weighing practices are openly practised and accepted by both buyers 
and fanners in Cameroon and Ghana according to Muntjewerff (1982). In 
Sierra Leone this is not the case. We might say that these practices are 
accepted among the traders. Illiteracy rates are high among farmers, and so 
a majority of the producers are probably not aware of these practices, and 
would certainly not accept them if they were. 
If one compares the actual prices offered by the traders with the test 
weight and the current leading producer price and the minimum producer 
price, the following conclusions can be drawn from table 7.9. Traders 
offered the correct price according to the current leading producer price in 
only 9 per cent of the test sales. Six test sales took place at the stores of 
a private exporter and none of them offered the correct price according to 
the leading producer price. More remarkable is the fact that, although all 
the test sales were carried out in Kenema or Blama, in 25 test sales (SS per 
cent) the traders offered less than the correct price according to the 
minimum producer price. 
Table 7.9 The number of test sales according to the correct value, taking 
into account the test weight and the current leading or 
minimum producer price, by type of trader 
Type of trader Leading Minimum < Minimum Total 
producer producer producer 
price price price 
Private exporter - 4 2 6 
Wholesaler 4 9 16 29 
Agent of wholesaler - 3 7 10 
Total 4 (8.9%) 16 (35.6%) 25 (55.5%) 45 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Normally, the traders do not disclose the producer price per pound and they 
do not show how they calculate the value of the produce. In 12 out of 
these 25 test sales, traders offered the current minimum producer price per 
pound, but either did not measure the produce properly or calculate the 
value of the produce correctly. Even if the traders disclose the correct 
leading producer price per pound, it is still easy for them to calculate the 
value by using a different producer price or to multiply the producer price 
with a lower than actual weight. As well as the above reasons, it appeared 
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that wholesalers and, especially, private exporters, are only interested in 
paying the leading producer price to those farmers or traders who offer at 
least two bags of produce. Farmers with small amounts of produce often 
received the minimum producer price or even less. 
7.3.2 Results from the farmers' test sales 
In this section we present the results of the tests we carried out with the 
help of several farmers. The farmers interviewed were asked whether they 
were about to sell some of their produce. If so, we asked them whether 
they were prepared to give us some information about the transaction. In 
order to compare the information the farmers gave of the weight and the 
price they received for their produce, we weighed their produce in advance. 
For more details of this test procedure, we refer to chapter 1. In total, 56 
farmers sold their produce and informed us of the weighing procedures and 
the prices they received for their produce. Two-thirds of the farmers (35) 
decided to sell their produce in one of the urban trading centres. One-third 
(21) sold their produce in a village. The results of the urban farmers' test 
sales are shown in table 7.10. 
The farmers ' test sales in the urban trading centres. 
All but two of the farmers told us that their produce had been weighed on 
a platform scale. The produce of the other two farmers was weighed on a 
hanging scale. Only 17 farmers received a receipt showing the value of the 
produce and, in some cases, also the weight. Three traders were not 
prepared to disclose the weight of the produce to the farmer. 
When we compare the weight of the produce as measured by ourselves 
with the weight as measured by the traders, it appears that in 16 of the 35 
farmers' test sales (46 per cent) the traders* weight was less than the 
weight measured by the authors. 
Significant deviations detrimental to the seller occurred in seven (20 
per cent) of the test sales25. For these transactions the weight differences 
varied between 4 and 35 pounds. As we have seen in section 7.3.1, the 
weight differences can be explained by several reasons, such as inaccuracy 
of the platform scales, too much weight deduction for the bags and 
rounding off the produce weight. For farmers selling small quantities of 
Significant deviations took mainly place when the farmers sold their produce to 
one of the regional wholesalers. No significant deviations occurred when the 
produce was sold to the co-operative union or to an agent of a wholesaler. 
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Table 7.10 The farmers' test sales in the urban trading centres 
Trader Test weight (in lbs) Weight (in lbs) and payment 
and value (in Le)* (in Le), offered by traders 
Private exporter 
Private exporter 
Private exporter 
Private exporter 
Private exporter 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Wholesaler 
Co-operalive 
Co-operative 
Co-operative 
Co-operative 
Co-operative 
Co-operative 
Co-operative 
Co-operative 
Agent wholesaler 
Agent wholesaler 
Agent wholesaler 
Agent wholesaler 
Agent wholesaler 
8 
105 
280 
9 
15 
5 
9 
154 
5 
50 
51 
91 
260 
395 
117 
27 
175 
64 
478 
356 
59 
74 
83 
15 
458 
57 
15 
275 
175 
40 
98 
4 
36 
9 
139 
800 - 960 
12,600 -14,700 
33.600 -39.200 
1,080 - 1,260 
1,800 - 2,100 
500 - 600 
900 - 1.080 
18,480 -21.560 
500 - 600 
6.000 - 7.000 
6,120 - 7,140 
10,920 -12,740 
31,200 -36,400 
47,400 -55,300 
11.700 -14.040 
3,240 - 3.780 
22,750 -26,250 
8,320 - 9.600 
62,140 -71,400 
46,280 -53,400 
7,670 - 8,850 
9,620 -11,100 
10,790 -12,450 
1,950 - 2,250 
59,540 -68,700 
7,410 - 8.550 
1,950 - 2,250 
35,750 -41,250 
22,750 -26.250 
5.200 - 6.000 
11,760 -13,720 
480 - 560 
3,600 - 4,320 
1,080 - 1,260 
18,070 -20,850 
8 
105 
270 
8 
15 
5 
9 
150 
5 
49 
51 
84 
n.d. 
360 
110 
22 
n.d." 
62 
476 
361 
60 
67 
84 
15 
459 
57 
14 
277 
174 
39 
98 
n.d." 
36 
9 
141 
750 
14,700 
32,400 
700 
2.100 
500 
810 
17,700 
500 
5,850 
5,600 
10,120 
36,400 
48,600 
11,400 
3,120 
23,000 
8,060 
63,982 
48,374 
7.200 
8,400 
10,920 
1,950 
59,670 
7,410 
1,830 
36,010 
22,620 
5,070 
11,660 
500 
3,960 
990 
18,330 
The value of the produce has been calculated according to the minimum and 
leading producer prices at the time of the transaction. 
n.d. means that the traders did not tell the farmer the weight of the produce. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
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produce, weight deductions can have considerable impact on the amount 
of money they receive. However, the inaccuracy of weighing equipment 
and the traders' weighing activities are not only shown by the weight 
deviations at the expense of the farmers. It appears from table 7.10 that in 
six farmers' test sales the traders indicated a higher weight compared to 
our own measurement. However, only in one farmers' test sale was this 
weight deviation more than two pounds. Consequently, all of these traders, 
except for one, paid the farmers too much, according to the minimum 
producer price. 
Because of the inaccuracies in the weighing procedures and in the 
price calculations, it appeared that the prices offered by the traders for the 
amount of produce did not always meet the correct weight and the current 
leading or minimum producer price. The results for different types of 
traders are shown in table 7.11. The traders only offered the correct price 
according to the leading producer price in nine per cent of the farmers' 
testsales. Thirty seven per cent received even less than the minimum 
producer price. There are three possible reasons for these discrepancies: the 
traders were using a price less than the minimum producer price; they did 
not measure the produce properly or they deliberately miscalculated the 
value of the produce. 
Table 7.11 The number of the farmers paid according to the correct value, 
taking into account the test weight and the current leading or 
minimum producer price, by type of trader 
Type of trader Leading 
producer 
price 
Minimum 
producer 
pnce 
8 
8 
3 
< Minimum 
producer 
pnce 
3 
8 
-
2 
Total 
5 
17 
8 
5 
Private exporter 2 
Wholesaler 1 
Co-operative 
Agent of wholesaler 
Total 3 (8.6%) 19(54.3%) 13(37.1%) 35 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
When the farmers sold their produce to one of the private exporters one 
would expect them to be paid according to the leading producer price. 
However, only in two out of five farmers' test sales, the private traders 
carried out the transaction correctly and paid according to the leading 
268 Who Pays the Price? 
producer price. In the remaining three test sales, the prívate exporters paid 
less than the leading producer price26. Those farmers who sold their 
produce to a wholesaler might at least expect to be paid according the 
minimum producer price. Still, in 8 out of 17 farmers' test sales the 
wholesalers did not weigh the produce correctly or did not pay according 
to the minimum producer price27. Those farmers who decided to sell their 
produce to a co-operative marketing association had the best chance of 
being paid at least according to the minimum producer price. Although the 
co-operatives did not pay the leading producer price, the weighing of the 
produce was done correctly and the farmers were paid according to a 
producer price which was at least the minimum producer price and 
sometimes even higher28. 
The farmers' test sales in the villages. 
In our tests, about one-third of the farmers (21 test sales) decided to sell 
their produce in their own village or in one of the surrounding villages. 
The results are shown in table 7.12. 
The majority of the farmers decided to sell their produce (mainly 
coffee) at a subcentre or a Village Marketing Center managed by a clerk 
of a co-operative. Nine farmers' test sales took place at a Village 
Marketing Center (for details of these centers and the co-operatives, see 
chapter 9). All the produce, except for one test sale, was weighed on a 
platform scale29. However, in six test sales, the difference in weight 
compared to our measurement was more than two pounds, and varied from 
One private exporter refused to pay according to the current producer prices 
because the cocoa was offered to him at the end of the buying season and 
because of the apparently bad quality of the cocoa. 
If the traders' weight of the produce only deviated by one pound and the value 
of the produce was calculated according to at least the minimum producer price, 
the farmers' test sale was considered as a correct transaction. 
When the farmers' test sales were being carried out, the Eastern Farmers Union 
did not have an export licence. Therefore, they had to sell their produce to other 
private exporters. This meant that they paid less than the leading producer price 
in order to cover their marketing expenses and to make some profit. 
In one case, the clerk of the Village Marketing Centre told the farmer that the 
co-operative did not purchase cocoa any more because the buying season was 
over. However, he was prepared to purchase the cocoa on his own behalf. The 
weight according to the clerk was three pounds less than the tested weight and 
he offered 80 Le per pound, a producer price which was 40 Le per pound less 
than the minimum producer price at that moment. 
The Marketing System at Regional Level 269 
Table 7.12 Farmers' test sales in the villages 
Trader Test weight (in lbs) Weight (in lbs) and payment 
and value (in Le)* (in Le), offered by traders 
Local merchant 
Local merchant 
Local merchant 
Local merchant 
Co-op (subcentre) 
Co-op (subcentre) 
Co-op (subcentre) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Co-op (VMC) 
Petty trader 
Petty trader 
Petty trader 
Petty trader 
Petty trader 
76 
68 
88 
792 
42 
46 
149 
10 
33 
16 
92 
90 
80 
232 
21 
74 
111 
5 
6 
5 
107 
7.600 
6.800 
7,040 
79,200 
4,200 
4,600 
14,900 
1,000 
3,300 
1,600 
10,120 
9,900 
8,800 
25.520 
2,310 
8,140 
11,100 
500 
600 
500 
10,700 
- 9.120 
- 8.160 
- 8,800 
- 95,040 
- 5,040 
- 5,520 
- 17,880 
- 1.200 
- 3,960 
- 1,920 
- 11,960 
- 11,700 
- 10,400 
- 30.160 
- 2,730 
- 9,620 
- 13,320 
600 
720 
600 
- 12,840 
n.d." 
67 
88 
768 
n.d. 
42 
147 
7 
30 
14 
90 
85 
80 
219 
17 
67 
n.d" 
5 
n.d." 
4 
107 
7.000 
7.370 
7.040 
89,600 
4,600 
5,040 
17,640 
560 
3,600 
1,680 
10,800 
11,050 
10,400 
28,470 
2,120 
8,710 
8,000 
400 
500 
480 
10,700 
The value of the produce has been calculated according to the bush price and the 
minimum producer price. 
n.d. means that the traders did not disclose the weight of the produce. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
3 to 13 pounds. Although the farmers were issued receipts showing the 
weight and the value of produce, they still do not have any control on the 
measurement procedure carried out by the Village Marketing Centre clerk. 
Moreover, several farmers complained that the clerk deducted too much for 
the weight of the bag. As with the measurement procedures in the urban 
trading centres, inaccuracies take place in the Village Marketing Centers 
and there is lack of control over the weighing procedures. 
Three of the farmers' test sales took place at a subcentre of a co-
operative, which was equipped with a hanging scale. Two test sales were 
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not weighed correctly, and differed by two and four pounds respectively. 
At one subcentre, the clerk did not want to disclose the weight and did not 
issue a receipt to the farmer. 
The inaccuracies and the malpractices of the weighing procedures at 
the Village Marketing Centers and the subcentres of the co-operatives had, 
of course, a negative effect on the amount of money the farmers received 
for their produce. In only one case did the farmer receive the correct 
money according to the test weight and the current minimum producer 
price. In 9 out of 12 test sales, the farmers received less than the minimum 
producer price but more than the local bush price. However, this is mainly 
due to inaccurate weighing because the weight, as measured by the clerk, 
was correctly multiplied by the minimum producer price. Two farmers 
received less than the local bush price due to inaccurate weighing, 
miscalculation and the use of lower producer prices. 
Nine out of 21 farmers decided to sell their produce to a local 
merchant or a petty trader either in their own village or a nearby village. 
All the local merchants, except for one, used hanging scales to measure the 
produce30. The petty traders used several types of three-pence pans to 
measure the produce. Two petty traders did not bother to weigh the 
produce and just offered a price for the produce to the farmer. This practice 
of not weighing the produce is common among petty traders. They offer 
a certain price depending on the type of bag and how far the bag has been 
filled with produce. 
Apart from the fact that in three farmers' test sales the local merchant 
or the petty trader did not disclose the weight, only one local merchant 
gave a weight which was considerably lower than the tested weight. 
However, five traders, mainly local merchants, offered a price which was 
in between the bush price and the minimum producer price. 
When we consider all the farmers' test sales which took place in the 
villages, it appears that the weighing practices of all types of traders are 
inaccurate. But the farmers have a better chance of receiving at least the 
minimum producer price, if they are able to sell their produce to a Village 
Marketing Center managed by a co-operative. The farmers who sold their 
produce to local merchants often received at least the bush price. Those 
farmers who sold their produce to petty traders often received less than the 
One local merchant used a three-pence pan to measure the produce. The test 
weight was equivalent to 131 three-pence pans of 6-pound weight. The merchant 
calculated 128 pans of 6-pound weight. So, the difference was 18 pounds in the 
merchant's favour. 
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bush price. 
7.3.3 Results from interviews 
The third and final set of information was gained from interviews with 
both farmers and traders. The results are based solely on information of 
their last transaction. Although the information gathered in this way is less 
reliable than the methods used in section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, it gives us some 
indication about the trends in the level of payments, which vary between 
different traders and between different types of produce, different locations 
or different periods of trading. 
Table 7.13 shows that, in total, the farmers and the traders provided 
us with information on 893 transactions, carried out during the buying 
seasons 1990/91, 1991/92 and 1992/93. As we have seen in the previous 
sections, the most important question to be answered is whether farmers 
actually received the correct amount of money according to the current 
producer prices. 
Table 7.13 The last farmer and trader transactions by type of produce, 
1990/91-1992/93 
Type of produce Buying season 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 Total 
107 
49 
40 
Total 212 196 485 893 
Source: Authors' survey (1992/93). 
Table 7.14 indicates the number of farmers that were paid according to the 
leading producer price by the traders in the main urban trading centres. The 
information about the transactions had been gathered for three different 
buying seasons. This partition is important, because for the 1990/91 buying 
season the producer prices were stipulated by the Government of Sierra 
Leone. Since the 1991/92 buying season, the establishment of the producer 
prices is controlled by the traders themselves without any government 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
12 
46 
154 
93 
112 
280 
212 
207 
474 
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intervention31. 
From table 7.14 we can conclude that only a small number of farmers 
(14 per cent of all transactions) received the best price for their produce at 
the time of the transaction. Those farmers who sold coffee cherries were 
not paid according to the leading producer prices. The lower percentages 
for the transactions involving coffee cherries, as compared to clean coffee 
and cocoa, can be largely explained by the relatively high processing costs 
the traders incur when purchasing coffee cherries. Another interesting 
conclusion is the significant difference between the results for the 1990/91 
buying season and the 1991/92 buying season. It appears that during the 
period of state-controlled marketing, a relatively higher number of farmers 
were able to receive the leading producer price as compared to the period 
without any government interference in marketing activities. From the 
traders' perspective this can partly be explained by the fact that during the 
1990/91 season, the traders were obliged to pay the official producer price. 
Table 7.14 The number of farmers paid according to the leading producer 
prices, by type of produce* 
Type of produce 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
Total 
1990/91 
abs 
6 
12 
45 
63 
. (in %) 
(50.0) 
(26.1) 
(29.2) 
(29.7) 
Buying 
1991/92 
abs. 
14 
-
9 
23 
(in %) 
(13.1) 
(0.0) 
(22.5) 
(11.7) 
season 
1992/93 
abs. 
12 
3 
26 
41 
(in %) 
(12.9) 
(2.7) 
(9.3) 
(8.5) 
total 
abs. 
32 
15 
80 
127 
(in%) 
(15.1) 
(7.2) 
(16.9) 
(14.2) 
The percentages given in this table show the number of farmers in proportion ω 
the total number of latest farmer and trader transactions by type of produce and 
by buying season as given in table 7.13. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Moreover, the traders, as official buying agents, received a commission and 
transport allowances to cover their marketing expenses. Since 1991/92, 
however, most traders are not able to pay the leading producer price. As 
we have seen in section 7.2, the majority of these traders act as agents of 
1
 For the buying season 1990/91 the leading producer price is equivalent to the 
official producer price set by the Government of Sierra Leone. 
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private exporters or have to sell their marketed produce to one of these 
private exporters. In order to cover their marketing costs and to generate 
a marketing profit, they are forced to purchase below the leading producer 
prices. 
Table 7.15 takes the traders' marketing costs and revenues into 
account. It shows the number of farmers that received at least the minimum 
producer price. From the farmers' perspective the picture that emerges from 
this table is only slightly better compared to table 7.14. Still, the majority 
of the farmers (70 per cent of all transactions) did not receive at least the 
minimum producer price. However, there is less difference between the 
buying seasons. In spite of the change from a state-controlled marketing 
system into a more privatized marketing system, there was no significant 
positive change in the percentage of farmers who received at least the 
minimum producer price. After a slight increase in the percentage of 
farmers who received at least the minimum producer price in 1991/92, the 
percentage decreased in 1992/93. 
Table 7.15 The number of farmers paid at least according to the 
minimum producer prices, by type of produce* 
Type of produce Buying season 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 total 
abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. (in %) 
Coffee clean 6 (50.0) 54 (50.5) 37 (39.9) 97 (45.8) 
Coffee cherries 12 (26.1) 7 (14.3) 5 (4.5) 24 (11.6) 
Cocoa 45 (29.2) 15 (37.5) 86 (30.7) 146 (30.8) 
Total 63 (29.7) 76 (38.8) 128 (26.4) 267 (29.9) 
The percentages given in this table show the number of farmers in proportion to 
the total number of latest farmer and trader transactions by type of produce and 
by buying season as given in table 7.13. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
One would expect, however, that the farmers who sold their produce in the 
main urban centres at the stores of the regional wholesalers, would receive 
at least the minimum producer price. Therefore, we have analyzed the 
impact of the location of the transaction on the level of payment. Further-
more, we also describe the impact of the type of trader on the level of 
payment. 
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Table 7.16 shows that about three-quarters of all transactions took 
place in the villages. Those farmers who decided to sell coffee cherries 
and, to a lesser extent, those farmers selling cocoa, conducted business in 
their own village or in a surrounding village. With regard to the sale of 
clean coffee, it appeared that more farmers decided to sell their produce in 
one of the main urban trading centres. 
In spite of the increase of the producer prices due to increased 
competition among the various types of traders, less than one-quarter of all 
transactions took place in the main urban trading centres in the 1992/93 
buying season. Compared to the results for the 1990/91 buying season, 
there is an increase in the number of farmers who sold clean coffee in an 
urban trading centre in 1992/93. For cocoa the picture is reverse. In 
1992/93, less farmers sold their cocoa in an urban trading centre compared 
to 1990/91. 
Table 7.16 The number of transactions in the villages and the urban 
trading centres, by type of produce* 
Type of produce Buying season 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 total 
abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. (in %) 
Urban trading 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
Total 
Villages 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
Total 
centres 
4 (33.3) 
- (0) 
36 (23.4) 
40 (18.9) 
8 (66.7) 
46 (100) 
118 (76.6) 
172 (81.1) 
67 (62.6) 
7 (14.3) 
18 (42.8) 
92 (46.5) 
40 (37.4) 
42 (85.7) 
24 (57.2) 
106 (53.5) 
43 
3 
52 
98 
50 
109 
226 
385 
(46.2) 
(2.7) 
(18.7) 
(20.3) 
(53.8) 
(97.3) 
(81.3) 
(79.7) 
114 (53.8) 
10 (4.8) 
106 (22.4) 
230 (25.8) 
98 (46.2) 
197 (95.2) 
368 (77.6) 
663 (74.2) 
The percentages given in this table show the number of fanners in proportion to 
the total number of latest farmer and trader transactions by type of produce and 
by buying season as given in table 7.13. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The Marketing System at Regional Level 275 
Therefore, the increased producer prices, especially in the main urban 
centres, seemed to encourage those farmers who had clean coffee for sale, 
to travel to the urban trading centres. Farmers who are able to sell clean 
coffee might be less restricted because of loan repayment obligations to 
local lenders. Normally, the majority of the loan repayments takes place 
during the cocoa buying season. The farmers who sell coffee cherries are 
often in urgent need for money and therefore decide to sell the cherries in 
their own village. Furthermore, the transport opportunities during the coffee 
buying season, which coincides with the dry season, are better compared 
to those in the cocoa buying season, which coincides with the rainy season. 
Urban transactions 
From table 7.17 it appears that those farmers who transacted business in 
one of the major urban trading centres, were not assured of receiving the 
Table 7.17 The number of farmers paid according to the leading producer 
price and the minimum producer price in the urban trading 
centres, by type of produce* 
Type of produce 
leading producer 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
Total 
1990/91 
abs. (in %) 
price 
4 (100) 
0 
17 (47.2) 
21 (52.5) 
minimum producer price 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
Total 
4 (100) 
0 
17 (47.2) 
21 (52.5) 
Buying 
1991/92 
abs. (in %) 
10 
0 
6 
16 
33 
0 
10 
43 
(14.9) 
(37.5) 
(17.8) 
(49.3) 
(62.5) 
(47.8) 
season 
1992/93 
abs. (in %) 
10 
0 
14 
24 
25 
0 
32 
57 
(23.3) 
(25.9) 
(24.0) 
(58.1) 
(59.3) 
(57.0) 
total 
abs. 
24 
0 
37 
61 
62 
0 
59 
121 
(in %) 
(21.1) 
(0) 
(34.9) 
(26.5) 
(54.4) 
(0) 
(55.7) 
(52.6) 
The percentages given in this table show the number of fanners in proportion to 
the total number of latest fanner and trader transactions in the urban trading 
centres by type of produce and by buying season as given in table 7.16. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
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best possible producer price. 
In about 27 per cent of all transactions, the traders paid the farmers the 
current leading producer price. Table 7.17 shows that in about 53 per cent 
of all transactions the traders paid at least the minimum producer. The 
percentage of transactions the minimum producer price was not received 
decreased slightly from 47 per cent in 1990/91 to 43 per cent in 1992/93. 
The privatization of produce marketing did therefore lead to increased 
producer prices, but did not lead to an increased number of farmers who 
actually received these producer prices. 
It is also then interesting to find out which types of traders did not pay 
the minimum producer price. During the 1990/91 buying season, the 
majority of those farmers who sold their produce in the main urban trading 
centres chose a regional wholesaler as their trading partner. The regional 
wholesalers were involved in 85 per cent of all the urban-based 
transactions. Although the regional wholesalers were still obliged to pay the 
official producer price by then, they did so in only 53 per cent of the 
transactions. The regional wholesalers paid less than 75 per cent of the 
official producer price in 15 per cent of all transactions. The results for the 
1991/92 and 1992/93 buying seasons are summarized in table 7.18. 
Table 7.18 The actual prices paid by different types of traders in the 
urban trading centres in the 1991/92 and 1992/93 buying 
seasons, for all produce 
Type of trader 
Private exporter 
Regional wholesaler 
Co-operative 
Local merchant 
Sold by relatives 
Total 
m.p.p.' 
abs. (in %) 
15 (39.5) 
31 (57.4) 
30 (66.7) 
13 (40.6) 
3 (18.8) 
92 (49.7) 
75-100% 
of m.p.p.' 
abs. (in %) 
12 (31.6) 
10 (18.5) 
10 (22.2) 
12 (37.5) 
6 (37.5) 
50 (27.0) 
50-75% 
of m.p.p.' 
abs. (in %) 
6 (15.8) 
8 (14.8) 
4 (8.9) 
7 (21.9) 
5 (31.2) 
30 (16.3) 
<50% 
of m.p.p." 
abs. (in %) 
5 (13.1) 
5 (9.3) 
1 (2.2) 
-
2 (12.5) 
13 (7.0) 
total 
abs. 
38 
54 
45 
32 
16 
185 
m.p.p. = minimum producer price. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Despite the privatization of the produce trade in 1991/92, 50 per cent of the 
farmers were still not paid at least according to the minimum producer 
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price. In 23 per cent of all transactions the traders paid less than 75 per 
cent of the minimum producer price. The private exporters even had an 
worse record compared to the regional wholesalers without an export 
licence. In 60 per cent all transactions the private exporters paid less than 
the minimum producer price, and in 29 per cent they paid less than 75 per 
cent of that price. It appeared that the majority of the farmers who sold 
their produce directly to the private exporters were not better off compared 
to the sale of produce to other types of traders. In only 26 per cent of all 
transactions did the private exporters pay the leading producer price. The 
private exporters appeared to be only interested in paying the leading 
producer price to those farmers and traders who offered large amounts of 
produce. However, many farmers do not sell more than one bag of produce 
at a time. 
Those regional wholesalers who do not have an export licence are 
more interested in the smaller amounts of produce offered by the farmers. 
Moreover, they are interested in attracting as many customers as possible, 
as they have to make their profit out of the balance between the price they 
offer to the farmers and the price they receive when selling their produce 
to the private exporters. The regional wholesalers paid below the minimum 
producer price less often than the private exporters. Still, in 43 per cent of 
all transactions, the farmers received less than the minimum producer price 
and in 24 per cent, they even received less than 75 per cent of the 
minimum producer price. 
The best trading partner for farmers in the main urban centres appeared 
to be the co-operative marketing associations. In two-thirds of all 
transactions the farmers received at least the minimum producer price. In 
only 11 per cent of all transactions did the farmers receive less than 75 per 
cent of the minimum producer price. 
An interesting aspect shown in table 7.18 is the role of the farmers' 
relatives in the sale of produce. The majority of the farmers (81 per cent 
of all transactions) who asked one of their relatives to sell the produce on 
their behalf, received less than the minimum producer price. In 44 per cent 
of all transactions, these relatives showed up with less than 75 per cent of 
the minimum producer price. Apparently, they took a considerable share 
for their services. 
Village transactions 
As we have seen in table 7.16, about three-quarters of all transactions took 
place at the village level. When the farmers sold their produce in the 
villages, they had even less chance of receiving the best possible price 
compared to those farmers who were able to sell their produce in the urban 
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trading centres. Table 7.19 shows the number of farmers who were paid at 
least the minimum producer price and the bush price in the villages. It 
appears that those farmers who sold their produce in the villages were less 
assured receiving the minimum producer price compared to the farmers 
who sold their produce in one of the urban trading centres. In about 22 per 
cent of all village transactions, the traders paid the farmers at least 
according to the current minimum producer price. The farmers had less 
chance receiving the minimum producer price for cocoa compared to the 
sale of clean coffee. 
Table 7.19 The number of farmers paid according to the minimum 
producer price and the bush price in the villages, by type of 
produce* 
Type of produce 
1990/91 
abs. (in %) 
minimum producer price 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
Total 
bush price 
Coffee clean 
Coffee cherries 
Cocoa 
Total 
3 (37.5) 
12 (26.1) 
28 (23.7) 
43 (25.0) 
4 (50.0) 
22 (47.8) 
48 (40.7) 
74 (43.0) 
Buying 
1991/92 
abs. (in %) 
21 
7 
5 
33 
31 
16 
8 
55 
(52.5) 
(16.7) 
(20.8) 
(31.1) 
(77.5) 
(38.1) 
(33.3) 
(51.9) 
season 
1992/93 
abs. (in %) 
12 
5 
54 
71 
21 
21 
103 
145 
(24.0) 
(4.6) 
(23.9) 
(18.4) 
(42.0) 
(19.3) 
(45.6) 
(37.6) 
total 
abs. (in %) 
36 (36.7) 
24 (12.2) 
87 (23.6) 
147 (22.2) 
56 (57.1) 
59 (30.0) 
159 (43.2) 
274 (41.3) 
The percentages given in this table show the number of farmers in proportion to 
the total number of latest farmer and trader transactions in the villages centres by 
type of produce and by buying season as given in table 7.16. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
During the cocoa harvesting season, many farmers are in urgent need of 
money to buy food. Therefore, they often sell their cocoa to the first trader 
who visits their village and accept any price they receive for their produce. 
Moreover, the farmers often take a loan from a trader before the cocoa 
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harvesting season in return for the sale of cocoa to that particular trader. 
During the coffee harvesting season, the farmers are in less urgent need of 
money and have more opportunities to choose a trader who pays the best 
price. As we have seen in table 7.16, the farmers decide more often to sell 
their coffee in the urban trading centres. The majority of cocoa 
transactions, however, takes place in the villages. 
When the results of the different buying seasons are compared, we can 
conclude that after the privatization of the produce trade, there was no 
significant increase in the number of farmers who received at least the 
minimum producer price. For the farmers selling coffee, the first year of 
privatization showed promising results. However by the second year, their 
chances of receiving at least the minimum producer price had dropped to 
levels similar to those experienced by cocoa producers, in spite of an 
increase of traders entering the produce buying business. 
When we take the bush prices into account, it appears from table 7.19 
that, over the three years, only 41 per cent of the farmers received at least 
the bush price. Therefore, we can conclude that in about 59 per cent of all 
village transactions the farmers were underpaid and did not receive a fair 
price for their produce. Farmers selling clean coffee had a better chance of 
receiving the bush price compared to cocoa farmers, and those selling 
coffee cherries. 
The comparison of the different buying seasons shows similar results 
for the transactions where farmers received at least a minimum producer 
price. After the privatization of produce trade, apart from a temporary 
increase for clean coffee sales in 1991/92, there was no significant increase 
in the number of farmers who received at least the bush price for their 
produce. 
The next question to be asked is what percentage of traders actually 
pay the minimum producer price or the bush price at the village level. The 
results for the 1990/91 buying season have been summarized in table 7.20. 
The majority of those farmers who sold their produce in the villages 
choose an itinerant petty trader or local merchant as their trading partner. 
Although the local merchants, as agents of regional wholesalers, were 
obliged to pay the official producer price in 1990/91, they only did so in 
35 percent of all village transactions. Several factors might contribute to 
the merchants' decision to pay less than the official producer price. The 
most important one was the low commission they received from the 
regional wholesalers to cover their trading expenses and to earn some 
profit. Furthermore, the farmers were not aware of the official producer 
prices and weight measurements. Moreover, there was no control over the 
measurement and price calculation. 
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Table 7.20 The actual prices paid by different types of traders in the 
villages for the 1990/91 buying season 
Type of trader Minimum Bush > 50% < 50% Total 
producer price of bush of bush 
price price price 
abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. (in %) abs. 
Itinerant trader 13 (15.3) 11 (12.9) 32 (37.7) 29 (34.1) 85 
Local merchant 25 (35.2) 20 (28.2) 21 (29.6) 5 (7.0) 71 
Wholesaler 1 - 3 - 4 
Sold by relatives 2 - 1 - 3 
Unknown 1 1 8 - 10 
Total 42 (24.3) 32 (18.5) 65 (37.6) 34 (19.6) 173 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Itinerant petty traders paid the official producer price in only IS per cent 
of all transactions. The petty traders work independently and indeed had to 
pay less than the official producer price in order to cover their trading 
expenses and to make some profit. Those petty traders who were able to 
pay the official producer price, could do so because they received some 
capital to purchase on behalf of the local merchants in return for a small 
reward, such as bags of rice or a fixed amount of cash. If one takes the 
bush price into account, however, it appears that the local merchants still 
paid less than the bush price in 37 per cent of all transactions. Petty traders 
paid less than the bush price in 72 per cent of all transactions. This would 
mean that the farmers had more chance of receiving at least the bush price, 
if they could sell their produce to a local merchant. 
When we compare the results of the last year of state-controlled 
produce, shown in table 7.20, with the results for the first two years of 
privatized produce buying, as shown in table 7.21, we can make the 
following remarks with regard to the prices paid at village level by several 
types of traders. 
As far as the total figures are concerned, it appears that, since the 
privatization of the produce trade, no major changes have occurred in the 
number of transactions where farmers received the minimum producer price 
or at least the bush price. In spite of the privatization of the produce trade, 
numerous traders paid less than the bush price to the farmers. Sixty per 
cent of the farmers did not receive the bush price as compared to 57 per 
cent in the year before. 
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Table 7.21 The actual prices paid by different types of traders in the 
villages for the 1991/92 and 1992/93 buying seasons 
Type of trader 
Itinerant trader 
Local merchant 
Co-operative 
Wholesaler 
Sold by relatives 
Unknown 
Total 
Minimum 
producer 
pnce 
abs. (in %) 
39 (12.6) 
15 (19.0) 
42 (65.6) 
7 (26.9) 
-
1 
104 (21.1) 
Bush 
price 
abs. (in %) 
61 (19.7) 
21 (26.6) 
9 (14.1) 
4 (15.4) 
-
-
95 (19.3) 
>50% 
of bush 
pnce 
abs. (in %) 
145 (46.8) 
37 (46.8) 
11 (17.2) 
12 (46.2) 
2 
6 
213 (43.3) 
<50% 
of bush 
pnce 
abs. (in %) 
5 (20.9) 
6 (7.6) 
2 (3.1) 
3 (11.5) 
-
4 
80 (16.3) 
Total 
abs. 
310 
79 
64 
26 
2 
11 
492 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
For the farmers who sold their produce to itinerant petty traders the 
chances of receiving at least the bush price were even less. The percentage 
of the farmers who received less than the bush price decreased only 
slightly from 72 per cent in the final year of state-controlled produce 
buying to 67 per cent since the privatization of the produce trade. 
One would expect, however, that the farmers would be better off if they 
could sell their produce to a local merchant. Due to the increased 
competition among local merchants, as agents of regional wholesalers, one 
would expect higher producer prices to be paid to the farmers. On the 
contrary, since privatization, local merchants paid less than the bush price 
in 54 per cent of all transactions compared to 37 per cent in the previous 
season. The local merchants and the petty traders continued to take 
advantage of the fact that the farmers had little knowledge of the current 
producer prices32. 
It appeared that, since the privatization of the produce trade, the 
farmers had the best opportunities for receiving the minimum producer 
price at the village level when they sold their produce at one of the co-
operative run Village Marketing Centers. At these Centers, the farmers 
Although the price knowledge of the current producer prices among the petty 
traders and local merchants is better compared to the farmers' price knowledge, 
38 per cent of the petty traders and local merchants had no idea of the current 
producer prices at the time of the interview. 
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were informed of the current minimum producer prices and the weighing 
procedures. The measuring equipment consisted of platform scales and 
hanging scales instead of the inaccurate three-pence pans used by the 
majority of the petty traders and local merchants. 
So far, we have analyzed the prices paid by the traders irrespective of the 
type of produce concerned. When we take the different types of produce 
into account, it appears that, since the privatization of the produce trade, 
farmers who sold clean coffee had better chances of receiving a reasonable 
remuneration for their produce compared to the sale of coffee cherries and 
cocoa. Table 7.22 shows the producer prices paid by different types of 
traders differentiated by type of produce. 
The itinerant petty traders and the local merchants offered better prices 
for clean coffee than they did for coffee cherries and cocoa. The petty 
traders must have been aware of the fact that the farmers in the coffee 
buying season are less pressed for cash or food. Those farmers who sell 
their produce in cherries might not have the time, money or labour to 
process the coffee. Petty traders and, to a lesser extent, the local merchants, 
immediately take advantage of this by offering lower prices. 
The itinerant petty traders particularly offered lower prices for cocoa 
than the bush price (66 per cent of all transactions), compared to the clean 
coffee sales (51 per cent). The farmers had more opportunities for getting 
at least the bush price when they sold their produce to one of the local 
merchants. Again, the best option for the farmers was to sell their cocoa 
to a co-operative. However, as we see in the next chapter, for various 
reasons the majority of the farmers still decided to sell their cocoa to one 
of the itinerant petty traders. One important reason is the fact that these 
petty traders are often the only source of credit for the farmers. When the 
farmers sold their produce in order to repay a loan, there was a risk that 
they would not receive either the bush price or the minimum producer 
price. 
Out of the 893 transactions on which we have received price 
information, 198 transactions were conducted in order to repay a loan. As 
we have seen in chapter 5, however, the majority of the loan repayments 
consists of the sale of produce and the deduction of the loan from the value 
of the produce. The transactions in table 7.23 consist only of those loan 
repayments where a certain amount of money or rice should be paid back 
with a fixed amount of produce. In 12 transactions the sale of produce to 
repay a loan took place in one of main urban trading centres. This shows 
that it was more difficult for the farmers to obtain loans from the regional 
wholesalers in the main urban trading centres. 
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Table 7.22 The actual prices paid by traders in the villages in the 1991/92 
and 1992/93 buying seasons, by type of produce 
Type of trader 
Coffee cherries 
Itinerant trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Sold by relatives 
Unknown 
Total 
Clean coffee 
Itinerant trader 
Local merchant 
Co-operative 
Wholesaler 
Total 
Cocoa 
Itinerant trader 
Local merchant 
Co-operative 
Wholesaler 
Sold by relatives 
Unknown 
Total 
Minimum 
producer 
pnce 
abs. (in %) 
7 (6.5) 
3 (8.3) 
1 
11 (7.2) 
12 (29.3) 
5 (26.3) 
15 (62.5) 
33 (36.7) 
20 (12.4) 
8 (29.6) 
26 (70.3) 
5 (29.5) 
1 
60 (24.0) 
Bush 
price 
abs. (in %) 
18 (16.7) 
8 (22.2) 
26 (17.1) 
8 (19.5) 
5 (26.3) 
4 (16.7) 
1 
18 (20.0) 
35 (21.7) 
8 (29.6) 
5 (13.5) 
3 (17.6) 
51 (20.4) 
>50% 
of bush 
pnce 
abs. (in %) 
55 (50.9) 
20 (55.6) 
2 
1 
2 
80 (52.6) 
17 (41.5) 
8 (42.1) 
4 (16.7) 
4 
33 (36.7) 
73 (45.3) 
10 (37.1) 
6 (16.2) 
6 (35.3) 
1 
4 
100 (40.0) 
<50% 
of bush 
pnce 
abs. (in %) 
28 (25.9) 
5 (13.9) 
2 
35 (23.0) 
4 (9.8) 
1 (5.3) 
1 (4.2) 
6 (6.6) 
33 (20.5) 
1 (3.7) 
3 (17.6) 
2 
39 (15.6) 
Total 
abs. 
108 
36 
3 
1 
4 
152 
41 
19 
24 
6 
90 
161 
27 
37 
17 
1 
7 
250 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The petty traders were involved in 73 per cent of all loan repayment 
transactions conducted in the villages, and the local merchants were 
involved in 20 per cent. The pnces that traders paid to farmers repaying 
loans with a fixed amount of produce are shown table 7.23. More than two-
thirds of the farmers received less than the bush price when they repaid 
their loan. Those farmers who repaid their loan with the sale of cocoa had 
the least chance of receiving the bush price. In 44 per cent of these 
transactions, the farmers received less than 50 per cent of the bush price. 
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Table 7.23 The actual prices paid by the traders for loan repayment in the 
villages, by type of produce 
Type of trader 
Cocoa 
Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Unknown 
Total 
Coffee cherries 
Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Unknown 
Total 
Coffee clean 
Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Total 
Total produce 
Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Unknown 
Total 
Minimum 
producer 
price 
abs. (in %) 
8 
1 
2 
1 
12 (16.9) 
8 
5 
1 
14 (14.7) 
2 
3 
5 (25.0) 
18 (13.3) 
9 (23.7) 
2 
2 
31 (16.7) 
Bush 
price 
abs. (in %) 
1 
1 
2 (2.8) 
14 
6 
20 (21.1) 
3 
1 
4 (20.0) 
18 (13.3) 
7 (18.4) 
1 
26 (14.0) 
>50% 
of bush 
price 
abs. (in %) 
14 
7 
3 
2 
26 
21 
9 
1 
1 
32 
4 
3 
7 
39 
19 
4 
3 
65 
(36.6) 
(33.7) 
(35.0) 
(28.9) 
(50.0) 
(34.9) 
<50% 
of bush 
price 
abs. (in %) 
28 
2 
1 
31 
28 
1 
29 
4 
4 
60 
3 
1 
64 
(43.7) 
(30.5) 
(20.0) 
(44.5) 
(7.9) 
(34.4) 
Total 
abs. 
51 
10 
7 
3 
71 
71 
21 
1 
2 
95 
13 
7 
20 
135 
38 
8 
5 
186 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
In 23 per cent of these transactions, the farmers borrowed a certain amount 
of rice in return for the same amount of cocoa. Compared to the value of 
one bag of rice, this resulted in a producer price for cocoa of about 50 per 
cent of the bush price. Those farmers who took a loan in return for coffee 
cherries had slightly better chances of receiving at least the bush price. In 
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30 per cent of all these transactions, the farmers received less than 50 per 
cent of the bush price. Those farmers who took a certain amount of rice as 
a loan and repaid the loan with the same amount in coffee cherries, 
received a reasonable producer price. Compared to the value of one bag of 
rice, this resulted in a producer price for coffee cherries which was 
between the bush price and the minimum producer price. In 46 transactions 
(48 per cent), the farmers took a loan in the form of rice and repaid the 
loan with a certain amount of coffee cherries. In 30 transactions the amount 
of rice borrowed equalled the amount of coffee cherries repaid. 
The farmers who took a loan in return for clean coffee, had a better 
chance of receiving at least the bush price. However, in only 11 per cent 
of all transactions, did the farmers repay their loan with clean coffee. The 
majority of the farmers preferred to repay their loan with coffee cherries 
to avoid the burden of hulling the coffee. 
To conclude, only one-third of the farmers who took a loan which they 
had to repay with an agreed amount of produce, were able to receive at 
least the bush price for their produce. Petty traders were often the only 
source of credit which resulted in producer prices which were far below the 
bush prices. 
7.3.4 Conclusions 
In this section we have tried to answer the question whether the 
privatization of the produce trade in Sierra Leone has indeed led to better 
and correct payment to the farmers by the produce buyers. In general, we 
may conclude that, in spite of an increased competition among various 
types of traders, the majority of the farmers did not receive the correct 
price for their produce according to either the current leading produce price 
or the minimum producer price in the urban trading centres, or the 
minimum producer price or the bush price in the villages. 
From the various test sales which were conducted in the urban trading 
centres, it appears that inaccurate weighing procedures are common among 
all types of traders. Furthermore, numerous traders, either deliberately or 
not, miscalculated the correct price for the produce. This meant that, even 
if the trader stated the correct producer price per pound, it was not 
guaranteed that the farmers would actually receive that correct price. 
Since the privatization of the produce trade, the highest producer price 
the farmers might obtain is the leading producer price paid by the private 
exporters in the urban trading centres. However, only 9 per cent of all 
farmers who sold their produce in one of the urban trading centres actually 
286 Who Pays the Price? 
received a remuneration for their produce according to the leading producer 
price at the time of the transaction in 1992/93. In 1990/91, the final year 
of state-controlled produce trade, 30 per cent of the farmers were able to 
receive the leading producer price, which was, at that time the official 
producer price set by the government33. 
If one takes the minimum producer price into account, it appeared that, 
in the urban trading centres in 1992/93, 37 per cent of all farmers did not 
receive even a price according to the current minimum producer price34. 
The farmers had the best chance of being paid at least according to the 
minimum producer price if they sold their produce to a co-operative. In 
general, although the producer prices are at a higher level in the urban 
trading centres compared to transactions which took place in the villages, 
numerous farmers appear to have difficulties in receiving these higher 
producer prices. 
The largest group of traders involved in produce buying in the urban 
trading centres are the regional wholesalers, a few of whom became private 
exporters following the privatization of the produce trade. In 1990/91, the 
regional wholesalers were involved in 85 per cent of all transactions. They 
paid the official producer price in only 53 per cent of all transactions they 
carried out. Since privatization, no significant changes have occurred in the 
level of underpayment by the traders. Sixty per cent of the farmers received 
less than the minimum producer price when they sold their produce to a 
private exporter. When the fanners sold their produce to the remaining 
regional wholesalers without an export licence, 43 per cent did not receive 
the minimum producer price. The best trading partners for the farmers in 
the urban trading centres are the co-operatives. Although the co-operatives 
were not able to pay the leading producer price, they paid the minimum 
producer price, in 67 per cent of all transactions. 
More than two-thirds of the farmers, however, sold their produce at the 
village level. The main types of traders who purchase at the village level 
are the petty traders and local merchants. Since the establishment of the 
Village Marketing Centers, the co-operatives have become major produce 
buyers outside the urban trading centres. Inaccurate weighing procedures 
33
 When we take the information, obtained by interviewing the farmers, into 
account, it appears that in 1990/91, 52 per cent were paid according to the 
official producer price and in 1992/93, 24 per cent were paid according to the 
leading producer price. 
34
 From the farmers' interviews it became clear that 43 per cent did not receive a 
price equivalent to at least the minimum producer price in the urban trading 
centres. 
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and miscalculation of the price according to the current producer prices at 
village level was common among the petty traders, local merchants and, to 
a lesser extent, the clerks of the co-operatives. 
Assuming that the best price the farmers might get in the villages is 
a price calculated according to the current minimum producer price, it 
appears that in the last year of state-controlled marketing, 25 per cent of 
all farmers received the minimum producer price (which was, at that time, 
the official producer price set by government). In 1992/93, after the 
privatization, fewer farmers (18 per cent) received the minimum producer 
price in the villages. The local merchants would be expected to pay the 
minimum producer price. However in 1992/93, only 19 per cent of the 
merchants did so, compared to 37 per cent in 1990/91. Farmers selling 
their produce to the Village Marketing Center had the best chances of 
receiving the minimum producer price. In 65 per cent of all transactions 
conducted at a Village Marketing Center, co-operatives paid at least the 
minimum producer price. The farmers who sold their produce to a petty 
trader had the least chance of receiving the minimum producer, only 15 per 
cent did so in 1990/91 and 13 per cent in 1992/93. 
Assuming that the farmers should get at least the bush price in the 
villages it appears that, in 1992/93, 62 per cent of the farmers did not 
receive even the bush price, as compared to 57 per cent in the last year of 
the state-controlled produce buying. In 1990/91, the petty traders paid less 
than the bush price in 72 per cent of all transactions. After the 
privatization, there were no improvements for the farmers, and 68 per cent 
were still underpaid by the petty traders. Those farmers who sold their 
produce to local merchants faced serious underpayment. In 1990/91,37 per 
cent of the farmers selling their produce to local merchants received less 
than the bush price. After the privatization, the situation worsened with 54 
per cent of the local merchants underpaying the farmers. 
When we take the different types of produce sold in the village into 
account, it appeared that those farmers who sold clean coffee, in general, 
had a better chance of receiving at least the bush price or the minimum 
producer price. Since the privatization, in 43 per cent of all clean coffee 
sales the farmers received less than the bush price as compared to 56 per 
cent of all cocoa sales. As we will see in the next chapter, the majority of 
the farmers sold their cocoa to petty traders while in the case of clean 
coffee sales, farmers more often sold their clean coffee to other traders for 
a variety of reasons. One of those reasons, mentioned here, is the 
obligation of some farmers to repay a loan with a fixed amount of produce. 
In the latter case, it appeared that about two-thirds of the farmers received 
less than the bush price when they repaid a loan. 
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Although there is more competition since the privatization of the 
produce trade, the majority of the farmers are still not paid according to the 
current producer prices. This applies to the farmers who sold their produce 
in the urban trading centres as well as to those farmers who sold their 
produce in the villages. The only advantages the farmers in the urban 
trading centres have, are the higher producer prices per pound as stated by 
several types of traders and better chances of being paid according to the 
minimum producer price. We have seen that the chances for the farmers to 
receive a reasonable remuneration differ according to the type of agents 
used. In the next chapter we describe the choices of trader and location 
made by the farmers and look at the reasons behind these marketing 
decisions. 
8 
The Marketing Behaviour of Coffee and Cocoa 
Producers 
Frank Sellies and Jos Wanders 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that the prices the farmers receive 
for their produce can vary considerably. The actual received prices vary not 
only between the villages and the urban trading centres but also between 
the different types of traders that have been identified. In general, the 
farmers had a better chance of receiving the leading producer prices when 
they were able to sell their produce in the urban trading centres to private 
exporters or other regional wholesalers. Furthermore, the co-operatives 
appeared to be good trading partners for the farmers, especially in those 
areas where the co-operatives bought produce through the Village 
Marketing Centers. 
In this chapter, we analyze the reasons why not all farmers receive the 
current leading producer price at the time of transaction. In chapter 1 we 
already identified several factors which could function as explanations for 
the occurrence of underpayment. We assumed that the factors "distance", 
"amount of produce", "credit relations", "social relations" and "education" 
all play a role in the explanation of the differences in the prices received. 
These factors determine, to a certain extent, the type of trader chosen by 
the farmer, or the location where the produce might be sold. We first 
describe where and to whom the farmers sold their produce. Second, based 
on the farmers' choice of trading partner, we describe and analyze the 
above mentioned factors which influence the marketing behaviour of the 
farmers. 
8.1 The choice of trader 
When describing the farmers' choice of type of trader and place of 
transaction, we make a distinction between the 1990/91 and 1992/93 
buying seasons and, where necessary, the differences between the sale of 
clean coffee, cherry coffee and cocoa are taken into account. 
During the 1990/91 buying season, we were able to obtain information 
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on 448 transactions. Table 8.1 shows that these transactions can be divided 
in 194 cocoa transactions and 254 coffee transactions. The largest group of 
transactions is between farmers and petty traders. In about 40 per cent of 
all transactions, the farmers decided to sell their produce to petty traders. 
Then, about 31 per cent of all transactions occurred between farmers and 
regional wholesalers. The third largest group of 26 per cent of all 
transactions was between the farmers and local merchants, who were 
mainly agents of regional wholesalers. 
Table 8.1 Coffee and cocoa transactions, by type of trader, 1990/91 (in 
percentages) 
Type of trader 
Petty traders 
Local merchants" 
Wholesalers" 
Co-operatives 
Unknown"" 
N 
Cocoa 
41.2 
26.3 
27.8 
1.0 
3.6 
194 
Coffee 
37.8 
26.0 
34.3 
0.4 
1.6 
254 
All transactions 
39.3 
26.1 
31.5 
0.7 
2.5 
448 
Mainly agents of private exporters or other regional wholesalers. 
Regional wholesalers including private exporters. 
These farmers either sold to traders they did not know, or somebody else sold the 
produce for them. 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
There appeared to be no major differences in the choice of trader between 
the coffee and cocoa transactions. Farmers selling coffee, sold their 
produce slightly more often to regional wholesalers and slightly less often 
to petty traders, than farmers selling cocoa. However, there are 
considerable differences between those selling clean coffee and those 
selling coffee cherries. Table 8.2 shows that 63 per cent of farmers selling 
coffee cherries sold to petty traders, compared to 19 per cent of farmers 
with clean coffee. 
Clean coffee was most often sold to wholesalers. Coffee in the form 
of cherries is usually sold in villages, and not transported to the urban 
buying centres, because its price is too low to be offset against the 
transport costs. Because petty traders and merchants are mostly active at 
the local level, it is not surprising that these two types of traders account 
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for more than 90 per cent of the cherry coffee transactions. 
Table 8.2 Cherry coffee and clean coffee transactions, by type of trader, 
1990/91 (in percentages) 
Type of trader 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
Cherries 
63.9 
27.8 
7.4 
-
0.9 
108 
Clean 
18.3 
24.7 
54.1 
0.7 
2.0 
146 
All Coffee 
37.8 
26.0 
34.3 
0.4 
1.6 
254 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
As we have mentioned before, there are significant differences in the 
producer prices depending on the location of transaction. In table 8.3 we 
distinguish between the transactions that took place in the farmers' home 
village or a nearby village and those that took place in one of the urban 
trading centres. 
Table 8 J 
Location 
Village 
Urban trading 
Unknown 
N 
Locations of transactions of 
coffee, 
centre 
cocoa, cherry 
1990/91 (in percentages) 
Cocoa 
62.4 
37.1 
0.5 
194 
Cheiries 
91.7 
8.3 
-
108 
Clean 
40.4 
58.9 
0.7 
146 
coffee and clean 
All transactions 
62.2 
37.3 
0.5 
448 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
Clearly, the majority of the farmers chose to sell their cocoa in their own 
village or a nearby village, cherry coffee especially is predominantly sold 
in the villages. Clean coffee, on the other hand, is mostly sold in the urban 
trading centres. In general, it appears that in more than two-thirds of all 
transactions the farmers sold their produce in the village. This meant that 
the majority of the farmers had less chance of receiving at least the 
minimum producer price. 
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During the 1992/93 buying season, we obtained information on 597 
transactions. Table 8.4 shows that these can be divided into 241 cocoa 
transactions and 356 coffee transactions. Compared to the 1990/91 buying 
season, the largest group, of 35 per cent of all transactions, was still 
between farmers and petty traders although more farmers seemed to have 
chosen another type of trader. Again, about 30 per cent of all transactions 
was conducted between farmers and regional wholesalers. Significantly 
fewer transactions were conducted between local merchants and the 
farmers. Instead, more farmers opted for the co-operatives as their trading 
partner. 
Table 8.4 Coffee and cocoa transactions, by type of trader, 1992/93 (in 
percentages) 
Type of trader 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
Cocoa 
37.3 
11.2 
30.3 
17.8 
3.3 
241 
Coffee 
32.6 
18.5 
29.8 
15.7 
3.4 
356 
All transactions 
34.5 
15.6 
30.0 
16.6 
3.4 
597 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The increase in transactions between the co-operatives and the farmers is 
due to the shift of our research area in 1992, to include Nongowa 
Chiefdom which contains several Village Marketing Centers run by a co-
operative. These Village Marketing Centers have become strong 
competitors for the local merchants and itinerant petty traders. 
There appeared to be no major differences in the choice of trader 
between the coffee and cocoa transactions. Only slightly more farmers sold 
their coffee to local merchants compared to those selling cocoa. This might 
be explained by the fact that more local merchants, as agents of regional 
wholesalers, are active in the villages, especially in the coffee buying 
season when the villages are more accessible and farmers are less pressed 
to sell their produce to the first trader they meet in the village. 
When we, again, differentiate the coffee transactions into cherry coffee 
and clean coffee transactions, it appears from table 8.5 that, as in 1990/91, 
the majority of the farmers selling coffee cherries choose a petty trader as 
their trading partner. For the farmers selling clean coffee the most favoured 
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trading partner was a regional wholesaler. 
Table 8.5 Cherry coffee and clean coffee transactions, by type of trader, 
1992/93 (in percentages) 
Type of trader 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
Cherries 
61.4 
26.0 
5.5 
3.1 
3.9 
127 
Clean 
16.6 
14.4 
43.2 
22.7 
3.1 
229 
All Coffee 
32.6 
18.5 
29.8 
15.7 
3.4 
356 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Furthermore, it appears that the co-operatives prefer to buy the clean coffee 
instead of the cherry coffee, to avoid the labour and costs involved in 
hulling the cherries. 
Table 8.6 Locations of transactions of cocoa, cherry coffee and clean 
coffee, 1992/93 (in percentages) 
Location 
Village 
Urban trading centre 
Unknown 
N 
Cocoa 
64.8 
34.4 
0.8 
241 
Cherries 
93.7 
5.5 
0.8 
127 
Clean 
44.0 
55.6 
0.4 
229 
All transactions 
63.0 
36.3 
0.7 
597 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Table 8.6 shows the locations of the transactions carried out in 1992/93. 
There are no major differences with the period 1990/91. About two-thirds 
of all transactions took place in the villages. In areas where Village 
Marketing Centers have been established, the percentage of transactions 
which take place in the villages may have increased because of the 
improved opportunities the farmers have for selling their produce in the 
villages for at least the minimum producer price. Therefore, although, in 
general, the majority of the transactions still took place in the villages, this 
does not necessarily mean that all farmers had less chance of receiving at 
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least the minimum producer price. Farmers nearby a co-operative 
Marketing Center have more options than those farmers in areas without 
a co-operative Marketing Center. 
8.2 The farmers' choice and accessibility 
In section 8.1 we presented the farmers' choice of a trader, regardless of 
their location. This means that we have not differentiated the farmers 
according to the relative distance of their villages to the urban trading 
centres. 
In section 7.1.2, we have distinguished three categories of villages 
according to accessibility, comparatively high, medium and low accessible 
villages. The accessibility of the villages may have an impact on the 
farmers' decision of where to sell his produce. Traders also consider the 
distance to the villages and the transport opportunities in their choice of 
where to purchase produce. Table 8.7 shows the coffee and cocoa 
transactions that were conducted in medium and low accessible villages in 
1990/91'. 
At first, we expected more farmers in low accessible villages to choose 
a petty trader as trading partner, compared to medium accessible villages, 
because petty traders are more active in remote, inaccessible areas. 
However, it appears that there are no major differences in the percentage 
of transactions conducted with petty traders in either medium or low 
accessible villages. The local merchants, who have more or less the same 
purchase characteristics as the petty traders, are a more favoured trading 
partner for the farmers in the low accessible areas. Since more local 
merchants had become agents of regional wholesalers they could extend 
their area of operation and also visited the more remote villages. 
When we aggregate the number of transactions conducted with petty 
traders and local merchants, we see that 71 per cent of all transactions in 
the low accessible villages are between farmers and petty traders or local 
merchants. In the medium accessible villages, more farmers decided to sell 
their produce directly to the wholesalers. Therefore, the share of 
transactions between farmers and locally active traders in medium 
accessible villages decreased to 61 per cent of all transactions. The farmers 
in medium accessible areas seem to have more opportunities to choose a 
None of the villages selected for our research in 1990/91, could be categorized 
as well accessible villages. 
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trading partner other than petty traders and local merchants. However, the 
majority of the farmers in the medium accessible villages still sold their 
produce to petty traders or local merchants. This indicates that other 
factors, apart from distance between village and trading centre, play a role 
in the farmers' choice of trading partner and location. 
Table 8.7 Coffee and cocoa transactions by type of trader in medium 
and low accessible villages, 1990/91 (in percentages) 
Type of trader 
medium accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
low accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
Cocoa 
46.1 
18.6 
29.4 
2.0 
3.9 
102 
35.9 
34.8 
26.1 
-
3.3 
92 
Coffee 
38.1 
19.4 
41.0 
-
1.4 
139 
36.5 
34.8 
26.1 
0.9 
1.7 
115 
All transactions 
41.5 
19.1 
36.1 
0.8 
2.5 
241 
36.2 
34.8 
26.1 
0.5 
2.4 
207 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
A different picture emerges from table 8.8, when the coffee transactions are 
differentiated into clean and cherry coffee transactions. So far, we have 
concluded that the trade in cherry coffee was the domain of the petty 
traders, but from table 8.8 it becomes clear that the local merchants are 
also ready to purchase cherries from farmers in the more remote villages. 
Both petty traders and local merchants increase their market share for clean 
and cherry coffee when the farmers are located in more remote or 
inaccessible villages. The wholesalers, in their turn, are more dependent on 
the farmers in the medium accessible villages who decide to sell their clean 
coffee in the urban trading centres more often than their colleagues in the 
more remote villages. 
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Table 8.8 Cherry coffee and clean coffee transactions by type of trader 
in medium and low accessible villages, 1990/91 (in 
percentages) 
Type of trader 
medium accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
low accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
Cherries 
74.5 
17.7 
5.9 
-
2.0 
51 
52.6 
38.6 
8.9 
-
-
57 
Clean 
17.1 
20.5 
61.3 
-
1.1 
88 
20.7 
31.0 
43.2 
1.7 
3.5 
58 
All Coffee 
38.1 
19.4 
41.0 
-
1.4 
139 
36.5 
34.8 
26.1 
0.9 
1.7 
115 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
We can observe the same pattern in table 8.9, which shows where farmers 
from medium and low accessible villages sold their produce. When we 
compare all transactions, we see that farmers living in low accessible 
villages sold their produce more often in their own village or one nearby. 
Farmers from more remote areas, who were selling cherry coffee, sold their 
produce more often in urban trading centres. However, one should note that 
there are only seven cherry coffee transactions made by farmers from low 
accessible villages in the urban trading centres. Of these seven, four 
transactions consisted of large amounts of more than six bags of coffee 
cherries. This explains why it became worthwhile for the farmers to travel 
to an urban trading centre and sell the produce to a regional wholesaler. 
So far, we have described the influence of the degree of accessibility of the 
villages on the farmers' choice of trader in 1991/92. The villages selected 
in 1992/93 can also be classified into three categories of accessibility. 
Table 8.10 shows the coffee and cocoa transactions that were conducted 
between traders and farmers from high, medium and low accessible villages. 
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Table 8.9 Locations of transactions of cocoa, cherry coffee and clean 
coffee by farmers from medium and low accessible villages, 
1990/91 (in percentages) 
Location Cocoa 
medium accessible villages 
Village 59.8 
Urban trading centre 39.2 
Unknown 1.0 
N 102 
low accessible villages 
Village 65.3 
Urban trading centre 34.8 
Unknown 
N 92 
Cherries 
96.1 
3.9 
51 
87.7 
12.3 
57 
Clean 
35.3 
64.8 
88 
48.2 
50 
1.7 
58 
All transactions 
58.5 
41.1 
0.4 
241 
66.7 
32.9 
0.5 
207 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
Compared to the 1990/91 buying season, the results for all transactions 
between farmers and petty traders seem to be more in line with our 
expectations. The farmers from remote villages chose a petty trader as 
trading partner more often, than the farmers with better access to the urban 
trading centres. When we differentiate the transactions for coffee and 
cocoa, it appears that relatively more farmers decided to sell their cocoa to 
a petty trader than those selling coffee. The distance to the urban trading 
centres seems to play a more obstructive role when farmers have to sell 
cocoa, compared to coffee. However, the difference in the percentages 
between the coffee and cocoa sales to petty traders might also be caused 
by the fact that during the buying season for cocoa the farmers are in more 
urgent need of money. This might also influence their preference for a 
petty trader, who is always around in the village and normally can satisfy 
the farmers' urgent cash needs. 
No significant differences can be observed between the percentages of 
transactions that were conducted between farmers from different accessible 
villages and wholesalers. It seems that the remoteness of the village did not 
play a vital role in the decision of the farmer to sell his produce to a 
wholesaler. However, one should note that the majority of the Village 
Marketing Centers run by co-operatives were located nearby or in a highly 
accessible village. This could mean that farmers who normally sold their 
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produce to wholesalers in the urban trading centres, decided to sell their 
produce in one of these nearby Marketing Centers. 
Table 8.10 Coffee and cocoa transactions by farmers from high, medium 
and low accessible villages, by type of trader, 1992/93 (in 
percentages) 
Type of trader 
high accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
medium accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
low accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
Cocoa 
29.0 
13.2 
34.2 
19.7 
4.0 
76 
42.3 
11.5 
24.1 
18.3 
3.9 
104 
44.7 
8.2 
30.7 
14.8 
1.6 
61 
Coffee 
23.7 
18.4 
34.2 
21.1 
2.6 
114 
31.9 
22.3 
28.7 
14.0 
3.2 
157 
39.3 
11.8 
32.4 
11.8 
4.7 
85 
All transactions 
25.8 
16.3 
34.2 
20.5 
3.2 
190 
36.0 
18.0 
26.8 
15.7 
3.5 
261 
41.3 
10.3 
32.1 
13.0 
3.4 
146 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Looking at the coffee and cocoa transactions between farmers and 
wholesalers separately, it appears that there are no significant differences 
in the percentages of farmers living in remote areas and those living closer 
to the urban trading centres. The distance to the urban trading centres 
seems to play a minor role in the farmers' decision to sell both coffee and 
cocoa to a wholesaler. Apart from the differences between coffee and 
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cocoa transactions, table 8.11 also shows the differences between clean 
coffee and cherry coffee transactions conducted by farmers from villages 
with different degrees of accessibility. 
Table 8.11 Cherry coffee and clean coffee transactions by farmers from 
high, medium and low accessible villages, by type of trader, 
1992/93 (in percentages) 
Type of trader 
high accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Agents 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
medium accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Agents 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
low accessible villages 
Petty traders 
Agents 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
Cherries 
63.0 
29.6 
3.7 
-
3.7 
27 
56.5 
32.3 
4.8 
-
6.5 
62 
65.8 
13.2 
10.5 
10.5 
-
38 
Clean 
11.5 
14.9 
43.7 
27.6 
2.3 
87 
15.8 
15.8 
43.2 
23.2 
1.1 
95 
27.7 
10.6 
40.4 
12.8 
8.5 
47 
All Coffee 
23.7 
18.4 
34.2 
21.1 
2.6 
114 
31.9 
22.3 
28.7 
14.0 
3.2 
157 
44.7 
11.8 
27.1 
11.8 
4.7 
85 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
For clean coffee, we see the familiar pattern of an increasing number of 
transactions between farmers and petty traders along with the decrease in 
accessibility of the villages. For cherry coffee, this is somewhat different. 
Irrespective of the degree of accessibility of the villages, the majority of 
the coffee cherry transactions were conducted between farmers and petty 
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traders and, to a lesser extent, local merchants. The pattern is apparently 
disturbed by the decision of several farmers, especially in the more remote 
areas, to sell their coffee cherries to the co-operative or the wholesalers. 
The main explanation for this is that co-operatives and wholesalers are only 
interested in buying coffee cherries when the amounts to be purchased are 
large. The larger amounts make it more attractive for them to purchase at 
the village level or for the farmers to travel to the urban trading centres. 
Table 8.12 Locations of transactions of cocoa, cherry coffee and clean 
coffee by fanners from high, medium and low accessible 
villages, 1992/93 (in percentages) 
Location Cocoa 
high accessible villages 
Village 50.0 
Urban trading centre 48.7 
Unknown 1.3 
N 76 
medium accessible villages 
Village 70.2 
Urban trading centre 29.8 
Unknown 
N 104 
low accessible villages 
Village 73.7 
Buying centre 24.6 
Unknown 1.6 
N 61 
Cherries 
96.3 
-
3.7 
27 
90.3 
9.7 
-
62 
97.4 
2.6 
-
38 
Clean 
40.2 
58.6 
1.2 
87 
48.4 
51.6 
-
95 
42.6 
57.4 
-
47 
All transactions 
52.2 
46.3 
1.6 
190 
67.0 
33.0 
-
261 
69.9 
29.5 
0.7 
146 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Whether farmers in more remote villages travelled less often to the urban 
trading centres can also be concluded from table 8.12. It shows the 
locations of the transactions for cocoa, cherry and clean coffee conducted 
by farmers from villages with different degrees of accessibility. For the sale 
of cocoa, the main conclusion is that the more inaccessible a village, the 
more cocoa transactions were conducted in the villages, and less in the 
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urban trading centres. 
For the sale of clean coffee no clear distinction can be made between 
the different categories of villages. Whether a village is highly accessible 
or not, a small majority of the transactions was conducted in the urban 
trading centres. This can be explained mainly by the fact that farmers are 
less pressed for money and take more time to select the trader they prefer. 
Moreover, the buying season for coffee coincides with the dry season, 
which means that fanners have more opportunities to travel. 
Summarizing, the transactions involving the sale of coffee cherries are 
predominantly conducted in the villages, except for a few transactions 
involving large amounts of produce. Most wholesalers do not purchase 
coffee cherries at their stores because of the time and costs involved 
hulling the cherries. Therefore, the purchase of coffee cherries is mainly 
the domain of petty traders and local merchants, who take the transport and 
hulling costs into account when setting the producer price. 
We have seen that, in general terms, the accessibility of the villages 
does not always play the same distinct role in the farmer's decision of 
where and to whom to sell his produce. Farmers in more remote areas 
seem to sell their cocoa more often to petty traders in their own villages, 
because by the time of the sales the roads are usually impassable for the 
vehicles of local merchants and wholesalers. Farmers in more remote areas 
seem to sell their clean coffee less in the villages and more to wholesalers, 
because the dry season is better suited for travelling. In general, since 
1990/91, more transactions took place in the villages. This can be 
explained by the establishment of the Villages Marketing Centers which 
attracted farmers who might otherwise have gone to the urban trading 
centres. 
The accessibility of the villages and the distance to the urban trading 
centres contributes to the farmer's decision of where and to whom to sell 
his produce. Whether the farmer decides to sell his produce in the urban 
trading centres also depends on the amount of produce he has for sale and 
the burden of travelling to a nearby town. In the next section, we see how 
the different amounts of produce for sale also influence the farmers' choice 
of trading partner. 
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8.3 The farmers' choice and the amount of produce per 
transaction 
The influence of the amount of produce on the farmer's decision of where 
and to whom to sell his produce works in several ways. Firstly, farmers 
with only small quantities of produce are less able to pay transport costs 
to urban trading centres than those with large quantities. These "small" 
farmers turn more often to itinerant petty traders or local merchants, who 
visit them in their village. Secondly, when a farmer has a large quantity of 
produce for sale, it becomes more attractive for other types of traders to 
visit the farmer's village. In that case, wholesalers may find it worthwhile 
to send a vehicle to collect the farmer and his produce and bring him to his 
store to carry out business. Thirdly, the wholesalers rarely pay the leading 
producer price for less than one bag of produce. This means it would not 
be worthwhile for a "small" farmer to travel to the stores of the 
wholesalers. However, a large majority of farmers are not aware of these 
practices and do not take this into consideration. 
In order to assess the extent to which different amounts of produce 
influence the marketing behaviour of the farmers, we have differentiated 
the various amounts of produce into several categories. For farmers who 
sold clean coffee or cocoa, four categories can be distinguished varying 
from less than one bushel, one to three bushels, three to six bushels and 
more than six bushels. These categories are based on the following 
observations. It appears that the majority of the transactions concern small 
amounts of produce of less than one bushel or one bag (three bushels). The 
transport costs for less than one bag of produce may take up a considerable 
percentage of the proceeds. This might force the farmers to sell their 
produce in their own village to petty traders or local merchants. For 
farmers who have more than one bag for sale, the transport costs might 
have less of an influence on their decision of where and to whom to sell 
their produce. Many traders, especially wholesalers, only become interested 
in sending their vehicle to collect the produce, when farmers have more 
than two bags (six bushels) for sale. 
For farmers who sold coffee cherries, four categories can be identified, 
varying from less than one bag, one to three bags, three to six bags and 
more than six bags. Coffee cherries are usually sold per bag, and hardly 
ever per bushel or three-pence pan. The proceeds of one bag of coffee 
cherries approximately equals the value of one bushel of clean coffee. 
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However, the transport costs of one bag coffee cherries are higher than one 
bushel of clean coffee. Therefore, farmers who decide to transport less than 
three bags of cherries, might have to use a considerable part of their 
proceeds to pay for the transport costs. For the traders, especially 
wholesalers, it might only be worthwhile to send a vehicle to a village if 
a farmer has at least six bags of cherries for sale. 
It is clear from table 8.13, that the wholesalers possess the largest 
market share in all the clean coffee transactions, at 54 per cent. This is also 
the case when we differentiate the clean coffee into the different categories 
we have identified. However, it can be concluded that, irrespective of the 
amount of clean coffee involved in the transactions, about half of all 
farmers decided to sell their produce to a wholesaler. The market share for 
local merchants is less stable for all categories compared to the 
wholesalers. They obtain a larger market share when the amounts for sale 
are larger. The largest market share for petty traders is found in 
transactions of one bushel or less, and decreases as the amount involved in 
the transactions increases. 
The market share of petty traders for cherry coffee decreases as the 
amounts increase, but they still possess the largest market shares for all 
categories, except that over six bushels. This leads to the conclusion that, 
for coffee, the petty traders concentrate more on cherry coffee and small 
amounts of clean coffee. This is consistent with their relatively small 
purchasing capital. The price of cherry coffee is relatively low, which 
makes it affordable, as are small amounts of clean coffee. For the farmers, 
however, the amount of produce they have for sale seems to contribute 
only to their decision of whom to sell their cherry coffee. Wholesalers and 
local merchants seem to be only interested in purchasing large amounts of 
coffee cherries. 
For cocoa, the petty traders possess the largest market share for all 
transactions. They especially dominate the transactions involving smaller 
amounts of produce. This means that, compared to the coffee transactions, 
more farmers with small amounts of cocoa prefer to sell to itinerant petty 
traders. The farmers with larger amounts of cocoa, especially those with 
more than six bushels for sale, prefer to sell their cocoa to wholesalers, and 
to a lesser extent, to the local merchants. However, 20 per cent of all cocoa 
transactions, involving more than two bags of cocoa, still took place 
between farmers and petty traders. 
For transactions involving between one and two bags of cocoa, it is 
even 46 per cent. This means that, although it would be worthwhile for the 
farmers to travel to an urban trading centre to receive a better price for 
their produce, they still decided to sell their cocoa to a petty trader. 
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Table 8.13 Different amounts of clean coffee, cocoa and cherry coffee 
transactions, by type of trader, 1990/91 (in percentages) 
Type of trader 0-1 bu. 1-3 bu. 3-6 bu. >6 bu. All 
dean coffee 
Petty traders 26.7 
Local merchants 20 
Wholesalers 48.9 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 4.4 
N 45 
cocoa 
Petty traders 67.4 
Local merchants 14.3 
Wholesalers 18.3 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 49 
coffee cherries 0-1 bag 
Petty traders 74.4 
Local merchants 20.9 
Wholesalers 2.3 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 2.3 
N 43 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
An explanation for this might be that most farmers want to sell their cocoa 
as quickly as possible. This is because the moisture content diminishes 
rapidly when the cocoa is stored and, thus, the weight decreases. Hence, 
farmers want to sell cocoa quickly after processing, because the weight is 
then at its peak level. Furthermore, several farmers are more restricted in 
their choice of trader because they obtained a loan from a petty trader in 
exchange for the sale of cocoa to their creditor. 
For the 1992/93 buying season, the influence of the amounts of 
19.6 14.3 
19.6 28.6 
58.9 57.1 
1.8 
56 21 
31.7 46.3 
35 24.4 
31.7 19.5 
2.4 
1.7 7.3 
60 41 
1-3 bags 3-6 bags 
71.4 50 
22.9 44.4 
5.7 5.6 
35 18 
4.2 18.5 
41.7 24.7 
50 54.1 
4.2 0.7 
2.1 
24 146 
20.5 41.2 
29.6 26.3 
40.9 27.8 
2.3 1.0 
6.8 3.6 
44 194 
>6 bags All 
25 63.9 
41.7 27.8 
33.3 7.4 
0.9 
12 108 
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produce for sale on the farmers' choice of trader are summarized in table 
8.14. 
Table 8.14 Different amounts of clean coffee, cocoa and cherry coffee 
transactions, by type of trader, 1992/93 (in percentages) 
Type of trader 
dean coffee 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
0-1 bu. 
24.7 
11.8 
39.8 
22.6 
1.1 
1-3 bu. 
9.2 
13.8 
48.3 
23.0 
5.8 
3-6 bu. 
16.1 
12.9 
51.6 
19.4 
-
>6 bu. 
11.1 
33.3 
22.2 
27.8 
5.6 
All 
16.6 
14.4 
43.2 
22.7 
3.1 
N 93 87 31 18 229 
cocoa 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
coffee cherries 
Petty traders 
Local merchants 
Wholesalers 
Co-operatives 
Unknown 
N 
51.2 
8.3 
26.2 
9.5 
4.8 
84 
0-1 bag 
75.5 
11.3 
3.8 
3.8 
5.7 
53 
41.8 
11.9 
34.4 
9.0 
3.0 
67 
1-3 bags 
61.8 
32.7 
1.8 
3.6 
-
55 
21.3 
8.5 
32.0 
34.0 
4.3 
47 
3-6 bags 
30 
50 
10 
-
10 
10 
20.9 
18.6 
30.2 
30.2 
-
43 
>6 bags 
11.1 
44.4 
33.3 
-
11.1 
9 
37.3 
11.2 
30.3 
17.8 
3.3 
241 
All 
61.4 
26.0 
3.9 
3.1 
3.9 
127 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The trends observed for clean coffee are similar to those in the 1990/91 
buying season. The wholesalers still have the largest market share, although 
they are losing considerable ground to the co-operatives, especially for 
transactions which involve more than three bushels of produce. 
If a Village Marketing Center, run by a co-operative, was within a 
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short distance of their village, the majority of the farmers preferred to sell 
their produce to the co-operative. The local merchants faced severe 
competition from the co-operatives, irrespective of the amount of produce 
for sale. The market share of the petty traders did not change significantly 
although they seem to be less favoured by farmers selling large amounts 
of clean coffee. 
For cherry coffee transactions, the same conclusions are drawn for the 
1992/93 buying season as for 1990/91. The petty traders have the largest 
market share and only face competition from local merchants, if larger 
amounts of produce are for sale. The co-operatives did not seem to be as 
active in their purchase of cherry coffee as clean coffee, which explains the 
limited differences between the 1990/91 and 1992/93 seasons. Apparently, 
co-operatives concentrated on the purchase of clean coffee and cocoa. 
Petty traders still hold the largest market share for cocoa, although 
farmers seem to prefer to sell large quantities to the co-operatives and 
wholesalers. The co-operatives do not seem to be very successful in 
attracting those farmers with small amounts of cocoa for sale. During the 
cocoa season, farmers tend to borrow small amounts of money or rice, 
especially from petty traders and, to a lesser extent, from local merchants 
and wholesalers. Therefore, the farmers sell small amounts of cocoa to 
these creditors to repay the loan. 
To find out whether the farmers sell small amounts of produce more 
often in the villages, irrespective of the type of trader they choose, we 
summarized the location of the transactions for different amounts of 
produce in table 8.15 for 1990/91 and in table 8.16 for 1992/93. In the 
1990/91 buying season, the majority of the transactions involving clean 
coffee took place in the urban trading centres, irrespective of the amount 
of produce involved. Larger amounts of produce especially, were sold at 
the stores of the wholesalers. For transactions involving small amounts of 
clean coffee, differences are less clear, and more transactions occurred in 
the villages. 
The majority of the cocoa is sold at the village level. Small amounts 
especially, are sold in the villages, while a small majority of the farmers 
preferred to sell the larger amounts of produce in one of the urban trading 
centres. As far as the cocoa transactions are concerned, it seems that loan 
repayment obligations of the farmers and the poor transport conditions in 
the cocoa buying season played a considerable role in the farmers' decision 
of where and to whom to sell their cocoa. For clean coffee transactions, 
farmers have more opportunities for selling their produce, irrespective of 
the amount of produce they have for sale. 
For cherry coffee the picture is very clear. A large majority of all 
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transactions took place at the village level. Only when large amounts of 
cherries are involved do the farmers consider travelling to the urban trading 
centres to find a trader who is willing to purchase coffee cherries. 
Table 8.15 Locations of transactions of different amounts of clean coffee, 
cocoa and cherry coffee by all farmers, 1990/91 (in 
percentages) 
Location 0-1 bu. 1-3 bu. 3-6 bu. >6 bu. All 
dean coffee 
Village 44.5 
Urban trading centre 55.6 
Unknown 
N 45 
cocoa 
Village 79.6 
Urban trading centre 20.4 
Unknown 
N 49 
coffee cherries 0-1 bag 
Village 93.0 
Urban trading centre 7.0 
Unknown 
N 43 
Source: Authors' survey (1991). 
The results for the 1992/93 buying season are almost identical to those in 
1990/1991. The farmers with small amounts of clean coffee tend to sell 
more in their village or a nearby village. This might be partly explained by 
the increased number of Village Marketing Centers which were active in 
some parts of our research area. The unsafe travel conditions in some parts 
of our research area should also be taken into account. Several farmers 
explained that they did not dare to travel too far, for fear of robbery or 
fatal ambush. 
39.3 42.9 
58.9 57.1 
1.8 
56 21 
61.6 63.4 
38.3 36.6 
60 41 
1-3 bags 3-6 bags 
97.2 94.4 
2.9 5.6 
35 18 
33.3 41.4 
66.7 58.9 
0.7 
24 146 
43.2 62.4 
54.6 37.1 
2.3 0.5 
44 194 
>6 bags All 
66.7 91.7 
33.3 8.3 
12 108 
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The percentage of cocoa transactions taking place in the villages 
increased only slightly compared to the 1990/91 season. The farmers who 
sold more than one bag, decided more often to sell their cocoa in the 
village, for much the same reasons as those selling clean coffee, the fear 
of robbery and better chances of getting the minimum producer price at the 
Village Marketing Centers. 
Table 8.16 Locations of transactions of different amounts of clean coffee, 
cocoa and cherry coffee by all farmers, 1992/93 (in 
percentages) 
Location 0-1 bu. 1-3 bu. 3-6 bu. >6 bu. All 
coffee dean 
Village 52.7 
Urban trading centre 47.3 
Unknown 
N 93 
cocoa 
Village 65.5 
Urban trading centre 32.1 
Unknown 2.4 
N 84 
coffee cherries 0-1 bag 
Village 96.3 
Urban trading centre 18.9 
Unknown 18.9 
N 53 
Source: Authors* survey (1993). 
Farmers selling large amounts of coffee cherries tended to sell in the urban 
trading centres. This can be partly explained by the fact that, due to the 
security problems in the country during the 1992/93 buying season, the 
wholesalers and their agents were reluctant to travel to the villages to 
collect the produce. 
39.1 
60.9 
-
35.5 
64.5 
-
38.9 
55.6 
5.6 
44.1 
55.5 
0.4 
87 31 18 229 
64.2 
35.8 
-
67 
1-3 bags 
98.2 
1.8 
-
70.2 
29.8 
-
47 
3-6 bags 
90 
10 
-
58.1 
41.9 
-
43 
>6 bags 
55.5 
44.4 
-
64.8 
34.4 
0.8 
241 
All 
93.7 
5.5 
0.8 
55 10 127 
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To conclude, it is clear that the farmers do take the amount of produce 
into account when they decide on where and to whom to sell their produce. 
However, the influence of the amount of produce for sale on the farmers' 
decisions varies widely with regard to the type of produce they have for 
sale. Farmers with small amounts of cocoa, tend to sell in the village more 
often than farmers with large amounts of produce. No significant 
distinction can be made between the transactions involving small or large 
amounts of clean coffee. Farmers with small amounts of clean coffee as 
well as farmers with large amounts both attempt to sell their clean coffee 
in one of the urban trading centres, to obtain at least the minimum 
producer price. 
So far, we have described both the impact of distance and amount of 
produce a farmer has for sale, on marketing behaviour. However, the 
farmers' decision making processes are far more complex, as we see in the 
next section. 
8.4 The influence of credit on the farmers' choice of trader 
The farmers' choice of trader is, to some extent, also influenced by the 
type of credit relations that exist between them and certain traders. Both 
the amount of credit that can be borrowed and the credibility of the farmer 
(i.e. his ability to repay the loan) are largely determined by his farming 
characteristics. We assume, for example, that larger farmers may receive 
more credit than smaller farmers. 
In order to distinguish between the amounts of coffee and cocoa that 
were produced, we have differentiated the farmers into small, medium and 
large farmers. Note that this differentiation is based on the amounts of 
coffee and cocoa produced by the farmers, rather than on the amount sold. 
We decided to make this distinction, because most loans are provided 
before the harvest. This means that the credit providers base their lending 
criteria, consequently, usually on the potential yield of a producer, not on 
the actual amount the producer has for sale, although the two are related2. 
The small farmers were defined as those producing up to one bag of 
coffee and or cocoa. The medium farmers produced one to three bags, 
2
 In most cases, the amount of coffee or cocoa harvested matched the amount that 
was sold. However, some farmers obtained only a small yield, and gave it away 
to relatives, for example. Other farmers purchased small amounts themselves "to 
fill up the bag", especially coffee cherries. In other cases, farmers repaid loans 
with (part of) their produce. 
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while the large fanners were able to produce more than three bags of 
produce. We also decided to differentiate the farmers on the basis of the 
harvested produce, instead of on either only their coffee or cocoa yield, in 
order to get a better socioeconomic picture of the producers. 
In section 5.3.S we described the credit characteristics of all the 
agricultural producers. We concluded that credit can take many forms. In 
this section, we describe the credit characteristics of the coffee and cocoa 
producers only. We differentiate the produce farmers into those who 
received credit from produce traders and the farmers who received loans 
from non-trading sources, usually friends and relatives. The first type of 
credit we call "produce-related credit", while the second is called "other 
credit". Furthermore, there are those farmers who did not receive any loans 
at all. This differentiation is based on the credit the farmers received in 
1991/92 (as in section 5.3.5, note that these farmers were interviewed in 
1992/93). However, we have also included credit obtained in earlier years, 
but which was repaid in the 1991/92 season. This is done in order to 
identify the loan repayment conditions, and to see whether the creditor is 
also the purchaser. This means that some farmers in the category without 
credit, might have received credit in earlier years, and this would have an 
impact on their selling behaviour in 1991/92. 
The majority, 61 per cent, of coffee and cocoa producers received 
credit in 1991/92. Almost three-quarters of these, 70 per cent, received 
produce-related credit. In order to see whether the type of credit influences 
the choice of trader, we differentiated the farmers into those without credit, 
those who received produce-related credit, and those who received other 
credit. For the three groups of farmers we looked at all their transactions 
which took place in 1991/92. A farmer may, therefore, score several times 
for several types of traders. Table 8.17 shows the aggregate outcomes. 
It appears that the produce was sold most often to petty traders or local 
merchants. Furthermore, farmers with produce-related credit and, to a lesser 
extent, farmers with other types of credit, sold their produce more often to 
petty traders, compared to those farmers without credit. The farmers 
without credit seem to prefer selling their produce to wholesalers. This can 
be explained by looking more closely at those farmers with produce-related 
credit who sold to petty traders. In 37 per cent of the cases, these farmers 
sold to petty traders from whom they had obtained credit, so that they 
could repay the loan. It can be said that these farmers were forced to sell 
to these petty traders. When we exclude this "forced selling behaviour", 
this group would only conduct 28 per cent of all their transactions with 
petty traders. This percentage is more in line with the figure for the farmers 
without credit. However, the farmers with other credit were also selling 
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relatively more often to petty traders than those without credit. This is also 
due to "forced selling", although the credit they took from produce-related 
sources was not received in 1991/92 but in earlier years (23 per cent of the 
transactions sold to petty traders was also sold to the credit source). 
Excluding the forced selling, the farmers with other credit would go, 
in 31 per cent of cases, to petty traders. Finally, the farmers without credit 
also experienced forced selling, due to credit received before 1991/92. 
However, it was on a smaller scale than the other groups, in 9 per cent of 
the cases. Without the forced selling, they would have conducted 26 per 
cent of all their transactions with petty traders. Thus, the credit ties that 
farmers have with produce traders, explain a large part of their marketing 
behaviour, but not all (in which case, the percentages would become equal 
for all types of farmers). 
Table 8.17 Choice of trader, by type of credit taker, 1991/92 (in 
percentages) 
All produce farmers with: 
Type of trader No credit Produce-related credit Other credit 
35.2 
11.4 
35.2 
11.4 
4.8 
N 225 264 105 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
It is clear that farmers without credit have a wider choice of trading 
partner. This can also be seen by looking at the percentage of the 
transactions that were conducted with a co-operative, an organization which 
pays relatively high produce prices. The farmers without credit score 
almost twice as high as those with credit. In other words, the farmers 
without credit were forced less often to sell to trading partners who paid 
low prices. We now see whether the amount of coffee and cocoa produced 
by the farmers influenced their credit opportunities and thus, their choice 
of trading partner. 
Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Co-operative 
Unknown 
28.4 
12.9 
32.0 
22.7 
4.0 
38.3 
18.6 
26.6 
13.3 
3.4 
First, the small coffee and cocoa producers. From this group, a majority 
(61 per cent) had received one or more loans in 1991/92. Of all the farmers 
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Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Co-operative 
Unknown 
29.9 
13.4 
37.3 
10.5 
9.0 
36.6 
15.5 
40.8 
2.8 
4.2 
with credit, 65 per cent received produce-related credit. Table 8.18 shows 
the percentage distribution of type of trading partner for the three different 
groups of credit takers. In the case of this group of small farmers, we also 
see that the produce was sold most often to petty traders or local 
merchants. Moreover, small farmers with a produce-related credit or 
another type of credit sold their produce to a petty trader more often than 
farmers without credit. Small farmers without credit chose a regional 
wholesaler more often as their trading partner. 
Table 8.18 Choice of trader for farmers with small amounts of produce, 
by type of credit taker, 1991/92 (in percentages) 
Small produce farmers with: 
Type of trader No credit Produce-related credit Other credit 
39.5 
10.5 
31.6 
10.5 
7.9 
N 67 71 38 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Compared with the overall picture in table 8.17, we see that co-operatives 
were selected less often as a trading partner, irrespective of the type of 
credit that was received. Small farmers with a produce-related credit seem 
to have few opportunities to sell their produce to the co-operatives. 
Those farmers with produce-related credit, who conducted transactions 
with petty traders, were forced to sell to them in 35 per cent of the cases. 
Without forced selling, they would conduct 24 per cent of their transactions 
with petty traders. Of those farmers with other credit, 20 per cent of their 
transactions with petty traders was forced, due to existing debts to these 
traders. When the forced selling is excluded, they would conduct 32 per 
cent of their transactions with petty traders. Finally, 10 per cent of the 
transactions of the farmers without credit was due to forced selling. 
Without the credit obtained in earlier years, they would have conducted 27 
per cent of their transactions with petty traders. 
So, compared to the general picture for all farmers, credit also 
influences the choice of trading partner for the small farmers, although to 
a lesser extent than we learned from the results for all farmers. 
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Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Co-operative 
Unknown 
28.4 
10.8 
33.8 
24.3 
2.7 
51.0 
17.3 
12.6 
13.5 
5.8 
Table 8.19 Choice of trader for farmers with medium amounts of 
produce, by type of credit taker, 1991/92 (in percentages) 
Medium produce fanners with: 
Type of trader No credit Produce-related credit Other credit 
28.1 
14.0 
40.4 
14.0 
3.5 
N 74 104 57 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Of the medium-sized farmers, 66 per cent received credit in the 1991/92 
season, a higher percentage than small farmers. Sixty-two per cent of these 
received produce-related credit, which is somewhat lower than for the small 
farmers. Table 8.19 shows the percentage distribution of their type of 
trading partner differentiated by type of credit taker. 
Petty traders were again the most favoured trading partners, 
particularly for farmers with produce-related credit. Thirty-eight per cent 
of these farmers were forced to sell to petty traders because of loan 
obligations. However, 32 per cent of the farmers would still have sold their 
produce to petty traders regardless of any debts. This percentage is much 
higher than for the small farmers. Compared to their smaller counterparts, 
more medium-sized farmers without any credit sold their produce to petty 
traders, but less often to wholesalers. Twenty-eight percent of the medium-
sized farmers with other forms of credit sold their produce to petty traders, 
and if forced selling is taken into account, this drops to 25 per cent. More 
medium-sized farmers than small fanners chose to trade with co-operatives, 
although those medium farmers with some form of tied credit could do so 
less often due to their obligations with other traders. 
It, therefore, appears that produce-related credit has a much greater 
influence on the choice of trading partner for medium-sized farmers, than 
for small farmers. 
Fifty-seven per cent of the large farmers took out loans in 1991/92, which 
is a lower percentage than either the medium or the small farmers. Ninety 
per cent of the loans were produce-related. As the percentage of large 
farmers with other forms of credit is small, it has been left out of this 
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analysis. So, large farmers seem to prefer to take produce-related credit, 
and they usually have large coffee and cocoa farms which can be used as 
collateral. They are usually wealthier than the smaller farmers, so do not 
need to borrow as often. 
Large farmers prefer to sell their produce to local merchants rather 
than petty traders, see table 8.20, and the merchants are more willing to 
lend money or rice to these large farmers than to the smaller farmers. 
Twenty-four per cent of the large farmers with produce-related credit 
conducted business with petty traders, of which thirty-six per cent were 
obliged to do so because of debt repayments. Taking this into account 
means that only 16 per cent of the large farmers willingly chose to trade 
with a petty trader. 
Table 8.20 Choice of trader for farmers with large amounts of produce, 
by type of credit taker, 1991/92 (in percentages) 
Large produce farmers with: 
Type of trader No credit Produce-related credit Other credit 
60 
40 
Petty trader 
Local merchants 
Wholesaler 
Co-operative 
Unknown 
27.4 
14.3 
26.2 
31.0 
1.2 
24.7 
22.5 
31.4 
21.3 
-
N 84 89 10 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Farmers without credit conducted 27 per cent of their transactions with 
petty traders, 17 per cent of which were due to pre-existing loan 
obligations. If these forced transactions are excluded, 23 per cent of the 
transactions were conducted with petty traders. 
More large farmers chose to sell their produce to the co-operatives, 
and those farmers without credit did so more often than those with 
produce-related credit. Large farmers, especially those with credit, used 
wholesalers more often than either small or medium-sized farmers, and this 
shows that they found it easier to obtain credit from these wholesalers than 
the smaller farmers. 
On the whole, large farmers find it easier to obtain credit from a wider 
range of sources than the smaller scale farmers. They have larger amounts 
of produce for sale and more collateral. However, their credit relations can 
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still restrict their choice of trader. But, as the prices offered by wholesalers 
were more attractive than those offered by either petty traders or 
merchants, being tied to a wholesaler is not a particular disadvantage. 
8.5 Education 
We have seen that the (non-) existence of credit relations between farmers 
and traders influences the marketing behaviour of the former. Education 
was also considered as an important factor influencing the marketing 
behaviour of produce farmers. Education is seen as a strong indicator of 
marketing knowledge. Farmers without (formal) education usually cannot 
read or write, and cannot check the receipts they may receive from produce 
traders. Furthermore, education may help the farmer understand the price 
mechanisms and weighing procedures used in the produce trade. Basic 
numeracy enables a farmer to double check the prices and weights and 
make sure that the correct amount of money is paid. 
In section 5.3.8, we differentiated the group of produce farmers into 
those who received no education at all (39 per cent of all farmers), those 
who received only informal education (37 per cent) and those who received 
some form of formal education (24 per cent). In table 8.21 we have related 
the level of education to the choice of trader, regardless of the type of 
produce for sale. 
Table 8.21 Choice of trader, by type of education for produce farmers, 
1991/92 (in percentages) 
All produce farmers with: 
Type of trader No education Informal education Formal education 
29.2 
19.4 
25.0 
20.8 
5.6 
N 225 225 144 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Co-operative 
Unknown 
39.1 
15.6 
28.0 
12.9 
4.4 
32.4 
12.0 
36.0 
17.8 
1.8 
From the results we can see that the uneducated farmers sold their produce 
to petty traders more often than the educated farmers. Furthermore, farmers 
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with some form of education sold their produce more often to either the 
wholesalers or the co-operatives. Those farmers with formal education sold 
more often to the co-operatives and local merchants compared to those 
farmers with informal education. Farmers with formal education might be 
more aware of the advantages of selling to the co-operatives and to those 
local merchants acting as agents of wholesalers. These traders probably pay 
better prices than petty traders. 
However, there are only slight differences between the groups of 
farmers with formal education and those with informal education. It seems 
that it is not so much the type of education received which determines the 
marketing behaviour, but the fact that any education was received at all. 
When we take the "forced selling" due to credit relations into account, 
it appears that the farmers without education would have sold slightly less 
often to petty traders and local merchants, and slightly more often to co-
operatives, and the farmers with either formal or informal education would 
sell much less often to petty traders and agents. 
Table 8.22 shows the marketing behaviour of those farmers with, and 
those without education. The figures in brackets are the percentages of 
transactions excluding the "forced selling", due to loan obligations. Now 
we can see even more clearly that the farmers with education sold less 
often to petty traders and more often to co-operatives, than those without 
education. 
Table 8.22 Choice of trader, by farmers with and without education, 
1991/92 (in percentages)* 
Type of trader 
Petty trader 
Local merchant 
Wholesaler 
Co-operative 
Unknown 
N 
All produce farmers: 
Without education 
39.1 (38.7) 
15.6 (14.4) 
28.0 (26.5) 
12.9 (14.9) 
4.4 (5.5) 
225 (181) 
With education 
31.2 (26.9) 
14.9 (13.4) 
31.7 (34.7) 
19.0 (21.0) 
3.3 (3.9) 
369 (305) 
The figures between brackets indicate the choice of trader by farmers with or 
without education taking forced selling into account. 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
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We may conclude that education, to a certain extent, influences the 
farmers' choice of trading partner. The farmers with some form of 
education are, therefore, at an advantage, as the wholesalers and the co-
operatives usually pay better prices. 
When we exclude the transactions due to forced selling, the 
percentages in brackets in table 8.22 present a more realistic picture of the 
farmers' choice of trader. We now see that the differences between the 
fanners with and the farmers without education are more significant for 
those who sold their produce to petty traders and to wholesalers. More of 
the educated farmers preferred to sell to other traders, unless they had 
outstanding loans with the petty traders. Co-operatives and wholesalers 
were especially favoured as they tended to offer better prices. 
The same pattern can be observed when we look at the locations of the 
transactions. The percentage of transactions carried out either in the home 
village or one nearby, also varies with the level of education. Seventy-one 
per cent of the farmers without any education conducted business in the 
villages, compared to fifty-eight per cent and forty-one per cent of the 
farmers with formal and informal education, respectively. Farmers with 
education more often sold their produce in the urban trading centres and 
received higher prices, than farmers without education. 
It is clear that education plays a role in both the selection of a trading 
partner and the location of transaction. However, one should note that 
education raises farmers' awareness of the current producer prices and the 
time of price changes. Furthermore, education can help the farmers to 
understand the weighing procedures and the calculation of the value of 
their produce. The farmers, of course, also gain more marketing knowledge 
with the experience of selling produce throughout the years. However, this 
does not match with the fact that the younger and educated farmers sold 
their produce to the wholesalers or the co-operatives which benefitted them 
most. But, as we have seen in chapter 5, a large majority of the farmers 
have insufficient knowledge about producer prices and weighing 
procedures. As we see in the next section, the farmers often mentioned 
better prices as one of their main reasons for selling their produce to a 
particular kind of trader. 
8.6 Reasons for choice of trader 
So far, we have described mainly rational economic factors which 
contribute to the marketing behaviour of farmers. However, the farmer's 
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decision of where and to whom to sell his produce also depends on several 
social aspects. The farmers also mentioned several other reasons which 
show that their decisions are sometimes short-term decisions, based on the 
current situation at the time of sale. To assess the influence of social 
aspects and other non-economic aspects on the farmers' decision we first 
categorize the whole spectrum of reasons given by the farmers to explain 
their marketing behaviour. 
The numerous reasons the farmers gave for their marketing behaviour 
have been categorized into six groups: credit reasons; price reasons; 
reasons related to social relations; reasons related to an urgent need for 
cash; reasons related to the costs of transport and, finally; reasons which 
were not specific for the choice. 
Credit reasons 
This category contains those reasons which are related to current or 
expected credit. The farmers sold to a particular type of trader because they 
had to repay a loan or an outstanding debt of one of their relatives. 
Furthermore, farmers explained their choice of trader by the expectations 
they have of obtaining credit from that same trader in the near future. They 
feel they can only obtain credit if they are a regular customer of that trader. 
Price reasons 
Obviously, this category contains reasons which are related to the financial 
expectations the farmer has when he sells his produce to a particular type 
of trader. The reasons in this category are indirect. For example, some 
farmers sold their produce to a particular trader because they 'thought he 
paid a high price', but also to find out 'if he paid a high price'. The 
reasons were seldomly direct, for example, 'his price is higher', because 
farmers are not usually aware of price levels. Often, the farmers only 
consider the total amount of money they received for their produce. 
Whether the price is high or not, depended more on their immediate 
financial needs at the time of the transaction, than on a real calculation of 
the producer price and the weight of their produce. 
Cash need reasons 
The reasons in this category reflect even more the links between the 
farmers' financial needs at the time of transactions and their choice of a 
trader. For example, farmers mentioned 'the need for (immediate) cash' as 
a reason why they sold their produce in their own village to the first trader 
they met and who was prepared to buy the produce. Other reasons given 
by the farmers were 'that trader had ready cash' (i.e. he could pay on the 
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spot), or 'because I needed the money when the man came by'. 
Transport reasons 
Because transport costs take up a considerable part of the farmers' cash 
crop proceeds, many farmers decide not to travel to an urban trading 
centre, but to sell their produce in their own village or a nearby village, 
instead. This is especially the case when the amount of produce is small 
and the proceeds would just about meet transport costs. Furthermore, 
several villages lacked sufficient means of transport. During the cocoa 
season, especially the farmers lacked both the time and the manpower to 
convey their produce to an urban trading centre. Examples of the reasons 
from this category are 'the produce was too small to transport' or 'lack of 
money to transport his produce', but also, in cases they sold their produce 
outside their own village, 'because the trader paid for the transport costs'. 
Social (relations) reasons 
Quite different from the categories given so far, are the reasons related to 
the type of relationship that exists between the trader and the farmer. This 
might be a family relationship, but also a friendship. The other common 
type of relationship is the "customer" relationship. The client (farmer) sells 
to a certain trader 'who does something good for me' or 'who helps me 
when I am in need'. This can mean that the farmer might receive credit (or 
has received credit for quite some time already), but also that the trader 
gives the farmer a small, token present before, during or after the 
transaction (for example, cigarettes). Customer relationships are typically 
long-term relationships, explaining why farmers often sell their produce to 
the same trader for many years in a row. These types of social relations are 
very important for the farmer and might be more of an influence on his 
decision to whom to sell his produce, compared to whether that same trader 
pays the correct price or not. Moreover, there are numerous cases where 
the fanner and the trader of his choice belong to the same extended family 
and have moral and social obligations to conduct business with somebody 
belonging to the same family. 
Unspecific reasons 
As well as the reasons given above, the farmers gave several reasons that 
indicate ad hoc decisions made at the time they were about to sell their 
produce. The majority of these reasons do not reflect a conscious choice. 
A large group of those farmers who decided to sell their produce in one of 
the urban trading centres, did not really know to whom they would sell 
their produce and let it depend on their inspiration at the moment of their 
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arrival. One reason might be 'because the vehicle stopped for his (i.e. the 
traders') shop'. Other farmers mentioned, for example, 'the shop boys took 
his produce and brought it to that trader's store'. It appeared that the 
wholesalers send their shop boys to the lorry-parks, often in front of theirs 
stores, to rush to the poda-podas to collect the farmers' produce and bring 
it to the store, before the farmers had a chance to make up their minds 
about whom to sell their produce. 
Tables 8.23 and 8.24 show the relative importance of the above mentioned 
categories of reasons for selecting a particular type of trader for the 
1990/91 and 1992/93 seasons. The absolute numbers of reasons mentioned 
("N") are higher than the numbers of transactions, because farmers could 
mention more than one reason per transaction. In general, for both periods 
we may conclude that two-thirds of all reasons given by the farmers are 
economic reasons involving aspects of credit, price expectations, cash need 
and transport. One-third of all reasons are social aspects and unspecific 
reasons. 
However, when we divide the reasons in the above mentioned 
categories we may conclude that, for both seasons, reasons related with 
social aspects and credit aspects were mentioned most by the farmers. The 
differences between the two periods are only marginal, with a slight 
increase in reasons relating to social aspects and a slight decrease in the 
reasons involving the cash need of the farmers. 
The important role played by the social aspects in the decision making 
process of the farmers differs, to some extent, by the type of trader chosen 
by the farmer. For those farmers who chose a petty trader as trading 
partner, the three most important reasons were, the urgent need for cash at 
the time of the transaction, the fact that they had to repay a loan or would 
like to secure credit in the near future, and the social obligations or 
customer ties they had with the trader. 
The reasons why the farmers chose a local merchant show that, again, 
credit plays an important role, because the local merchants, as the petty 
traders, are more inclined to provide the farmers with credit than the 
wholesalers. Social relations seem to play a more important role in 1992/93 
compared to 1990/91. This might be explained by the fact that the farmers 
began to realize that these local merchants, as agents of wholesalers, paid 
better prices than the petty traders. Therefore, the farmers attempted to 
build up a customer relation with the local merchant. Furthermore, the 
farmers realized that an increasing number of local merchants came with 
their vehicles to their villages. So, they had more opportunities to sell their 
produce in the village against reasonable prices and, at the same time, they 
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could save the usual transport costs. As a consequence, transport reasons 
played a more significant role for the farmers who chose a local merchant 
as their trading partner. 
For those farmers who sold their produce to wholesalers, social 
relations played an important role. Many farmers would like to become a 
regular customer of a wholesaler, in exchange for help to develop the farm 
and increase agricultural output. In general, these social relations are quite 
different to the social relations the farmers have with petty traders. In the 
latter case, family ties play a more important role. 
Social obligations with wholesalers, who are predominantly of Lebanese 
origin, rarely exist. Looking at the reasons the farmers mentioned for 
selling their produce to wholesalers, it becomes clear that the higher 
producer prices the farmers might obtain from them played a more 
significant role, compared to petty traders and local merchants. Although 
the wholesalers mentioned that they only gave credit to a few, large-scale 
farmers, it seems that the farmers still hoped to obtain a loan from a 
wholesaler in the near future by selling produce to them. In 1992/93, a 
quarter of all reasons mentioned by the farmers for selling to wholesalers, 
were credit-related reasons. More than 30 per cent were reasons stressing 
the hope of becoming a regular customer of a wholesaler. Interestingly, 
about one-fifth of the reasons mentioned by the farmers, showed that they 
had not really made up their minds about whom to sell their produce, on 
their arrival in town. The drivers of the poda-podas, tipped by the 
storekeepers, and the shop boys made the decision for the farmers, by 
taking the produce off the vehicle to carry it to their boss. 
The most important reason why farmers sold their produce to a co-
operative, was the belief that they would receive better prices compared to 
other types of traders. Two reasons are of interest, which we have labelled 
as social relations. Several farmers told us they sold to co-operatives 
because the Town Chief or the Paramount Chief told them to do so. The 
majority of the farmers in the vicinity of a Village Marketing Center, run 
by a co-operative, mentioned this reason. Moreover, in some villages there 
were even bye-laws forcing people to sell the produce to a co-operative. 
Another interesting reason is that, according to the farmers, they had 
to sell produce to the co-operatives in order to become a member. As a 
member, they could contribute and profit from the co-operatives' savings 
and credit programme. Furthermore, members would have priority in 
obtaining loans above non-members, which were usually one or two bags 
of rice. 
The reasons the farmers gave for the choice of trader varied slightly 
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between coffee and cocoa transactions. Table 8.25 and 8.26 provide a 
breakdown of the reasons given by the farmers for coffee transactions in 
1990/91 and 1992/93. The breakdown for the cocoa transactions in 1990/91 
and 1992/93 can be found in table 8.27 and 8.28. In both seasons, the main 
reasons given for specific coffee transactions are related to credit and social 
relations. Those farmers who sold coffee to petty traders mentioned 
repayment of credit more often than those farmers who sold cocoa. This 
can be explained by the fact that farmers usually obtain a loan in the 
hungry season and are only ready to repay the credit in the dry season, 
when coffee has been harvested. 
The main reasons given for cocoa transactions are also related to credit 
and social relations. However, in general, compared to the coffee 
transactions, the farmers' urgent need for cash, plays a more significant 
role when cocoa is sold. Cocoa is harvested at the end of or immediately 
after the hungry season, when cash is most urgently needed. Those farmers 
who sold cocoa and, to a lesser extent, coffee to a petty trader, mentioned 
their urgent need for cash more often as reason for their marketing 
behaviour. 
Another difference between the reasons for coffee and cocoa 
transactions is the role transport plays in the farmers' decision to sell to a 
local merchant. Although, in general, transport seems to be of minor 
importance overall in the farmers' decision on where to sell their produce, 
it does play a significant role for those farmers who sold their produce to 
local merchants, especially for the cocoa transactions in 1992/93. The 
increasing number of local merchants who visit the villages with their 
vehicles is of more importance to the farmer in the hungry season when the 
roads are impassable and the money is lacking to pay for transport. In the 
dry season, the farmer has more transport opportunities and is more able 
to pay for transport to sell his coffee in the urban trading centres. 
For those farmers who sold cocoa to the wholesalers, credit seems to 
play a more important role than for the farmers who sold coffee. This 
seems somehow contradictory to the situation for the farmers who preferred 
to sell to the petty traders where credit seems to play a more important role 
in the coffee transactions. In the cases where farmers sold their cocoa to 
wholesalers, they tried to secure a loan for the next cocoa season and when 
farmers sold coffee to petty traders they mentioned they had to repay a 
loan. Although these are different reasons, both are categorized as reasons 
related to credit. 
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To conclude, two-thirds of all the reasons given by coffee and cocoa 
producers for their marketing behaviour can considered economic. 
However, the influence of the social environment should not be ignored, 
as many farmers mentioned the impact of social relations on their choice 
of trading partner. 
8.7 Conclusions 
So far, we have seen that the privatization of the agricultural produce trade 
has led to an increase in producer prices due mainly to increased 
competition among private exporters. This means that the farmers have 
better opportunities for receiving a relatively high producer price, especially 
in the urban trading centres. However, it is clear that, in spite of this price 
liberalization, the majority of the farmers did not receive these leading 
producer prices. It appears that all the types of traders we have identified, 
pay less than the leading producer price, minimum producer price or bush 
price for produce, even when location and marketing costs are taken into 
account. In spite of the occurrence of underpayment, the farmers have the 
best opportunities to obtain a price which comes close to the leading 
producer price, when they are able to sell their produce to the wholesalers 
in the urban trading centres or the co-operatives running the Village 
Marketing Centers. 
However, as we have seen in this chapter, not all farmers chose the 
wholesalers or the co-operatives as their trading partner. In 1990/91, about 
40 per cent of all transactions were conducted between the farmers and the 
petty traders. Because of increase in competition among the traders, this 
percentage decreased to 35 per cent in 1992/93. In terms of remuneration 
for their produce, the farmers are worse off when selling produce to petty 
traders. 
In spite of an increase in producer prices since the liberalization of the 
produce trade, the farmers themselves have not been liberalized and seem 
still to be restricted in their choice of trader, as in the period of state-
controlled marketing. Although the best producer prices could be obtained 
in the urban trading centres, two-thirds of all transactions took place in the 
villages, in both the 1990/91 and the 1992/93 buying seasons. Since the 
privatization of the produce trade, however, the farmers do have better 
opportunities for receiving at least the minimum producer price in the 
villages. But they do not always seem to be in a position to take advantage 
of these opportunities. Furthermore, the majority of the transactions in the 
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villages is still conducted between the farmers and the petty traders. 
Several factors have been identified which either restrict or extend the 
opportunities the farmer has to transact business with the trader of his 
choice. First of all, the accessibility of the villages and the distance to the 
urban trading centres have an impact on the fanner's choice. The farmers 
in remote and relatively inaccessible villages sell their produce in their own 
village or a nearby village more often than those farmers who live closer 
to an urban trading centre. This means that farmers in the more remote 
areas, who cannot afford to travel to the urban trading centres, can only 
choose between petty traders or local merchants as their trading partner. 
Wholesalers rarely purchase outside the urban trading centres. A difference 
can be observed between the cocoa, clean coffee and cherry coffee 
transactions. In the more remote villages, the farmers sold their cocoa more 
often in their village or a nearby village than the farmers who sold coffee. 
These farmers were able to cover their transport costs and sell their coffee 
in the urban centres. The farmers selling coffee had more choice of trading 
partner. Moreover, the transport conditions are better in the dry season, 
compared to the rainy season when the roads are almost impassable. For 
the farmers who sold cherry coffee, distance does not play a significant 
role because the wholesalers in the urban trading centres are not interested 
in buying coffee cherries, unless it is in large amounts. 
In general, one may conclude that the distance between the urban 
trading centres and the villages restricts the farmers' trading opportunities, 
especially during the cocoa buying season. However, although more 
transactions took place in the villages in 1992/93 compared to 1991/92, this 
did not mean that the farmers' marketing opportunities worsened. On the 
contrary, the increase of transactions in the villages can partly be 
contributed to an increasing number of Village Marketing Centers run by 
the co-operatives and other agents of wholesalers, who provided the 
farmers with another opportunity to sell their produce at the village level. 
But of more importance to the farmers is the fact they now had a chance 
to receive at least the minimum producer price for their produce, even at 
village level. Whether the farmers are indeed able to take that chance 
depends, however, on several other factors influencing their freedom of 
choice. 
Closely related to the distance between the villages and the urban 
trading centres, is the amount of produce the farmers have for sale. For 
both periods, the amount of produce contributed to the farmer's 
considerations of where and to whom to sell his produce. In general, we 
conclude that farmers with small amounts of produce for sale tended to sell 
their produce more often in their own village or a nearby village. The 
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transport costs would be too high compared to the proceeds to make selling 
elsewhere worthwhile. However, the influence of the amount of produce for 
sale depends upon the type of produce. For the sale of cherry coffee, the 
amount of produce seems only to be of any importance when a farmer has 
a large amount, of more than six bags, for sale. It would then be 
worthwhile for either a trader to send someone to the village to collect the 
produce or for a farmer to travel to an urban trading centre. For the 
remaining cherry transactions it appears that, irrespective of the amount, all 
sales took place in the village or a nearby village, as only petty traders and, 
occasionally, the local merchants, are prepared to purchase cherry coffee. 
The amount of clean coffee for sale has less of an impact on a 
farmer's choice of location and trader, as most farmers prefer to sell in the 
urban trading centres. However, those farmers with very small amounts of 
less than one bushel, tended to sell in the villages. The amount of produce 
for sale is much more important for cocoa farmers. Small amounts tend to 
be sold in villages, whilst farmers with more than two bags prefer to trade 
in the urban centres. Cocoa farmers seem to be more influenced by 
transport conditions and loan obligations than coffee farmers. The Village 
Marketing Centers failed to attract the smaller producers, who usually had 
outstanding loans with certain petty traders. 
Loan repayment obligations contribute significantly to the farmer's' 
choice of trader. About 60 per cent of all coffee and cocoa producers we 
interviewed, had obtained a loan or had to repay a loan at the time of the 
interview. The majority of the farmers obtained their loans on the condition 
that they repaid it by selling the produce to the creditor. It appeared that 
the most important source of credit for the farmers were the petty traders 
and, to a lesser extent, the local merchants. Furthermore, those farmers 
without any credit sold their produce more often to wholesalers than those 
farmers with a credit, who were more or less tied to their creditor. The 
small farmers have few options other than to sell their produce to their 
creditor, who was usually a petty trader. The large farmers appeared to be 
less vulnerable to the influence of loan repayment obligations. In 
comparison to the smaller farmers, they could also obtain credit from local 
merchants and, in some cases, from regional wholesalers. Although these 
credit sources may also restrict the farmers' freedom of choice of trading 
partner, the large fanners had more opportunities to sell the remainder of 
their produce to other traders. Moreover, in general, wholesalers and local 
merchants pay producer prices more in line with the current minimum and 
leading producer prices. 
As well as the economic considerations mentioned so far, it appears 
that the farmer's choice is also influenced by his level of education. It 
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appears that farmers with some form of education sold their produce more 
often to either wholesalers or the co-operatives. Apparently, farmers with 
some form of education are better informed and acquainted with the 
advantages of selling their produce directly to the wholesalers or the co-
operatives. The young farmers have had better education opportunities than 
the older ones and appear to sell more often to the wholesalers and the co-
operatives. 
Although education seems to help farmers' decision making processes, 
the majority of educated farmers were still unaware of current producer 
prices, and had little control over the weighing and calculation practices of 
the traders. There is, therefore, a case for more specialized, marketing-
related education to improve farmers' knowledge of trading types and 
practices and thus, empower their bargaining position. 
All factors above mentioned, are mostly economically motivated 
considerations which restrict the farmers' choice of the most profitable 
trading partner. However, the farmers are not always able to make an 
economically motivated decision. Sometimes, because of family traditions, 
farmers are more or less compelled to sell their produce to somebody 
belonging to the same family, quite often a petty trader. This prevents the 
farmer from choosing a trader who might give him more profit. But it 
appears that farmers also sold their produce because of a friendship they 
had with a certain trader or because they would like to become a customer 
in exchange for more help, when in need. As well as these socially 
motivated reasons, some farmers mentioned that they really had no idea 
whom to sell produce to, especially those farmers who decided to sell in 
the urban trading centres. 
Farmers cited socially motivated, credit-related reasons most often, as 
exerting an influence on their choice of trader. Although, when aggregating 
the various reasons into economically motivated reasons on the one hand, 
and socially motivated or ad hoc decisions on the other hand, it appears 
that two-thirds of all reasons given by the farmers are economically 
motivated. The reasons mentioned by the farmers differ, to some extent, for 
the type of trader chosen by the farmer. For those farmers who sold to 
petty traders, the most important reasons were the urgent need for cash, the 
obligation of loan repayment and social obligations. Those farmers who 
sold to local merchants, mentioned credit relations and the wish to become 
a customer to obtain credit in the future. Transport reasons became more 
important, because the farmers felt they could good get higher prices from 
local merchants compared to petty traders and, at the same time, did not 
need to transport their produce to an urban trading centre. The farmers sold 
their produce to wholesalers more often as they wished to become a regular 
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costumer in exchange for help maintaining their coffee and cocoa 
plantations. The higher producer prices obtained from wholesalers also 
played a more significant role, compared to the motivations for conducting 
a transaction with a petty trader or a local merchant. For those farmers who 
preferred to sell their produce to the co-operatives, higher prices were 
mentioned most often. Furthermore, they mentioned that the village and 
chiefdom authorities strongly advised them to sell to the co-operative. 
To conclude, it is clear that the decision making process for farmers 
is a complex one, with different factors influencing and restricting their 
choice of trader. We have seen that in the urban trading centres the 
producer prices are comparatively higher than in the villages. Furthermore, 
the wholesalers and co-operatives pay producer prices which deviate less 
from the leading producer prices and minimum producer prices, than the 
producer prices paid by petty traders and local merchants. 
However, in spite of the liberalization of the produce trade, the farmers 
do not seem to be liberalized yet and seem to be still restricted in their 
choice of the trader. Moreover, in spite of the higher producer prices, the 
farmer still does not have any control on weight and price calculation 
practices of the traders. So far, the liberalization of the produce trade has 
only meant the government's withdrawal from fixing the producer prices 
and exporting agricultural produce. The farmers will only profit from these 
increased producer prices and, consequently, increase their agricultural 
output, if attention is focused on those factors which prevent them from 
selling their produce to the trader who offers the best price. Furthermore, 
the farmers will only benefit from the advantages of the privatization of the 
produce trade, if they are empowered to attain an equal bargaining position 
with the traders. 
9 
Farmers' Reactions to Deficiencies in the Marketing 
System 
Frank Sellies 
We may now conclude that the marketing system for coffee and cocoa in 
Sierra Leone is not functioning efficiently. The privatization of the coffee 
and cocoa marketing has not resulted in better opportunities for farmers. 
They have not benefitted from privatization and liberalization. This chapter 
explores some of the opportunities available for farmers to become more 
equal partners in the marketing system. Section 9.1 analyzes the current co-
operative movement in Sierra Leone, illustrated using the example of one 
co-operative. In section 9.2, the CARE Village Marketing Project is 
evaluated, as an attempt to improve the marketing facilities for coffee and 
cocoa farmers. 
9.1 The co-operative movement in Sierra Leone 
The small farmers of Sierra Leone have always played a marginal role in 
the marketing system of export crops. This is due not only to the behaviour 
of the several types of private traders, but to state organizations as well. 
One possible way forward to change this situation could be the revival of 
the co-operative movement. Farmers can then exercise more control over 
the functioning of the marketing system for cash crops. 
Because of their negative experiences with co-operative experiments 
in the past, it is necessary that the producers of export crops believe that 
a new attempt will be of benefit to them. Already there are promising 
indications of such a revival, and we are convinced that the new co-
operative initiatives should be given serious consideration as an alternative 
way to start development. But first, we describe briefly the history of 
government involvement with the co-operative movement in Sierra Leone. 
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9.1.1 The history of state-induced co-operative development 
The recorded history of the co-operatives in Sierra Leone began in 1948 
with the Co-operative Societies Ordinance, enacted by the British Colonial 
Government. This Act encompassed the creation of the Co-operative 
Department (which was effected in 1949) and set the requirements which 
the Co-operative Societies had to meet. The Department was responsible 
for the promotion and registration of co-operatives and the training of their 
members, committee members and secretaries. It was also supposed to 
audit the accounts of all the co-operative societies' and, generally speaking, 
supervise the co-operative movement. 
The fact that the Co-operative Act was legislated in the late 1940s 
does not mean that co-operatives did not exist before this time. On the 
contrary, one of the reasons for government initiation of the Act was the 
fact that produce and rice marketing co-operatives had already been 
established since the mid 1930s. For example, in the northwest of the 
country (in the Great Scarcies area) senior officers of the Ministry of 
Agriculture set up several rice marketing groups, which sold the purchased 
rice to the Rice Mill in Mambolo. So, it can be argued that the government 
only institutionalized, rather than initiated the co-operative movement in 
1949, and by doing so, was able to control it. One of the means of 
exercising this control was to create a hierarchical co-operative model, in 
which all the decisions were channelled down from the top. 
To make sure that the co-operative model in Sierra Leone was easily 
controllable, the Co-operative Societies Ordinance was largely based on the 
British-designed co-operative model, which had already been implemented 
in India in 1912. It encompassed the establishment of "state-sponsored co-
operatives", with the appointment of the necessary staff to promote and 
supervise societies (Samura, 1978). 
According to Mukonoweshuro (1993), the leadership of the co-
operative societies that were created from 1949 onwards, consisted mainly 
of state-appointed "big men1" (notably Chiefs, but also traders), 'for only 
they could be trusted not to turn them into radical rural organizations 
challenging the established hierarchy in the economy' (p. 163). These big 
In the lingua franca of Sierra Leone, the class of "big men" refers to those 
people with power, i.e. money, in a given society. The concept is derived from 
the fact that the powerful often had big bellies. This phenomenon, also 
sometimes referred to as "boss men", can manifest itself not only at the local, 
but at the regional and national levels as well. It is synonymous with the better 
known concept of "patron". 
Farmers' Reactions 333 
men had an interest in maintaining the status quo, in order not to lose their 
power base. Consequently, the members of co-operatives had virtually no 
say in the running of the societies. 
The Colonial Government of Sierra Leone also created several 
institutions to guide "the co-operative experiment" during the years. One 
of these institutions was the Registrar of Co-operative Societies Loan 
Scheme (RCSLS). It was started in 1950, financed by a low interest 
government loan. The Scheme provided short-, medium-, and long-term 
loans, which were meant for agricultural production and marketing. The 
primary and secondary societies (the latter were also known as Unions) 
were the beneficiaries of those loans, but they in their turn had to provide 
loans to member farmers (Johnny, 1985). The loan recovery rate was 
extremely low, so by the beginning of the 1970s, the loan activities were 
at a standstill. 
After several years of "top-down" experimentation with different types of 
co-operatives, 131 coffee and cocoa marketing co-operatives were 
registered in 1956 (ILO/ICA/CDSL, 1991). Those societies marketed 
around a quarter to a third of the coffee and cocoa production at that time. 
At the end of the 1950s, the Sierra Leone Co-operative Marketing 
Federation (SLCMF) was established in order to co-ordinate the activities 
of the different marketing co-operatives. At the regional level, Co-operative 
Unions had been set up on a geographical basis, in which several (primary) 
co-operative societies worked together in order to benefit from economies 
of scale (e.g. transport). Five of those Co-operative Unions located in the 
southeast of Sierra Leone, amalmagated into SLCMF (Klomberg and van 
Riessen, 1983). 
The number of co-operative societies that were established rose 
considerably until well into the 1960s. It even led to a freeze in the active 
promotion of co-operative development by the Co-operative Department. 
The Department was insufficiently equipped to keep up with the rapid 
growth of the co-operative movement (ibid.). 
The success of the cocoa and coffee marketing co-operatives, at least 
when measured quantitatively, can be attributed to the better prices they 
paid to farmers, but was also due to the fact that leading members of the 
SLCMF were also actively engaged in the Sierra Leone People's Party, the 
dominant party in the country at that time (Johnston, 1968). Encouraged by 
the initial success of the coffee and cocoa marketing co-operatives, 
marketing societies for rice, banana, fish and vegetables were also 
established. 
Around 1966, the situation for the marketing societies became 
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increasingly difficult. A lot of them collapsed, because a shortage of cash 
within the SLPMB; they could not pay the farmers (and the co-operatives) 
on the spot. The primary reason for the cash shortage of the Board was due 
to the time period existing between payment to the farmer and the 
collection of the export proceeds. The Board was only being paid for the 
produce after the arrival of the shipment in the country of destination, 
while the farmer expected to be paid immediately he had delivered the 
produce to the Board. The result of this was that the functions of the co-
operatives were taken over by Licensed Buying Agents and their 
intermediaries. A related constraint for the co-operative movement was the 
assumption of power by the All People's Congress in 1967. The co-
operatives lost the political support they had received until then, from 
SLPP (NCDB, personal communications, 1992; see also: Jabati, 1978). 
Already in the previous year, the government had withdrawn its guarantee, 
and the co-operatives were no longer able to obtain overdraft facilities from 
commercial banks. So, the cash shortage within the SLPMB, coupled with 
the cancelling of the overdraft facilities, led to severe cash flow constraints 
for the co-operative societies. They could no longer pay farmers directly, 
who themselves had no choice other than to turn to other produce 
purchasers. 
The Co-operative Department and the Ministry of Trade and Industry tried 
to prevent the total collapse of the co-operative movement by launching 
several initiatives; by establishing the National Co-operative Development 
Bank in 1971, for example. It was created following the failure of RCSLS, 
and was meant as an apex financial institution for all co-operative societies, 
with the task of mobilising funds for co-operative development. Between 
1971 and 1975, a total amount of 32,000 Le was issued as loans 
(HXMCA/CDSL 1991). So, its impact was small2. 
The Bank also functioned as a Licensed Buying Agent for SLPMB for 
some time, in which it purchased a sizeable amount of produce (see table 
9.1). The Bank's function as a mobilizer of co-operative savings was 
negligible, primarily because there were hardly any active co-operative 
societies left. The Bank ceased virtually all operations halfway through the 
1980s. In September 1991, however, a committee was set up in order to 
prepare a restructuring plan for NCDB. The committee, with members 
coming from the Bank of Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Finance and the 
2
 In addition, Johnny (1985) mentions that between 1975 and 1980, only 71 loans 
with a total amount of 114,000 Le were issued. 
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Co-operative Department, concluded that 'the NCDB could not be 
successfully restructured and should therefore be wound up and a new 
institution established in its place.' (Report, 1993, p. 8). The committee 
recommended that the new NCDB should be called the Co-operative Bank 
(SL) Ltd., and become a Development Rural Finance Institution, thereby 
not confining itself solely to co-operative societies. It should act as a 
commercial bank, with a rural bias. A prerequisite for becoming a 
"genuine" bank would be the hiring of professional banking personnel. 
Since its start in 1971, NCDB had always been managed by the Co-
operative Department, not by bankers. The new Co-operative Bank should 
become independent from the state and, hence, from the Co-operative 
Department. To date, the funding for the winding up of NCDB and the 
subsequent creation of the new Co-operative Bank has yet to be found. 
Table 9.1 Produce sales of NCDB, Kenema, 1983/84-1985/86 (in metric 
tons) 
Produce 
Cocoa 
Coffee 
Palm kernels 
1983/84 
188.5 
123.3 
26 
1984/85 
241 
356 
99 
1985/86 
220 
159 
34.5 
Source: Aldworth and Wisniewksi (1987). 
An apex body was also created on behalf of the primary and secondary 
savings and credit societies. The National Savings and Credit Co-operative 
League of Sierra Leone (NASCCLOS) started in 1970 with an initial 
membership of 22 secondary and 216 primary societies (Samura, 1991). 
According to their objectives, the League had to assist the member 
societies in technical and financial matters, provide education and training, 
promote mobilization of local savings and so on. Due to weak management 
capabilities, financial difficulties (membership fees could not keep up with 
inflation) and apparently disinterest of the societies, NASCCLOS was 
dormant until 1990. An initial attempt to revitalise NASCCLOS had been 
made in 1980, but after the cessation of the external financial assistance, 
the League continued to lie dormant in 1984. Finally, in 1990, the Registrar 
of the Co-operative Societies made the first steps in reviving the 
organization. There were changes in the leadership of NASCCLOS and 
there are now plans to improve the auditing of the organization. Currently, 
the African Confederation of Co-operative Savings and Credit Associations 
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(ACCOSCA) is providing technical support to NASCCLOS. 
The Sierra Leone Co-operative Marketing Federation had virtually 
collapsed by the beginning of the 1960s due to the lack of sufficiently 
trained staff, the presence of illiterate officials at top-level, embezzlement 
and the inefficient creation of too many sub-agents (GOSL, 1970). 
Formally it stopped functioning in 1967, because the newly elected APC 
government withdrew its political support and financial guarantees. Already 
by then the need was felt to establish another umbrella organization which 
would have to ensure the growth and efficiency of all types of co-operative 
societies. The apex body which would have to take care of these goals was 
called the National Co-operative Congress of Sierra Leone (NCCSL), and 
it was finally established in 1980. Its responsibilities included such 
activities as to assist the members with their operational and technical 
problems, to promote and organise co-operative activities and to represent 
the co-operative movement on the national and international level. 
'After a long period of inactivity the Congress has recently 
commenced to revitalize itself (ILO/ICA, 1991). In 1990, a conference 
was held during which a new Board of Directors was elected, and a 
number of resolutions were adopted. The main target for a revitalized 
NCCSL would be to take over the tasks of the Co-operative Department. 
The latter should concentrate on the legal aspects (i.e. registration, 
administration, and so on) only. The co-operative movement should not be 
guided or controlled by the state any more. All the co-operative societies 
should become Non-Governmental Organizations. Furthermore, the 
Congress is expected to take over the education and training tasks of the 
Co-operative Department (which the latter was unable to carry out in any 
case). They also should become the spokes organization of the co-operative 
movement, not only at the national but at the international level as well. 
The bottleneck in the revitalization of NCCSL is financial. The 
Congress needs income in order to be able to perform its functions. The 
current head of NCCSL went on a trip to Moscow in 1991 and contacted 
a Russian company ("Vatan"), willing to invest in Sierra Leone. The 
intermediary for Russian investment in Sierra Leone would be NCCSL. 
The NCCSL and Vatan would establish two joint-ventures, "Co-op Inter" 
and "Gelpol Ltd" (NCCSL, personal communication, 1992). The former 
should be responsible for exporting, processing and manufacturing 
agricultural resources in Sierra Leone, and would also take care of the 
import and distribution of agricultural inputs and manufactured goods. 
Gelpol would be responsible for the provision of mechanical and electrical 
engineering services to member societies of NCCSL. They would be 
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responsible for the repair and maintenance of all the co-operatives' 
equipment and machinery. Nine activities have been identified in which 
Co-op Inter and Gelpol plan to be active. To date, this investment 
programme is still in its planning phase. 
To summarize, the new apex organizational structure of the co-operative 
movement in Sierra Leone will look as follows. The NCCSL will be the 
representative of all the co-operative societies in Sierra Leone. They will 
also take care of the training and education of co-operative staff. The 
NCDB will become a commercial bank and will be renamed Co-operative 
Bank (SL) Ltd. In addition, they will be primarily responsible for the 
financial affairs of the co-operative movement. NASCCLOS will be a 
separate entity which is responsible for all the savings and credit societies. 
The savings and credit societies are seen as separate organizations from the 
other types of societies, mainly marketing co-operatives, so that the 
existence of a separate apex organization is seen as justified. The tasks that 
are left for the Co-operative Department, then, all have to do with the legal 
aspects of the co-operative movement. They should undertake registration 
and administration functions, but should also be responsible for a new Co-
operative Act, now that the old Act is clearly out of date. 
It is obvious that the top-down approach, although failing in the past, 
has not been abandoned by the current co-operative officials and the Co-
operative Department. In this respect, it is doubtful whether individual co-
operative members will see or experience any benefits of this strategy. 
9.1.2 The present situation of the co-operative societies 
The National Workshop on Co-operative Training and Financial 
Management, which was held in November 1980 in Sierra Leone, can be 
considered as the basis for the current revival of new co-operative activities 
in Sierra Leone. The Workshop analyzed the achievements and constraints 
of the co-operative movement, and made recommendations for future 
developments. The seminar concluded that the mistakes from the past were 
mainly due to the fact that the essential principles of the so called "bottom-
up" approach were neglected; consultation with the target population was 
seen as the basic precondition for the success of any co-operative initiative. 
One result of the Workshop was the founding of the National Co-operative 
Congress, but more importantly, the basis was laid for the concept of 
"multi-purpose co-operative societies", which were to be organized at the 
chiefdom level. This new type of co-operative would replace the single-
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chiefdom level. This new type of co-operative would replace the single-
purpose, village based, (marketing) co-operative societies. The multi-
purpose societies had to provide a comprehensive package of services, 
including delivery of agricultural inputs, supply of consumer goods to their 
members (particularly rice), were to issue credit, and facilitate storage, 
processing and marketing services. 
The organization was to be at chiefdom level, because past experience 
had shown that the village based co-operatives were too small to be viable, 
and it had become clear that many of these societies were created by co-
operative officials with the purpose of obtaining government loans, to 
achieve statistical success and so to enhance their chances of promotion in 
the Service (Samura, 1978). The chiefdom, as an administrative unit of 
about 10 to 20,000 inhabitants, was seen as the ideal area of operation. 
This was mainly because it was sufficiently large enough to provide the 
basis for sustainable provision of basic services, such as marketing, input 
and credit. In addition to this, an organization on a chiefdom basis also fits 
very well 'in the existing cultural, economic and social customs and meets 
the needs of this basic unit of self government and self-help.' (Aldworth 
and Wisniewski, 1987, p. 18). 
As mentioned before, although the basis of the current enthusiasm was 
created in 1980, it was not until 1986 that the first new multi-purpose co-
operative was instituted, the Nongowa Co-operative Growers and 
Marketing Association ("Nongowa Growers"). The driving forces behind 
the founding of this co-operative were two men with considerable 
experience in co-operative thinking, and who had both worked within the 
Co-operative Department for years. Also important in the process of 
convincing potential members of the possible benefits of a co-operative 
(which was, after the devastating experience that people had with the co-
operative movement during the 1960s, unduly necessary) was the fact that 
one of the two former civil servants happened to be the Paramount Chief 
of Nongowa chiefdom, the traditional (elected) leader of that chiefdom. He 
played an important role in convincing the chiefdom population that the 
unity of farmers could be of benefit to them all. 
The concept of chiefdom-based co-operatives is derived from 
experiences from India. At the beginning of this century, village co-
operatives were organized in the Punjab Province (Brahme, 1984). Some 
thirty years later, those small village groups thought it wise to merge into 
larger groups to achieve greater efficiency and productivity. The larger 
Associations were able to procure economic advantages which were not 
feasible for the village-based associations. 
It is important that the co-operative is established at chiefdom level, 
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because in Sierra Leone the chiefdoms have always played a prominent 
role in the political, social and economic history of the country. Chiefdoms 
have served - and still serve - as the basic elements of political 
administration and they are units of social and cultural activities. 
The co-operative also had to have a bottom-up approach, had to rely 
on indigenous technologies, and the organizational structure would have to 
be locally based. The latter was especially important, because in Sierra 
Leone the rural population relies more on the traditional customary system 
than on the national governmental structures (Gerretsen and Sellies, 1989). 
This was another reason why it was beneficial that the Paramount Chief 
was involved in the founding of Nongowa Growers. 
At the last count, 1514 co-operative associations were registered, but 
only 505 seem to be active (ILOVICA/CDSL, 1991). Of those active co-
operatives, only seven are multi-purpose co-operatives as intended at the 
Workshop in 1980, one which is Nongowa Growers. The other six co-
operatives are located in Pejeh West, Luawa, Gaura, Mandu, Tunkia and 
Small-Bo Chiefdoms, which are all chiefdoms in the Eastern Province. 
9.1.3 A multi-purpose co-operative society: Nongowa Growers 
The Nongowa Co-operative Growers and Marketing Association was 
registered in June 1986 as an agricultural co-operative, whereby one of the 
founding fathers defined this type of co-operative as: 
(...) a voluntary association of farm people to serve themselves through their own 
business on a profit sharing basis. The objectives of members of the co-operative 
is [are] to improve their farm incomes by the orderly marketing of their products 
and by purchasing their supplies through [an?] organisation owned and controlled 
by themselves. (Andriessen and Stommels, 1991, p. 43, quoting Mustapha, 1988). 
The main goal of Nongowa Growers is the improvement of the 
socioeconomic position of the farmers and the enhancement of co-operative 
ideas. The main objectives under this goal include: 
1) to eliminate, through co-operative marketing, the middlemen and 
obtain the highest possible price paid by the Government of Sierra 
Leone for coffee and cocoa; 
2) to purchase agricultural inputs and basic consumer goods in bulk and 
make them available to members at a reasonable cost; 
3) to establish a credit system with short and medium term loans for the 
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members, as a way of reducing the farmers' dependency on petty 
traders and other money lenders for credit; 
4) to educate members and agricultural producers in co-operative 
principles and ideas, and: 
5) to act as a spokesman for and be a representative of the members 
(Nongowa Growers, 1986 and CRS/Nongowa Growers, 1991). 
To achieve these objectives, the co-operative is not only engaged in the 
field of marketing, but executes non-marketing activities as well. 
Nevertheless, its main endeavour remains the marketing activities, notably 
the purchase, transport and sale of coffee and cocoa. 
Marketing activities 
The first and foremost marketing activity of Nongowa Growers is the 
purchase and sale of coffee and cocoa. For this purpose, the co-operative 
uses six Village Marketing Centers. They also use six subcentres. These are 
dwellings that the co-operative is renting to conduct transactions and to 
store coffee and cocoa. In addition, Nongowa Growers has established four 
collection points. These collection points are located in villages where 
Nongowa Growers does not have their own building (owned or rented), but 
where the co-operative has stationed an agent (see map 9.1). Once every 
so often, one of the co-operative's vehicles collects the produce purchased 
by the agent at the collection point. To achieve maximum collaboration 
with the chiefdom population, at least one Village Marketing Center, 
subcentre or collection point is located in each of the eight sections of 
Nongowa Chiefdom (see table 9.2). 
The Marketing Centers are constructions which are designed and 
assembled by the international NGO CARE. The idea behind their 
establishment was to eliminate the exploitation of farmers by the 
middlemen and traders (Molitor and Ghandi, 1987). Basically, they started 
with a building in a village, after which the farmers would have to take the 
organization of the center organization. This initiative would lead ideally 
to the creation of a marketing co-operative at village level (for a further 
evaluation of the Village Marketing Center Project, see section 9.2). 
Because CARE and Nongowa Growers both started their marketing 
activities around the same time, it was logical that the two initiatives would 
attempt some form of collaboration. After all, Nongowa Growers was an 
association organized at chiefdom level, but with members in the villages. 
The co-operative also needed a means of connecting the chiefdom to the 
village level. The participation of the members could also be assured this 
way. 
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• Marketing Center (functioning) 
О Marketing Center (irregularly, 
or non-functioning) 
• Chiefdom Co-operative Subcentre 
• Chiefdom Co-operative Headquarters 
Vlap 9.1 Locations of co-operative buying centres in the research area, 
1987-1993 
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Table 9.2 Overview of the distribution of Village Marketing Centers, 
subcentres and collection points per chiefdom section* 
(Nongowa Chiefdom) 
Marketing Center Subcentre Collection point 
Largo (7) Ngelahun (6) Vaahun (Masahun) (6) 
Talia (6) Nyandeyama (5) Potehun (3) 
Vaahun (5) Majihun (5) Konabu (3) 
Samie Foluma (4) Komende (5) Pandero (8) 
Nekabo (3) Jormu (3) 
Kpeima (3) Tilorma (2) 
The head office of Nongowa Growers is in Kenema (1) 
The eight sections of Nongowa Chiefdom are: 
(1) Gbo Lambayama" 
(2) Gbo Kakayama" 
(3) Dagbayna 
(4) Kagbado Geigbla 
(5) Kona Foiya 
(6) Dakpana 
(7) Kona Kpindifu 
(8) Kagbado Kaboima 
(1) and (2) form together the chiefdom capital Kenema. 
Sources: Nongowa Growers (1986-1994); authors (1993). 
The Marketing Centers which CARE constructed were a perfect means to 
that end. Thus the co-operative members saw a visible result (a building) 
from their organization, and Nongowa Growers had a foothold at the 
village level. The additional benefit for CARE was that they now had an 
indigenous organization with which they could negotiate and plan. At the 
same time, they could work together in educating and training the farmers 
about the marketing of cash crops and the administration of the centers. 
CARE was working in several chiefdoms in the Kenema and Kailahun 
Districts of the Eastern Province in Sierra Leone. The Village Marketing 
Project finished in July 1992 because the funding ended and no further 
financial means for the project could be found. Recently, co-operatives at 
chiefdom level have been established in other chiefdoms, but those 
initiatives are still in their early stages. 
The coffee and cocoa that Nongowa Growers purchased from their 
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members was, until the abolition of SLPMB, delivered to James 
International, a large company mat is also engaged in the wholesaling and 
retailing of consumer goods. In fact, the co-operative was acting as a 
traditional LBA, but the produce was delivered to a private company, 
instead of to the SLPMB. Nongowa Growers had selected James 
International, as the company was able to provide them with working 
capital, rice, vehicles, and so on. The agreement between the co-operative 
and James International was of mutual benefit. 
Each of the Marketing Centers, subcentres and the central store in 
Kenema (which is a former NCDB buying station) are run by a store clerk, 
who is on the co-operative's pay roll. Nongowa Growers has stimulated the 
use of platform scales, which are now used in almost all centers. These 
scales are more accurate than the more widely used hanging scales (the 
latter have springs which lose their buoyancy quite easily, with or without 
the help of a trader) and the so-called "three-pence-pans". Those pans are 
fairly simple to "re-bend", and in addition, there are several different pan 
sizes, from which the trader knows exactly how to benefit. The co-
operative agents at the collection points still have to use hanging scales 
instead of platform scales, for financial reasons. 
The store clerk has to weigh the produce, and issue a receipt, on which 
he has to write the quantity of produce and the price for which it is bought. 
The farmer receives a copy and a second copy is used to list the weekly 
purchases. In the office of the central store in Kenema all the receipts are 
kept in an archive. Furthermore, an internal auditor makes monthly checks 
on the buying practices of the different store clerks, as an extra guarantee 
that the farmers receive the official producer prices. 
Since their inception, Nongowa Growers has shown an increase in the 
purchase of produce every year, until the rebel war broke out in March 
1991, as table 9.3 displays. The rebel activities affected, in first instance, 
the Kailahun District. Kenema District was not directly affected, but 
experienced a considerable influx of refugees. The population of Nongowa 
Chiefdom also received many people who had fled from the rebel-invaded 
areas. Although not affected directly, the psychological effects of the 
rumours about the atrocities that the rebels were supposed to have 
committed should not be underestimated. Many farmers were afraid, and 
this had a definite effect on the attention they were willing to give to their 
coffee and cocoa farms. Moreover, the hosting of refugees meant that the 
demand on food increased. Consequently, many farmers decided to 
concentrate more on food (specifically rice) production, than on cash crops. 
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Table 93 Turnover figures of Nongowa Growers 1987/88-1993/94 (in 
metric tons) 
Season 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
Cocoa 
purchases 
197.7 
227.1 
225.1 
254.6 
150.1 
170.2 
112.3 
sales 
200.4 
225.5 
223.1 
239.5 
152.5 
168.8 
110.5 
Coffee 
purchases 
137.1 
159.9 
164.0 
99.1 
119.4 
110.1 
56.5 
sales 
136.1 
152.6 
142.9 
114.9 
120.8 
109.3 
36.5 
Sources: Nongowa Growers (1986-1994); authors' calculations (1993/94). 
The effect of the war on the purchase of cocoa was not yet visible in the 
season 1990/91. Farmers usually harvest their cocoa from August until 
February, which means that the peak season in selling their cocoa falls 
between September and April (see figures 9.1 and 9.2). The rebel incursion 
started in March, which meant that most farmers already had sold their 
cocoa, and that the declining cocoa purchases of Nongowa Growers were 
not noticeable until the 1991/92 season. 
The coffee harvesting season starts several months after the cocoa 
harvest, and lasts from December until May. For these farmers, the rebel 
war started during the height of their coffee selling period. The immediate 
result for Nongowa Growers was that their coffee purchases declined by 
approximately 40 per cent. 
In the beginning of 1993, after relative calm, the rebel war entered a 
new phase. Again, the effect was especially noticeable on the co-
operative's coffee purchases. Cocoa purchases were showing an upward 
trend again, but coffee purchases declined by more than 10 per cent. See 
also figures 9.3 and 9.4. 
As mentioned before, these turnover figures coincided with the expansion 
of the total number of members of Nongowa Growers, until the rebel war 
broke out. The membership number increased from 40 in September 1986 
to 2255 by September 1994 (see table 9.4). 
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Table 9.4 Membership development of Nongowa Growers 1986-1994 
(year ending in June) 
Male members 
Female members 
Total membership 
1986 
7 
7 
1987 
199 
9 
208 
1988 
497 
38 
535 
1989 
1267 
210 
1477 
1990 
1450 
239 
1689 
1991 
1757 
286 
2043 
1992 
1854 
301 
2155 
1993 
1916 
334 
2250 
1994 
1920 
334 
2255 
Sources: Nongowa Growers (1986-1994); authors' calculations (1993/94). 
In principle, every farmer (although theoretically he has to be an inhabitant 
of Nongowa Chiefdom) is allowed to sell his produce to Nongowa 
Growers. Thus Nongowa Growers does not differentiate between members 
and non-members for the purchase of produce. Nevertheless, the co-oper-
ative tries to encourage the farmers to become official members. To 
become a member, a farmer has to pay a small entrance fee, it is then 
possible for him to buy one or more shares in the co-operative. The 
benefits for members are, the yearly distribution of dividends (which are 
based on the amount of coffee and or cocoa a member has sold to 
Nongowa Growers), the payment of interest on the shares and the chance 
to obtain credit in the form of rice or cash. However, the amount of credit 
that Nongowa Growers has provided to their members was rather limited, 
due to the limited possibilities of accumulating capital. 
A second marketing activity of Nongowa Growers is the transport of 
produce. One of the main constraints farmers face is a means with which 
to carry there produce to a buying station. The CARE/Nongowa Growers 
initiative was, of course, an improvement for many farmers because of the 
resulting decentralization of buying points. So, in that respect, Nongowa 
Growers was already meeting the farmers' transport problems. In addition, 
farmers could also have produce collected by one of the co-operative's 
mini-trucks, for which a relatively small amount per bag is charged. This 
is, however, only possible when a farmer or a village as a whole can make 
sure that there will be a full load. The trucks are of more importance for 
securing the transportation of coffee and cocoa from the Village Marketing 
Centers, subcentres and the collection points to the central store in 
Kenema. 
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Non-marketing activities 
Nongowa Growers is also engaged in non-marketing activities, such as the 
selling of rice and other consumer goods, the issuing of loans and 
educating and advising farmers. To begin with, the training and advice was 
meant to be implemented in collaboration with CARE, but after they had 
cancelled the Village Marketing Project, the co-operative was on its own. 
At the moment, Nongowa Growers still lacks both the financial means and 
the technical knowledge to educate farmers, other than in co-operative 
principles and ideas. 
Although all these exercises are basically non-marketing activities, they 
are all more or less related to the marketing constraints farmers face. The 
position of the farmers cannot be altered solely by improving the way 
coffee or cocoa is marketed. For instance, from earlier research it became 
clear that many farmers were "tied" to certain traders because of credit 
relations. A well known phenomenon was the borrowing of a bag of rice 
by a farmer during the hungry season (the time immediately before the new 
rice harvest, when rice is in short supply), which had to be repaid with a 
bag of cocoa at the time of cocoa harvesting, although the cocoa might be 
up to four times as valuable. The "tiedness" of this relationship lies not 
only in the fact that the farmer has to pay back the loan (which, after all, 
is logical), but that a trader is capable of either obligating the farmer to sell 
all his produce to him, or that the farmer himself feels compelled to sell all 
or part of his produce to the trader, at virtually any price, so as to secure 
a possible future loan (for all kinds of credit arrangements, see Peperkamp, 
1981; Debouillé and Wanders, 1987; Gerretsen and Sellies, 1989; chapter 
5 and section 8.4). In this respect, it is of paramount importance for 
Nongowa Growers to be able to supply their members with credit. If the 
co-operative is unable to do so, most farmers simply do not have any other 
choice but to turn to somebody who does. In most cases this will be a 
middleman or buying agent. Thus, farmers are tied to traders and hence 
receive low prices, and Nongowa Growers will be faced with a diminishing 
rum-over. But, as mentioned before, Nongowa Growers' ability to extend 
credit to their members is limited, see table 9.S. 
The co-operative has issued three different types of loans, which, 
except for seed rice loans, are only issued to members. First, there are 
plantation loans. These are short term cash loans, with a duration of one 
year. The applications for the loans are judged by a loan committee. All 
applicants for plantation loans are visited individually. The applicant should 
have a plantation of either coffee or cocoa, he has to have a guarantor and 
he must be a "patronizing member", which means that he should have 
already sold his produce to the co-operative. 
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Table 9.5 Amounts of different types of loans issued by Nongowa 
Growers, 1988/89-1993/94 (in Leones) 
Year Plantation loans Seed rice loans Members' loans 
1988/89 175,800 
1989/90 651,400 
1990/91 912,600 561,440(464 bu) 308,000 
1991/92 1,881,420 119,000 (62 bu) 460,920 
1992/93 1,425,000 561,800(106 bu) 975,425 
1993/94 1,752,000 530,000 (75 bu) 120,000 
Sources: Nongowa Growers (1986-1994); authors' calculations (1993/94). 
The amount of produce a farmer has sold to Nongowa Growers in the 
previous year limits the maximum amount he can borrow. For instance, 
when a farmer has sold five bags of produce to the co-operative, the loan 
committee capitalizes two or three bags of produce as the maximum 
amount the farmers can receive. It does not equal the full amount, because 
the farmer will need some cash after he has repaid the loan. The interest 
on the loan is 10 per cent, and the loan is repaid by deducting the loan 
amount, plus interest, from the farmer's produce sales to the co-operative 
at the time of the next sale. Plantation loans are meant for brushing and 
improving the farm methods, but Nongowa Growers was until now unable 
to provide the necessary farm inputs, such as fertilizers, insecticides and 
farming tools. 
The second type of loans are seed rice loans, for which non-members 
can apply as well. These loans are seasonal and in kind. After all 
applications have been compiled, every applicant is visited to make sure he 
has a bush (for upland rice) or a swamp (in the case of swamp rice). He 
also has to possess a coffee or cocoa plantation, which functions as 
collateral. The applicant has to have a guarantor, which is often the Town 
Chief, or the head of the family. Loans are distributed to households rather 
than to individuals, because the varied tasks in rice farming involve 
different members of the household. After all applications are compiled, the 
loan committee assembles and discusses the applications. The total number 
of bushels applied for is calculated, as are the costs involved. Depending 
on the capital available, the rice is then bought from the Seed 
Multiplication Project. The rice is distributed in April, May and June, 
which are the ploughing months. The interest is 50 per cent in kind on the 
principal, so for every bushel borrowed, the applicant should repay 1.5 
bushel. If the household fails to repay the loan after the rice harvest in 
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December or January, the loan period is extended for one year. If it is still 
not repaid by then, the loan will be revalued at the prevailing paddy rice 
price. The recalculated amount is then deducted from the produce sales of 
the household head to the co-operative. 
Finally, Nongowa Growers issue members' loans. These are short term 
cash loans, with a maximum duration of two years. The applicant should 
be a patronizing member, and should use the loan for social commitments, 
such as school fees, ceremonies and so on. The loan application committee 
has to approve the loan request by considering the loan purpose. The 
maximum loan amount is again based on the amount of produce the 
applicant has sold to Nongowa Growers in the previous year, as for the 
plantation loans. The repayment period is determined by the loan 
committee. 
The main constraint that Nongowa Growers face is financial. Their 
level of profits has been insufficient to build up a substantial loan fund. 
And as long the co-operative is unable to acquire this fund, it will remain 
handicapped in its competition with other traders. 
The other non-marketing activities of Nongowa Growers are just as 
important as the credit activities. For example, the provision of 
(consumption) rice at reasonable prices diminishes the need of a farmer to 
borrow, either rice, or cash in order to buy rice. So it seems obvious that 
the non-marketing activities reduce the dependency of farmers on the 
"benevolence" of traders, and hence, improves the living conditions of 
those farmers. Rice provision to consumers has been relatively modes in 
recent years, see table 9.6, although the provision of consumption rice was 
more successful than the credit provision, when comparing the capital 
available for both services. However, the amount of rice sold in 1991/92 
was barely enough to provide each member with one bag of rice for the 
whole season. 
It might be clear, from the profit levels, that the sales of rice are not 
generating enough profit for the co-operative, to be sustainable. For 
example, the profit in the 1991/92 season was not sufficient to pay for the 
operation costs of Nongowa Growers for just one month, which was 
approximately 850,000 Leones in the 1991/92 season (Nongowa Growers, 
personal communication, 1992). For Nongowa Growers, profit making is 
therefore, of utmost importance. Besides rice, there are other sources of 
profit. In their central store in Kenema, as well as in some of the 
Marketing Centers, the co-operative is selling consumer goods, such as soft 
drinks and beer, but also cigarettes and tobacco. But again, profit levels are 
marginal, as table 9.7 shows. 
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Table 9.6 Consumption rice purchases and sales by Nongowa Growers, 
1987/88-1993/94 (in Leones) 
Year Rice purchases Rice sales Gross profit 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
121,905.50 
5,151,980.00 
5,562,650.00 
20,380,300.00 
15,742,600.00 
7,800,000.00 
7,600,000.00 
157,060.00 
6,055,086.00 
5,873,375.00 
23,578,619.00 
16,515,045.00 
8,537,050.00 
9.233,500.00 
35,154.50 
903,106.00 
310,725.00 
3,198,319.00 
772,445.00 
737,050.00 
1,633,500.00 
Sources: Nongowa Growers (1986-1994); authors' calculations (1993/94). 
Table 9.7 Consumer goods purchases and sales by Nongowa Growers, 
1988/89-1993/94 (in Leones) 
Year Drinks purchases Drinks sales 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
154,800.00 
3,383,714.93 
1,279,164.37 
13,476,470.70 
13,317,090.00 
2,246,904.00 
151,467.00 
3,701,385.00 
1,284,728.00 
14,084,750.00 
13,609,983.00 
2,342,170.00 
-continued: 
Tobacco purchases Tobacco sales Total gross profit 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
-
3,319,000.00 
1,722,540.00 
-
-
-
-
3,476,810.00 
1,736,440.00 
-
-
-
-3,333.00 
475,480.07 
19,463.70 
608,280.00 
292,893.00 
95,266.00 
Sources: Nongowa Growers (1986-1994); authors' calculations (1993/94). 
Again, the total gross profits on the consumer goods sales in 1991/92 
would be insufficient to cover even a month's running costs. It seems clear 
that the profit base should be expanded. This could be achieved by 
undertaking more income generating activities, such as selling farm inputs 
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and other consumer goods. In the long term, the co-operative might even 
go into the processing of coffee and cocoa. In the short term, exporting the 
produce itself, instead of selling it to other exporters, seems the most viable 
option. Already promising developments have started in this respect (see 
section 9.1.4). 
However, there is a danger for Nongowa Growers in being active in 
all kinds of activities. By trying to cover almost every field of marketing, 
or marketing related, problems, the strains on management and organization 
might become too severe. There must be enough skills available to manage 
all activities, otherwise operations might grow too complicated and leading 
the co-operative will become a burden to its management and 
uncontrollable by its members. 
What are the achievements of the Nongowa Growers co-operative so far? 
This is a difficult question to answer because the general aim of the co-
operative, namely to improve the socioeconomic position of the farmers, 
can be evaluated in different ways and, hence, lead to different outcomes. 
Indirectly, the success of Nongowa Growers might be assessed by looking 
at the increase in membership. After all, membership will only then 
increase when farmers see or expect benefits in joining the co-operative. 
Current membership is at 2255 (1994), starting from 7 in 19863. This is 
not a bad figure, and by considering this membership development, the co-
operative seems successful. 
In addition, the success of Nongowa Growers can also be assessed by 
looking at it as a role model for other groups of farmers. In November 
1992, the Small-Bo Growers, a co-operative based on the Nongowa 
Growers model, began to purchase cocoa. Since their foundation in the 
beginning of 1992, their membership increased from 58 in March of that 
year, to 1349 by the end of September 1994. They managed to purchase 
over 25 tons of cocoa and almost 80 tons of coffee in the first year of their 
operation4. It seems that the Nongowa Growers example can convince 
farmers in other areas that co-operation is of benefit to them. If it were not 
for the rebel war, other co-operatives based on the Nongowa Growers 
model, notably the ones in Peje West, Tunkia and Gaura Chiefdoms, would 
have been well on their way in copying the success of Nongowa Growers. 
3
 This figure represents approximately 10 per cent of all the fanners in Nongowa 
Chiefdom. 
4
 One should take into account that Small-Bo Growers only started purchasing 
cocoa, when the cocoa season was already halfway. 
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The market share in purchasing coffee and cocoa might also be 
considered as an indicator of the co-operative's success rate Although there 
are no exact figures for the total amount of coffee and cocoa produced and 
marketed in Nongowa Chiefdom, the market share of Nongowa Growers 
in the chiefdom was estimated to be about one-fifth for cocoa and one-third 
for coffee in 1991 (Andriessen and Stommels, 1991). 
A more direct way of measuring the success of the co-operative can 
be done by analyzing the services they provide. Almost from the start 
Nongowa Growers began issuing loans to members. Initially, the amount 
of credit issued was more symbolic than substantial, but year by year the 
amount rose until the rebel war started. The demand for credit still exceeds 
supply, but at least the co-operative was increasingly fulfilling the tangible 
need of farmers. A benefit which cannot be underestimated is that the co-
operative paid the official producer prices for coffee and cocoa to farmers 
until the abolition of the activities of SLPMB, which is in sharp contrast 
to the activities of traders. In 1986, of all the farmers of Nongowa 
Chiefdom, 55 per cent received less than the producer prices set for coffee 
and cocoa - on average 20 to 25 per cent less - from the buying agents 
appointed by the Board. Middlemen paid even less than that - on average 
40 to 50 per cent less than the producer prices - to approximately 70 per 
cent of all farmers (Debouillé and Wanders, 1987). By paying the official 
producer prices for coffee and cocoa, Nongowa Growers improves the 
income of farmers considerably; at least by 20 per cent (however, the 
improvement is higher in practice, as more farmers sell to middlemen than 
to official buying agents). After SLPMB stopped functioning, which also 
led to the abolition of the official producer prices in December 1991, the 
co-operative paid farmers 85 to 90 per cent of the leading producer price, 
the price it received when selling the produce on to private exporters. 
When exporting themselves, the target of the co-operative is to pay farmers 
60 per cent of the f.o.b. price it receives. 
Other services that Nongowa Growers provide (e.g. the transport 
facilities, provision of consumer goods, education in co-operative ideas) are 
appreciated as well. The decentralization of buying stations is particularly 
worth mentioning. By establishing six Marketing Centers, six subcentres 
and four collection points in the area, the co-operative has increased the 
number of market outlets outside Kenema to sixteen. They increased 
opportunities for farmers to sell their coffee and cocoa considerably. There 
are now more options available than ever before, and farmers know that. 
In that respect, it can be argued that the members have an apparently felt 
need for the services that Nongowa Growers provides, because there is a 
clear demand for it, and hence, it is of benefit for the farmers, i.e. is 
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successful. The co-operative provides farmers with market power, it 
enables them to exercise some form of control over their own production, 
and protects them against harmful activities of middlemen. 
One of the criticisms against the performance of co-operatives in general 
has been that they did not reach the poor strata of the farming population, 
but benefitted the larger, richer farmers. The better-off farmers, usually also 
better informed, took over the management. In the case of Nongowa 
Growers, it appears that the members are indeed the larger farmers, 
especially those members who joined the co-operative during its early years 
(Andriessen and Stommels, 1991). These members have larger acreages of 
coffee, cocoa and or rice than non-members. This seems to support the 
criticism. The current tendency is, according to Andriessen and Stommels, 
that the smaller farmers have also started to join Nongowa Growers. In 
addition, one has to keep in mind that non-members are allowed to sell to 
the co-operative, as well as members. The main benefit of Nongowa 
Growers' existence thus is not confined to large farmers per se, there are 
even more non-members selling to the co-operative than members. 
However, the non-members miss out on the credit offered and the profit-
sharing at the end of the financial year. 
9.1.4 Future outlook for the multi-purpose co-operatives 
It seems that the new co-operatives that have been founded since 1986 got 
off on the right footing. They were initiatives from the farmers themselves, 
and they were relatively successful, notably Nongowa Growers. However, 
there are potential threats for the multi-purpose co-operatives. Their main 
concern at the moment is the fact that they do not earn enough profit to be 
self-sustaining. Because the co-operatives paid the official producer price 
to the farmers, they were only able to make money on the, very low, 
commissions they received from either SLPMB or James International. 
There were also profits made on the sales of the consumer goods, rice, soft 
drinks and beer in the centers. Rice, for example, was bought in bulk from 
James International, and sold to the farmers at a small profit, while at the 
same time local rice traders were under-priced. Nonetheless, the net profits 
that were made would in the long run be insufficient to cover all expenses, 
salaries, future investments, and so on. 
Other constraints faced by the co-operatives are, for example, the 
necessary expansion of the network of buying points in the chiefdoms. For 
Nongowa Growers, an increase in the total number of buying points to 15 
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was seen as necessary to gain a better coverage of the working area 
(CRS/Nongowa Growers, 1991). This expansion has been achieved. 
However, Small-Bo Growers should also expand the number of buying 
points. Furthermore, the transport with the mini-trucks will pose a problem 
for Nongowa Growers in the near future, because the current trucks are old 
and need to be replaced - Small-Bo Growers does not even possess such 
trucks. 
A different type of potential constraint concerns the current leadership 
of Nongowa Growers. As mentioned before, one of the factors which made 
Nongowa Growers a success until now was the fact that two enthusiastic 
men with experience in co-operative ideas convinced a lot of farmers that 
a co-operative could be a vehicle for development. The potential danger 
existed, as in any co-operative, that when those men stepped back, the co­
operative would fall apart. Unfortunately, one of them, Paramount Chief 
Kapuwa Matoe ΠΙ, passed away in 1993. It is now up to the people of 
Nongowa Chiefdom to elect a new traditional leader, who hopefully, is just 
as enthusiastic about the co-operative movement as Chief Kapuwa was. In 
the case of Nongowa Growers, the avoidance of a leadership crisis has 
been tried by laying emphasis on the training of the staff, so it seems that 
the current leadership can succeed without too many much difficulties. 
In addition, as mentioned before, being a multi-purpose co-operative 
organization could imply organizational difficulties. Nongowa Growers, 
particularly, is involved in many different fields, and the danger exists that 
the strains on management becomes too severe. The co-operatives must try 
to have sufficient technical knowledge in order to fulfil all the different 
tasks desired. If not, the co-operatives have to confine their activities to 
those that they are actually able to execute. 
The constraints mentioned above, except for the last two, are all financial 
constraints. When there are profits, those constraints will cease to exist. So, 
the co-operatives have to find ways of earning more profit. 
One means of realizing more benefits could be the establishment of 
processing facilities for coffee or cocoa. This would ensure a higher added 
value and provide employment opportunities. However, the financial 
requirements for such a development would be substantial, so it should be 
considered as a long term option. 
Another, more realistic means of earning more profits would be to 
establish a Co-operative Union. Such a Union would have to be composed 
of several multi-purpose co-operatives. The merging of several chiefdom 
co-operatives into a Union, would assure a higher level of production 
supply. The Eastern Farmers Multipurpose Co-operative Union Ltd. 
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("Eastern Farmers Union"), was established in 1992. In the Eastern Farmers 
Union, ten primary multi-purpose co-operatives joined together for mutual 
benefit. The following, main objectives are stated in the bye-laws: 
1) to arrange the best possible terms for the sale of produce for the 
member organizations; 
2) to grant short and medium term loans to member associations; 
3) to finance smallholder farmers of member associations in developing, 
improving and operating agricultural enterprises; 
4) to arrange for the purchase and distribution of such goods and services 
as may be required by member associations; 
5) to act as a spokesman for and be representative of the member 
associations; 
6) to advise and direct member associations in their work relating to the 
co-operative movement, and: 
7) to encourage the improvement of education and living standards 
throughout the area of operations (Eastern Farmers Union, 1992b). 
The creation of the Eastern Farmers Union came at a convenient time. In 
December 1991, the Sierra Leonean government liberalized the marketing 
of coffee and cocoa. Since then, Nongowa Growers, and the other co-
operatives which started their operations later, no longer received 
commission on the purchase of their produce. Their profits had to be made 
from the price paid by an exporter. Around the same time, the co-operative 
loosened its ties with James International. Nongowa Growers began to sell 
their produce to other enterprises active in the export of coffee and cocoa. 
One reason for this switch to other exporters was the almost continuous 
lack of cash from James International. The co-operative often had to wait 
months before receiving their proceeds. James International had been slow 
in meeting their obligations since 1990, which led to the issuing of I.O.U.'s 
to the farmers by Nongowa Growers, instead of cash. This either meant 
that farmers had to wait for their proceeds for quite some time, or had to 
tum to other traders, and consequently receive lower payments. 
One promising development is the contact that Nongowa Growers 
established in 1993 with the Dutch fair-trade organization "Max Havelaar". 
Through Max Havelaar, Nongowa Growers came into contact with several 
Dutch importers of cocoa. Around the same time, the first half of 1993, the 
manager of Nongowa Growers found out that since April 1990, private 
enterprises were allowed to export goods without a licence. This is 
remarkable, because Nongowa Growers had been trying to obtain an export 
licence from the government for several years. Nobody in the 
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administration had bothered to tell them that an export licence was no 
longer necessary (GOSL, 1990). This meant that Nongowa Growers, or 
better, the Eastern Farmers Union, was able to negotiate several contracts 
with the Dutch importers. By exporting the cocoa themselves, rather than 
selling on to another company, the Eastern Farmers Union could pay their 
member farmers a better price and gain the profits needed to keep the co-
operatives running. The world market prices for coffee and cocoa are 
substantially higher than the producer prices the co-operatives used to 
receive from private exporters, so that a considerable increase of their 
proceeds was realized. Besides exporting themselves, the Eastern Farmers 
Union may have considerable economic and political influence on the 
different actors in the marketing system for export crops. 
The current Registrar of Co-operative Societies recognises not only the 
potential income-improving element as the main benefit of the formation 
of the Eastern Farmers Union, but in the end would like to see it take over 
all the marketing related responsibilities which were once addressed by 
several parastatale (Co-operative Department, personal communication, 
1991). By this he means not only the export activities, formerly 
commenced by the SLPMB, but also exercises related to agricultural credit 
provision to small farmers, provision of extension services, delivery of 
production inputs, and so on. 
The main constraint after the founding of the Eastern Farmers Union 
is the fact that only Nongowa Growers and Small-Bo Growers are really 
actively operating as marketing co-operatives. Although there are five other 
multi-purpose co-operative societies registered, none of them are at the 
same level of development as Nongowa Growers, or even Small-Bo 
Growers. They are all at different stages of development, which makes a 
balanced development of the Eastern Farmers Union more difficult. 
Currently, Nongowa Growers is also negotiating with several 
organizations, to start a project spreading the co-operative ideas to other 
areas, i.e. chiefdoms, to increase the number of buying centres and to 
establish a fund for the purchase of agricultural commodities and consumer 
goods (see, for instance, CRS/Nongowa Growers, 1991 and Eastern 
Farmers Union, 1992a). The Eastern Farmers Union still needs additional 
funding in order to subsist. 
In general, the point of viability of co-operatives should not be neglected. 
First of all, the internal organization is vital. However, it is not only 
important for its survival that members participate in the organization or 
that it responds to a perceived need of its members. The institutional and 
economic context or environment of a co-operative is just as important. 
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Even the most well organized organization is sensitive to a hostile 
environment. The possible failure of a co-operative society should not only 
be judged by looking at its organizational structure, but might also be a 
result of external factors. 
A factor of critical importance for the future development of the co-
operative movement is the rebel war, which confronted the eastern part of 
Sierra Leone in March 1991. This prompted not only a decrease in the 
production of food crops, notably rice, but also in the production of cash 
crops. The latter means that the supply of coffee and cocoa to the different 
traders, buying agents and companies has declined considerably. Nongowa 
Growers also faced reduced offerings of produce. These developments will 
signify a standstill in the evolution of the co-operatives, but, as the Project 
Manager of Nongowa Growers put it: '(···) in the near future the marketing 
co-operatives wish to re-enter into the produce marketing business with 
renewed zeal as farmers see this rebel incursion as an eye-opener in many 
areas of their economic life and that joint economic efforts will pay 
dividends.' (Nongowa Growers, personal communication, 1991). 
We do not believe that a complete privatization of the marketing system 
will be of much benefit for the farmers. Therefore, a third alternative 
should be given a fair chance to serve the farmers when marketing their 
produce, i.e. marketing co-operatives. Co-operatives have had a bad start 
in Africa in the past, due to a great variety of unfortunate circumstances 
and mistakes. These can and should be avoided, however, in which case 
co-operatives can be a good means to improve the efficiency of the 
marketing system. 
The failure of co-operative organizations in the past can, to a large 
extent, be attributed to the way that they were implemented. Governments 
introduced co-operative organizations "from above" without consulting the 
target population. When co-operatives are a response to the real need of 
farmers, when farmers are allowed to participate in the organization from 
the start, then co-operative organizations have a much better chance of 
surviving. 
In Sierra Leone, marketing co-operatives have recently started to 
participate in the marketing system for coffee and cocoa again, after a 
period of inactivity. The co-operative example presented here was a 
reaction to the vulnerability individual farmers experienced within the 
marketing system for export crops. By co-operating together, farmers gain 
the chance to exercise more marketing power. They have a stronger 
position in the negotiations with trading partners, economies of scale are 
realised and farmers have the opportunity to receive services that were 
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previously out of reach. Working co-operatively has brought farmers visible 
benefits. In addition, the co-operative activities have functioned not only 
as a protection mechanism against the detrimental effects of 
commercialization, but also as a means to benefit from the processes of 
agricultural commercialization as well. 
One has to keep in mind that Nongowa Growers, and to a lesser 
degree Small-Bo Growers, are exceptions. They are not representative of 
the co-operative movement in Sierra Leone. They are just two of seven co-
operatives that have currently registered as multi-purpose co-operative 
societies, active in the field of coffee and cocoa marketing in Sierra Leone. 
They are also the most advanced because they started operating 
successfully, earlier than the others. It remains to be seen whether the other 
co-operatives will achieve the same level of success as Nongowa Growers 
and Small-Bo Growers, and whether the co-operation within the Eastern 
Farmers Union will be successful. 
Although there are several constraints still faced by the multi-purpose 
co-operative associations, the results that have been achieved so far are 
considerable. The co-operative movement, based on farmers' initiatives and 
involvement, not only deserves a second chance, but is entitled to it. 
9.2 The CARE Village Marketing Project 
In November 1945, CARE was founded as a voluntary non-profit, non-
political non-govemmental organization in the United States of America. 
At that time, the primary responsibility of CARE was to meet the needs of 
the destitute people in post-war Europe, mainly by distributing food aid 
(Anonymous, 1979). CARE was one of the agencies that played a major 
role in implementing the Marshall Plan. As Europe recovered, CARE 
gradually phased out of Europe, and became increasingly involved in 
providing food in developing countries. In the 1960s, it also embarked on 
other types of aid. Self-help programmes became important, aiming to help 
the beneficiaries to become self-reliant (ibid.). 
CARE has evolved from an American non-governmental organization 
into an umbrella organization which co-ordinates the programme activities 
of member associations in several countries, including Canada, Great 
Britain, Norway, Germany, France, Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan and 
Austria. The umbrella organization, therefore, is now called CARE 
International. The member associations, as well as other organizations and 
governments, provide funding for different programmes and projects. 
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CARE International in Sierra Leone, for instance, has had projects funded 
by CARE Britain, CARE Norway, CARE Germany and Sierra Rutile. 
Currently, CARE International is one of the largest developmental 
organizations in the world, with over 7,000 employees and more that 400 
million US Dollars available each year for its projects (CARE, personal 
communications, 1992). 
The activities of CARE International in Sierra Leone started in 1961. 
The first programme was a food aid programme that continued to 1977. In 
1973, CARE became involved in the National Feeder Roads Construction 
Programme in a preliminary way. From 1975 onwards, CARE, in 
collaboration with EIADP, started building feeder roads. The aim of this 
project was to create a network of rural roads in order to provide 
agricultural producers better access to urban areas (Wall and Ghandi, 
1991). However, Airey (1984 and 1985) states that the project was founded 
on the idea that road building activities, when linked to agricultural 
extension activities, would lead to development. The extension activities 
would then be the task of EIADP. Between 1975 and 1985, more than 300 
miles of roads were constructed or rehabilitated in the Eastern Province. 
Other programme activities in Sierra Leone have included educational 
activities and a water supply and sanitation project in Moyamba District. 
An agricultural rehabilitation programme has also been carried out in 
Moyamba District, largely supported by Sierra Rutile, as a compensation 
for land degradation caused by the mining of rutile. CARE began the 
Village Marketing Project in the Eastern Province in 1985. 
9.2.1 The Village Marketing Project (VMP): the first two phases 
In 1982, during Field Days organized by EIADP, farmers had already 
raised the need for locally-based market outlets (Molitor and Ghandi, 
1987). The EIADP prepared a 'Proposal for the Development of Mini-
Marketing and Mini-Distribution Centers at the Model Programme Villages 
in the Eastern Area Project' (ibid., p. 10). This proposal was presented to 
a number of donor organizations for funding, of which CARE was the only 
one that responded positively. CARE's interest in the proposal was based 
on the fact that the Feeder Roads Programme, although opening up many 
remote areas with high production, lacked other supporting infrastructure. 
Moreover, 'the EIADP's successes in increasing crop production begged 
for better marketing' (Molitor, Ghandi and Schmidt, 1986, p. 6). The 
proposal maintained that the greatest constraints faced by coffee and cocoa 
farmers were inadequate marketing and storage facilities. Among the 
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problems cited were poor road infrastructure, insufficient transport 
opportunities and underpayment of farmers by middlemen. These problems 
were considered to be main disincentives to increase the production of 
coffee and cocoa. The basic idea was to build village-based centres, 
consisting of a storehouse with a cement drying floor. Initially, the 
intention was to build 100 of these centres, which were supposed to enable 
the farmers to group their produce together (ibid.). By doing so, the centres 
would attract an LBA to come to the village and purchase the collected 
coffee and cocoa. By grouping their produce together, farmers would save 
the costs of transport to a buying station and have a better chance of 
receiving the official producer price. The locations of these centres were 
to be in the Model Production Programme Villages of EIADP and were 
planned to be operated by the Farmers Production and Marketing Brigades. 
In the 1985/86 season, two pilot centres were constructed at sites 
chosen by EIADP. During the construction of the pilot centres, CARE 
revised the original EIADP proposal and an application for funding was 
made to construct another ten Marketing Centers, as they were then re-
christened. The selected village was supposed to collect all the local 
building materials (notably sand and mud blocks for the walls). The VMP 
would provide the imported inputs, such as cement, nails, roofing and 
paint. Masons and carpenters would also be provided when these skills 
were not locally available. 
The revised proposal refined the problems that the project needed to 
tackle. As main marketing constraints the proposal mentioned the uncertain 
market outlets and crop transportation, the lack of market-related 
knowledge and the susceptible farmer position, leading to usurious credit 
arrangements (ibid.). From June 1986 onwards until 1988, the first phase 
of the VMP proposal, secured funding from CARE International and the 
National Authorizing Office (NAO) of Sierra Leone. During the first phase, 
an additional ten centers were constructed (one of which was funded by the 
United States Embassy). 
In the first half of 1987, CARE's Regional Technical Advisor (RTA) 
for Small Enterprise Development visited the VMP with the objective of 
reviewing the design and implementation of the project. Besides revising 
several procedures and documents, the RTA reviewed and refined an earlier 
proposal to involve women more in the VMP. Early analysis had shown 
that coffee, cocoa and palm kernel production and marketing were 
primarily male dominated activities. This highlighted the project's suspicion 
that women were unlikely to benefit directly from the centers, although 
they contributed considerably to the work involved in cash crop production 
(and marketing). Furthermore, food production was seen as necessary 
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because of the regular occurrence of food shortages in villages. 
Consequently, thirty female agricultural workers were assigned to the 
newly created women's programme (Ritchie, 1987). Twelve of these 
women were to be based in the villages with centers. They should attempt 
to involve women in food crop production, petty trading, savings 
organizations and household management activities. The overall conclusion 
of the RTA was that the project had started well, and that it had proven 
that it was possible for farmers to work together and sell their crops for the 
official price (ibid.). 
In December 1987, the Village Marketing Project management wrote 
a proposal for the second phase of the VMP (1988-1991). The authors 
concluded that in their first year of operation, the two pilot centers had 
handled 54 tons of coffee and 29 tons of cocoa, valued at over 3,568,000 
Leones5 (Molitor and Ghandi, 1987). It was estimated that the farmers who 
sold their produce to the centers received a 25 per cent better price, which 
meant that the project benefited participating farmers an estimated 892,000 
Leones. 
The new project proposal reformulated the original problem statement 
and aimed at achieving two so-called "Final Goals": 
1) 'To increase the quality of life for 5,600 project participants who are 
either selling cash crops through the centers or [are] involved in 
activities linked to the centers', and: 
2) 'To increase the investment in farm and off-farm productive activities 
by 5,600 project participants.' (Molitor and Ghandi, 1987, p. 13). 
In order to achieve these goals, the VMP would assist existing village 
groups to build Marketing Centers, train and organise the groups to operate 
and maintain the centers, and would promote other production oriented 
activities. The proposal states six Intermediate Goals: 
1) 'To organize village groups to construct 30 additional Market Centers'; 
2) 'To train and organize 30 village groups to operate and maintain their 
village marketing system' [i.e. center]; 
3) 'To increase the income of 3,750 participants who market their cash 
crops through the centers'; 
4) 'To increase the market-related knowledge of participants'; 
3
 This amounted to about US Dollars 102,000 at the time, although Molitor and 
Ghandi calculated it at approximately US Dollars 120,000. 
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5) 'To develop an appropriate village-based savings and credit scheme 
and implement it in 15 villages', and: 
6) 'To promote additional production-oriented activities in each village 
approximately as follows: 
a. Increased supply for sale in the villages of basic food stuff[s], 
agricultural inputs, and construction material 
b. Organization of regular market days around crop buying days at 
40 centers 
с Concentration of MANR&F demonstration activities, Field Days 
and extension service in Market Center villages.' (ibid.). 
The first four Intermediate Goals were essentially the same as before, 
although more centers were to be built, leading to an increase in the 
number of participants. However, the new elements consisted of the food 
production component, which was already being implemented and the 
inclusion of a savings and credit scheme in the project. It was reasoned that 
farmers could earn a considerable amount of cash from the sales of 
produce, but that this cash would be quickly spent on "secret societies" and 
additional wives (Ritchie, 1987). Thus, a few months after harvesting, the 
farmer would meet the "hungry season" again as usual. Whether this lack 
of savings was due to the lack of opportunities to save, or that is was due 
to personal decisions or priorities for the disposal of income, remained 
unclear. Nevertheless, the promotion of savings was seen as a venture 
worthwhile looking into. Although the proposal did not contain a well 
defined savings and credit scheme, it seemed clear, considering the high 
inflation rates in the country at the time, that it would not be wise to save 
in cash. Instead, investing surplus money in kind was regarded as an 
interesting option. For instance, palm oil was relatively cheap during 
harvest time, but its price went up automatically during the hungry season. 
Palm oil is relatively easy to store, which made it an attractive commodity 
to save during harvest and sell during periods when it is in short supply. 
The project hoped to provide certain Village Marketing Centers and 
savings and credit groups with containers to store the oil as an experiment. 
Furthermore, in the new proposal the conclusion was reached that the 
site selection criteria for future Marketing Center locations had to be 
revised. The original criteria were designed by EIADP. Site selection was 
based on the geographical distribution across Kenema and Kailahun 
Districts, the probability of good village co-operation, the vehicle 
accessibility of the village and 'certain political considerations' (Molitor 
and Ghandi, p. 14). These criteria had led to a wide distribution of the 
Marketing Centers, which created a number of logistical problems for the 
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project, related to the poor transport infrastructure. This becomes clear 
when looking at the locations of the twelve centers that were built in the 
first phase of VMP. They are located in ten different chiefdoms. From the 
1987/88 season, the site selection criteria were adapted to reality. First of 
all, the project decided to concentrate its construction efforts to a maximum 
of three chiefdoms per year. These "target chiefdoms" were selected after 
consultation with key informants, who ranked chiefdoms according to the 
likelihood of success for the project. Villages within these chiefdoms were 
selected by consulting Chiefdom Authorities, such as the Council of Elders 
or at a meeting with all village and section chiefs. 
Once a village was selected and had accepted the Marketing Center, 
an agreement was signed between the project and the market village. This 
document specified the roles and responsibilities of the village, CARE and 
the MANR&F. Then the center could be built. CARE's involvement in 
marketing activities was limited to technical assistance on record keeping, 
group problem solving, monitoring and reporting on marketing and other 
activities at the centers. CARE did not interfere in the villages' selection 
of the type of supervision for the centers, nor in the choice of the center 
clerk or buying agent who would operate the center. The new proposal 
simply stated that 'most of the organizations chosen by the 12 test sites are 
simply the age old African village meeting called whenever the need 
arises' (ibid., p. 14). The center clerk was to be selected by the villagers 
themselves. The clerk was supposed to negotiate with an LBA, who would 
provide purchasing capital in cash and or in rice. 
Training was considered to be an important part of the project 
implementation, and was envisaged to take place at four levels: staff, center 
clerks, village and regional. Staff training would have to include issues 
such as co-operative marketing; participatory teaching and organization 
methods; implementation of the village marketing training curriculum and 
reporting requirements. The center clerks would also have to be trained in 
co-operative marketing. However, basic business record keeping; improved 
cash crop management techniques and (after it had been developed) 
implementation of savings and credit schemes were to be fitted into the 
curriculum as well. Village training would embody the marketing of cash 
crops; improved crop production and processing technologies; rural savings 
and record keeping for the centers. Finally, on the regional level, the VMP 
hoped to host conferences for villagers from different market villages. 
Topics that would have to be covered included providing a summary of the 
project; explanation of the roles of Farmers Brigades, MANR&F and 
CARE; the marketing of cash crops; progress reports of each brigade; the 
role of women in agriculture and improved crop production and processing 
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technologies. It was planned that a regional meeting would be held every 
dry season. 
Since October 1987, the VMP already made efforts to incorporate a 
food production component. Women's Groups Developers (WGDs) had 
been employed and trained in vegetable and rice production. Nine WGDs 
had been stationed in Marketing Center villages by 1988. In the villages, 
these WGDs had made contacts with existing women's groups, and were 
involved in vegetable production. Some groups had started osusus (see 
Gerretsen and Sellies, 1989 and section 10.2) and some groups had started 
fish ponds. These undertakings were all considered to 'effect in some way 
to the food and labor shortage induced credit problem' (ibid., p. 17). Food 
production groups appeared to be very popular. The number of groups was 
'increasing at an unprecedented rate' (Stearns, 1990, p. 9). In 1989, 19 
groups were already producing rice, cassava and vegetables (Heerschap and 
Koreman, 1991). 
Between 1988 and 1991, a total of 16 Marketing Centers were 
constructed, adding the total for the two project phases to 28. Of these 28, 
two were not completed during the second phase of the VMP (see table 
9.8). Even when the 1990/91 season is left out of consideration, in which 
the rebel war started, some inevitable conclusions have to be reached. The 
most striking conclusion is that after a promising start, most centers show 
a decrease in the amount of produce that is purchased. Only the Village 
Marketing Center in Dodo bought more cocoa and coffee in 1989/90 than 
during its first season of operation. Furthermore, only four centers show an 
increase in one type of produce only, notably cocoa. It seems that the early 
enthusiasm of producers for the centers rapidly disappeared. An explanation 
might be that after the first year of operation, it was more difficult to 
obtain purchasing capital, be it from large produce buyers, such as James 
International, or from the village's own accumulation. Sierra Leone 
suffered from a severe shortage of Leone bank notes during 1989. 
9.2.2 The Village Marketing Project: final phase 
During the implementation of the second phase of the project it became 
clear that there were several soft spots in the project implementation. 
Although construction targets were reached, the task of having the centers 
properly owned, controlled and managed by a group of villagers seemed 
too great a challenge. The VMP had concentrated more on building the 
centers than on establishing representative ownership and sound 
management. The operation of the centers was left to the villagers 
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Table 9.8 Produce purchase of Village Marketing Centers, 1987/88-
1990/91 (in pounds)* 
Village 
Kpuwabu 
Nyandehun 
(Luawa) 
Jormu 
Kpetema 
Kambama 
Talia 
Njegbellu 
Dodo 
Cocoa 
14,560 
24.024 
14,466 
NA 
211,268 
114,664 
26,598 
77,817 
73,438 
2,214 
5,131 
32,940 
21,787 
12,134 
NA 
25,810 
_ 
-
25.613 
11,218 
77,593 
38,571 
129,095 
100,449 
3,937 
61,612 
17,460 
10,080 
2,494 
49,361 
144,113 
NA 
Coffee 
10,822 
14,586 
10,800 
NA 
173,524 
10,800 
32,175 
21,568 
8,264 
6,155 
1,268 
NA 
9,617 
3,105 
NA 
81,311 
_ 
-
44,310 
5,690 
975,912 
544,121 
82,922 
28,861 
9,617 
3.105 
3,600 
NA 
15,649 
4,163 
28,260 
NA 
Season 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88" 
1988/89" 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
-Continued: 
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Village Cocoa Coffee Season 
Kamasu 
M am boma 
Kpeima 
Vaahun 
Samie Foluma 
Gbeworbu 
Nyandehun 
(Gaura) 
Fayiema 
Dam 
Madina 
Gawama 
23.891 
1,618 
31,655 
5,221 
1,617 
8,463 
122,530 
4,149 
2,288 
71,523 
11,947 
18.358 
NA 
NA 
37,888 
23,877 
62,181 
15,348 
20,943 
1,112 
69,410 
NA 
29,600 
53,116 
NA 
19,373 
NA 
261,150 
85,610 
66,513 
NA 
253,316 
35,541 
15,681 
6,581 
4,215 
21,530 
NA 
3,351 
13,580 
3,314 
4,911 
845 
NA 
NA 
7,914 
3,567 
30,512 
11.510 
6,666 
21,156 
15,621 
NA 
3,451 
NA 
3,052 
NA 
355.202 
13,221 
7,352 
NA 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1989/90 
1990/91 
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-Continued: 
Village 
Jokibu 
Semabu 
Baoma 
Palima 
Joyomie 
Joi 
Patama 
Cocoa 
NA 
NA 
72,156 
6,720 
17,640 
198,501 
53,461 
85,221 
1,144 
Coffee 
NA 
NA 
8,134 
11,200 
-
62,218 
13,120 
30,210 
231 
Season 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1990/91 
1990/91 
1990/91 
1990/91 
1990/91 
The figures are incomplete due to several reasons. First of all, in some Marketing 
Centers, the quality of record keeping is inadequate. Second, some figures are 
missing for the 1990/91 season (especially for coffee) due to the rebel incursion 
of March 1991. 
Up to 1989, the Kambama Marketing Center had organizational problems and lack 
of funding to purchase produce. 
Sources: Allen (1992); authors (1993). 
themselves, which had mixed results. In some cases, the centers were run 
by groups of villagers, but in other cases the centers were controlled or 
owned by wealthy individuals or village authorities. The project realised 
this and changed its strategy. More time and effort had to be put into 
informing and organising a village or center committee before the center 
would be built (Stearns, 1989; Hiscock, 1990). This committee should 
consist of both men and women, the leaders of the food production groups 
and preferably the buying agent or center clerk. 
It also became clear that the success of the food production component 
was detrimental to the original aims of the VMP, namely to increase the 
benefits to smallholder farmers from their sale of coffee and cocoa. The 
extension workers' time and effort were drawn away from the marketing 
side of the project. This was not surprising, considering the agricultural, 
production, background of most extension staff. They did not possess 
sufficient marketing knowledge to inform and organise villagers, nor to 
Farmers' Reactions 371 
provide them the necessary training and advice in business management 
and marketing. It seemed essential that the extension staff should upgrade 
their own communication, group organization and agricultural marketing 
skills. 
The site selection criteria were further refined and strengthened during 
the mid-term evaluation in 1989. First of all, villagers had to have 
demonstrated their ability to organize and complete a community project. 
Second, the proposed village should not be involved in too many other 
activities that would hinder the construction process. Third, the village 
should not be involved in any serious local or political dispute. Fourth, 
during any time of the year, the village should be accessible for both light 
and heavy vehicles, and its location should be within a three hour drive 
from Kenema. Furthermore, the selection of the land on which the center 
is to be constructed had to be agreed on by the whole community, and 
should not belong to an individual. Finally, the project stipulated several 
guidelines for the operation of the Marketing Center. These guidelines were 
to be finalized before construction would begin, and included the selection 
of a center committee, the selection of a buying agent or center clerk and 
the involvement of satellite villages. The latter were defined as villages 
surrounding the Marketing Center village, and whose producer-inhabitants 
could make use of the services offered by the Marketing Center. The 
intention was that satellite villages would contribute to the construction of 
the Marketing Center, but would also be represented on the center 
committee (Stearns, 1989). 
Since 1986, Nongowa Growers, was active in the purchase of coffee 
and cocoa. By 1988, CARE had constructed five Marketing Centers in 
Nongowa Chiefdom, the co-operative's home-base. The center clerks that 
were running these centers were on the co-operative's pay-roll. For CARE 
this meant that the centers were functioning well and that they would not 
have to engage in the training of these clerks or buying agents, as 
Nongowa Growers took care of those aspects. At the same time, for CARE, 
the co-operative could be the perfect locally based organization to co-
operate with in training and educating producers of coffee and cocoa, and 
members of center committees. The benefits for Nongowa Growers were 
that the Marketing Centers functioned as their market outlets at the village 
level. This was important for them, because being a chiefdom based 
organization, they needed to set foot in the villages so that their members 
could see a visible result of co-operation in marketing. This would also 
lead to a better participation by members in the co-operative. This 
alternative co-operative management of a Marketing Center was also tried 
in other chiefdoms. For instance, in Pejeh West Chiefdom, three centers 
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were constructed which were operated by the Pejeh West Growers6. These 
functioned until the rebel war broke out in 1991. 
In 1991 and 1992, an additional ten Marketing Centers were 
constructed, adding to a total of 38 by mid 1992. Of these 38, five were 
not completed, some due to the rebel war, and other factors. Besides 
disturbing farming practices of the majority of the population in the 
District, the war had also destroyed many buildings. Of the 14 Marketing 
Centers that had been built in Kailahun District, 12 had been damaged by 
the beginning of 1992. Seven out of the nineteen centers constructed in 
Kenema District were also damaged. For safety reasons, the four centers 
constructed in 1992 were all located in the area west of Kenema. 
The end of the second phase of the VMP was thus, characterized by 
a drastically reduced area of programme activities. On the one side, the 
project was restricted to safe areas of operation, west of Kenema. On the 
other, a follow up to the first two phases of the project had to be written. 
In the new proposal, the low prices that farmers were receiving for their 
produce were analyzed as being caused by both technical and pricing 
inefficiencies in the market system. Technical constraints included 
inadequate transport infrastructure, low quantities of produce for sale and 
lack of sufficient, safe, warehouse space. Pricing inefficiencies of the 
market system were seen as induced by the lack of market related 
knowledge of farmers. By continuing to build mini-warehouses and market 
buildings, the new proposal intended to 'improve produce marketing by 
both assisting communities to make infrastructural improvements and to 
provide adult education which will increase the farmer's marketing skills.' 
(Wall and Ghandi, 1991, p. 13). The new project proposal failed to attract 
major donor funding. 
In March 1992, CARE's RTA visited Sierra Leone to 'critically review 
the [new and old] basic project assumptions.' (Allen, 1992, p. 3). The 
underlying premises of the review was that ways had to be found to reduce 
the costs of the project. The report concluded that trade liberalization had 
made the Marketing Centers superfluous, because 'now that price 
conditions are benign, and there are greater margins to be made, buyers 
and exporters are under much less pressure to cut the farm-gate price: in 
fact the opposite is true as competition increases (...)' (ibid., p. 5). This 
analysis was, however, based on the comparison of the leading producer 
prices with the world market prices of Arabica coffee, a type fetching 
higher prices than Robusta, but not produced in Sierra Leone. The RTA 
6
 Officially the "Pejeh West Co-operative Growers and Marketing Association". 
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indicated a radical alteration of the original project proposals. The report 
suggested the project to refrain from center construction, and instead 
recommended that emphasis should be given to road rehabilitation. A pilot 
credit programme was also considered to be a useful experiment. Adult 
education, an aspect which the new proposal for the third phase of the 
VMP still considered crucial, was treated with doubt. Training farmers in 
basic literacy and numeracy in order to improve their market related 
knowledge and, hence, make cheating by traders more difficult was not 
seen as vital. This was because the RTA concluded that 'there is 
inadequate information to prove that a lot of cheating takes place, or if so, 
that illiteracy and numeracy training of the broad mass of producers, will 
effectively address the problem.' (ibid., p. 8). The report advised the 
project to test the effectiveness of adult education first, with effectiveness 
defined in economic terms. 
This RTA paid considerable attention to the question of credit. The 
project had, after the early, unsuccessful, trials with the palm oil saving 
system, not pursued the credit issue further (also on recommendation of 
CARE's RTA at that time), although an evaluation implemented in 1988 
still highlighted the importance of credit (Bell, 1989). Interestingly, the 
RTA report recommended that the project proposal would budget for 
funding for a detailed study of the establishment of a rural bank, the 
operations of informal lending systems and of the feasibility of gaining 
access to credit from the BSL. It seemed that credit was on the agenda 
again, after being dismissed by CARE's previous RTA. In September 1992, 
the RTA returned to Sierra Leone to write a proposal for the "Kenema 
Rural Savings and Loan Pilot Project (KRSLPP)" (Allen et al., 1992). The 
problem and causes that were expected to be remedied with the proposed 
savings and credit project diverged from the original coffee and cocoa 
marketing constraints. The new proposal wanted to address the low level 
of economic and food security of rural households. It summarized the 
problem by stating that the Kenema District is characterized by inadequate 
local rice production, leading to a demand for credit. In addition, it is 
characterized by low cash income from agriculture, which is caused by low 
food and cash crop production. The latter is, in turn, caused by low 
investments in farm technology, high cost of rice, the preference for 
investing in customary obligations instead of in agriculture, and the high 
cost of informal credit. The proposal wanted to tackle these inter-related 
causes by starting a pilot credit project, in which three types of credit 
systems were to be tested and studied: 
1) The Nongowa Co-operative Loan Fund. Funds obtained from the 
374 Who Pays the Price? 
NDB, on-loaned to Nongowa Growers, would be guaranteed by 
KRSLPP. In first instance, Nongowa Growers would focus on 
expanding its current credit activities to individual farmers, but would 
later deliver indirect credit to Farmers Associations. 
2) Rice Banks. Experimental rice banks would be founded in three 
Marketing Center villages in Kenema District. These rice banks should 
lend rice to villagers, who should reimburse in cash plus an 
economically sufficient interest rate. 
3) Research. A study of traditional savings and credit techniques was 
envisaged, in order to select the most successful and adaptable models. 
These were supposed then to be widely promoted through workshops 
and field visits (ibid.). 
When critically examining the KRSLPP, the general remark to be made is 
that the three components into one project would lead to complex 
management. The pressure on the extension staff would be considerable, 
although the staff was supposed to undergo an extensive training during the 
first six months of the project. It also seems that the first project 
component leans heavily on the model that had already been proposed by 
Johnny in 1986 (see also section 10.2), although it is significantly adapted. 
The third component of the project also looks familiar. Several year ago 
such a study was conducted by Gerretsen and Sellies (1989). However, 
after a change in the project management at the time, a credit project was 
considered to be too risky, and not pursued any further. Finally, the starting 
capital for the rice banks that were to be tested was based on the financial 
value of a so called Community Sponsored Development Activity (CSDA). 
After a village had implemented such a CSDA, CARE and the community 
would jointly decide on its value. CARE then would provide a matching 
grant of equal value, with which the starting capital for the rice bank, i.e. 
rice, had to be purchased. The matching sum would have to be at least 
equivalent to the value of three tonnes of rice (or 60 bags). This equalled 
a minimum of 500,000 Leones at the time, a formidable sum for villagers 
indeed. The question arises whether such a sum would be within the reach 
of the average village, leaving aside the operational problems of rice banks 
in the Sierra Leonean rural context. As with the new project proposal for 
the third phase of the VMP, the KRSLPP did not manage to find the 
financial resources to get the project started. This can be partly attributed 
to the on-going rebel war in the country at the time. 
In 1987, a baseline survey was held to provide the base information with 
which a follow-up survey would be compared, in order to evaluate the 
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impact of the VMP. This follow-up, regrettably, never took place. The 
baseline survey only provides descriptive data material, see Koppers 
(1988). A second study, the participant survey held in 1988, provides a 
preliminary analysis of the impact of two Marketing Centers on farmers 
(Bell, 1989). Although some of the data material was admittedly weak, as 
data obtained in six villages were left out, an important conclusion was still 
reached; there existed significant ties between some of the farmers and 
certain buying agents. 'Simple cross tabulation shows a strong correlation 
between those farmers who did not sell all of their produce to the centers, 
and those fanners who were in debt from the previous year.' (ibid. p. 7-8). 
Credit was also seen as crucial in later research on the impact of the 
VMP (Heerschap and Koreman, 1991). Besides stating that the availability 
of a Marketing Center reduces the transport costs of farmers considerably, 
Heerschap and Koreman concluded that those farmers who had obtained 
credit from traders, were severely constrained in choosing their produce 
buyer. Hence, they are not likely to participate in the project. They also 
considered the availability of rice at the centers. Marketing Centers would 
attract less farmers when they would have no rice for sale. Furthermore, 
they found that the buying agents at the Marketing Centers were paying the 
farmers more for their produce than the other traders. Moreover, those 
Marketing Centers with a clerk employed by Nongowa Growers were 
paying better prices than the agents hired by other regional wholesalers. In 
addition, farmers from satellite villages were receiving a higher price for 
their produce than the farmers from the center villages, a phenomenon that 
they could not explain. Another aspect mentioned was that the training 
component of the VMP was still very weak, and focused on agricultural 
production instead of on marketing issues. Finally, they concluded that 
most farmers are not involved in the organization of the centers, and did 
not know how the centers were organized. 
For our fieldwork periods in 1990/91 and 1992/93, we selected several 
Marketing Center villages. In 1990/91, we were able to visit Patama, and 
one of its satellite villages; Tewo, and Joi, and its satellite village 
Bangoma. The Marketing Centers of both Patama and Joi were not 
functioning at the time. In 1992/93, we visited all these villages again, and 
found that the centers were still not functioning. However, in Joi the center 
was being used by a petty trader, who was an agent of a local merchant, 
as his private storage facility. In 1992/93, we also visited the center 
villages of Kpeima, Joyomie, Bandah and Kuranko. In these villages, the 
Marketing Centers were all functioning to a certain degree. When looking 
at the transactions of the respondents, we have to conclude that only 
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Kpeima was functioning "normally", i.e. as originally intended by the 
VMP. In the 1991/92 season, approximately half of all the coffee and 
cocoa transactions were sold to Nongowa Growers, which had stationed a 
center clerk in the Kpeima Marketing Center. The reasons for not selling 
to the Marketing Center (or Nongowa Growers), paints the picture of two 
aspects that make the co-operative vulnerable. In the case of the 
transactions that were concluded with other purchasers than the co-
operative, more than 65 per cent of the respondents were either tied to 
other traders because of the credit they had received, or they turned to 
other purchasers because these had ready cash available. This leads to the 
conclusion that a Marketing Center that cannot offer credit opportunities, 
or does not have ready cash available to pay farmers on the spot, will have 
a difficult time competing with those purchasers who can offer these 
facilities. 
The story of the other three center villages is different. Both in Bandah 
and in Kuranko, the Marketing Center had fallen into the hands of a petty 
trader. In Bandah, the Chairman of the center committee had made a deal 
with a local merchant from Kenema. This petty trader had provided the 
Chairman with purchasing capital during part of the 1992/93 season 
(mainly for purchasing cocoa), and was duly appointed the center's 
absentee buying agent, although the Chairman of the committee functioned 
as the acting buying agent. Basically, the Bandah Marketing Center was 
functioning as cheap market outlet for this local merchant, because no 
negotiations, for instance, about receiving fair prices, had taken place. 
Furthermore, the Chairman of the center committee had a hidden agenda, 
in turn he had received prefinancing from Volcafé, and he also used the 
Marketing Center for his own business. From April 1993, the local 
merchant did not turn up in Bandah any more and consequently no more 
purchasing took place. More or less the same story can be told for the 
Kuranko Marketing Center. There the Town Chief, who was an agent for 
Volcafé, had taken control of the center and used it for his own benefit. 
During our visit it appeared that some of the coffee and cocoa farmers had 
too much respect for the traditional authority of the Chief. This prevented 
them from arguing with him, although they might disagree with the way 
he was running the center. Bandah and Kuranko are examples of centers 
that have fallen in the hands of individuals. The villagers were not capable 
of controlling the Marketing Centers themselves. The VMP might be 
blamed for these examples of lack of representative ownership. After all, 
it was the project's task to guide the organization of the centers. Table 9.9 
gives an overview of the transactions conducted at the Marketing Centers 
we visited and the transactions conducted with other purchasers. These 
Farmers' Reactions 377 
were recorded in the Marketing Center villages and refer to the 1991/92 
season for both coffee and cocoa. 
Table 9.9 Overview of coffee and cocoa transactions concluded in 
Marketing Center (MC) villages, 1991/92 season 
Village 
Patama 
Joi 
Kpeima 
Joyomie 
Bandah 
Kuranko 
Coffee (MC)' 
-
9 
5 
, , . 
8 
Coffee (non-MC)" 
15 
13 
9 
13 
8 
6 
Cocoa (MC) Cocoa (non-MC) 
. 
-
5 
1 
—··*· 
1 
7 
7 
6 
12 
7 
2 
Transactions conducted with Marketing Center (clerk or buying agent). 
Transactions conducted with purchasers other than Marketing Center buying agent. 
Transaction with the local merchant who would prefinance the chairman of the 
center committee the next season. 
Includes four transactions to the chairman and deputy chairman of the center 
committee, two transactions to the local merchant who prefinanced the chairman 
later, and one transaction to the assistant of the chairman (in the latter's position 
as petty trader). 
Source: Authors' survey (1993). 
The center in Joyomie is an example of a center managed by the villagers 
themselves. In first instance, the villagers had selected the agent of a 
private exporter (Suma). This agent did not show up for some time after 
purchasing produce at the center. He did, however, leave some of his 
purchasing capital behind, with which the village decided to purchase 
produce themselves. Furthermore, the center committee tried to raise their 
own purchasing capital by collecting money from the villagers. On a small 
scale, they were capable of organising the purchase of produce on their 
own. They even managed to collect sufficient capital to buy their own 
platform scale. However, they did not enjoy the benefit of the scale very 
long. In November 1992 the Small-Bo Growers opened their office in 
Blama and they were not able to afford a platform scale, the village of 
Joyomie then decided to lend them their own. Due to both the lack of 
purchasing capital and the missing platform scale, less than 20 per cent of 
all transactions in Joyomie were conducted at the center in 1991/92. Credit 
relations and the availability of ready cash with other traders again seem 
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to make up more than half of the reasons given for going to other 
purchasers. 
Three main weaknesses of the implementation of the VMP, thus 
become clear. First, after building the centers, the project did not concern 
itself with the management of the centers. Some centers ended up being 
controlled by individuals, instead of by the village. Second, villages were 
on their own when it came to the accumulation of sufficient capital to 
purchase produce. Without cash available at a center, farmers are forced to 
turn to other traders. Finally, the lack of funds to provide credit to coffee 
and cocoa producers, be it in cash or in kind, also makes it difficult to 
compete with the credit-issuing traders. Regrettably, the project did not pay 
sufficient attention to these aspects, neither did they educate the Marketing 
Center villages in the ways and means to overcome these difficulties. 
In addition, we think that the VMP could be questioned on two major 
organizational project failures. First of all, the project did not give enough 
thought to the issue of the site selection criteria. After realizing early on in 
the project's first phase of operation that the existing site selection criteria 
were inadequate, a unique opportunity was missed to improve on this. The 
VMP's only guides were practical, project implementation matters, e.g. 
vehicle accessibility. In other words, the project only looked at their own 
constraints. They did not take the villages' prospects properly into account. 
For instance, the project totally overlooked the aspects of Chiefdom 
sections (see section 2.1.4). Chiefdom inhabitants are usually centred on the 
section their village belongs to. They will hesitate to make use of services 
or amenities, such as Marketing Centers, which are not situated in their 
own section. A second failure of the VMP was that it realized too late that 
the project's extension staff was insufficiently equipped to guide the 
marketing side of the project. Too much attention was, at the time 
logically, concentrated on the food production component. Most of all, the 
VMP might be reproached for not remedying this omission. For although 
this problem was recognized early on, the training of both extension staff, 
center committee members and producers, never took off. This has led to 
organizational chaos at the majority of the centers, which was already 
apparent before the rebel war disturbed the marketing of coffee and cocoa 
in a large part of the project area. Thus, to a large extent, the project can 
be considered responsible for the non-functioning of these centers. 
During the six years of its existence, the VMP has tried to improve the 
marketing opportunities of small scale coffee and cocoa farmers. By 
constructing Marketing Centers outside central places, such as Kenema and 
Blama, the project, at first glance, improved these opportunities (compare 
maps 9.2 and 9.3). This seemed obvious, because a farmer did not need to 
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Buying Centre 
Research Area 
Chiefdom Boundaries 
Vfap 9.2 Locations of main buying centres in Kenema District, unti 
1987 
380 Farmers' Reactions 
Map 93 Locations of main buying centres and (non-)functioning 
Village Marketing Centers in Kenema District, 1987-1993 
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travel to Kenema any more, but could sell his produce in the village 
instead. The farmer, thus saved transport costs. Other advantages, such as 
the availability of rice supplied through the Marketing Center, and the 
receipt of both the correct prices and more or less correct weights, must 
also be mentioned. These, however, strongly depend on the type of buying 
agent that is operating at the Marketing Center. The same applies for 
potential benefits, such as sharing in the buying agent's commission. 
However, the project staff was lax in checking whether these subjective 
benefits actually occurred. The receipt of the correct prices and weights 
was a benefit that was only assumed to occur at the centers. 
Consequently, we think it is lamentable that the VMP did not pay 
sufficient attention to the selection and functioning of buying agents. 
Furthermore, even the aforementioned benefit of decentralization of buying 
points is also dependent on the choice of a buying agent or clerk. 
Currently, of the 33 completed Marketing Centers, less than ten are 
functioning properly. The ones that do function are all operated by center 
clerks employed by multi-purpose co-operatives. The rest of the centers 
either have no buying agent at all, for instance, Kpuwabu or Patama, or 
they have appointed an agent, but do not possess any purchasing capital, 
for instance, Bandah. Furthermore, some center villages have rented their 
centers to miners, for instance, Palima, and some have even left their center 
to a petty trader, Joi and Kuranko, for instance. Even although the rebel 
war has disturbed center activities, especially in Kailahun District, this is 
not a good record. 
10 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Frank Sellies and Jos Wanders 
From the 1970s to the present day, the majority of Sub-Saharan countries 
have suffered economic decline. Low world market prices for their exports, 
high prices for imported goods and an increasing population pressure on 
their resources have forced them to the international community for help. 
Financial assistance has been given, especially by the World Bank and 
IMF, in the form of conditioned loans. In order to be considered for a loan, 
a country should develop a structural adjustment programme according to 
the neo-classical guidelines of the creditor. An important part of this 
programme was to cut down government's expenditures and, moreover, 
facilitate the privatization of the country's economic sector. This would 
create the conditions for economic progress in the country. However, it 
remains to be seen whether economic progress will indeed occur and who 
will profit from it. 
In this study we have tried to answer this question with regard to the 
coffee and cocoa sector in Sierra Leone. It has shown that the production 
and marketing conditions of small scale farmers during a period of 
transition from a state-controlled marketing system towards a privatized 
marketing system have not really changed. It has not lead to improved 
production and marketing opportunities and, consequent, higher incomes 
for the farmers. In section 10.1, we summarize the findings which have led 
us to this, the most important conclusion of our study. In section 10.2, we 
present some policy recommendations which comprise the additional 
measures necessary to improve the farmers' production and marketing 
conditions in a privatized marketing system. The section ends with the 
description of two attempts that have been made to improve the marketing 
position of the farmers. These initiatives have already been implemented. 
In section 10.3, we present a proposal for an alternative form of 
agricultural credit provision, which has not yet been implemented, but we 
think is certainly worth considering. Because credit has proved to be such 
an important factor in determining the marketing position of the farmers, 
we give it appropriate attention. 
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10.1 Summary and results 
Purpose of study and research objectives 
This study has described and analyzed the marketing system for coffee and 
cocoa in Sierra Leone, during a period of transition from a state-controlled 
marketing system to a privatized marketing system. Our basic assumption 
was that this change should lead to better producer prices being paid to the 
farmers. It should at least lead to correct payment, according to the current 
producer price and the actual weight of the produce. Therefore, the 
following two research questions were formulated: 
1) Are the coffee and cocoa producers in Sierra Leone underpaid, and if 
so, what are the causes of underpayment? 
2) What measures can be taken in order to avoid or reduce underpayment 
and to improve the production and marketing conditions for these 
producers? 
In order to answer these research questions, we dealt with the following 
research objectives: 
to describe the socioeconomic differentiation among coffee and cocoa 
producers; 
to describe the marketing system of coffee and cocoa in Siena Leone; 
to establish the levels of underpayment; 
to describe the causes for underpayment based on the following 
factors: distance (accessibility); amount of produce; credit relations; 
social relations and education; 
to describe the farmers' reactions and government policies. 
The study context 
The fieldwork was mainly carried out in Eastern Province, the heart of the 
coffee and cocoa producing areas. It comprised two periods which 
coincided with the pioduce buying seasons for 1990/91 and 1992/93. 
During these periods, we visited 34 villages, located in five chiefdoms in 
the Kenema District. The chiefdoms and villages were selected on the basis 
of the distance from the villages to urban trading centres and the 
accessibility of the villages. Furthermore, we took into account the 
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presence of Village Marketing Centers in a chiefdom. To assess the impact 
of socioeconomic differentiation among the fanners on their marketing 
conditions we selected the chiefdoms on their suitability for both coffee 
and cocoa production. 
The research area consisted of five chiefdoms in Kenema District, Eastern 
Province: 
Dama Chiefdom: 
This is an area with a high production potential for both coffee and 
cocoa. The marketing possibilities in this chiefdom are poor: it does 
not have an urban trading centre and it possesses one Village 
Marketing Center. 
Koya Chiefdom: 
This chiefdom has a low production potential for both coffee and 
cocoa. There is no urban trading centre in the area, and there is one 
Village Marketing Center. 
Nongowa Chiefdom: 
Like Dama Chiefdom, this is a chiefdom which has a high production 
potential for both coffee and cocoa. However, its marketing 
possibilities are far better, with the urban trading centre of Kenema 
within its boundaries. Moreover, it has six Village Marketing Centers 
managed by a co-operative. 
Small-Bo Chiefdom: 
This area has a high production potential for coffee, but a low 
production potential for cocoa. It has Blama as an urban trading centre 
within its boundaries, and has one Village Marketing Center. Its 
marketing opportunities are relatively good because it is a small 
chiefdom. 
Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom: 
This chiefdom has a low production potential for both coffee and 
cocoa. Although there is no urban trading centre in the area, there are 
four Village Marketing Centers, so the marketing possibilities here are 
relatively well developed. 
We gathered information on the production and marketing conditions of the 
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farmers by using standardized farmers' and traders' questionnaires. 
Furthermore, several test sales were carried out to measure the actual prices 
paid by traders to the farmers. These actual prices have been compared 
with the current producer price to see whether the farmers were being 
underpaid or not. Using this information we could determine the extent to 
which farmers were being underpaid and which types of traders would be 
the most suitable for the farmers to conduct their business with. 
The next step was to describe the farmers' choice of a particular trader 
and the reasons behind his choice. This information enabled us to describe 
how far the socioeconomic position of the farmer and his marketing 
conditions affected his choice of trader. 
The theoretical context 
Many studies on agricultural commercialization over-emphasize the extent 
to which economic decisions, such as the choice of crop cultivation or the 
use of hired labour, are determined by external market forces. Insufficient 
attention has been paid to the reactions and counterforces of farmers in this 
process. It is necessary at the grassroots level not only to analyze the 
consequences of commercialization for the farmers, but also to look at the 
ways in which farmers develop their own initiatives in reaction to their 
declining self-reliance. 
This neglect of the producers is also apparent in the analyses on the 
functioning of marketing systems. The discourse on the pros and cons of 
a privatized versus a state-controlled marketing system especially, has been 
dominated by the analysis of the role of the state and several types of 
traders within the system. Little attention has been paid to the role of 
producers. Do they also profit from the fundamental changes in the 
marketing system? Furthermore, how do they react under certain marketing 
conditions and what initiatives do they develop to protect or improve their 
bargaining position? 
We think that co-operatives should be taken seriously as a potential 
means for producers to resist the detrimental effects of incorporation in 
general, and agricultural commercialization in particular. This also means 
that such producers' initiatives should be taken into account when 
analyzing marketing systems. 
The commercialization of the agricultural sector can be seen as an 
agent of change in the development of marketing systems. In this respect, 
agricultural commercialization is seen as a necessary, but insufficient 
condition for development in general, and the development of marketing 
systems in particular. Co-operatives may provide the vehicle for peasants 
to share in the benefits of commercialization, when it results in a more 
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efficient functioning of marketing systems. 
In this study, producers are taken into account as actors in the 
marketing system of export crops in Sierra Leone. Moreover, we here 
described and analyzed co-operative organization building as an instrument 
to improve the position of small scale farmers within the system. 
Agriculture in Sierra Leone 
The economy of Sierra Leone is characterized by a heavy reliance on 
agriculture and mining. The agricultural sector leans on the production of 
rice, coffee and cocoa. The sector is an important contributor to GDP, a 
source of livelihood for the majority of the population and the only sector 
capable of providing employment for a large number of people. However, 
the Sierra Leonean agricultural sector is characterized by low productivity 
and production levels, and seasonal unemployment. 
Most of the farming in Sierra Leone takes place in two distinct agro-
ecological zones: the upland area and the swamp area. The latter is used 
exclusively for the cultivation of swamp rice. The upland area can be used 
under a rotational bush-fallow system, whereby mostly rice and vegetables 
are cultivated. It can also be used under a permanent cultivation system, 
whereby oil palm, coffee and cocoa are important. The permanent 
cultivation system reflects the change from a communal land tenure system 
to more private ownership. 
In the research area, upland rice cultivation is characterized by low 
production and productivity levels, even lower than the national averages. 
Productivity is highest in Nongowa Chiefdom. Coffee and cocoa cultivation 
competes with upland rice cultivation for agricultural labour and suitable 
land. Diamond mining and the growing rural-urban migration add to labour 
shortages. Furthermore, the production of upland rice is characterized by 
low levels of modern inputs. Fallow periods are long enough for rotational 
bush-fallow cultivation, so do not seem to create production and 
productivity constraints. 
Inland valley swamp rice cultivation is also characterized by low 
production and productivity levels in the research area, and as with upland 
rice cultivation, these levels lie below the national averages. However, 
swamp rice productivity per acre is higher than upland rice productivity. 
Yet, farmers prefer upland rice cultivation. Swamp rice cultivation is more 
labour intensive, is considered hazardous to health and cannot be grown 
together with other crops. Moreover, the taste of swamp rice is considered 
inferior to upland rice. In our research area, productivity is highest in 
Kandu Leppiama Chiefdom. The production of coffee and cocoa, the 
diamond mining and the rural-urban exodus also influence the labour 
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availability for swamp rice cultivation. As with upland rice, there are low 
levels of modern inputs. 
Coffee and cocoa cultivation demand specific climatic and soil 
conditions, which confines them to the southeast of Sierra Leone. The 
average yields of coffee and cocoa are low in Sierra Leone, and are even 
lower in the research area. The peak labour requirements, during the 
planting and harvesting periods for both crops, overlap with the harvesting 
periods for both upland and inland valley swamp rice. In our research area, 
the productivity of both coffee and cocoa are highest in Nongowa 
Chiefdom and lowest in Koya Chiefdom. 
Cocoa productivity is negatively influenced by maintenance problems, 
weather problems, labour shortage and animal damage. There is a lack of 
"modem cultivation practices", such as low fertilizers and pesticides; and 
pruning and rehabilitation techniques are not widely known. Moreover, the 
rebel war prevented the farmers visiting their farms frequently, and caused 
a serious decline in the acreages maintained and harvested by the farmers. 
Coffee productivity has also been negatively influenced by the rebel 
war, although less than for cocoa, as the height of the rebel war coincided 
more with the harvesting of cocoa. Labour shortages, maintenance 
problems and animal damage play less pronounced roles in the case of 
coffee, as it is a more resilient crop than cocoa. Few modem cultivation 
practises, such as the application of pesticides or fertilizers, are used. 
Pruning and rehabilitation techniques are not widely known, but are used 
more often than for cocoa. Production and productivity levels are, 
therefore, adversely affected. 
We have differentiated agricultural producers into two types: "Type I 
farmers", the cocoa and coffee producers, and "Type Π farmers", the 
farmers without coffee or cocoa farms and those with immature, not 
bearing, coffee and cocoa. Type I farmers generally are older, possess 
larger households, have received less education, but have received more 
extension activities. Moreover, they have fewer income generating 
activities, had more potentially available household labour, cultivated more 
acreage and received more credit than Type Π farmers. It became clear that 
Type Π farmers were not capable of being self-sufficient in rice, although 
they were less "distracted" from rice production than Type I farmers. 
The Type I, coffee and cocoa, farmers were categorized according to 
several socioeconomic characteristics. It appeared that large farmers 
obtained credit less often than small and medium-sized farmers. However, 
the majority of the credit that was obtained by large farmers was produce-
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related credit. Large farmers needed to borrow less often, but when they 
did, they had more options for credit than both the small and the medium-
sized farmers. 
The small coffee and cocoa farmers were less educated than the 
medium and large farmers. Of the latter two groups, the large farmers had 
received more formal education, while the medium farmers had received 
more informal education. This means that large farmers tended to have a 
better marketing knowledge than the small and medium farmers, as formal 
education appeared to be an important precondition for farmers to 
remember producer prices. Of all coffee and cocoa farmers, one-third 
claimed to know the current prices of either or both coffee and cocoa. 
Farmers from high production potential areas for cash crops could name a 
price more often than farmers from the medium and low production 
potential areas for cash crops. 
Of the coffee and cocoa farmers, the large ones occupy the best 
position within the marketing system of coffee and cocoa in Sierra Leone. 
They needed less credit, had received more education and could remember 
more producer prices, especially the prices offered by private exporters and 
the other regional wholesalers. These traders only offer prices per pound 
for produce, and the level of price knowledge per pound is positively 
related to received formal education. 
The marketing system for coffee and cocoa: national level 
The European dominated export trade lasted from 1896 until 1948. It was 
characterized by the "two-way" trade system: on the one hand, European 
trade companies purchased and exported agricultural produce, while on the 
other hand, they sold manufactured goods. 
This colonial-type of export trade was replaced by a system of state-
controlled marketing in 1948, with the establishment of the Sierra Leone 
Produce Marketing Board. SLPMB had a monopoly on the export of 
agricultural crops, and appointed Licensed Buying Agents. The Board 
implemented a system of stabilized producer prices and tried to eliminate 
the role of middlemen. The private and institutional LBAs were supposed 
to provide all services between the up-country purchase of coffee and 
cocoa and the delivery of produce to the central stores of SLPMB. 
As a consequence of government acceptance of structural adjustment 
programmes in the 1980s, as a condition to receive IMF loans, several 
sectors of the economy, including the export trade, underwent significant 
reforms aimed at the privatization of these sectors. The privatization of the 
export trade led to the restructuring of SLPMB; the abolition of its export 
monopoly and the increase of producer prices. In 1992, all SLPMB 
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activities were stopped, because the Board could no longer operate 
profitable since the lost of its monopoly. The monopoly position of 
SLPMB was replaced by the oligopoly of a few large, private traders. 
In spite of the privatization, it is still questionable whether the farmers 
have actually received the producer prices they are entitled to and whether 
their marketing conditions and opportunities have been improved. 
The marketing system for coffee and cocoa: regional level 
The infrastructure of the research area can be considered as poorly 
developed although, since the middle of the 1980s, the average distance 
between supplier and purchaser has been narrowed. This is mainly due to 
an increased number of buying points, the Village Marketing Centers, 
outside the main urban centres, in smaller towns and even in villages. 
Not only is the road network is poorly developed, but there are few 
other transport opportunities for producers to choose from. Their main 
transport choice consists of headloading and public transport, the poda-
poda's. Some traders do possess vehicles, which they can use to collect 
produce in villages. 
The accessibility of villages or buying stations was assessed by a 
combination of absolute distance, the conditions of the roads connecting the 
villages with buying stations and the availability and frequency of 
transport. The villages were divided in three categories of accessibility. 
We can conclude that no major changes have occurred in farmers' 
selling behaviour in our research area, between the 1989/90 and 1991/92 
buying seasons. The majority of transactions, taking place in villages, 
increased slightly due to the presence of the Village Marketing Centers. 
There were no major changes in the types of transport used by the farmers. 
The producers chose to conduct their business with the following types of 
traders: 
the regional wholesalers: 
They operate from their main stores in the regional urban centres and 
cover large parts of the produce areas. They consist of the private 
exporters and the regional wholesalers without an export licence. The 
Eastern Farmers Union is mentioned seperately. It is a co-operative 
private export organization, although initially, it was an LBA. Later 
on, it became an agent for one of the main private exporters, and in 
1993 the Union became a private exporter. 
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the local merchants: 
The majority of these are agents of the regional wholesalers. They 
operate from their smaller stores or shops in the urban centres or 
smaller towns in the producing areas. Generally, their activities are 
prefinanced by the regional wholesalers. 
the small scale itinerant petty traders: 
This is largest group of traders. They operate independently at the 
local level and the amount of produce buying per petty trader is rather 
limited. For some of them petty trading is a means to generate extra 
income besides farming and mining. They therefore, only make 
incidental purchases. The time of produce buying depends on the 
money available at the time or any prefinance they are able to get 
from local merchants or regional wholesalers. 
We can now observe two major changes that have taken place in the 
marketing channels since the period of state-controlled marketing. On the 
one hand, the producer is now able to sell his produce directly to a private 
exporter, which might lead to increased producer prices. On the other hand, 
more types of traders are functioning at the local level. Agents of all types 
of private exporters purchase produce in the villages, as well as the petty 
traders. Furthermore, a co-operative is running several Village Marketing 
Centers in the villages. However, produce can still flow via as many as 
four intermediary actors to the final buyer. 
In spite of the changes in the number and types of actors involved in 
produce buying at the local level, only slight changes have taken place in 
transactions between producer and trader. To measure whether the 
transactions were carried out according to the current producer prices, i.e. 
prices for produce offered by traders to farmers (or intermediaries), we 
have discerned three types of producer prices: 
leading producer prices: 
The maximum prices which are offered to the producers and the 
traders by the main private export organizations in the urban trading 
centres. 
minimum producer prices: 
The prices which are offered to the producers and the traders by the 
regional wholesalers without an export licence. These prices are fixed 
by the regional wholesalers at a certain level below the leading 
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producer prices, taking into account their marketing costs, profit 
margins and the prices they receive from the private exporters. 
bush prices: 
The producer prices which the local merchants and the petty traders 
should pay to farmers, taking into account the traders' marketing costs 
and profit margin. Marketing costs and profit margin, however, can 
vary widely between traders. Therefore, we based the general bush 
prices on the price information we obtained from farmers, petty 
traders, local merchants and regional wholesalers. On average, bush 
prices appeared to be 20 Leones per pound less than the minimum 
producer price at the time of transaction. 
On the basis of several types of test sales that we conducted, we may 
conclude that, in spite of the increased competition between the various 
types of traders, the majority of farmers did not receive the correct price 
for their produce, according to either the current leading producer price or 
the minimum producer price in the urban trading centres and the minimum 
producer price or the bush price in the villages. 
In both the urban centres and the villages, it became clear that 
inaccurate weighing practices are common among all types of traders. 
Furthermore, numerous traders, deliberately or not, miscalculated the 
correct price for the produce, when taking the current producer prices into 
account. Only 9 per cent of the farmers who sold their produce in one of 
the urban trading centres, actually received a remuneration for their 
produce according to the leading producer price at the time of transaction 
in 1992/93. In 1990/91, the final year of state-controlled marketing, 30 per 
cent of the farmers were able to receive the leading producer price, which 
was, at that time, the official producer price set by the government. 
Assuming that the best price farmers might get in the villages is a 
price calculated according to the current minimum producer price, it 
appeared that in the last year of state-controlled marketing, 25 per cent of 
all farmers received the current minimum producer price (which was, by 
then, the official producer price set by the government). In 1992/93, after 
the privatization, 18 per cent of all farmers received the minimum producer 
price in the villages. 
Assuming that the farmers should at least get the bush price in the 
villages, it appeared that in 1992/93, 62 per cent of the farmers did not 
even receive the bush price, as compared to 57 per cent in the last year of 
state-controlled marketing in 1990/91. 
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When we took the different types of produce sold in the villages into 
account, it appeared that those farmers who sold clean coffee, in general, 
were more likely to receive at least the bush price or the minimum 
producer price. Those farmers, however, who had to sell cocoa, were less 
likely to receive at least these prices. This was due to the annual hungry 
season. At this time, farmers tend to borrow rice or cash to buy rice, so 
that they can survive the period before their new rice is available. The 
therefore, develop certain credit relationships with traders, which affect the 
prices they eventually receive for their produce. Farmers also had less 
opportunities to receive the minimum producer price or the bush price, 
when they sold cherry coffee. This is due to the processing costs of cherry 
coffee and the fact that cherry coffee is hardly ever weighed, traders often 
purchase it by bag. 
Farmers are most likely to get the minimum producer price in either 
villages or urban trading centres, when they sell their produce to a co-
operative, and farmers are least likely to receive the minimum producer 
price when they sold their produce to a petty trader. Even if the bush price 
is taken into account, the worst trading partner for the farmers appeared to 
be a petty trader. In the final year of state-controlled marketing, the petty 
traders paid less than the bush price in 72 per cent of all their transactions. 
After the privatization, they still paid less than the bush price in 68 per 
cent of all transactions. 
Although there is more competition since the privatization of the 
produce trade, the majority of the farmers are still not paid according to 
current producer prices. This is the case for the farmers who sold their 
produce in the urban trading centres, as well as for those farmers who sold 
their produce in the villages. 
The marketing behaviour of coffee and cocoa producers 
We have seen that the privatization of the trade in agricultural produce has 
only led to an increase in producer prices in the urban trading centres due 
to increased competition among private exporters. This means that the 
farmers are more likely to receive the highest producer price in the urban 
trading centres. However, it is clear that in spite of this price liberalization, 
the majority of the farmers do not receive these leading producer prices 
and are not able to sell their produce to the highest bidder. Still, the 
farmers are more likely to obtain a price which comes close to the leading 
producer price, when they can sell their produce to the wholesalers in the 
urban trading centres or the co-operatives running the Village Marketing 
Centers. 
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In 1990/91 and 1992/93, two-thirds of the farmers sold their produce 
in the villages. It appears that only a minority of the farmers found their 
way to the urban trading centres. In 1990/91, 40 per cent of all farmers 
sold their produce to a petty trader. Although since the privatization other 
types of traders have been operating at village level, 35 per cent of all 
farmers still sold their produce to petty traders. Apparently, not all the 
farmers who sold their produce in a village were able to sell their produce 
to a Village Marketing Center or were aware of the better prices paid by 
these centers or local merchant. 
Several factors have been identified which restrict or extend the 
opportunities the farmer has to conduct business with the trader of his 
choice: 
1) The accessibility of the villages and the distance to the urban trading 
centres have an impact on the farmer's choice of location and trading 
partner. The farmers in remote and barely accessible villages sell their 
produce more often in their own village or a nearby village, than those 
farmers who live closer to an urban trading centre. In general, one 
may conclude that the distance between the urban trading centres and 
the villages restricts the farmers' trading opportunities, especially 
during the cocoa buying season. Although more transactions took place 
in villages in 1992/93 compared to 1991/92, this does not mean that 
the farmers' marketing opportunities worsened. On the contrary, the 
increase of transactions in the villages can be partly attributed to an 
increasing number of Village Marketing Centers, where farmers could 
obtain higher prices. 
2) We may conclude further that farmers with small amounts of produce 
for sale, tend to sell more often in their village or a nearby village, 
and not in urban trading centres. This influence is less in the sales of 
coffee cherries: the proceeds of more than six bags can cover the 
transport costs, but also make it worthwhile for a trader to visit the 
farmer in his village. Hence, large amounts of cherry coffee are still 
sold in villages. 
3) Loan repayment obligations contribute significantly to the farmer's 
choice of trader. The majority of the farmers either took out a loan or 
had to repay a loan at the time of interview. The majority of the 
farmers took that loan under the condition that they repaid it, by 
selling their produce to the creditor. It appeared that the most 
important sources of credit were the petty traders and, to a lesser 
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extent, the local merchants. Furthermore, those farmers without any 
credit sold their produce to a wholesaler more often than those farmers 
with credit, who were more or less tied to their creditor. Small farmers 
often have no choice but to sell their produce to their creditor, who is 
usually a petty trader. It appears that large farmers are less vulnerable 
to influences of loan commitments, and obtained their credit either 
form local merchants or regional wholesalers. Although these credit 
sources may also restrict the farmers' choice of a trading partner, the 
large farmers had more opportunities to sell the remainder of their 
produce to other traders. 
4) It appeared that farmers with some form of education more often sold 
their produce to either wholesalers or co-operatives. Especially the 
young farmers have had better education opportunities than the older 
ones and appear to sell produce more often to wholesalers and co-
operatives. To improve the farmers' knowledge of the pros and cons 
of all types of trading partners and to strengthen his bargaining 
position during the transactions, the farmers' education should be more 
specialized towards marketing related knowledge, such as the 
calculation of weights and prices. 
5) Because of family relations, the farmers are often compelled to sell 
their produce to somebody belonging to the same family. But it 
appeared that farmers also sold their produce because of a friendship 
they had with a certain trader or because they would like to become 
a customer in exchange for more help when they would be in need. 
The basis for this friendship is the potential credit that a trader can 
provide. This means that adequate credit supply to farmers may 
overcome their need to look for "friends". 
Farmers mentioned socially motivated and credit relations most often, when 
explaining their choice of trader. When aggregating the various reasons into 
economically motivated reasons on the one hand, and socially motivated 
or ad hoc decisions on the other hand, it appears that two-thirds of all 
reasons given by the farmers are economically motivated. 
To conclude, behind each farmer's choice of trading location and 
trader lies a complex decision making process, influenced by many factors. 
We have seen that in the urban trading centres, the producer prices are 
higher compared to those in the villages. Furthermore, the wholesalers and 
the co-operatives pay producer prices which deviate less from the leading 
producer prices and minimum producer prices, than the producer prices 
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paid by petty traders and local merchants. In spite of the higher producer 
prices, the farmer still has little control over weighing practices and price 
calculations of the traders. So far, the liberalization of the produce trade 
has only meant government withdrawal from fixing the producer prices and 
exporting agricultural produce. The farmers will only profit from these 
increased producer prices and, consequently, increase their agricultural 
output, if attention is focused on those factors which prevent them from 
selling their produce to the trader who offers the best prices. 
10.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
It has become clear that the privatization of the marketing system has led 
to the withdrawal of the state from the purchase and export of produce. 
Official producer prices have been abolished and traders are free to set 
their own price and even export the produce themselves. However, for the 
producers little has changed for the better. For several reasons, the majority 
of them are still restricted in their choice of trader. Moreover, 
underpayment, deliberate or not, is still widespread among all types of 
traders. Therefore, in order to provide coffee and cocoa farmers with better 
opportunities within the marketing system, attention should be focused on 
the following aspects: 
1) The establishment of control mechanisms for the weighing, calculation 
and payment practices of traders. The government should play a role 
here. A revitalized, decentralized, Ministry of Agriculture should 
provide the manpower and resources to effectuate a reliable control 
mechanism. This means that the activities of the Produce Inspection 
Branch should be thoroughly evaluated and overhauled. Whether a 
new organization has to be created, or that a new PIB should be 
entrusted with this delicate task, is a matter of discussion. The main 
point made here, is that it is clear that the old PIB is not functioning 
well enough, and that well paid Inspectors should receive the resources 
they need to do their job adequately. 
2) To improve the transparency of the marketing system for farmers, 
requires some form of basic, village-based, education. In the first place 
farmers should be made aware of their situation and should realize the 
causes of the low remunerations they receive for their produce. They 
should be informed of all the options available for location and trader. 
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Furthermore, this village-based education should be specifically geared 
towards basic numeracy training, such as the calculation of weights 
times prices, and the understanding of electronic calculators. Another 
example is training in the understanding of the British weight system 
and the functioning of platform and hanging scales. A better 
knowledge of the prices for coffee and cocoa (and the changes in these 
prices) will also improve the farmers' marketing power. The education 
will have to be given in such a way that it links in with the farmers' 
local situation in their community. Already various local NGOs have 
been identified which co-operate with farmers at the local level and 
have gained their confidence. These local NGOs, with support of the 
co-operatives, may provide the type of education which is needed in 
the villages. 
3) In addition to the previous recommendation, attention should also be 
paid to the education and training of petty traders. It appeared that the 
largest group of trade relations exists between farmers and petty 
traders. Moreover, farmers are worse off when selling their produce to 
petty traders. However, one can question whether the underpayment by 
petty traders is done deliberately or not. Many petty traders are 
unaware of producer price development during the buying season. 
Often, they only know how to measure produce and to calculate the 
price per three-pence pan. Petty traders, like the farmers, lack the 
necessary marketing knowledge when selling their produce to local 
merchants or regional wholesalers. Therefore, policy should not be 
aimed at eliminating their role as produce buyer. On the contrary, it 
should be aimed at improving their marketing knowledge and at 
improving their bargaining position with other produce traders. 
Moreover, petty traders fulfil an important social function within the 
farmers' community, where they also belong. Eliminating their role as 
produce buyer would also have negative consequences for their role as 
informal credit suppliers to the farmers, as they are often the sole 
source of credit for many farmers. 
4) The improvement of the accessibility of villages and buying stations 
should receive attention. The accessibility problem can be alleviated 
by pursuing the decentralization of buying points, in which co-
operatives should be the forerunners. Moreover, accessibility can also 
be enhanced by improving the quality of the roads and by increasing 
the occurrence and frequency of public transport. The government 
should facilitate these aspects. However, external influences, such as 
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the availability and cost of petrol, are difficult to control and can have 
a negative influence on transport facilities. 
5) Increasing the production and productivity of coffee and cocoa farms 
will not only increase the farmers' income but will also indirectly 
alleviate the problem of accessibility as well. This is because the 
farmers with large amounts of produce for sale can afford the transport 
costs whereas the farmers with relatively smaller amounts, are unable 
to do so. Extension and training of farmers is instrumental in this 
respect and should be especially geared towards the maintenance of 
existing farms. It appeared that farmers, because of lack of capital and 
labour, were unable to maintain their existing coffee and cocoa 
plantations. But they still expanded their coffee and cocoa farms at the 
expense of fertile land for rice farming, in order to demarcate the land. 
Therefore, a balance must be found between a policy aimed at self-
sufficiency in rice production and a policy aimed at improving the 
farmers' cash income by increased coffee and cocoa production. 
Farmers should be discouraged from extending their coffee and cocoa 
farms and concentrate more on increasing production and productivity 
of the existing ones. In the first instance, training should be provided 
in pruning and rehabilitation techniques. However, extension activities 
should also be directed towards improving the production of rice. 
6) Efforts should go into trying to make "unhealthy" social relations 
superfluous by providing alternatives. This means that farmers should 
be aware of the higher prices available form other traders. Higher 
prices for produce diminish the need for credit. For our research area, 
it was shown that co-operatives paid relatively high prices. It should 
become clear to farmers that it is beneficial for them to sell the 
produce to co-operatives. Co-operatives must make the farmers aware 
of this, they should make the prices for coffee and cocoa widely 
known, and clarify the other advantages of selling to co-operatives. 
7) From some of the recommendations mentioned above, it is clear that 
we advocate the organization of farmers into co-operatives. This is not 
only useful for specific exercises, such as the training of farmers. It is 
also important because farmers' organization is an instrument of 
empowerment. However, as mentioned before, farmers themselves 
have to see and recognize the benefits of joining together. Crucial, 
therefore, is that co-operatives should have sufficient access to export 
markets and credit or prefinance facilities, so that their member 
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farmers receive higher prices and the opportunity of obtaining loans. 
8) Finally, there is an urgent need for the establishment of alternative 
credit sources for small scale fanners. In section 10.3, we present an 
agricultural credit system which may fill the current gap. 
The farmers will only benefit from the advantages of the privatization of 
produce trade, if they are empowered to attain an equal bargaining position 
with the traders. Therefore, we now refer briefly to some recent initiatives 
designed to improve the marketing position of farmers. 
Initiatives to overcome deficiencies in the marketing system 
One means empowering farmers is to unite them into co-operatives. From 
1948 onwards, the government tried to initiate co-operative development 
"from above", as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to control 
("capture", according to Hyden, 1980) the peasantry. The government also 
established several co-operative (apex) organizations. These were short-
lived. Interference from above and limited or no democratic control by the 
members were detrimental to the sustainability of these organizations. 
During a Co-operative Workshop in 1980, it was concluded that the 
mistakes from the past were mainly due to the fact that the essential 
principles of the so-called "bottom-up" approach had been neglected. 
Consultation with the target population was seen as the basic precondition 
for the success of any co-operative initiative. The concept of multi-purpose 
co-operative societies, organized at chiefdom level, was introduced. This 
new type of co-operatives had to replace the single-purpose, village based 
marketing co-operatives. The multi-purpose societies had to provide a 
comprehensive package of services, including delivery of agricultural 
inputs, supplying of consumer goods (particularly rice), issuing of credit, 
and the facilitation of storage, processing and marketing services. 
The first multi-purpose co-operative society was the Nongowa Co-operative 
Growers and Marketing Association, established in 1986. Their main 
objectives are: 
to eliminate middlemen and obtain the highest possible price; 
to make agricultural inputs and basic consumer goods available to 
members; 
to establish a credit system for members; 
to educate members and farmers in co-operative ideas and principles, 
and: 
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to act as a spokesman for, and be representative of, the members. 
Nongowa Growers conducts marketing activities, of which the most 
important ones are the purchase, transport and sale of coffee and cocoa. 
The co-operative has established buying points in many villages in 
Nongowa Chiefdom. Nongowa Growers also conducts non-marketing 
activities, such as the sale of rice and other consumer goods, and the 
issuing of loans. 
The potential threats to the future of multi-purpose co-operatives 
consist of the earning of enough profit to become self-sustainable, the 
expansion of the network of buying points in their area of operation (for 
now, especially important for Small-Bo Growers, the second functioning 
multi-purpose co-operative) and leadership succession. The solution for 
more profit earning lies in the formation of a Co-operative Union, which 
was established in 1992, and which is capable of exporting substantial 
amounts of coffee and cocoa on behalf of its member co-operatives. The 
Eastern Farmers Union has been trying to do just that, since the 1992/93 
buying season. 
In our opinion, co-operative efforts deserve support in the initial stages 
of their development. Co-operatives are suitable instruments to empower 
producers of coffee and cocoa, and should be given the chance to prove 
themselves. Contacts with fair-trade organizations in the coffee and cocoa 
importing countries, also provide openings to other importers of produce, 
and improve chances to export and hence, make sufficient profit. 
Another initiative intended to improve the marketing position of coffee and 
cocoa farmers was implemented by the International NGO CARE. In 
1986/87, they started two pilot Village Marketing Centers. In these centers, 
the farmers could sell their coffee or cocoa to buying agents, which they 
themselves would have to select. In this respect, the centers would decrease 
the distance between farmers and traders. The centers were supposed to be 
controlled and managed by the farmers. After a promising start, most 
Village Marketing Centers showed a decrease in the amount of produce 
that was purchased. It seemed that the early enthusiasm of the producers 
for the centers quickly disappeared. An explanation might be that after the 
first year of operation, it became more difficult to obtain purchasing 
capital, be it from large produce buyers or from the villages' own 
accumulation. 
Three main weaknesses of the Village Marketing Project can be identified: 
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1) after building the Marketing Centers, the project did not consider the 
management of the centers, specifically the training of center 
committee members and farmers was neglected; 
2) villages were left to accumulate sufficient capital by themselves, and: 
3) the lack of funds to provide credit to coffee and cocoa farmers, either 
in cash or in kind, made it difficult to compete with the credit issuing 
traders. 
Positive aspects of the Village Marketing Project include the establishment 
of decentralized buying points, often correct weighing procedures and 
higher producer prices, especially where the center is managed by a co-
operative, and the availability of rice credit. It would, therefore, be of great 
benefit to both farmers and co-operatives if all the Village Marketing 
Centers could be handed over to the co-operatives. This is a development 
that obviously requires in-depth discussions with all the communities and 
co-operatives involved. 
10.3 Agricultural credit for farmers1 
The provision of agricultural credit to farmers has long been the focus of 
attention for development workers and policy makers alike. Large amounts 
of domestic and foreign aid capital have gone into numerous agricultural 
credit programmes and projects. Agricultural credit is seen as kick-starting 
economic development, by encouraging the adoption of, expensive, modern 
technologies. However, there is a negative attitude towards informal 
lenders. For example. Von Piscke et al. (1983) call informal, non-
institutional, finance, anti-developmental and exploitative. Efforts should 
be made, therefore, to overcome the practices of informal lenders by 
providing cheap, formal, credit. 
We have seen that the selected farmers in our research area are, to a 
high degree, dependent on informal credit sources, notably produce traders. 
A farmer's choice of location and trading partner is largely determined and 
restricted by credit relations. We already concluded that alternatives to 
these type of credit sources are needed, and deal first with the existing 
informal credit sources, and then go on to look at more formal sources. 
1
 The findings of this section are partly based on Gerretsen and Sellies (1989). 
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10.3.1 Informal credit sources 
Informal credit, or non-institutionalized credit, is provided by family, 
friends, money lenders and local merchants and traders. Local savings and 
credit groups are also considered informal sources of credit. Loans are 
usually of short duration and they may be used either for production or 
consumption purposes. Additional features of informal credit include simple 
application and approval operations, easy access, no collateral demand, and 
promptness of disbursements. This makes them highly attractive. The share 
of informal credit in the rural areas in Sierra Leone is estimated to be 
around 90 per cent of all credit taken (Abu, 1993). The repayment rate is 
also high, because lenders are familiar with borrowers, and sometimes even 
meet them daily. This makes them well-informed of their activities, thus, 
enables them to accurately determine the default risk. Interest rates vary 
from source to source, and may range from nil (by family) to two or three 
hundred per cent on the principal (by traders). Information on repayment 
rates is scarce, but is generally believed to be high. Johnny (1985) reports 
rates of 80 to 90 per cent for loans from traders, and around 65 per cent 
for credit obtained from family and friends. 
One of the disadvantages of informal credit suppliers that is often 
mentioned is the fact that these informal lenders charge very high interest 
rates. One of the reasons for these high - often even called "usurious" -
interest rates is the high risk involved in providing credit. Informal lenders 
do not usually demand collateral or guarantee as security. Furthermore, the 
informal lenders supply the credit without demanding that the loan has to 
be used for productive purposes only, which potentially means that the loan 
"is eaten", without earning its repayment directly. 
Seibel and Damachi (1982) distinguished two forms of co-operation 
based on savings and credit, namely rotating savings associations and non-
rotating credit associations. During their research in Liberia, they came 
across a wide variety of these two types of savings associations which were 
often difficult to differentiate. Gerretsen and Sellies (1989), undertook a 
study in the eastern part of Sierra Leone. They identified 65 groups and 
classified them into six broad categories of self-help groups. The following 
four have credit and or savings functions: Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (RoSCAs), also known as "(o)susu" in Sierra Leone; non-
rotating savings groups with a purely social security function; savings and 
credit groups (the most common group type in the eastern part of Sierra 
Leone) and non-rotating savings groups. Gerretsen and Sellies also provide 
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a further analysis of the different group types. 
In the last decade, more attention has been paid to the possible role of 
informal groups in agricultural credit programmes. In 1973, Roberts was 
still sceptical about using such groups ("moneyclubs" as he called them) 
for credit programmes, because the lack of education of members of such 
traditional institutions could cause serious constraints. Roberts, therefore, 
believed that 'attention might be given to promoting institutions which may 
be more remote from the traditional club, but which, perhaps for that 
reason, may be more popular and successful' (Roberts, 1973, p. 13). 
However, more recent publications (Hoist, 1984; Johnny, 1985; Leonard, 
1986; Koppers, 1988, and Gerretsen and Selbes, 1989; among others), are 
more clearly in favour of using informal groups in agricultural credit 
schemes. Aside from stating the usefulness of informal groups, few authors 
indicate ways of using these groups in practice. We deal with this problem 
later, but first describe the credit opportunities provided by formal sources 
in Sierra Leone. 
10.3.2 Formal agricultural credit 
Credit which is made available through institutional channels, such as 
commercial banks, development programmes or state agencies, is defined 
here as formal credit. 
Subsidized, formal credit has long been seen as the best way to make 
credit more available to small scale farmers. In reality however, cheap 
agricultural credit has not reached the poor smallholder farmers in most 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Lele (1975) and La-Anyane (1985), for 
example, found that it was only the large farmers who benefited from these 
credit programmes. Lack of familiarity with these formal programmes and 
their procedures, added to the general mistrust and suspicion among 
farmers for modern types of institutions, were factors that led to low 
participation by small scale farmers in formal credit programmes. 
Furthermore, in most cases the credit was made available in kind, so the 
farmers could not decide for themselves how to use the loans. Farmers 
were also not allowed to apply credit for non-agricultural purposes. 
However, several authors have pointed out the need for this type of credit, 
and emphasized the relationship between production and consumption 
needs for peasant farmers (Bouman, 1977; Karimu and Richards, 1980; 
Koppers, 1988). Credit for consumption purposes should be accepted as 
being legitimate and loans should therefore be untied (Adams and Graham, 
1981). Bouman (1977, p. 200) states: 'Can we really draw a sharp 
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distinction between production and consumption in an environment where 
business and household are closely intertwined? Why should payment to 
hired labour be regarded as production oriented and the purchase of food 
for the family (farm hands) as pure consumption?' 
Forty years ago the Government of Sierra Leone recognized the need to 
pay proper attention to the provision of agricultural credit. Through various 
channels and systems, funds were made available throughout the rural 
areas. The Development of Industries Board, the Registrar of Co-operative 
Loan Scheme and the Agricultural Loans and Credit Scheme are some of 
the formal credit programmes which have all started and either ceased or 
failed, (see, for example, Karr, 1976; Johnny, 1985; Williams, 1985 and 
Gerretsen and Selbes, 1989). Here, a concise chronological history of the 
current formal sources of credit for small scale farmers in Sierra Leone is 
presented. 
The National Development Bank (NDB) 
In 1968, the NDB was established under the auspices of the government 
and with advice from the World Bank and the African Development Bank. 
The NDB provides three types of financial assistance (Rogers and May-
Parker, 1978). First, the Bank participates directly in a project, second, 
NDB can guarantee debts to third parties. Finally, the Bank provides loans. 
The task of NDB was to provide medium- and long-term loans to viable 
enterprises. "Viable", in this case, means "commercially profitable", and 
thus excluded most farmers, especially subsistence farmers, as potential 
clients. Moreover, the minimum credit ceiling of 5,000 Leones (which was 
initially fixed at 7,500 Leones) did not make the NDB more accessible for 
small farmers. Between 1968 and 1977, the Development Bank disbursed 
credit to 94 projects, of which 36 belonged to the agricultural sector (ibid.). 
The total amount of credit involved in these agricultural projects was 
almost 1.6 million Leones, averaging 43,680 Leones2. 
Currently, the NDB is guided by the Government's Programme for 
Economic Recovery (see also section 3.1.6) in selecting the projects that 
may receive financial assistance (Abu, 1993). However, these projects are 
capital intensive and are not intended to benefit individual, small farmers. 
2
 This equalled to US Dollars 45,864, or almost 230 times the GDP per capita in 
1977. 
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The National Co-operative Development Bank 
The NCDB was established in 1971. It was meant to function as an apex 
financial institution for all co-operatives. The bank was supposed to 
provide loans to co-operative societies to develop areas in agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, commerce and small scale industries. Individuals could 
receive credit by applying to the co-operative of which they were a 
member. Loan operations have been limited. Between 1977/78 and 
1981/82, only an average of three loans per annum were extended 
(Williams, 1985). The bank also failed to mobilize co-operative savings. 
This was primarily because membership, in terms of societies and 
individuals, was low. The bank was forced to go into cash crop marketing 
activities in order to ensure some sort of revenue to cover its operation 
costs. The NCDB virtually stopped issuing loans in the 1980s. Recently, 
a programme has been designed to reawaken the bank to life again (see 
9.1.1). The idea is that the NCDB should become a viable commercial 
entity with a development objective. 
Integrated Agricultural Development Projects 
We already have elaborated on IADPs in section 3.1.6, but focus on their 
credit component here. The Commercial Services Sections of the IADPs 
provided two types of loans, seasonal and development loans. Seasonal 
loans were meant for food crops (mainly rice, but also maize and 
groundnuts). They were typically in kind, and composed of packages of 
high yielding seeds and fertilizers. 
Development loans were provided for both swamp rice and tree crop 
development. For swamp rice, this type of loan covered the costs of farm 
tools, seed rice and labour hire for swamp development (for example, 
construction of drainage channels). Development loans for tree crops 
covered the costs of high yielding planting material and the hire of labour. 
The loans were intended to be in cash. In the case of EIADP, however, 
Gerretsen and Sellies encountered only farmers who had received seedlings 
in kind, repayable by a share of the harvest (Gerretsen and Sellies, 1989). 
Repayment periods differed, depending on the type of tree crop for which 
the loan was issued. 
The credit component of IADPs ran into difficulties due to high 
overhead and operation costs. Repayment rates worsened over the years. 
For example, EIADP faced repayment rates that had decreased to 10 per 
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cent by 1981 (Williams, 1985)\ The most important reasons for the failure 
of the credit systems of the different IADPs can be summarized by an 
over-ambitious extension of credit operations, by inadequate loan 
applications and difficult lending procedures and by high overhead and 
operation costs. Furthermore, there was a shortage of staff to pursue 
defaulters and the programmes suffered from corrupt credit officials. 
Commercial Banks 
The commercial banks in Sierra Leone have always had a minor impact in 
terms of agricultural credit provision. There are several reasons for this. 
First and foremost, there is the general view of farmers held by the banks. 
In the past, commercial banks have termed agricultural producers as 
'emergent farmers [who] are still mostly illiterate and bound by strong 
tribal concepts and customs. They are completely ignorant of business 
methods and have little notion of the meaning and obligations of 
institutional credit' (Commercial Banks, 1978, p. 64). Farmers divert the 
borrowed funds too often to consumption, rather than to productive uses. 
Second, the banks demand some sort of collateral from the borrowers. 
Because of the communal land tenure systems that prevail in the country, 
farmers are unable to use their land as security. Usually they do not 
possess other forms of security, such as savings accounts or houses (which 
are either family owned or of negligible value). Third, the banks are 
located in cities and towns, and do not have a network of branches in the 
rural areas. Farmers usually live in remote areas. Distance is the restrictive 
factor here. It is difficult for the lenders and the borrowers to meet each 
other. These factors made the commercial banks perceive farmers as high-
risk borrowers, being not credit worthy, and leading to low repayment 
rates. Hence, agricultural credit is seen as costly, and cannot be covered by 
the interest rate. 
Three commercial banks have provided agricultural credit in Sierra 
Leone, Barclays Bank of Sierra Leone Ltd., Standard Bank Sierra Leone 
Ltd. and the Commercial Bank of Sierra Leone Ltd. However, their 
agricultural credit operations have been moderate. Between 1969/70 and 
1989/90, the percentage of total credit extension that all commercial banks 
disbursed to agricultural projects fluctuated between 0.1 (1973/74) and 7.4 
3
 At the start of the second phase of EIADP (1976-79), the Project's lending 
operations were carried out by the Faimers Finance Company (FFC) instead of 
the Commercial Department However, FFC's lending procedures and types of 
loans were identical, as were the problems. Williams (1985) and Gerretsen and 
Sellies (1989) elaborate more on the activities of FFC. 
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per cent (1988/89), and averaged under 5 per cent (Williams, 1985; CSO, 
1992). 
Rural Banks (RBs) 
In the second half of the 1980s the idea of establishing rural financial 
institutions received more and more attention. Rural Banks, based on the 
models in use in Ghana and the Philippines (Williams, 1985) were 
considered useful in mobilizing rural savings and extending credit to large 
segments of the rural population. A first proposal for Sierra Leone was 
produced in 1981. 
In 1985, BSL started a pilot rural banking project, the Yoni RB, in 
Mile 91. Rural Banks are organized as joint stock companies, and are 
capitalized by both the local residents they intend to service and 
institutional shareholders, among which was the Bank of Sierra Leone. 
Currently, there are six other RBs, the Marampa-Masimara RB (Lunsar), 
the Kunike RB (Makali), the Dam RB (Dam), the Moa-Male RB 
(Bunumbu), the Mattru RB (Mattru Jong), the Sewama RB (Sefadu), and 
finally, the Bombali RB (Makeni) (PEMSD, personal communications, 
1992; Abu, 1993). The Banks are supposed to cover a limited area of 
operation, usually two or three chiefdoms. However, the last RB 
established, the Bombali RB, covers seven chiefdoms (PEMSD, personal 
communications, 1992). New Rural Banks were given a tax holiday and an 
interest free loan. 
The Yoni RB has experimented with alternative forms of security. It 
has accepted, for example, the hypothecation of crops, a pledge on family 
land with the approval and consent of the Paramount Chief and a lien on 
shares held by the borrower as collateral (MAFF/FAO, 1992). Although 
data are not yet available, this initiative may yield positive results. The 
Banks rely heavily on the support of Bank of Sierra Leone. The day-to-day 
management of the Rural Banks is in the hands of BSL, but is envisaged 
to rest eventually with the local communities. The initial share capital was 
very low, and has not expanded to date (Minster/Abco, 1993a). Although 
at least 50 per cent of the RBs' loan portfolio should go to the agricultural 
sector, of which 60 per cent goes to smallholders, the number of loans 
issued has remained marginal. Rural Banks have not been capable yet of 
making a significant impact in rural development. Savings mobilization has 
remained low, due to low interest rates combined with high inflation rates. 
Moreover, most of these Rural Banks are situated in war affected areas, 
and do not function at the moment. 
The inevitable conclusion that has to be derived from the different formal 
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credit programmes that have been implemented in Sierra Leone, is that they 
have all failed. One exception may be the Rural Banks. Although these are 
barely functioning at the moment, as they have virtually stopped their 
operations as a result of external influences, rather than internal difficulties. 
The formal credit programmes have suffered from low repayment 
rates, they reached fewer farmers than intended and they were not self-
sustainable. The reasons for the failure of formal credit include: 
insufficiently trained and often corrupt credit officials, difficult lending 
procedures, poor loan appraisals and inadequate credit supervision. These 
negative factors function as "push-factors" for the majority of the rural 
population. Hence, the success of informal credit can be, to large extent, 
attributed to the push-factors of formal lending. Informal credit providers 
are rooted in the community, they understand local conditions and are 
flexible in adapting their lending procedures to the needs of borrowers. In 
addition, they do not face competition from formal sources. Formal credit 
does not reach villages, and villagers do not reach town-based formal 
sources of credit. Consequently, 'the widespread use of informal finance 
suggests that it is well suited to rural conditions' (Johnny, 1985, p. 28). 
As agricultural credit is still considered to be one of the preconditions 
for rural development, and as the farmers from our research area are 
entitled to a stronger position in the marketing system for coffee and cocoa, 
we have to look at alternative forms of providing credit. One option can be 
the provision of credit through co-operative societies. This could be 
achieved through apex organizations, such as NASCCLOS or NCDB, but 
they need to be restructured first. Primary co-operative societies and co-
operative unions may also provide credit (in section 9.1 we have elaborated 
more on co-operative credit provision, see sections 9.1.2 and 9.1.3). A 
second option is the Rural Banks, which, until now, have not had the 
chance to prove their potential. In the short and medium term, these banks 
should receive management support to ensure that they are sufficiently 
equipped to provide a suitable package of services to the rural population. 
In addition, they should not only pay attention to credit, but to the 
mobilization of rural savings as well, in order to become self-sustainable. 
Finally, the idea of linking formal and informal sources of credit in one 
credit system deserves serious consideration. 
10.3.3 The use of informal credit groups 
What alternative ways are there then for a system of agricultural credit 
which fulfils the desired aims and objectives, which reaches the poorest 
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segments of the target population and which ensures a high repayment 
rate? It is clear that the traditional, individually oriented, institutional credit 
distribution is not efficient in reaching large numbers of people. As in the 
case of providing extension services, group approaches may be an 
economic necessity in organizing credit systems. Wherever social systems 
will permit, group responsibility and group benefit will have to be 
emphasized; first, to reduce the costs of the credit provision, secondly to 
assure a high repayment rate and finally, to mobilize new savings into a 
credit system (Lele, 1975). According to La-Anyane (1985), the extension 
of effective institutional credit to small scale farmers is best done through 
the formation of co-operative societies as the main agencies for distributing 
loans from agricultural credit institutions to farmers. However, the lack of 
efficient management of credit programmes and assured sources of 
financial support for these programmes are still barriers to their functioning 
(see section 9.1). Leonard (1986) is also convinced of the need for a broad 
rural credit system. According to him, more emphasis has to be put on 
extending savings clubs into small credit unions, so that they can provide 
the basis for small, cost-effective, credit operations through links with more 
formal banking institutions. What is needed then, is assistance for the 
extension of the functions of an indigenous social institution and its 
linkages with commercial banks. 
More authors are in favour of some sort of link between the formal 
and informal credit sector (Bouman, 1977; Hoist, 1984; Johnny, 1985; 
Koppers, 1988). Johnny, however, is the only author who has elaborated 
on this idea. 
By combining formal institutions with informal groups, many of the above-
mentioned problems which have evolved from the official credit 
programmes in the past can be solved. Time has shown that informal 
financial institutions have many advantages which the formal institutions 
lack. But the informal credit suppliers also lack certain qualifications which 
are considered indispensable for the efficient functioning of agricultural 
credit systems. 
It is logical then to try and link formal institutions with informal 
savings and credit groups, using the strengths of both systems and avoiding 
the weaknesses that normally constrain the success of a credit system. In 
order to do this, we have listed the advantages and disadvantages of both 
types of credit systems for small scale farmers, so that a clear picture 
emerges, that the strengths of the one complement the weaknesses of the 
other (see table 10.1). 
Moreover, informal financial institutions are highly attractive for a 
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number of additional reasons. One is that they are socially attractive 
because they are usually based on a type of "social network", such as 
family ties or church membership. This means that a money club is not 
only considered to be a financial structure, but it is seen by its members as 
a centre of social activity as well. Another reason why these clubs or 
groups are attractive, is the fact that membership requires a regular 
contribution to the club, which is a definite incentive to save. 
Table 10.1 Strengths and weaknesses of formal and informal credit 
systems 
Formal credit Informal credit 
Strengths Weaknesses 
-availability of extension 
-long-term loans possible 
-large loan fund 
-specific credit knowledge 
-no extension available 
-only short-term loans 
-limited loan fund 
-no specific credit knowledge 
Weaknesses Strengths 
-low accessibility 
-loans for productive purposes only 
-complicated procedures 
-officials are often corrupt 
-loans are large 
-low loan repayment 
-rigid loan collection 
-cover mainly urban areas 
-no direct contact with clients 
-high accessibility 
-loans for production and 
consumption purposes 
-simple procedures 
-corruption less common due to 
strong social control 
-loans are small 
-high loan repayment 
-flexible loan collection 
-cover mainly rural areas 
-direct contact with clients 
Source: Gerretsen and Sellies (1989). 
Another, more economic, reason for their attractiveness is that informal 
credit suppliers prove to be more cost-effective than formal institutions, in 
terms of default rates, overhead costs, and so on (see, for example, Hoist, 
1984). Hoist (p. 30) mentions the following reasons for trying to promote 
the link between formal and informal institutions: 
1) 'Formal institutions could extend low-cost group loans to these 
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associations'; 
2) 'Members could use their claim vis-a-vis the associations as collateral 
for individual credit from formal financial institutions', and: 
3) 'Funds that are temporarily not needed by the members could be used 
to make a group deposit in banks or other formal institutions'. 
As mentioned before, many authors have already posed the "linking" idea 
but only Johnny (1985) has put it into a virtually complete model, which 
was adapted by Gerretsen and Sellies (1989). 
After concluding that formal, or institutional, credit programmes have 
failed to do their job, Johnny (1985) mentions three conditions which have 
to be met before a credit system can be started successfully; namely that 
not only productive loans are needed but consumptive loans as well, that 
the lending operations should not be too complex for farmers to understand 
and that corruption among credit officials should be avoided. He then 
continues with three elements which have to be embedded in a credit 
system if it is meant to operate on a self-sustaining basis: 
1) 'Interest charges on loans must cover operating costs, but operating 
costs have to be kept low'; 
2) 'A regularly maintained high rate of loan recovery has to be ensured', 
and: 
3) 'A mechanism for self-accountability has to be built into a credit 
system' (p. 164-165). 
He concludes by stressing that 'no institutional credit delivery system can 
be expected to meet the above prescriptions all at once (...)' and 'informal 
lenders fulfil most of the prescriptions in the "guidelines", but they 
generally do not have the necessary volume of resources (...)'. Therefore, 
'some measures of co-operation between credit institutions and informal 
lenders would be rewarding' (p. 165). 
It is important to stress that the informal credit suppliers meant above 
are informal (commercial) money lenders or farmers' groups, i.e. farmers' 
associations and village savings clubs, while the other types of informal 
sources, e.g. family, friends, other farmers and so on, are forms of 
"reciprocal assistance"; when a favour is given it is expected that it will be 
returned in the future. These should not be expected to fulfil a role in 
making formal credit institutions more accessible for small scale farmers. 
Gerretsen and Sellies (1989) propose a model, largely based on Johnny 
(1985), in which an organization with a network in the rural areas functions 
as the formal credit supplier. In the case of Sierra Leone, Rural Banks 
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could fulfil this role. Self-help groups, preferably those with savings and 
credit activities, whether on a co-operative basis or not, could function as 
intermediaries between formal credit suppliers and farmers (see figure 
10.1)4. The farmers should request loans from the intermediary, which 
would approve them or not. 
This approach should not be confused with the group lending projects 
which are currently so much in fashion. In many of these projects, groups 
of people are identified, which are considered promising enough to provide 
them with credit, in bulk. The groups can then decide on the on-lending of 
the credit to their members. These groups are often production groups, 
which need production credit, and usually have no previous experience of 
credit provision. They may or may not have been founded for the credit 
project. The groups are seen as promising, because they are active in small 
enterprise development, and capable of making profits, hence, capable of 
repaying loans. 
The model suggested here, tries to make use of the experience in savings 
and credit provision of existing groups at the local level. They know their 
clients and are embedded in the local context. They are best suited to 
inform the potential borrowers on the conditions, which are also adapted 
to the local situation. Farmers do not need to travel to larger towns and 
know the credit officials personally, so the threshold for obtaining credit 
is relatively low. The formal credit supplier should provide funds and, 
when necessary, agricultural inputs to the local group. The Rural Bank, or 
any other organization, should, in consultation with the intermediary, 
discuss the terms on which these funds are made available to the 
intermediary. The intermediary, however, should have full authority on the 
terms on which they lend these funds to their clients in the villages. 
The correct selection of the informal intermediaries is considered the 
key for a successful implementation of the proposed credit model. 
Gerretsen and Selbes developed a "sophistication measurement" in order 
to select the most suitable type of self-help group as an intermediary. With 
the sophistication measurement, they tried to quantify the qualities of the 
different groups that they have studied with respect to their possible 
usefulness as an intermediary between formal institutions and the target 
population of an agricultural credit programme, usually farmers. They listed 
4
 Johnny (1985), is also considering reliable money lenders as intermediaries. 
Here, we concentrate ourselves on savings and credit groups, because, contrary 
to the profits of money lenders, group profits are distributed among members. 
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a number of criteria and labelled those with weighted scores. The scores, 
or weights, were designed with the credit model in mind, and are based on 
what are, generally, considered important prior conditions for credit 
programmes to succeed. Basically, the measurement tries to select the 
groups that are suitable to fulfil the role they have to play in thecredit 
model. The measurement does not imply that one should not give loans to 
certain group types, but only that certain groups are, in their opinion, better 
suited to fulfil a specific role than others. 
The heart of the matter in this section has been the possibility of linking 
formal institutions and informal groups in an agricultural credit programme. 
It had been proved that both types of organizations can be complementary 
on many points. On the basis of a model proposed by Johnny (1985), 
which was revised by Gerretsen and Sellies (1989), the pros and cons of 
such a Unking have been discussed. 
In order to select an intermediary body between a formal credit 
providing institution and farmers, "the target population", a "sophistication 
measurement" can be used. The measurement aims at assessing different 
types of groups, in order to decide which type can best play the role of an 
intermediary, as described in the proposed credit model. The measurement 
procedure is designed to give a rough assessment of different types of 
groups in their potential performance of specific tasks, in this case 
becoming an intermediary between a formal institution and farmers in an 
agricultural credit system. Experimental credit projects with the selected 
groups should show the usefulness of the measurement and the 
effectiveness of the proposed credit model. 
By implementing the proposed credit model, more capital can flow 
into the agricultural sector in general, and into coffee and cocoa production 
in particular. Coffee and cocoa producers will, consequently, acquire a 
greater chance to sell their produce to the trading partners of their choice. 
The implementation of this alternative form of credit provision contributes, 
accordingly, to income increases for many smallholder farmers. 
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Appendix 
Visited in 
1990/91 
Chiefdoms 
Dama 
Koya 
Total: 248 
3.1 Summary of research 
Villages (respondents) 
Tewo (8) 
Majihun (15) 
Baoma (13) 
Patama (15) 
Siama (9) 
Yibaima (15) 
Lilema (15) 
Beobu (15) 
Gama (15) 
Bangoma (11) 
Serabu (15) 
Joi (15) 
Nyandehun (15) 
Bogboabu (15) 
Njaluahun (15) 
Perewama (15) 
Gorahun (15) 
Segbwema (12) 
respondents. 
areas in 1990/91 and 1992/93 
Visited in 
1992/93 
Chiefdoms 
Dama 
Koya 
Nongowa 
Small-Bo 
Kandu L. 
Villages (respondents) 
Tewo (8) 
Majihun (15) 
Baoma (13) 
Patama (15) 
Siama (9) 
Yibaima (15) 
Lilema (15) 
Beobu (15) 
Bangoma (11) 
Serabu (15) 
Joi (15) 
Polehun (15) 
Kpeima (15) 
Dia (15) 
Ngelahun (15) 
Barveh (13) 
Mano Koiehun (15) 
Saliema (15) 
Yovohun (15) 
Saama (10) 
Gandorhun (15) 
Joyomie (15) 
Yoni (11) 
Masahun (15) 
Bandah (15) 
Gangama (15) 
Kuranko (15) 
Total: 375 respondents (of which 120 from 
1990/91). 
Source: Authors (1990 and 1992). 
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Appendix 7.1 Composition and absolute distance of most common and 
alternative routes, between the selected villages and the urban 
buying stations and the availability of motorized transport in the 
selected villages 
village 
Jovohun 
Saama 
Joyomie 
Saliema 
Barveh 
Gandorhun 
Majihun 
Kuranko 
Kpeima 
Gama 
Mano-K. 
Tewo 
Siama 
Dia 
Gangama 
Potehun 
Baoma 
Patama 
Yibaima 
Gbeowobu 
Masahun 
Yoni 
Lilema 
Ngelahun 
Periwama 
composition of route 
(distances in miles) 
minor(3.0)-main( 1.5) 
bush(2.5)-sec(2.0) 
bush(3.0)-main(8.0) 
sec(6.0) 
bush(2.0)-sec(3.5) 
minor(0.5)-main(6.0) 
minor(3.5)-main(3.0) 
bush(8.5)-main(5.0) 
bush(4.5)-sec(2.5)" 
sec(5.5)-main(8.5) 
minor(0.5)-sec(9.5) 
minor(2.0)-sec(8.0) 
sec(5.5)-main(6.0) 
minor( 1.5)-sec(3.0)-main(7.0) 
bush(2.0)-main(9.5) 
minor( 1.5)-sec( 18.0) 
bush(2.0)-main(19.0) 
main(12.0) 
bush(9.5)-sec(2.5)" 
minor(2.0)-sec(3.0)-main(8.0) 
minor(2.0)-sec(10.5) 
bush( 1.5)-minor(3.5)-main(7.5) 
bush(1.5)-minor(3.5)-main(16.5) 
minor(7.5)-main(6.0) 
minor(2.5)-sec(12.5) 
minor(l .5)-sec(6.5)-main(5.5) 
minor(2.5)-main(12.0) 
sec(9.0)-main(5.5) 
sec(6.5)-main(8.0) 
minor(5.5)-main(9.5) 
minor(2.0)-main(13.0) 
bush(8.0)-main(8.0) 
bush(1.5)-minor(6.5)-sec(3.0)-main(8.0) 
minor(2.0)-main(15.0) 
sec(13.0)-main(5.5) 
availability 
of motorized 
transport* 
frequent 
none 
none 
frequent 
none 
occasional 
occasional 
occasional 
frequent 
frequent 
occasional 
frequent 
frequent 
occasional 
occasional 
occasional 
occasional 
frequent 
frequent 
frequent 
none 
none 
none 
frequent 
frequent 
occasional 
occasional 
frequent 
frequent 
frequent 
occasional 
none 
none 
none 
frequent 
abs. 
dist. 
(in miles) 
4.5 
4.5 
11.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.5 
6.5 
13.5 
7.0 
14.0 
10.0 
10.0 
11.5 
11.5 
11.5 
19.5 
21.0 
12.0 
12.0 
13.0 
12.5 
12.5 
21.5 
13.5 
15.0 
13.5 
14.5 
14.5 
14.5 
15.0 
15.0 
16.0 
19.0 
17.0 
18.5 
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-Continued 
Bangoma bush(3 5)-sec(10 0)-main(5 5)" 
bush(2 0)-minor(9 5)-sec(13 0) 
Gbandah minor(10 5)-main(10 5) 
Nyandehun minor(l 5)-sec(15 0)-raain(5 5) 
Joi rainor(9 5)-sec(13 0) 
bush(2 5)-sec(15 0)-mam(5 5)" 
Bogboabu sec(19 0)-main(5 5) 
Serabu bush(3 0)-sec( 19 0)-mam(5 5)" 
bush(5 0)-minor(9 5)-second(13 0) 
Gorahun minor(3 5)-sec(22 0)-main(5 5) 
Segbwema bush(4 0)-sec(22 0)-main(5 5) 
Jaluahun bush(4 0)-main(8 0)-sec( 12 0)-mam(8 0) 
minor(5 5)-sec(22 0)-mam(5 5) 
none 
none 
frequent 
occasional 
frequent 
frequent 
frequent 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
19.0 
24.5 
19 5 
22 0 
22.5 
23 0 
24 5 
27 5 
27 5 
310 
315 
32 0 
33 0 
The availability of motorized transport refers to the possibility of public transport, 
traders' vehicles or passengers cars entering a village Frequent means these 
vehicles enter or stop at least once a day in that particular village Occasional 
means these vehicles only enter that particular village at irregular intervals and 
often only at request of the villagers None means that the village is not accessible 
for any of these vehicles because of the condition of the road 
People using that particular route need to cross a nver by canoe 
Sources DOS-maps (1965). authors (1993) 
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Appendix 7.2 
village 
1. Jovohun 
2. Saama 
3. Joyomie 
4. Saliema 
5. Barveh 
6. Gandorhun 
7. Majihun 
8. Kpeima 
9. Kuranko 
10. Gama 
11. Mano-K. 
12. Tewo 
13. Dia 
14. Siam a 
15. Potehun 
16. Baoma 
17. Palama 
18. Yibaima 
19. Gbeowobu 
20. Masahun 
21. Yoni 
22. Ngelahun 
23. Periwama 
24. Ulema 
25. Bangoma 
Classification of the selected villages according 
relative distance 
station 
absolute 
to their absolute and 
by the most used route to the nearest urban buying 
village 
distance (in miles) 
4.5 
4.5 
6.0 
6.0 
6.5 
6.5 
7.0 
10.0 
10.0 
11.5 
11.5 
12.0 
12.5 
13.0 
13.5 
13.5 
14.5 
14.5 
14.5 
15.0 
15.0 
17.0 
18.5 
19.0 
19.0 
1. Jovohun 
2. Joyomie 
3. Barveh 
4. Saama 
5. Saliema 
6. Gandorhun 
7. Kpeima 
8. Kuranko 
9. Gama 
10. Tewo 
11. Mano-K 
12. Siama 
13. Polehun 
14. Yibaima 
15. Gbeowobu 
16. Baoma 
17. Masahun 
18. Majihun 
19. Dia 
20. Yoni 
21. Patama 
22. Periwama 
relative 
distance' 
4.5 
6.0 
7.0 
9.5 
9.5 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
11.5 
12.0 
13.0 
13.0 
13.5 
14.5 
14.5 
15.0 
15.0 
16.0 
16.5 
17.0 
17.0 
18.5 
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-Continued: 
Gbandah 
Gangama 
Nyandehun 
Joi 
Bogboabu 
Serabu 
Gorahun 
Segbwema 
Jaluahun 
21.0 
21.5 
22.0 
22.5 
24.5 
27.5 
31.0 
31.5 
32.0 
23. Gbandah 
24. Ngelahun 
25. Joi 
26. Nyandehun 
27. Bogboabu 
28. Bangoma 
29. Gangama 
30. Lilema 
31. Serabu 
32. Gorahun 
33. Segbwema 
34. Jaluahun 
21.0 
21.0 
22.5 
23.5 
24.5 
26.0 
28.0 
28.5 
37.5 
38.0 
39.5 
44.0 
The relative distance expresses not only the absolute distance to the nearest buying 
station but also takes the type of road and the availability of motorized transport 
on that particular route into account. The relative distance is calculated by 
multiplying the absolute distance with factor one for main roads, secondary roads 
and minor roads with frequent public transport and other vehicles. We multiplied 
distances by factor two for minor roads with only occasional availability of 
vehicles and by factor three for bush paths or minor roads which are not accessible 
for vehicles. 
Sources: DOS-maps (1965); authors (1993). 
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Appendix 7.3 Average monthly exchange rates, January 1980 until December 
1993 (Leones per US Dollar) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
2.51 
6.01 
5.82 
5.79 
5.71 
5.68 
5.32 
5.51 
5.40 
5.32 
5.21 
5.21 
5.15 
4.93 
5.03 
4.87 
4.91 
12.03 
22.07 
25.06 
28.09 
31.05 
32.26 
35.71 
38.02 
43.10 
51.02 
50.00 
44.05 
35.09 
25.00 
22.99 
22.99 
22.99 
23.04 
23.04 
23.04 
23.04 
28.09 
29.07 
31.06 
34.13 
35.09 
39.06 
33.78 
39.06 
39.06 
39.06 
-Continued: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
44.05 
44.05 
44.05 
65.36 
65.36 
65.36 
65.36 
65.36 
65.36 
65.36 
65.36 
65.36 
120.48 
120.48 
120.48 
120.48 
161.29 
163.93 
166.67 
166.67 
178.57 
178.57 
185.18 
188.68 
196.08 
204.08 
211.19 
231.59 
245.59 
251.32 
282.01 
328.19 
353.57 
394.14 
420.95 
425.42 
444.29 
461.96 
476.74 
494.71 
498.60 
507.56 
510.00 
512.70 
513.30 
516.40 
520.40 
531.60 
552.40 
561.80 
561.90 
562.60 
563.60 
566.90 
569.30 
569.10 
570.60 
571.50 
578.90 
576.50 
Source: IMF (1984-1993). 
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Appendix 7.4 The producer prices for cocoa in the urban centres of Sierra Leone 
from August 1986 until July 1993 (in Leones per pound)* 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May" 
June" 
July" 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May" 
June" 
July" 
1986/87 
12 
12 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
1990/91 
20 
20 
35 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
1987/88 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
1991/92 
60/ 45 
60/ 45 
80/ 80 
100/ 80 
120/100 
140/120 
150/120 
150/120 
150/120 
150/120 
100/ 80 
100/ 80 
1988/89 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
13.5 
20 
1992/93 
100/ 80 
120/100 
120/100 
120/100 
140/120 
140/120 
140/120 
140/120 
140/120 
120/100 
120/100 
120/100 
1989/90 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
Before August 1991 the listed producer prices are the official producer prices set 
by the government. From August 1991 onwards, this appendix shows two types 
of producer prices. In the left are column the current leading producer prices paid 
by private exporters. The right column shows the minimum producer prices paid 
by the regional wholesalers. 
The buying season for cocoa normally lasts from August until April. In the other 
months producers have only incidental cocoa for sale. Furthermore, since the 
privatization of the produce trade, cocoa is purchased at lower producer prices 
then, because traders are unsure on the actual prices in the following season. 
Source: SLPMB (1991); Regional wholesalers, personal communications (1991, 
1992, 1993). 
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Appendix 7.5 
December 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August" 
September" 
October" 
November" 
December 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August" 
September" 
October" 
November" 
The prod lucer prices for coffee in the urban centres of Sierra Leone 
from December 1986 until August 1993 (in Leones 
1986/87 
16 
16 
18 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
1990/91 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
55 
75 
75 
90 
90 
/ 40 
/ 55 
/ 55 
/ 55 
/ 55 
1987/88 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
1991/92 
100/ 80 
125/100 
125/100 
125/100 
125/100 
125/100 
110/ 90 
110/90 
110/ 90 
110/90 
110/ 90 
100/80 
1988/89 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
1992/93 
100/ 80 
120/100 
140/120 
150/130 
150/130 
150/130 
150/130 
150/130 
per pound)* 
1989/90 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
Before July 1991 the listed producer prices were the official producer prices set 
by the government of Sierra Leone. From July 1991 onwards, this appendix shows 
two types of producer prices. The left column shows the current leading producer 
prices paid by private exporters. The right column shows the minimum producer 
prices paid by the regional wholesalers. 
The buying season for coffee normally lasts from December until August. In the 
remaining months producers only have incidentally coffee for sale. 
Source: SLPMB (1991); Regional wholesalers, personal communications (1991, 
1992, 1993). 
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Inleiding 
Sinds de jaren zeventig vertoont het inkomen van het merendeel van de 
bevolking van de landen ten zuiden van de Sahara een gestage achteruit-
gang. De wereldmarktprijzen voor hun exportproducten blijven laag, terwijl 
de prijzen van de importgoederen stijgen. Doordat tegelijkertijd de 
bevolkingsdruk toeneemt, zijn de meeste landen gedwongen om financiële 
steun te vragen aan de internationale gemeenschap. De Wereldbank en het 
Internationale Monetaire Fonds verstrekken deze steun voor het grootste 
deel in de vorm van geconditioneerde leningen. Om voor een lening in 
aanmerking te komen moet een land een structureel aanpassingsprogramma 
(SAP) ontwikkelen, volgens de neoliberale richtlijnen van de schuldeisers. 
De belangrijkste onderdelen van zo'n SAP zijn vermindering van de 
overheidsuitgaven en privatisering van de economie. Beide zouden 
belangrijke en noodzakelijke voorwaarden zijn voor het realiseren van 
economische vooruitgang voor de gehele bevolking. Het blijft echter de 
vraag of economische vooruitgang daadwerkelijk plaatsvindt en wie 
daarvan profiteert. 
In dit onderzoek staat deze vraag centraal, met betrekking tot een van 
de belangrijkste pijlers van de economie van Sierra Leone: de koffie- en 
cacaosector. Dit boek laat zien dat de omstandigheden waaronder kleine 
boeren koffie en cacao produceren en verhandelen nauwelijks zijn 
verbeterd tijdens de periode waarin de invloed van de overheid werd 
geminimaliseerd ten gunste van een geprivatiseerd marktsysteem. 
De opzet van het onderzoek 
De studie beschrijft en analyseert de productie en de handel in koffie en 
cacao in Sierra Leone tijdens de overgang van een door de overheid 
gecontroleerd marktsysteem naar een vrij marktsysteem. Het uitgangspunt 
was dat een geprivatiseerd marktsysteem zou leiden tot het betalen van 
hogere prijzen door de handelaren aan de producenten. Bovendien zou zo'n 
systeem moeten leiden tot correcte betalingsprocedures op basis van de 
gangbare producentenprijzen en het feitelijke gewicht van de aangeboden 
hoeveelheden koffie of cacao. Voor dit onderzoek werden daarom de 
volgende onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd: 
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1) Worden de producenten van koffie en cacao in Sierra Leone onderbe-
taald en zo ja, wat zijn de oorzaken van deze onderbetaling? 
2) Welke maatregelen kunnen genomen worden om onderbetaling te 
verminderen of zelfs tegen te gaan? 
Ten einde deze onderzoeksvragen te kunnen beantwoorden zijn de 
volgende onderzoeksdoelstellingen geformuleerd: 
- het beschrijven van de sociaal-economische differentiatie van de koffie-
en cacaoproducenten; 
- het beschrijven van het marktsysteem voor koffie en cacao in Sierra 
Leone; 
- het verzamelen van gegevens over de feitelijke producentenprijzen die 
door de handelaren worden betaald; 
- het beschrijven van de oorzaken van onderbetaling aan de hand van de 
volgende factoren: de bereikbaarheid van de handelscentra, de hoeveelheid 
cacao en koffie die een producent aanbiedt, de kredietrelaties tussen 
handelaar en producent, de sociale banden tussen handelaar en producent, 
en de invloed van onderwijs; 
- het beschrijven van de reacties van de producenten en het gevoerde 
overheidsbeleid ten aanzien van de veranderingen in het marktsysteem. 
De methoden van onderzoek 
Het veldwerk is voornamelijk uitgevoerd in de Eastern Province, het hart 
van de koffie- en cacaoproductiegebieden in Sierra Leone. De gegevens 
zijn verzameld tijdens de opkoopseizoenen 1990/91 en 1992/93. Tijdens 
deze perioden hebben wij 34 dorpen bezocht, verspreid over vijf chiefdoms 
in Kenema District. De dorpen werden geselecteerd op basis van hun 
afstand tot en hun toegankelijkheid vanuit de stedelijke marktcentra. 
Bovendien werd rekening gehouden met de aanwezigheid van bepaalde 
lokale opkoopcentra, de zogenaamde Village Marketing Centers. 
Tijdens ons verblijf in de dorpen zijn, met behulp van gestandaardi-
seerde enquêtes onder boeren en handelaren, gegevens verzameld over de 
omstandigheden waaronder de kleine boeren koffie en cacao produceren en 
verhandelen. Bovendien zijn, op verschillende manieren, gegevens 
verzameld over de feitelijke koffie- en cacaoprijzen die de handelaren aan 
de producenten betaalden. Die prijzen zijn vergeleken met de gangbare 
producentenprijzen ten tijde van de transactie, om vast te stellen of de 
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producenten werden onderbetaald of niet. Aan de hand van deze gegevens 
hebben wij kunnen vaststellen in hoeverre de door ons onderscheiden typen 
handelaren de juiste prijs betaalden en welk type handelaar de beste 
handelspartner voor de producent was. 
Vervolgens hebben wij onderzocht aan wie de producenten daadwerke-
lijk hun koffie en cacao verkochten en welke verklaring zij gaven voor hun 
verkoopgedrag. Met behulp van deze informatie kon worden vastgesteld in 
hoeverre de sociaal-economische omstandigheden van kleine boeren hun 
verkoopgedrag en hun keuze van een handelspartner beïnvloedden. 
De theoretische context 
Tal van studies betreffende het proces van agrarische commercialisatie in 
ontwikkelingslanden benadrukken de mate waarin economische besluitvor-
mingsprocessen in de landbouw, bijvoorbeeld bij de gewaskeuze of het 
gebruik van betaalde arbeidskrachten, extern worden bepaald. Ze besteden 
echter veelal onvoldoende aandacht aan de maatregelen die de producenten 
zelf nemen om de negatieve gevolgen van marktgerichte agrarische 
productie zoveel mogelijk te beperken. Het lijkt ons daarom noodzakelijk 
om op dorpsniveau niet slechts de gevolgen van agrarische commercialisa-
tie voor de producenten te beschrijven, maar om ook expliciet aandacht te 
schenken aan de initiatieven die deze producenten zelf nemen om hun 
afhankelijke en kwetsbare positie, die een gevolg is van hun incorporatie 
in de commerciële sector, te verbeteren. 
Het gebrek aan voldoende aandacht voor de rol van de producenten 
komt ook naar voren in de analyses van het functioneren van marktsyste-
men voor gewassen. De discussies over de voor- en nadelen van een 
geprivatiseerd marktsysteem, ten opzichte van een door de overheid 
gecontroleerd marktsysteem, worden vooral gedomineerd door de rol die 
de overheid en de verschillende handelaren spelen in het betreffende 
marktsysteem. Er is nauwelijks aandacht geweest voor de rol die de 
producenten spelen. Kunnen zij in gelijke mate profiteren van de funda-
mentele veranderingen die een marktsysteem ondergaat? Hoe reageren zij 
op bepaalde veranderingen in dat marktsysteem en welke initiatieven 
ontplooien zij om hun onderhandelingspositie te behouden of te verbeteren? 
In dit verband is het zinvol om de rol van coöperaties, als een van de 
initiatieven van producenten om zich teweer te stellen tegen de nadelige 
effecten van agrarische commercialisatie, onder de aandacht te brengen. 
Coöperaties kunnen voor producenten een middel zijn om gezamenlijk hun 
onderhandelingspositie ten opzichte van handelaren te versterken, wat tot 
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een verbetering van hun inkomens- en levensomstandigheden kan leiden. 
De landbouw in Sierra Leone 
De economie van Sierra Leone wordt grotendeels gedragen door de 
mijnbouw en de landbouw. De agrarische sector leunt sterk op de productie 
van rijst, koffie en cacao en levert een belangrijke bijdrage aan het Bruto 
Nationaal Product. Belangrijker is het feit dat de sector de grootste 
werkverschaffer is en het merendeel van de bevolking voor haar levenson-
derhoud dus afhankelijk is van de landbouw. De productiviteit in de 
landbouw is daarentegen erg laag en seizoenswerkloosheid is een veel 
voorkomend verschijnsel. 
De landbouw in Sierra Leone vindt plaats in moerassige dalen en op 
hellingen en hoger gelegen gebieden. De moerasgebieden worden 
uitsluitend gebruikt voor de verbouw van natte rijst. In de hoger gelegen 
gebieden bedrijven de boeren shifting cultivation, een vorm van akkerbouw 
waarbij regelmatig van akker wordt gewisseld en grote delen van het land 
voor langere tijd braak liggen om de bodemvruchtbaarheid te laten 
herstellen. De voornaamste voedselgewassen die verbouwd worden zijn 
droge rijst en diverse groenten. Behalve voor shifting cultivation gebruiken 
de boeren de hoger gelegen grond ook voor permanente aanplantingen van 
handelsgewassen, zoals oliepalmen, koffie en cacao. 
In ons onderzoeksgebied wordt de droge rijstbouw gekenmerkt door 
een lage productiviteit en opbrengsten die beneden het landelijk gemiddelde 
liggen. Bovendien wordt een deel van de vruchtbare gronden in beslag 
genomen door permanente koffie- en cacaogaarden en gaat door de 
verzorging van de koffie- en cacaobomen een deel van de beschikbare 
arbeidskracht voor de droge rijstbouw verloren. Het tekort aan arbeids-
krachten wordt nog versterkt door de aantrekkingskracht van de diamant-
mijnbouw in het gebied en door de omvangrijke migratie van jonge mensen 
vanuit de dorpen naar de steden, waar ze een beter inkomen hopen te 
verkrijgen. 
De natte rijstbouw levert hogere opbrengsten en heeft een hogere 
productiviteit dan de droge rijstbouw. In ons onderzoeksgebied liggen 
echter ook de productiecijfers van de natte rijstbouw beneden het landelijke 
gemiddelde. Hoewel de opbrengsten in de natte rijstbouw hoger zijn, geven 
de meeste boeren toch de voorkeur aan droge rijstbouw, omdat het werk 
in de moerassen veel zwaarder, intensiever en ongezonder is. Bovendien 
smaakt droge rijst beter dan natte rijst en kan men in de moerasgebieden 
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geen andere gewassen, zoals groenten, verbouwen. Ook voor de natte 
rijstbouw geldt dat de koffie- en cacaoproductie, de mijnbouw en de trek 
naar de stad de beschikbaarheid van arbeidskracht onder druk zetten. 
De verbouw van koffie en cacao vereist specifieke klimatologische en 
bodemkundige omstandigheden, die men in Sierra Leone alleen aantreft in 
het zuidoosten van het land. In ons onderzoeksgebied, gelegen aan de rand 
van de meest productieve koffie- en cacaogebieden, zijn de productie en de 
productiviteit van koffie en cacao laag en beneden het landelijk gemiddelde 
gelegen. 
De productiviteit van de cacaoplantages wordt vooral nadelig beïnvloed 
door het gebrek aan voldoende arbeidskrachten. Het aanplanten van de 
boompjes en de oogstperiode vallen namelijk samen met de oogsttijd voor 
de rijst. Bovendien worden de bomen en de oogst vaak beschadigd door 
apen, insecten en schimmelziekten. In de meeste gevallen missen de boeren 
de juiste middelen en technieken om de bomen goed te onderhouden. 
Bovendien zijn de boeren vanaf midden 1991 hun aanplantingen minder 
vaak gaan bezoeken, vanwege de onveiligheid in het gebied, veroorzaakt 
door rondtrekkende rebellengroepen. Deze factoren veroorzaakten een 
sterke afname van het aantal en de oppervlakte van de plantages die 
daadwerkelijk onderhouden en geoogst worden. 
Ook de productiviteit van de koffiegaarden wordt nadelig beïnvloed 
door het gebrek aan arbeidskrachten. De oogsttijd voor koffie valt 
grotendeels samen met de tijd waarin nieuwe akkers in gereedheid gebracht 
moeten worden voor de droge rijstbouw. Bovendien vergt het onderhoud 
van koffie-aanplantingen meer werk, omdat er meer struiken en onkruid 
tussen de bomen gaan groeien dan in cacaoplantages. Koffiebonnen zijn 
echter sterker dan cacaobomen en minder gevoelig voor ziekten. Verder 
worden de boeren bij hun oogstwerkzaamheden vaak belemmerd door de 
talloze mieren op de boomstammen. Ook voor het onderhoud van 
koffiebomen geldt dat de boeren de juiste middelen en technieken missen 
en dat de bezoeken aan de plantages verminderd zijn vanwege de onveilige 
situatie in het zuidoosten van het land. Het gevolg is een sterke daling van 
het aantal hectares dat daadwerkelijk onderhouden en geoogst wordt. 
Het marktsysteem voor koffie en cacao op nationaal niveau 
Aan het einde van de negentiende eeuw introduceerden Europese kolonis-
ten koffie en cacao als nieuwe handelsgewassen in Sierra Leone. Vanaf dat 
moment kwam ook de opkoop van deze gewassen volledig in handen van 
Europese handelshuizen. Sinds 1948 houden deze handelshuizen zich niet 
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meer met de opkoop bezig, maar laten ze die over aan een door de 
overheid gecontroleerde opkooporganisatie, de Sierra Leone Produce 
Marketing Board (SLPMB). De SLPMB kreeg een monopolie op de export 
van handelsgewassen en liet de opkoop over aan handelaren met een door 
de SLPMB verstrekte opkoopvergunning, de zogenaamde Licenced Buying 
Agents (LB A's). Om allerlei vormen van tussenhandel uit te schakelen was 
het alleen deze LBA's toegestaan koffie en cacao op te kopen. Zij moesten 
zorgen voor het transport van de gewassen naar de opslagruimtes van de 
SLPMB in Freetown. Om al te grote prijsfluctuaties te voorkomen waren 
de LBA's verplicht om de boeren de door de overheid vastgestelde 
producentenprijzen te betalen. 
Doordat de tekorten op de betalingsbalans aan het eind van de jaren 
tachtig steeds hoger opliepen, zag de Sierra Leonese overheid zich 
genoodzaakt bij de Wereldbank en het IMF leningen aan te gaan. 
Voorwaarde voor het verkrijgen van deze leningen was het introduceren 
van een structureel aanpassingsprogramma voor verschillende sectoren van 
de economie. Dit betekende onder meer dat tal van sectoren geprivatiseerd 
dienden te worden en dat de overheid haar aandelen in staatsbedrijven 
moest verkopen. Door de privatisering van de exportsector verloor de 
SLPMB haar exportmonopolie en moest ze gaan concurreren met 
particuliere handelsondernemingen. Deze veranderde situatie leidde er in 
1992 toe dat de SLPMB haar poorten sloot. Het monopolie van de SLPMB 
maakte plaats voor een oligopolie van slechts enkele grote particuliere 
handelsbedrijven. Ondanks de privatisering van de opkoop en de export van 
handelsgewassen, blijft het daarom de vraag of de producenten daadwerke-
lijk hebben kunnen profiteren van de hogere producentenprijzen, die het 
gevolg zouden zijn van de toenemende concurrentie bij de export van 
koffie en cacao. Bovendien is het de vraag of de privatisering voor de 
boeren tot betere productie- en verkoopomstandigheden heeft geleid. 
Het marktsysteem op regionaal niveau 
De infrastructuur in het onderzoeksgebied vormt vaak een obstakel voor 
regelmatig en betrouwbaar transport van goederen en personen. De meeste 
wegen zijn onverhard en in het regenseizoen nauwelijks begaanbaar voor 
voertuigen. Tal van dorpen zijn dan slechts te voet bereikbaar. Bovendien 
zijn er weinig transportfaciliteiten voor de producenten om hun producten 
naar de stedelijke handelscentra te brengen. Het openbaar vervoer wordt 
verzorgd door kleine vrachtauto's, zogenaamde poda-poda's, die onregel-
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matig langs komen en vaak slecht onderhouden zijn. In het regenseizoen, 
dat samenvalt met het opkoopseizoen voor cacao, worden de transportprij-
zen door de eigenaren van de poda-poda's sterk verhoogd. Dit wordt op 
sommige trajecten ook mogelijk gemaakt door het gebrek aan concurrentie. 
Tal van boeren zijn daardoor genoodzaakt hun producten lopend naar de 
stedelijke marktcentra te brengen. Om de verschillen in toegankelijkheid 
van de bezochte dorpen in ons onderzoeksgebied vast te stellen, hebben wij 
rekening gehouden met de absolute afstand tussen de dorpen en de 
stedelijke marktcentra, met de kwaliteit van de wegen en met de frequentie 
van de openbare vervoersmogelijkheden. 
Ondanks alle transportproblemen zijn de afstanden tussen de dorpen 
en de opkoopcentra in sommige gebieden midden jaren tachtig geringer 
geworden, en wel door een toename van het aantal opkooppunten buiten 
de stedelijke marktcentra. Deze toename is vooral te danken aan de 
activiteiten van CARE, een ontwikkelingsorganisatie die de afstand tussen 
producent en opkoper wilde verkleinen door de bouw van lokale opkoop-
centra, de Village Marketing Centers. Helaas is het echter zo dat verschil-
lende van die dorpscentra niet goed functioneren en dat er nog altijd veel 
dorpen zijn die zich niet in de buurt van een Village Marketing Center 
bevinden. 
Wat betreft de plaats waar de transacties tussen de handelaren en de 
producenten plaatsvonden, konden wij concluderen dat er in ons onder-
zoeksgebied geen noemenswaardige verschillen tussen de opkoopseizoenen 
1989/90 en 1991/92 zijn ontstaan. Een kleine meerderheid van alle 
transacties bleef plaatsvinden in de dorpen. Ook traden er geen veranderin-
gen op in de wijze van transport. Ongeveer tweederde van de boeren die 
hun producten buiten hun dorp verkochten, maakte geheel of gedeeltelijk 
gebruik van het openbaar vervoer. Ongeveer de helft van de producenten 
vervoerde de oogst geheel of gedeeltelijk te voet. 
De producenten van koffie en cacao kunnen bij verkoop in principe kiezen 
uit de volgende categorieën van handelaren: 
De regionale groothandelaren. Zij kopen koffie en cacao op in hun 
warenhuizen die zich in de stedelijke marktcentra bevinden. Om in de 
dorpen koffie en cacao op te kopen maken zij meestal gebruik van agenten. 
Voordat de handel geprivatiseerd werd, fungeerden de regionale groothan-
delaren als opkoopagenten van de SLPMB. Sinds de privatisering hebben 
sommigen van hen een vergunning voor directe export gekregen en 
verkopen de andere groothandelaren hun productie aan de hoogste bieder 
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onder de exporteurs. Een van de exporteurs is de Eastern Farmers Union, 
een coöperatieve organisatie. 
De lokale handelaren. Deze groep handelt in allerlei consumptiegoede-
ren en handelsgewassen vanuit hun opslagplaats of winkel in de kleinere 
steden of de wat grotere dorpen. De meesten werken als agent voor een 
van de regionale groothandelaren. Ze kopen de koffie en de cacao op in de 
omgeving van hun woonplaats en verschaffen de boeren daarbij op 
voorhand krediet. 
De kleine rondtrekkende handelaren. De kleine ambulante handelaren 
vormen de grootste groep opkopers en zijn tevens de verkopers van allerlei 
artikelen die de plattelandsbevolking dagelijks nodig heeft. Ze kopen lang 
niet altijd koffie en cacao op, maar doen dat voorzover hun bedrijfskapitaal 
dat toelaat. Sommigen, vaak vaste klanten van grotere handelaren, kunnen 
zich van informele voorfinanciering door lokale of zelfs regionale 
handelaren verzekeren. Weer anderen investeren het kapitaal dat zij uit de 
diamantmijnbouw hebben verkregen in de koffie- en cacaohandel. 
Vergeleken met de lokale en de regionale handelaren is de omvang van 
hun handel echter vrij beperkt. Voor velen is het een manier om het 
inkomen uit de landbouw en de mijnbouw aan te vullen. 
Sinds de privatisering van het marktsysteem voor koffie en cacao zijn er 
twee veranderingen opgetreden in de relatie producent-opkoper. De eerste 
is dat de producenten nu de mogelijkheid hebben om hun gewassen direct 
aan een exporteur te verkopen, met alle mogelijke prijsvoordelen vandien. 
De tweede verandering is dat de concurrentie tussen de onderscheiden 
typen handelaren op dorpsniveau groter is geworden. Naast de talloze 
kleine rondtrekkende handelaren, proberen nu ook steeds meer lokale 
handelaren en handelaren uit de stedelijke centra, die agent zijn van 
groothandelaren en particuliere exporteurs, een graantje mee te pikken. 
Bovendien vormen in sommige chiefdoms de coöperaties, die met steun van 
lokale opkoopagenten Village Marketing Centers beheren, geduchte 
concurrenten voor de andere lokale handelaren. Ondanks deze beide 
veranderingen komt veel koffie en cacao nog steeds via meerdere 
tussenhandelaren uiteindelijk bij de exporteur terecht, wat betekent dat er 
niet erg veel veranderd is sinds de afschaffing van het door de overheid 
gecontroleerde systeem. Gevolg is dat de producent lagere prijzen ontvangt 
dan mogelijk zou zijn. 
Belangrijker is het feit dat, ondanks de zojuist besproken veranderin-
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gen, de meeste betalingen nog steeds niet plaatsvinden op basis van de 
gangbare producentenprijzen ten tijde van de transactie. Bij het onderzoek 
naar de hoogte van de betalingen hebben we drie soorten producentenprij-
zen onderscheiden: 
Maximum producentenprijzen. Dit zijn de hoogste prijzen die in de 
stedelijke marktcentra betaald worden door de belangrijkste exporteurs van 
koffie en cacao aan de overige handelaren en aan producenten. Als gevolg 
van de onderlinge concurrentie tussen de exporteurs, verschillen deze 
maximum producentenprijzen weinig. 
Minimum producentenprijzen. Dit zijn de prijzen die in de stedelijke 
marktcentra betaald worden door de groothandelaren zonder exportvergun-
ning. Deze prijzen liggen enigszins beneden de maximum producentenprij-
zen, omdat groothandelaren zonder exportvergunning rekening moeten 
houden met onkosten, winstmarges en de maximum producentenprijzen die 
de exporteurs bereid zijn aan hen te betalen. 
Dorpsprijzen. Dit zijn de gemiddelde producentenprijzen die de lokale 
handelaren en de kleine rondtrekkende handelaren in de dorpen zouden 
moeten betalen aan de producenten, rekening houdend met onkosten en 
winstmarges. Deze onkosten en winstmarges kunnen sterk verschillen per 
handelaar. Daarom hebben wij gemiddelde dorpsprijzen berekend, op basis 
van de informatie die verzameld werd onder producenten, lokale handelaren 
en rondtrekkende handelaren. Gemiddeld lagen deze dorpsprijzen 20 
Leones per pound onder het niveau van de minimum producentenprijzen. 
Op basis van de informatie, die wij verzameld hebben over de werkelijke 
bedragen die de handelaren aan de producenten betaalden, konden wij het 
volgende vaststellen. Ondanks de toenemende concurrentie tussen de 
verschillende typen handelaren, ontvingen de meeste producenten niet de 
prijs voor hun koffie en cacao waar zij recht op hadden, gegeven de 
vigerende maximum of minimum producentenprijs in de steden, of de 
minimum producentenprijs of dorpsprijs in de dorpen. Zowel in de 
stedelijke marktcentra, als in de dorpen, zijn het onzorgvuldig wegen en het 
gebruik van inaccurate weegschalen nog altijd meer regel dan uitzondering. 
Bovendien maken tal van handelaren, al dan niet opzettelijk, verkeerde 
berekeningen van het uit te betalen bedrag. Slechts 9% van de producenten 
die, in het opkoopseizoen 1992/93 hun oogst in een van de stedelijke 
marktcentra verkocht, ontving ook werkelijk het bedrag dat overeenkwam 
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met de aangeboden hoeveelheid en met de maximum producentenprijs op 
het moment van de transactie. In 1990/91, het laatste door de overheid 
gecontroleerde opkoopseizoen, slaagde nog 30% van de producenten erin 
om de maximum producentenprijs te ontvangen. Hierbij dient vermeld te 
worden dat de maximum producentenprijs toen gelijk was aan de van 
overheidswege vastgestelde producentenprijs. 
Voor de producenten die in hun dorp of in een nabijgelegen dorp 
koffie of cacao verkochten, was de minimum producentenprijs het hoogst 
haalbare. Het bleek dat in het seizoen 1990/91, 25% van deze groep de 
officiële producentenprijs ontving. In het opkoopseizoen 1992/93 was dat 
nog slechts 18%. 
Veel handelaren, vooral de rondtrekkende kleine handelaren, zijn niet 
in staat om de minimum producentenprijzen te betalen, omdat velen van 
hen zelf slechts de minimum producentenprijs uitbetaald krijgen. Van hen 
zou echter wel verwacht mogen worden dat zij de producenten de 
gemiddelde dorpsprijs betalen. De realiteit is anders. In het opkoopseizoen 
1992/93 ontving maar liefst 62% van alle producenten op het moment van 
de transactie minder dan de dorpsprijs. In het opkoopseizoen 1990/91 was 
dat 57%. 
De producenten die gedroogde en gepelde koffiebonen in de dorpen 
verkochten hadden meer kans om ten minste de dorpsprijs of de minimum 
producentenprijs te ontvangen dan de verkopers van cacaobonen. In 
tegenstelling tot het opkoopseizoen voor koffie, valt het opkoopseizoen 
voor cacao samen met het hongerseizoen (of regenseizoen). Dit is de 
periode dat de boeren door hun rijstvoorraad raken en krediet nodig hebben 
om rijst bij te kunnen kopen. Dit krediet, nu, wordt meestal verkregen op 
voorwaarde dat de schuldenaar zijn cacao aan de schuldeisers tegen een 
lagere producentenprijs verkoopt. Ongunstig is ook dat de wegen in het 
hongerseizoen slecht begaanbaar, aangezien dit een negatief effect heeft op 
de prijzen die handelaren willen betalen. 
Ook de producenten die genoodzaakt zijn hun koffie in onbewerkte 
vorm te verkopen, dus als gedroogde bessen, hebben minder kans om ten 
minste de dorpsprijs te ontvangen. De handelaar moet dan zelf voor verdere 
behandeling zorgen. Bovendien worden koffiebessen nauwelijks gewogen 
en worden de producenten per zak uitbetaald. 
De grootste kans om tenminste de minimum producentenprijs te 
ontvangen bleken de koffie- en cacaoboeren te hebben wanneer zij hun 
producten verkochten in een van de opkoopcentra van een coöperatie. De 
geringste kans om tenminste de minimum producentenprijs te ontvangen 
hadden de producenten die hun gewas aan rondtrekkende kleine handelaren 
verkochten. Zelfs wanneer men van de dorpsprijzen uitgaat, bleken de 
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rondtrekkende kleine handelaren de minst voordelige handelspartner voor 
de producenten te zijn. Vastgesteld kon worden dat tijdens het laatste door 
de overheid gecontroleerde opkoopseizoen, bij 72% van de transacties met 
kleine handelaren, aan de producenten minder dan de gangbare gemiddelde 
dorpsprijs werd betaald. Sinds de privatisering is dit nog altijd bij 68% van 
de transacties het geval. 
Het verkoopgedrag van de koffie- en cacaoproducenten 
De producenten die in staat waren om hun producten in de stedelijke 
handelscentra te verkopen aan particuliere exporteurs, groothandelaren 
zonder exportvergunning of aan coöperaties, maakten - zoals vermeld - de 
meeste kans om een bedrag te ontvangen dat gelijk was aan de maximum 
producentenprijs of deze het meest benaderde. Toch verkocht in beide 
opkoopseizoenen maar liefst tweederde van de geïnterviewde boeren hun 
koffie of cacao in de dorpen. Slechts een minderheid besloot of was in 
staat de productie in de stedelijke handelscentra te verkopen, verwachtend 
hiervoor ten minste de minimum producentenprijs betaald te krijgen. 
Bovendien was het zo dat 40% van alle producenten in het seizoen 1990/91 
hun productie aan kleine rondtrekkende handelaren verkocht. Ondanks het 
feit dat deze kleine handelaren sinds de privatisering meer concurrentie 
hebben gekregen van handelaren uit de steden, verkocht nog steeds 35% 
van alle producenten hun productie aan de kleine handelaren. Blijkbaar 
waren maar weinig producenten in staat om in de dorpen een andere 
handelspartner te kiezen of besloten ze trouw te blijven aan hun traditionele 
afnemer. Veel producenten bleken ook niet op de hoogte te zijn van de 
hogere prijzen die uitbetaald werden in de lokale opkoopcentra, de Village 
Marketing Centers. 
Bij de keuze van een afnemer speelden, naast de verschillende prijsniveaus, 
in het algemeen de volgende factoren een rol: 
\)De toegankelijkheid van de dorpen en de afstand tot de stedelijke 
marktcentra. De producenten die in veraf gelegen en slecht toegankelijke 
dorpen woonden verkochten hun handelsgewassen vaker in hun eigen dorp 
of in een nabijgelegen dorp dan de producenten die in de buurt van een 
stedelijk marktcentrum woonden. Vooral in het opkoopseizoen voor cacao 
beperkt de toenemende afstand tussen stad en dorp de keuze van een 
afnemer. Hoewel in het seizoen 1992/93 een kleine toename te constateren 
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viel van het aantal transacties dat in de dorpen plaatsvond, betekende dit 
nog niet dat de handelsmogelijkheden voor de producenten verslechterden. 
Integendeel, deze toename kan voor een groot deel verklaard worden door 
het groeiende aantal normaal functionerende Village Marketing Centers, 
waar de boeren meer dan de gemiddelde dorpsprijzen kunnen ontvangen. 
2) De hoeveelheid te verkopen koffie of cacao. Uit het onderzoek bleek 
dat boeren met kleine hoeveelheden cacao of koffie vaker besloten hun 
gewassen in hun eigen of een nabijgelegen dorp te verkopen dan degenen 
die grotere hoeveelheden hadden aan te bieden. In het eerste geval drukken 
de transportkosten zwaarder op de totale opbrengst dan in het laatste. De 
verkoop van gedroogde koffiebessen vindt, ongeacht de hoeveelheid, 
hoofdzakelijk in de dorpen plaats. De bijkomende verwerkingskosten en de 
transportkosten drukken te zwaar op de uiteindelijk opbrengst om elders 
afnemers te zoeken. 
3) Aangegane schulden. De meeste geïnterviewde boeren waren 
leningen aangegaan die terug betaald dienden te worden. De meerderheid 
had de leningen verkregen onder de voorwaarde dat zij deze zouden 
aflossen via de verkoop van koffie of cacao aan de kredietverschaffer. De 
kleine rondtrekkende handelaren waren degenen van wie het gemakkelijkst 
door de boeren krediet verkregen kon worden. De producenten die geen 
lening hadden afgesloten bleken vaker een regionale groothandelaar als 
afnemer te kiezen dan de producenten die verplichtingen bij een lokale 
kredietverschaffer waren aangegaan. Vooral de kleine boeren bleken vaak 
met handen en voeten aan hun schuldeiser te zijn gebonden. Zij zagen bij 
het aflossen van hun schulden vaak hun gehele opbrengst verloren gaan. De 
grotere producenten ondervonden veel minder beperkingen. Zij konden 
vaak gemakkelijker gebruik maken van andere kredietverschaffers, zoals 
regionale handelaren. Hoewel ook deze grotere boeren verplicht waren hun 
schulden af te lossen via de verkoop van koffie of cacao, ontvingen zij 
doorgaans hogere prijzen en kon een deel van de productie daardoor aan 
een handelaar van eigen keuze worden verkocht. 
4) Onderwijs. Uit ons onderzoek bleek dat de boeren die enigerlei 
onderwijs hadden genoten, vaker hun productie aan groothandelaren of aan 
coöperaties verkochten dan boeren die nauwelijks onderwijs hadden 
genoten. Vooral de jongere boeren bleken meer ontwikkeling te hebben. 
5) Sociale relaties tussen producent en handelaar. Vanwege familie-
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banden waren de boeren vaak gedwongen om hun productie aan een 
bepaalde handelaar te verkopen. Ook vriendschapsrelaties beïnvloedden 
echter de keuze van een afnemer, ongeacht de prijs die deze bereid was te 
betalen. Tal van producenten vinden het hebben van een sterke vriend-
schapsband met een handelaar belangrijk voor het geval ze in financiële 
moeilijkheden komen te verkeren en een helpende hand nodig hebben. 
Van alle redenen die de producenten opnoemden om hun al dan niet 
vrijwillige keuze van een handelspartner te motiveren, vormen de sociale 
relaties en de kredietrelaties met handelaren de meest genoemde redenen. 
Wanneer echter alle verklaringen die door de producenten voor hun 
verkoopgedrag werden gegeven, geaggregeerd zouden worden in, enerzijds, 
sociaal gemotiveerde beslissingen en, anderzijds, economisch gemotiveerde 
beslissingen, dan blijkt tweederde van alle verklaringen op de een of andere 
wijze van economische aard te zijn. 
Beleidsaanbevelingen 
Om de positie van de koffie- en cacaoproducenten op de afzetmarkt te 
verbeteren zullen diverse maatregelen moeten worden getroffen. 
1 ) Er dient meer controle te komen op het wegen van koffie en cacao, 
op de prijsberekening en op de uitbetalingspraktijken van de handelaren. 
Deze controle zou ter hand genomen kunnen worden door het Ministerie 
van Landbouw, dat voorheen ook toezicht hield op de kwaliteit van koffie 
en cacao. Voorwaarde is dan wel dat de afdeling die zich bezig hield met 
de kwaliteitscontrole gereorganiseerd wordt en dat voldoende geschoold 
personeel en hulpmiddelen ter beschikking worden gesteld om corruptie te 
voorkomen. 
2) Het inzicht in en de kennis van het marktsysteem dienen te worden 
verbeterd door het verzorgen van volwassenenonderwijs in de eigen 
woonomgeving. De boeren zullen hierbij in de eerste plaats bewust 
gemaakt moeten worden van hun marginale positie binnen het marktsys-
teem en meer inzicht moeten krijgen in de oorzaken van de matige 
beloning die zij voor hun handelsgewassen krijgen. Ook zouden zij 
geïnformeerd moeten worden over de verschillende typen handelaren en de 
lokaties waar deze handelaren gewassen plegen op te kopen. Vervolgens 
zou het onderwijs zich meer specifiek kunnen richten op enkele vormen 
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van elementair rekenen, zoals het leren wegen van gewassen en het 
berekenen van de waarde van de productie volgens de gangbare producen-
tenprijzen, alsook op het leren omgaan met rekenmachientjes. Voorts zal 
vanzelfsprekend een betere kennis van de vigerende marktprijzen voor 
koffie en cacao de onderhandelingspositie van de producenten ten goede 
komen. Het is van belang dat deze vorm van onderwijs nauw aansluit bij 
de wensen en behoeften van de producenten. Inmiddels zijn al verschillen-
de lokale NGO's actief die het vertrouwen van de lokale bevolking hebben 
gewonnen en nauw samenwerken met dorpsgemeenschappen om de 
levensomstandigheden te verbeteren. Deze lokale NGO's zijn, mogelijk met 
steun van de coöperaties, het meest geschikte kanaal om bedoeld onderwijs 
te verzorgen. 
3) Er moet ook aandacht worden besteed aan onderwijs en training van 
de handelaren, in het bijzonder van de kleine rondtrekkende handelaren. 
Het merendeel van de transacties vindt immers plaats met deze groep van 
opkopers. Bovendien blijken de producenten de minste kans op correcte 
betaling te hebben indien zij hun productie aan een kleine handelaar 
verkopen. Lang niet altijd is hierbij van opzettelijke onderbetaling sprake. 
In feite zijn tal van kleine handelaren niet op de hoogte van de maximum 
producentenprijzen of van de ontwikkeling van de producentenprijzen 
tijdens het opkoopseizoen. Bovendien zijn ze alleen bekend met het wegen 
van koffie en cacao met behulp van onnauwkeurige middelen, zoals 
verschillende soorten pannen en containers. Net zoals de producenten, 
missen ook de kleine handelaren de nodige marktkennis wanneer zij de 
opgekochte koffie en cacao weer doorverkopen aan een lokale handelaar 
of groothandelaar. Daarom dient het beleid niet zozeer gericht te worden 
op het uitschakelen van de grote groep van kleine tussenhandelaren. 
Integendeel, het dient gericht te worden op het beter laten functioneren van 
deze groep. Dit geldt temeer daar de kleine handelaren een belangrijke 
sociale functie binnen de lokale gemeenschap vervullen. Het uitschakelen 
van hen als opkoper van handelsgewassen zou belangrijke negatieve 
gevolgen hebben voor de informele kredietverlening. 
4) Voorts moet er aandacht besteed worden aan het verbeteren van de 
toegankelijkheid van de dorpen en de opkoopcentra. De plannen tot 
decentralisatie van de opkoopcentra dienen gestimuleerd en ondersteund te 
worden. Bovendien kan de toegankelijkheid vergroot worden door 
verbetering van de wegen. Dit zal de betrouwbaarheid en de regelmaat van 
het openbaar vervoer ten goede komen. Er zal echter wel controle op de 
transportprijzen van het openbaar vervoer uitgeoefend moeten worden. 
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Verbetering van de kwaliteit van de wegen zal er ook toe leiden dat de 
groothandelaren meer zullen gaan opkopen in de dorpen. 
Een voorbeeld uit de praktijk kan duidelijk maken waarop gelet moet 
worden. De Village Marketing Centers zijn lokale opkoopcentra die door de 
lokale bevolking gebouwd zijn, met behulp van CARE, een internationale 
ontwikkelingsorganisatie De doelstelling van CARE was de boeren de 
gelegenheid te geven hun koffie en cacao in hun eigen of in een nabij 
gelegen dorp te verkopen aan een handelaar, die door de producenten was 
uitgekozen om het opkoopcenlmm te beheren. Het bestuur en de controle 
over het opkoopcentrum moest in handen komen van de lokale gemeenschap. 
Na een veelbelovende start, bleken veel Marketing Centers te kampen te 
hebben met afnemende hoeveelheden opgekochte koffie en cacao Vooral de 
opkoopcentra die niet beheerd werden door een c/nejuom-cooperatie hadden 
problemen om voldoende handelskapitaal te vergaren De achterliggende 
oorzaken waren de volgende-
- Na het organiseren van de bouw van de opkoopcenira, heeft CARE te 
weinig aandacht geschonken aan hel beheer van de Marketing Centers; 
- CARE besteedde nauwelijks aandacht aan het verzoek van de lokale 
gemeenschap om voor voldoende handelskapitaal te zorgen of om te 
assisteren bij het vinden van een betrouwbare en voldoende kapitaalkrachtige 
handelaar, 
- Het ontbreken van kredietvoorzieningen in de meeste opkoopcentra 
belemmerde die opkoopcentra om te concurreren met handelaren die wel 
krediet konden verlenen 
Alleen de Marketing Centers die in handen waren van een chiefdom-
cooperaüe functioneerden naar behoren In deze opkoopcentra werden aan de 
producenten de geldende minimum producentenprijzen betaald. Dit laatste 
was niet altijd het geval in de opkoopcenira die werden beheerd door lokale 
agenten van exporteurs, groothandelaren of zelfs kleine handelaren. 
Bovendien konden de leden van de cooperaüe zonodig krediet verkrijgen m 
de door de cooperaüe beheerde Marketing Centers. Om ook de andere 
Marketing Centers naar behoren te laten functioneren zou overdracht van het 
beheer naar een cAii/dom-coöperatie een oplossing kunnen zijn. 
5) De productiviteit van de koffie- en cacaoplantages zal eveneens 
verhoogd dienen te worden. Een hogere productiviteit zal niet alleen het 
inkomen van de boeren verbeteren, maar zal indirect ook leiden tot een 
vermindering van de transportproblemen Voor producenten van grote 
hoeveelheden koffie of cacao drukken de transportkosten immers minder 
zwaar op de totale opbrengst dan voor producenten met kleine hoeveelhe-
den. Ter verbetering van de productie en de productiviteit zijn voorlichting 
en training van de koffie- en cacaoboeren essentieel. De nadruk zal hierbij 
moeten liggen op het onderhouden van de bestaande aanplantingen Uit ons 
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onderzoek werd duidelijk dat een deel van de boeren vanwege gebrek aan 
kapitaal en mankracht niet in staat was de bestaande aanplantingen volledig 
te onderhouden en de productie geheel te oogsten. Toch breidden zij hun 
plantages uit en wel om op die manier land af te bakenen dat in de 
toekomst door hun kinderen gebruikt kan worden. Deze uitbreiding ging 
vaak ten koste van vruchtbare, voor rijstbouw geschikte grond. Een en 
ander maakt duidelijk dat er een zeker evenwicht gevonden zal moeten 
worden tussen enerzijds een beleid dat gericht is op een verbeterde eigen 
voedselvoorziening, met name voor wat betreft rijst, en anderzijds een 
beleid dat gericht is op verbetering van het inkomen door middel verhoging 
van de opbrengsten in de bestaande plantages. De boeren moeten ervan 
overtuigd worden dat het steeds maar uitbreiden van de aanplant contra-
productief werkt en aandacht voor de bestaande plantages voorrang moet 
krijgen. De scholing zal daarom voornamelijk gericht moeten worden op 
het verbeteren van de onderhoudsmethoden van de koffie- en cacaobomen. 
Het onderricht zou gecombineerd moeten worden met voorlichting over 
methoden ter verbetering van de rijst- en groentenverbouw, teneinde een 
zo efficiënt mogelijk gebruik van kapitaal en arbeidskrachten te maken. 
6) Er zullen stappen moeten worden ondernomen om "ongezonde" 
vriendschapsrelaties tussen producenten en handelaren overbodig te maken. 
Dit houdt in dat de boeren bekend zullen moeten zijn met de hogere 
prijzen die andere typen handelaren bieden. Hogere prijzen voor koffie en 
cacao verminderen de noodzaak van leningen. In ons onderzoeksgebied 
bleek dat de coöperaties relatief hoge prijzen betaalden. Het moet de 
boeren duidelijk worden dat het voordelig is om hun koffie en cacao aan 
die coöperaties te verkopen. De coöperaties moeten de boeren op dit vlak 
voorlichten, zij moeten hun prijzen aan alle boeren bekend maken en zij 
moeten ook de andere voordelen van coöperatief lidmaatschap onder de 
aandacht brengen. 
7) Het coöperatiewezen moet worden gestimuleerd. Uit de tot nu toe 
gedane aanbevelingen zal duidelijk zijn geworden dat wij de organisatie 
van boeren in coöperaties belangrijk vinden. Deze organisaties zijn niet 
alleen nuttig voor concrete activiteiten, zoals onderwijs. Zij zijn ook 
belangrijk, omdat boerenorganisaties instrumenten voor bewustwording 
zijn. De boeren zullen echter zelf de voordelen van samenwerking moeten 
zien en herkennen. Doorslaggevend voor het succes van coöperaties is hun 
toegang tot exportmarkten en kredieten of voor-financiering, omdat de 
leden dan hogere prijzen kunnen ontvangen en de mogelijkheid hebben om 
leningen af te sluiten. 
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Omdat wij dit punt zo belangrijk vinden, gaan we wat uitgebreider in op een 
voorbeeld uit de praktijk. De coöperatieve beweging in Sierra Leone is in het 
verleden nauwelijks succesvol geweest Gebrek aan vertrouwen van de leden 
in een van bovenaf opgelegde en weinig democratische organisatiestructuur 
leidde, samen met de bestaande corruptie binnen de coöperatiebesturen, tot 
het einde van de coöperatieve beweging in de jaren zestig Tijdens een 
workshop in 1980 over de oorzaken van het falen van de coöperatieve 
beweging in het verleden, werd duidelijk dat een coöperaue gedoemd is te 
mislukken, indien de toekomstige leden niet bij de besluitvorming omtrent 
organisatie en beleid worden betrokken Op basis van de behoeften en 
wensen van de toekomstige leden, werd de coöperaties op chiefdomiuveau 
nieuw leven ingeblazen De coöperaties moesten hun leden een pakket van 
diensten kunnen leveren, zoals inputs ter verhoging van de productiviteit in 
de landbouw, de verkoop van consumptiegoederen (voornamelijk njst), 
krediet en faciliteiten voor het opslaan, verwerken en verhandelen van 
agrarische producten De eerste nieuwe coöperatie werd de Nongowa Co 
operative Growers and Marketing Association, kortweg ook wel de Nongowa 
Growers genaamd, gevestigd in Nongowa Chiefdom Hun belangrijkste 
doelstellingen zijn 
- de tussenhandel uitschakelen en de hoogst mogelijke producentenprijs aan 
de leden bieden, 
- de leden voorzien van agrarische inputs en consumptiegoederen, 
- de leden voorzien van krediet, 
- het geven van onderwijs en training aan de leden, en 
- het vertegenwoordigen van de leden 
De Nongowa Growers houden zich voornamelijk bezig met het 
opkopen, transporteren en verhandelen van koffie en cacao Daarvoor hebben 
zij verschillende opkoopcenira gevestigd, verspreid over het gehele chiefdom. 
Verder houden zij zich, in mindere male, bezig met de verkoop van njst en 
consumptiegoederen en met het verstrekken van leningen aan de leden Een 
gevaar voor de toekomst van de coöperatie vormt de hoge winstmarge die 
nodig is om de organisatie draaiende te houden Om de marketingkosten 
enigszins te drukken hebben zij, met andere сЛ/е/Уот-cooperaties, een 
Coöperatieve Unie opgericht Daarin zijn de cW/dom-cobperaties vertegen-
woordigd Deze Unie zou, met name op het gebied van de opkoop en de 
export van koffie en cacao, efficiënter en concurrerender kunnen werken 
Dergelijke nog vnj jonge coöperaties verdienen vooral in de beginfase 
ondersteuning om uil te kunnen groeien tot organisaties die aan producenten 
een belere onderhandelingspositie verschaffen Contacten met fair-trade 
organisaties kunnen ervoor zorgen dat deze coöperaties in de beginfase over 
voldoende kapitaal beschikken en betrouwbare handelspartners vinden in de 
imponerende landen 
8) Tot slot zullen maatregelen genomen moeten worden om de toegang 
van kleine boeren tot de diverse kredietfaciliteiten te verbeteren In deze 
studie hebben wij daarvoor een aanzet gegeven door een model te 
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presenteren, waann formele en informele kredietverschaffers aan elkaar 
gekoppeld worden 
Landbouwkrediet wordt gezien als een belangrijk ontwikkelingsinstrument 
De laatste decennia werd dan ook veel kapitaal in agrarische kredietprogram-
ma's en -projecten gestoken, zonder dat deze ovengens erg succesvol zijn 
geweest Deze kredietprogramma's zijn te beschouwen als een vorm van 
formeel krediet en vergelijkbaar met het krediet dat beschikbaar komt via 
institutionele kanalen, zoals banken, officiële ontwikkelingsprogramma's of 
staatsorganisaties Al deze formele kredietverschaffers blijken slecht in staat 
om de boeren te bereiken, reden waarom tal van formele kredietverschaffers 
niet eens (meer) aan agrarische kredietprojecten beginnen Meer effect heeft 
tot nu toe het informele of niet-geinstitutionahseerde krediet gehad, het wordt 
geleverd door familieleden, vnenden, commerciële geldleners en handelaren 
Ook lokale spaar- en kredietgroepen worden beschouwd als informele 
kredietverschaffers. Informele leningen worden onder meer gekenmerkt door 
korte terugbetahngspenodes, kleine bedragen en gemakkelijke verkrijgbaar-
heid Een en ander maakt informeel krediet aantrekkelijk en goed toegesne-
den op de behoeften van de kredietnemers Vaak is er echter onvoldoende 
kapitaal om de kredietbehoeften via deze informele weg te dekken Het lijkt 
ons daarom logisch dat er geprobeerd wordt om de formele en de informele 
kredietverschaffers aan elkaar te koppelen en wel op een zodanige wijze dat 
de sterke kanten van beide vormen benut worden 
In het door ons voorgestelde model knjgt de formele kredietverschaffer 
een niet zo dominante rol, omdat de eigenlijk kredietverstrekking wordt 
overgelaten aan informele groepen die als intermediair fungeren tussen de 
formele kredietverschaffers en de boeren De keuze van deze informele 
groepen is daarom cruciaal Ze verkrijgen hun middelen van formele 
kredietverschaffers De informele groepen moeien al ervaring opgedaan 
hebben met het verstrekken van leningen, liefst ook met het genereren van 
spaargelden 
Gerrelsen en Seilies (1989) ontwikkelden een soort gewogen index om 
lokale spaar- en kredietgroepen te selecteren, waarvan verwacht mag worden 
dat zij succesvol kunnen functioneren als intermediair tussen formele 
kredietverschaffers en boeren Zaken die in deze index aandacht krijgen zijn 
de organisatiestructuur van de groep, lidmaatschap en contributie, groepsacti-
viteiten en groepsgeschiedems Hel model, zoals hier beschreven, probeert de 
ervaring van lokale groepen met kredietverschaffing te benutten Deze 
groepen kennen hun cliënten en zijn geworteld in de lokale context Ze zijn 
daarom hel best gekwalificeerd om potentiele leners te informeren over 
kredietvoorwaarden die zijn aangepast aan de lokale situatie. Voor de boeren 
betekent dit meer concreet dat zij niet meer naar grotere plaatsen behoeven 
te gaan om leningen ie verkrijgen en dat zij de krediet-funcuonanssen 
persoonlijk kennen, waardoor de drempel voor het verkrijgen van krediet 
relatief laag is De formele kredietverschaffer stelt in hel genoemde model, 
in overleg met de gekozen intermediair, de voorwaarden voor de levering van 
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de kredielfondsen vast. De intermediaire groep is echter autonoom in het 
vaststellen van de voorwaarden bij het verder uitlenen van deze fondsen aan 
de boeren. 
Door dit kredietmodel toe ie passen, kan er meer kapitaal beschikbaar 
komen voor de agrarische sector in het algemeen en de koffie- en cacaopro-
ductie in het bijzonder. Resultaat zal zijn dat de koffie- en cacaoproducenten 
een grotere kans krijgen om hun productie te verkopen aan de handelaar van 
hun keuze. De uitvoering van deze alternatieve vorm van kredietverlening 
draagt, met andere woorden, bij aan de inkomensverbetering van veel kleine 
koffie- en cacaoboeren. 
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Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift: 
WHO PAYS THE PRICE? 
The Production and Marketing of Coffee and Cocoa 
in Sierra Leone under Structural Adjustment 
Nijmegen, 23 januari 1997 
Frank Sellies en Jos Wanders 
I 
De coöperaties die in de jaren vijftig en zestig in Afrika ontstonden waren 
voorbeelden van een "top-down" benadering. Deze benadering leidde tot de 
ineenstorting van veel coöperaties, omdat de leden niet betrokken waren geweest 
bij de opzet. Echter, deze ineenstorting betekent niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat de 
basisideeën achter coöperaties onjuist zijn. Hoewel de implementatie vaak 
desastreus was, verdienen de ideeën gepaste aandacht. 
II 
Het feit dat Max Havelaar een minimale, eerlijke prijs voor koffie en cacao 
garandeert aan coöperaties wil nog niet zeggen dat alle coöperaties altijd een 
minimale, eerlijke prijs garanderen aan hun leden. 
III 
De mogelijkheden voor boeren om krediet te verkrijgen kunnen aanzienlijk 
verbeteren, wanneer de suggestie om informele en formele kredietverschaffers 
aan elkaar te koppelen serieus zal worden genomen. 
IV 
In plaats van het scholen van boeren in het Engelse gewichtensysteem, in het 
gebruik van zakcalculators en in "basic numeracy" valt te overwegen om koffie 
en cacao in volume, in plaats van gewicht te meten. Boeren kunnen volume-
eenbeden zelf lellen, terwijl ze weegschalen niet kunnen "lezen". 
ν 
De academische discussie over staatsinterventie versus vrijhandel heeft dikke 
boeken opgeleverd. Helaas heeft deze discussie niets opgeleverd voor de kleine 
koffie- en cacaoboeren. 
VI 
Bij een verdere marginalisering van het boerenbestaan in Sub-Sahara Afrika, 
wordt de uitspraak dal "Mankind's options for avoiding catastrophy are decrea­
sing, while delays in implementing the options are, quite literally, deadly" steeds 
meer bewaarheid. 
Abdul Крапа Ghandi, Agricultural Officer, Kenema, Sierra Leone (1983). 
VII 
De betrouwbaarheid van wetenschappelijk onderzoek in het zuidoosten van Sierra 
Leone neemt toe wanneer onderzoekers rekening houden met de volgende uit­
spraak: "Kuku-jumuku, moa-muhu, moa-muhu ngor-ngor", ofwel: "Alleen wij die 
tot de groep behoren, kennen de geheimen van de groep" (Mende gezegde). 
VIII 
Als men wil bewijzen dat boeren door de Structurele Aanpassings Programma's 
hogere prijzen voor hun - Robusta - koffie ontvangen, moet men daarvoor niet 
de wereldmarktprijzen voor Arabica koffie gebruiken. 
IX 
De moeite die promovendi doen om te worden opgenomen in de rubriek "Stellin­
gen" van het NRC Handelsblad gaat ten koste van hun proefschrift ("opportunity 
costs of effort"). Ofwel de betreffende rubriek, ofwel het formuleren van 
stellingen dient terstond te worden afgeschaft. 
X 
Voor veel KUN medewerkers betekent het moment waarop het KUNieuws over 
de campus verspreid is de definitieve aankondiging van het weekeinde. Teneinde 
de secundaire arbeidsvoorwaarden voor de betreffende medewerkers niet verder 
te verslechteren, verdient het aanbeveling de verspreiding van dit periodiek 
voortaan nimmer meer op vrijdagen, doch immer op donderdagen te laten 
plaatsvinden. 

From the 1970s onwards, structural adjustment programmes were 
increasingly seen as an ¡mportrant solution to stop economic decline in 
developing countries. The liberalization and the privatization of the marketing 
of export crops formed often a crucial part of these programmes. 
This study reveals for Sierra Leone whether the liberalization and the privatization 
of the marketing system for coffee and cocoa indeed led to economic progress. 
It discloses that the production and marketing conditions for farmers did not 
improve under structural adjustment, hence, did not lead to higher prices and 
incomes. 
The authors show, on the basis of comprehensive fieldwork, that it is 
insufficient to liberalize and privatize the marketing system for coffee and cocoa. 
In order to create better production and marketing conditions for farmers, 
complementary measures are necessary, for example, in the field of farmers' 
organization, education and credit. These are given appropriate attention in 
this work. 
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